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Africa Quarterly

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AFRICA QUARTERLY

A Journal Of African Affairs

Vol. VI

April-June 1966

No. 1

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Note to Contributors

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AFRICA QUARTERLY

(A Journal of African Affairs)

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AFRICA QUARTERLY is published in January, April, July and October every year.

AFRICA QUARTERLY is devoted to a study and objective understanding of African affairs. It publishes contributions from outstanding writers, experts and specialists on various political, economic, social, cultural and literary subjects of interest to the people of Africa. Apart from these, it carries documentation on different specialised African subjects.

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Subscription (*in India*) : Rs. 10 per annum

Subscription (*Foreign*) ; £ 1. 10sh. or \$ 5

Single Copy : Rs. 3

Single Copy : 9sh. or \$ 1.50

Edited, published and printed by S. A. Mehdi for the Indian Council for Africa
at the New India Press, New Delhi.

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Constitutional Progress in Malawi

BRIDGLAL PACHAI

THE annual convention of the Malawi Congress Party held in 1965 at Lilongwe (capital of the Central Province and the town chosen to be the country's new capital) was more than a yearly stocktaking of the progress achieved by the party in its programme of nation-building. It had before it two main tasks : to decide upon a Republican constitution for Malawi and choose the party's candidate for the Presidency.

Of these, as a local newspaper commented editorially a day after the conference opened, the second was "a manifestly simpler task since people of all races in this country will welcome the nomination of the Prime Minister, Dr. Banda, as the country's head of state next July."¹ The first task was not as simple or as clear-cut as the second. The conference had not only to evaluate the constitutional changes which had taken place but also chart out a new constitution which would give expression to the people's desire for a Republican constitution for the greater good of the country.

Before the Republican Constitution of 1965 is considered, it will be useful to review the developments of the past 20 years. Nyasaland passed through two important phases in her constitutional advance. The years 1945 and 1960 had special significance for Nyasaland and the continent. In 1945 the Convention of Associations in Nyasaland submitted proposals for constitutional changes by which the Legislative Council would have a Governor and 22 members— 10 official and therefore Europeans, two Asians, one coloured, three Africans, and two representatives of agriculture and commerce who would in practice be Europeans. The strength of the respective race groups in the Legislative Council would be :

<i>RACE</i>	<i>PROPORTION</i> (including Go- vernor)	<i>PERCENTAGE</i> (including Go- vernor)
European	17/23	74
Asian	2/23	9
African	3/23	13
Coloured	1/23	4

The Nyasaland Government accepted the proposals with minor modifications, the chief one being that all members would be nominated and would not necessarily represent particular interests. The Government's proposals were not well received by the European community which thought that the entire constitution was premature, probably because it conceded 22 per cent non-white representation. Though in the eyes of the Europeans the concessions were far-reaching, all that the new constitution did in fact envisage was that representation in the Legislative Council should be as follows: Europeans 78 per cent, Africans 13 per cent and Asians 9 per cent. The Secretary of State said it was a step in the direction of representative government and the non-white colonists accepted it as better than nothing. After all in the not-too-distant Kenya the Asians had obtained only five seats in the Legislative Council in 1923 for a population that was more than double the population of Europeans who had more than twice as many seats. It was not until 1944 that the first African was nominated to the Kenyan Legislative Council.²

The constitution came into effect in 1949 and remained in force without any further change until it was replaced by the Constitution of 1955 which came into operation in 1956.

The Constitution of 1955, which envisaged a Legislative Council of 22 members, provided that 11 of the members would be officials and therefore whites; the other 11 were to be chosen as follows: the white voters were to elect 6 and the remaining 5 were to be elected by the three provincial councils in the country and would therefore be Africans. Asian representation was dropped.³

This gave the African nationalists 23 per cent strength in the Legislative Council, far from the controlling position they had asked for by 1960 and which the Governor, Sir Robert Armitage, felt was an extravagant demand. To the African nationalists, of course, the demand was not unreasonable. They thought it should have been conceded long ago. Dr. Banda and his lieutenants had asked that by 1960 their territorial legislature should represent African opinion, by which was meant an African majority. To reach this objective it was necessary to obtain a new constitution. This could be done only by rousing the political consciousness of the masses. In early 1959 intensified political activities created more disorder than the territorial Government could cope with. A crucial stage was reached when white troops from Southern Rhodesia arrived in Nyasaland on 21 February, 1959; five days later an emergency was declared, the Nyasaland African National Congress proscribed and its leaders arrested. On 3 March, 1959, five days after the proclamation of the emergency, Dr. Banda and his supporters were arrested.⁴

A long stalemate might have developed at this stage if a band of young and enthusiastic politicians had not appeared on the scene. Among them was Mr. Aleke Banda who, with the help of his supporters, European and African, started a mimeographed publication, *Ntendere pa Nchito* (Happiness at Work). On 30 September, 1959, was formed the Malawi Congress Party with Orton Chirwa as President-General and Aleke Banda as Secretary-General to take the place of the proscribed Nyasaland African National Congress. These developments had the full support of Dr. Banda who was still in detention in Southern Rhodesia. The success achieved by the Malawi Congress Party was phenomenal. Its membership had risen to 15,000 by 18 November, 1959. By 15 December the figure stood at 28,000.⁵

Local organisation and political activity was one aspect of the work of the Malawi Congress Party; spreading its message abroad was another. To this end, its President-General, Mr. Orton Chirwa, paid a five-week visit to the United Kingdom after assuming the party's leadership. His main purpose was to press the party's demand for the release of detainees, including Dr. Banda, to ask for termination of the emergency regulations and to protest against the composition and terms of reference of the Monckton Commission.⁶

The Malawi Congress Party began publication of a newspaper, *The Malawi News*, in place of the mimeographed broadsheet, *Ntendere pa Nchito*, which was essentially a workers' organ and had a limited circulation. To overcome this limitation a monthly journal, *Tsopano*, was started as an unofficial organ of the Malawi Congress Party.

Tsopano means "now" and in this simple but meaningful word were expressed the aspirations of a militant movement. The first issue of *Tsopano*, a six penny monthly, appeared in October 1959 a few days after the formation of the Malawi Congress Party. In this publication, as in the *Ntendere pa Nchito*, which continued to exist, could be seen the guiding hand of young Aleke Banda who was Associate Editor of both. *Tsopano* adopted a reasonable line. While its main task was to express the African nationalist viewpoint, this did not prevent it from throwing open its pages to its critics. It published a letter to the editor written by a European attacking the journal and its policies. The letter described the journal as a biased, hypocritical publication. Its call for relief of the families of detainees was denounced and its call for a boycott of the Monckton Commission was likened to "that of a spoilt child who sulks in a corner if he doesn't get his own way in everything." The journal replied as follows: "...*Tsopano's* concern is to publish the viewpoints of Africans (but) we cannot be indifferent to the viewpoints of Europeans. Most of us agree that Europeans can

play an important role in the cultural and physical developments which will confront Africa. Equally, most of us will be sorry if Europeans, through lack of humility and sympathy, put themselves in a position where they can have no part or place in the Africa of the future." On the question of race relations *Tsopano* adopted a sensible line.

Its first issue had a circulation of 1200; four months later, in February 1960, the figure rose to 6,000. Though *Tsopano* played a useful role in its first 12 months, the fast-moving events of 1959 called for the publication of a journal which would appear more frequently and reach a wider audience. It was decided to bring out a mimeographed weekly, the *Malawi News*, alternatively in English and Chinyanja. In its first issue, which appeared on 19 December, 1959, the journal said: "We are waging an uphill struggle against white domination and suppression from the south and colonial agents in Zomba. We have few leaders in our struggle because most of them are in detention. We cannot meet and talk and discuss what we think because of the state of emergency. . . . Yet we want our people to know what we are doing and thinking. Since we cannot meet we can only do it by writing. But we are poor. We have no money to buy a press. The only paper that can express our genuine feelings is *Tsopano* but it is a monthly and cannot in any case be used as a party organ yet. White settler papers do not want to give us good and fair publicity. All the people in Nyasaland and our members in particular will therefore understand how necessary it is to have the *Malawi News* so that we know what we are doing and thinking."⁸

The strenuous efforts of the nationalists in Malawi brought about minor changes in the constitution which were looked upon as interim changes. The table on the next page⁹ shows the progress achieved until then in the struggle for complete control of government.

The 1959 interim constitutional arrangements gave Nyasaland a Legislative Council of 27 members, excluding the Governor and the Speaker, comprising 4 officials, ex-officio; 10 nominated officials; 7 African non-officials (3 elected and 4 nominated); and 6 non-African non-officials, all elected. The Executive Council comprised 9 members: the Governor (as Chairman); 3 officials; ex-officio, 2 nominated officials; 2 nominated non-African non-officials and 2 nominated African non-officials.

Thus Africans were for the first time appointed members of the Executive Council on 24 August, 1959, 70 years after a British protectorate was proclaimed in Nyasaland.¹⁰ The events of 1959 leading to these changes indicated beyond any doubt that the people of Nyasaland were determined to continue the struggle for a new constitution.

NYASALAND TERRITORIAL COUNCILS AND FRANCHISE

	At Federation (1953)	1955 Changes	1957 Changes	1959 Changes
<i>Legislative Council Officials</i>	21 Governor + 10	23 Governor + 11	25 Governor + 12 Including Speaker.	29 Governor + 14 Including Speaker.
<i>Non-officials</i>	5 Europeans selected from nominations
	1 European appointed on other grounds.	6 non-Africans elected on non-African roll.
	1 Asian selected from nominations.
	3 Africans selected from nominations by African Protectorate Council.	5 Africans elected by African Protectorate Council	..	7 Africans 3 elected by A.P.C. and 4 nominated by Governor
<hr/>				
	At Federation (1953)	1955 Changes	1957 Changes	1959 Changes
<i>Executive Council Officials</i>	Governor + 4	Governor + 5	..	Governor + 5
<i>Non-officials</i>	2 (non-Africans)	4 to include 2 Africans
<hr/>				
<i>Franchise</i>	None—all members nominated or appointed.	Only non-Africans earning £200 per annum or possessing property worth £250.

The British Government assessed the political climate correctly. For 1960 was a year of decision not only for Nyasaland but also for Africa. That year a great part of Africa became independent or got closer to independence. Since 1957 there had been expectations that constitutional talks would result in gains for Africans in Nyasaland. Mr. Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State for Colonies, had announced in 1957 that the status quo would continue till the end of the term of the Legislative Council in May 1960. Two months before the term was due to end, Mr. Macleod visited Nyasaland to prepare the ground. On 14 April, 1960, he announced that the constitutional talks promised in 1957 would be held in London later that year.¹¹

The constitutional conference was held at Lancaster House in London in July 1960. The Europeans were represented by the United

Federal Party (Messrs. Dixon, Blackwood and Little) and the Africans by the Malawi Congress Party (Dr. H.K. Banda, and Messrs. Orton Chirwa, W.K. Chiume and Aleke Banda), the Congress Liberation Party (Mr. T.D.T. Banda), the United Federal Party (Mr. Mathews Phiri) and Nyasaland Legislative Council members who had dissociated themselves from Dr. Banda during the emergency (Messrs. Chin-yama and Kwenje). The Asians were represented by an Asian Association member (Mr. Sattar Sacranie).¹² The conference agreed on a new constitution for Nyasaland with the following important features: The Government was to comprise the Governor, an Executive Council of 10 members and a Legislative Council of 28 members. The Executive Council was to consist of 5 officials, three ex-officio and two nominated, and 5 non-official elected members, two on the higher roll and three on the lower roll. Of the 28 members of the Legislative Council 20 were to be elected on the lower franchise and 8 on the higher franchise.¹³

The principle of election in contradistinction to nomination featured more prominently in the Lancaster House conference than at any previous constitutional talks. The salient features of the constitution were : All voters were required to satisfy the following conditions : (i) They should be at least 21 years old ; (ii) should have lived in the country for 2 years prior to their registration ; and (iii) should be either British subjects or British protected persons belonging to Nyasaland. Voters on the lower roll should be (i) 21 years of age; should be literate in English and have an income of over £120 or property worth £250 ; or (ii) should be literate in any language in common use in the country and provide evidence of having paid their taxes for 10 years ; should be at least 27 or 28 years old. Lucy Mair makes a significant comment on this age requirement in the following words : "The U.F.P. had sought to fix the age of political discretion at 40 years, but it was found that the necessary tax records were not available. The ten-year requirement was agreed to on the understanding that all districts had records for this period. Since liability for tax begins at 18, this gives a minimum age of 27 or 28, and was calculated to exclude a number of more militant supporters of Malawi."¹⁴ Other persons not literate but holding certain "status" posts were deemed to be *prima facie* "responsible" persons and eligible for franchise. This category included chiefs and headmen, members of district councils, past and present, master farmers, pensioners and ex-servicemen.

The conference delegated to the Constitutional Working Party the duty of recommending qualifications under which women might enjoy franchise on the lower roll. The Working Committee recommended that the right of franchise should be extended to any woman who (i) was able to satisfy the requisite qualifications in her own right;

if a married woman did not possess the necessary means qualification, she should be deemed to have the income or property qualification of her husband ; or (ii) was able to satisfy the registering officer that she had been married for ten years or more and was also literate in English or any specified language.¹⁵ The higher franchise was open to (i) university graduates ; (ii) those who had an income of £300 per annum or property worth £500, and secondary education ; (iii) those who had an income of £480 or property worth £ 1000 and primary education ; and (iv) those with an income of £ 720 or property worth £ 1500 having no further educational qualification than the ability to complete a registration form in English.¹⁶

The elections held in August 1961 on the basis of the 1960 constitution gave an overwhelming victory to the Malawi Congress Party which won all 20 seats on the lower roll and confounded the critics by winning two of the eight seats on the higher roll—the only seats contested by it on the higher roll. The victorious candidates on the higher roll were Mr. I.K. Surtee, president of the coloured community, who later became Speaker of Parliament, and Mr. Mikeka Mkandawire, founder-secretary of the African Chamber of Commerce. The United Federal Party won five seats on the higher roll, the last seat on which was won by Mr. Colin Cameron (Independent). The final position was : Malawi Congress Party 22, United Federal Party 5 and Independent 1.

Thus it was that Nyasaland achieved majority rule. The road to independence passed over the Rubicon when the five non-official seats on the Executive Council were filled as follows : 2 higher roll seats : Mr. Colin Cameron, Independent, Minister of Works and Transport, and Mr. M. Mkandawire, M. C.P., Minister without Portfolio ; 3 lower roll seats : Dr. H.K. Banda, M.C.P., Minister of Natural Resources and Local Government ; Mr. Chiume, Minister of Education, and Mr. Bwanausi, Minister of Labour.¹⁷

By the beginning of 1962 Dr. Banda had established his position as a *de facto* Prime Minister. Within a year the experiment of entrusting Africans with their own affairs generated sufficient confidence to pass from the stage of responsible government to that of self-government. "With ritual precision," writes Rotberg, "the British Government agreed, at a conference in London during November 1962, that Nyasaland should become self-governing early in the New Year. A month later, R.S. Butler, the then Secretary of State for Central African Affairs, promised in principle to permit Nyasaland to secede from the Federation. He confirmed what many had long realized: that the Federation was dead."¹⁸ It was not from the ruins of the Federation that modern Malawi emerged. Rather, it was the emergence of modern

Malawi that dealt the severest blow to the Central African Federation. The spirited opposition to the C.A.F. spearheaded by the Malawi Congress Party, the gaining of a new constitution for Nyasaland in 1960, the decisive victory in the elections of 1961 and the successful handling of the business of Government between 1961 and 1962—all these played a significant part in the death of the Federation on 31 December 1963. The elections of 1961 on the basis of the Lancaster House Constitution of 1960 did not result in *de jure* responsible government. No one was designated Prime Minister though in practice the Governor, Sir Glyn Jones, did allow Dr. Banda to exercise the powers and privileges of a Prime Minister. What was needed was to give a legal cover to the existing position and an extension of it to lend it the substance and reality of full self-government.

For the purpose of granting complete self-government another constitutional conference was held in London in November 1962. It was at this conference that Dr. Banda spoke his famous words: "When I came here in 1960 I said that I had come in the spirit of give-and-take. This time I have come in the spirit of take—to take what is mine by conquest at the ballot box and, if I may be forgiven for saying so, by successful and creditable performance in office."¹⁹ The conference granted Nyasaland complete internal self-government which was introduced in two stages. The first stage was the replacement, on 1 February 1963, of the Executive Council by a Cabinet headed by Dr. H. K. Banda — the country's first Prime Minister — and comprising eight elected non-official Ministers together with an ex-officio Minister of Finance included in the Cabinet at the special request of the Prime Minister. The second stage was reached on 9 May 1963 when the Cabinet ceased to be an advisory body to the Governor except in respect of certain matters like public safety and order. The Legislative Council was renamed the Legislative Assembly.²⁰ In September 1963, Mr. R.A. Butler, Minister-in-Charge of Central African Affairs, and the Prime Minister of Nyasaland, Dr. Banda, agreed to a new constitution granting independence to the country on 6 July 1964. The constitution provided for a Legislative Assembly of 53 members, 50 of whom were to be elected on a general roll while 3 (reserved for European members) on a special roll.²¹ On 6 July 1964, the new State of Malawi came into being under a monarchical constitution, within the British Commonwealth, with a Legislature of 53 members headed by a Prime Minister.

The former British Protectorate of Nyasaland had been ruled under many constitutions since 1891. Till 1949 it was governed under Crown Colony constitutions of different kinds. Between 1949 and 1960 constitutions providing for representative government were introduced. In 1963 full responsible government was granted. In 1964

the state of Malawi became independent under a monarchical constitution. In 1965 a Republican Constitution was adopted which resulted in the coming into being of the Republic of Malawi on 6 July 1966. The Republican Constitution which emerged from the Lilongwe Conference held from 13 to 17 October 1965 is Malawi's fourth constitution in a decade. The events leading to it were set in motion with the announcement by the Prime Minister, Dr. Banda, on 13 July 1965 that Malawi had decided to become a Republic from 6 July 1966. Shortly after the announcement he set up a Constitutional Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Aleke Banda, Secretary-General of the Malawi Congress Party, and comprising the following members: Mr. J.Z.U. Tembo, Minister of Finance, Development and Planning; Mr. G.W. Kuntumanji, Minister of Natural Resources; Mr. G. Chakuamba, Minister of Social and Community Development; Mr. M.Q.Y. Chibambo, Minister of Works, and Mr. A.A. Muwalo, Minister of Information, as Secretary. The committee began its deliberations on 5 August 1965 and examined various republican constitutions, including those adopted by France, India, Ghana, Nigeria, Britain, Germany, the United States of America, Zambia and Tanzania. It was guided by the following principles: that the conditions and needs of every country are different; that the diverse and individual requirements and circumstances of the people of Malawi must influence the final pattern of the constitution, especially the need "in a country comparatively under-developed and inexperienced in nationhood for a form of government which will afford the necessary degree of unity, resolution and stability to permit the maximum fulfilment of the country's human and physical resources in the shortest period of time".²²

The proposals of the Constitutional Committee were presented to the delegates, 394 in all, who assembled for the annual convention of the Malawi Congress Party at Lilongwe. The conference was attended by 15 delegates from the Malawi Congress Party Central Executive, five from the League of Malawi Women's National Committee, four from the League of Malawi Youth National Committee, four from the Malawi Youth Central Regional Committee, two from the Malawi Youth Southern Regional Committee, five from the Malawi Youth Northern Regional Committee, 56 representing the Chairmen, Secretaries and Treasurers of M.C.P. Districts, 65 representing the Chairmen, Secretaries and Treasurers of the League of Malawi Women Districts, 65 representing the Chairmen, Secretaries and Treasurers of the League of Malawi Youth Districts, 36 Members of Parliament, 47 Chiefs from the Southern Region, 45 Chiefs from the Central Region, 21 Chiefs from the Northern Region, 21 Chairmen of District Councils and three delegates from Zambia.²³

In his opening address to the conference, the Prime Minister outlined the work before it. He said though the first important con-

ference since his return to the country in 1958 had taken place in Nkata Bay in that year and the second important conference at Nkhota-Kota in 1960 after his release from prison, it was the Lilongwe conference that was far more important than the earlier ones because it had to work out far-reaching constitutional changes. He added :
“..... Now the time has arrived in my view when we must change our form of Government here. Freedom? Already we have that. There is no question of freedom or independence. That is already here. The question is : freedom under a monarchical form of government or freedom under a Republican form of government? That is the question. Well, I thought we must follow the example of other African states where we have free people under a Republican form of government rather than a monarchical form.”²⁴ His advice to the conference, best expressed in his concluding remarks, was: “Decide on the kind of constitution you want. Decide whom you want to be President. Strengthen the constitution of the Malawi Congress Party. Put the position of chiefs secure in the constitution, European representation secure in the constitution. And discipline. Set an example for the people of this country how to live.”²⁵

The main features of the proposals for the new Republican constitution accepted by the conference were :

(1) A President, elected by the people, will be both Head of State and Head of Government. The office of Prime Minister will be replaced by that of the office of President. The Constitutional Committee explained the significance of this recommendation in the following words : “The decision is given greater weight by the need of a young sovereign state in present-day Africa to enjoy stability, strength and solidarity in its Government. An executive which is easily divided from within or without, or which is unduly vulnerable to the varying influences of minorities, is unlikely to be able to perform with the necessary degree of expedition and resolution the difficult task of leading a young nation faced with the tremendous problems of nation-building and economic development which exist in Malawi.”²⁶

(2) There is no provision for a Vice-President. The Constitutional Committee was of the view that such an office encouraged an element of division and that it tended to run counter to the principle that the person who at any time exercises the functions of President should be one who at that time represents the choice of the majority of the people.

(3) Malawi will become a one-party state under the Republican Constitution.

(4) Provision has been made for inclusion in the Cabinet of not more than three members chosen by the President from outside Parliament so that their special qualifications, knowledge or experience in a particular field will be advantageous to the country as a whole. Such Ministers will enjoy the usual privileges, except the right of voting.

(5) The Constitution will recognize the role of Chiefs in the field of traditional government.

(6) The Constitution provides for representation of minorities at the discretion of the President on the basis of nomination by the President up to a limit of five members of Parliament "without constituency election or representation, to represent a particular minority or other special interests in the country."

On the closing day of the Convention a number of resolutions were adopted. The last three had a direct bearing on the Constitution and read as follows :

(The members)

(8) "Wholeheartedly approve the draft Constitution of the Malawi Congress Party and pledge to abide by the provisions therein;

(9) Wholeheartedly and willingly endorse and accept the proposals for the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi and, in particular, endorse the proposal to establish in Malawi a strong and stable government, under a one-party state, and to have a President who shall be both Head of State and Head of Government and shall have no Vice-President or Prime Minister.

• (10) Unanimously nominate Ngwazi Dr. Kamuzu Banda Life President of the mighty Malawi Congress Party, first Prime Minister of the independent State of Malawi, Father and Founder of the Malawi Nation, as the Malawi Congress Party candidate for the Presidency of the Republic of the State of Malawi.²⁷

The Prime Minister, who did not attend the functional sessions of the Convention, addressed it when it had concluded its work. In accepting the decisions of the conference, he made the following pledge: "For my part I will do my best as I have been trying to do my best ever since I came here in 1958". But, he went on to say, there was bound to be criticism of the proposed constitution from some quarters, especially on the issues of a one-party state and of a Head of State functioning also as Head of Government. Such criticism, he said, would have no foundation if democracy was found to exist in a situation in which the Government was chosen by the people as it was bound to

be in accordance with the proposed constitution. He said: "Whether it is a dictatorship or not, as long as it is the people who choose the dictator, it is not a dictatorship."²⁸

Dr. Banda's point was that a one-party state whose Head of State was also Head of Government was not *ipso facto* undemocratic. It did not follow that Malawi had to imitate existing patterns to gain approbation and acclaim. As an example of how circumstances influenced constitutional changes and practices, the Prime Minister referred to Sir Robert Walpole's assumption of the role of Prime Minister in Britain in 1721 as a development which was influenced by the Hanoverian ruler's position and practice in those days in matters of government in that country. His concluding remarks on this point were: "Democracy in every country, any country, is the result of the conditions of that particular country and not anything sent from heaven."²⁹

The proposals submitted by the Constitutional Committee, accepted by the National Convention at Lilongwe on 16 October 1965, were subsequently endorsed by the Malawi Government. They were presented to Parliament as a White Paper on 9 November 1965. The Minister of Natural Resources, Mr. Kumtumanji, moving the motion for acceptance of the proposals, said: "We feel that the best way for us to build up this country and to raise the standards of living of the people as a whole lies in providing constitutionally for a perpetuation of the system which we have already had, in fact, for some years—a system under which elected leaders of the Malawi Congress Party are free to devote themselves to building up the State of Malawi in the best interests of its people, without the wasteful friction and disunity which the existence of a number of minority parties can produce."³⁰ The Minister of Finance, Mr. Tembo, said: "We also want some history written about ourselves, and this is one of the subjects on which we can have history of our own. Even the question of having no Vice-President — we are going to try it, and want people to know that this was first tried in Malawi" (referring to a Committee of Ministers to act in the absence of the President).³¹ The Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Blackwood, said: "We also readily accept the motives underlying many of the proposals in the White Paper, the underlying intention to have a stable state here without interruptions and subversions, and to let all get on building and developing Malawi."³² On co-operation in the future, Mr. Blackwood said that it would be forthcoming but that European expatriates should not be compelled to join the ruling party. He regretted the absence of a Bill of Rights but agreed that what was of weight was what the people wanted and what they were prepared to do, saying "it is true that your protection comes from the people of the country and their goodwill."³³ Winding up the debate, Dr. Banda assured the Europeans that they would not be compelled to join the

Malawi Congress Party. His concluding remarks were : "I only want to thank the House and, through the House, the country as a whole, for its faith in me, nominating me as the first President of the Republic of Malawi. I will do my best. All I ask is that the Party and the country be united. There must be unity, there must be loyalty, obedience and discipline, because we have a job on our hands, the job of building this country, this beautiful country of Malawi."³⁴

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2. Bennet and Rosberg, *The Kenyatta Election: Kenya 1960-61*.
3. See Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa*, pp. 269-270.
4. Ibid. pp. 296-7.
5. *The Malawi News*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 19 December 1959.
6. *Tsopano*, No. 3, December 1959. Mr. Chirwa yielded his position to Dr. Banda on the latter's release from detention. At the time of writing this article Mr. Chirwa was not in Malawi and is no longer in the Government.
7. *Tsopano*, No. 5, February 1960.
8. *The Malawi News*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 19 December 1959. The journal acquired a printing press in December 1960 and its first printed issue appeared on 9 February 1961.
9. Vide Philip Mason, *Year of Decision*, p. 260.
10. Vide Report of the Nyasaland Constitutional Conference, 1960. pp. 1-4.
11. Report of the Nyasaland Constitutional Conference, 1960, p. 3.
12. Lucy Mair, *The Nyasaland Elections of 1961*, p. 9. Of these members only Dr. Banda and Mr. Aleke Banda are at present holding Government office.
13. Ibid., p. 10
14. Ibid, p. 11
15. Report of the Constitutional Working Party, 1961, p. 13. Women graduates as well as male graduates who satisfied the general requirements of nationality, residence and age were eligible to be registered as voters on the roll of their choice.
16. Lucy Mair, *The Nyasaland Elections of 1961*, p. 12
17. Lucy Mair, op. cit., pp. 80-81. Except for Dr. Banda, none of the other Ministers holds office today.
18. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa*, pp. 313-4
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20. Ufulu, *The Story of the Malawi Congress*, p. 38
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India and Tanzania

NIRMAL SINGH GREWAL

THE Republic of Tanzania, comprising the erstwhile Republics of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, is a next-shore neighbour of India on the eastern coast of Africa. In size, it is almost equal to Pakistan, or about one-third of India. As most of the country is situated at a relatively high altitude, it does not have a typically tropical climate.

It is difficult to say when the earliest contacts between India and Tanzania were made. There is however some circumstantial evidence which tends to establish that contacts between the two countries existed as early as the pre-Christian era. R. Reusch mentions the observations of Freya Stark that the discovery of the teak wood used in the ancient buildings of Yemen establishes the fact that India had trade links with countries situated on her west before the Minacan inscription dating back to the 14th century B.C.¹ Again, there are references to the geography of Africa in the Puranas. The region between the central lakes and the east coast of Africa (part of Tanzania) is referred to as "Chandrasthan" and the River Nile as Krishna in the Indian scriptures. The British explorer, John H. Speke, the modern discoverer of the source of the River Nile (1862), concedes that the ancient Indians had "some kind of communications" with the western parts of Tanzania. In fact, Speke had with him during his explorations a map and a "most interesting paper" prepared by Lt. Wilford which showed the river and the "Mountains of the Moon".²

Thus it would appear that the Indians in the pre-Christian era definitely had some knowledge of and contacts with Tanzania. Evidence of these contacts can be had throughout the Christian era. The Greek navigator who is credited with having written the "Periplus of the Erythraean Sea" in 60 A.D. mentions that there existed a flourishing trade between India and Africa³. The traders of the west coast of India carried cargoes of Indian cloth, wheat, rice, butter, ghee and sugar to Africa and on their return voyage brought ivory, gold dust and some slaves to India. Periodic information is given by the Arab geographer Idrisi, Ibn Said, Marcopolo, Vas-co-de-gama, Barbosa and Ibn Batuta

which would show that an almost uninterrupted maritime link between India and Africa existed throughout these centuries. With the passage of time more and more Indian merchants joined in the trade with Africa and established many business houses on the east coast of Africa, resulting in a semi-permanent Indian settlement there⁴. Freeman-Greenville believes that by the end of the 15th century Indians must have settled in Tanzania and its neighbouring coastal area "in petty numbers"⁵.

It was, however, in the 19th century A.D. that the east coast of Africa came under considerable Indian influence. Indians began to settle permanently in Zanzibar in the first quarter of the 19th century and gradually shifted to the main trading centres on the African mainland⁶. A few of them undertook commercial visits well into the interior⁷. The consolidation and extension of Indian contacts and sphere of influence in this region received an impetus with the coming of Sultan Said to Zanzibar from Muscat when he made the island his permanent headquarters in 1841. The Sultan had also brought with him a large number of Indian traders and bankers who had settled in Muscat with his active support. The Sultan dreamt of making Zanzibar an important centre of international trade and to realize this objective he freely patronized and encouraged Indian traders and bankers⁸. American and European firms in Zanzibar engaged Indian traders as their agents in those parts of the sultanate of Zanzibar where they themselves were prohibited from carrying on trade and commerce⁹.

The dream of Sultan Said was realised to a great extent. He opened trade channels with the interior of the African mainland from where slaves and ivory were brought and then exchanged with foreign goods like cloth, cups and plates. This opening up of the interior and of the Suez Canal in 1861, which brought European and North American markets closer to Zanzibar, stimulated commercial activity in Zanzibar, leading to a steady increase in its economic prosperity which in turn widened the scope and sphere of Indian traders and commercial houses in the sultanate. The influence of the Sultan now extended well into the interior of the African mainland and he was respected and obeyed by the tribal chiefs. The importance and prestige of the Sultan during this period was symbolised by an Arab proverb: "When you play the flute in Zanzibar, all Africa, as far as the lakes, dances".¹⁰

All this would appear to have attracted some immigration from India. The Sultan followed a liberal immigration policy. Lord Kitchner observed that there were "numerous" Indian nationals settled all along the coast of the sultanate.¹¹ Sir John Kirk, who was Indian Political Agent and later Agent and Consul-General at Zanzibar

during 1866-87, said the whole business and commerce of Zanzibar was controlled by the Indians when he went out there in 1866 and that there was no English trade there.¹²

So completely did the Indians monopolize the commercial activity of the area that the sultanate came to be considered "a commercial dependency" of India.¹³ Sir Bartle Frere observed in 1873 that "of all classes connected with the trade of East Africa, there is none more influential than the natives of India". They were the agency which collected the local produce for foreign markets and made foreign goods available to the natives of Africa.¹⁴

It may be of interest to observe here that there has never been any attempt on the part of the Indian people or any Indian commercial interest to carve out a colony for itself in Africa despite their long contacts with and commercial interests in Africa. This is significant when we consider that some British and other European and American companies and societies had embarked upon such colonial pursuits in Africa in different periods of time and thereby shown "the way" to the trading interests and adventurers of other nationalities at a time when there were easy opportunities for colonial adventures. So great has been the abhorrence of the Indian people for colonies that when it was suggested that Tanganyika be allocated to India as a colony after World War I, as we shall soon examine, the Indian leaders at once opposed it.

Contacts during German Rule 1886—1918

Unlike the Indians, the Germans did not remain insensitive to the imperialist adventures of other white people. A chain of societies was formed in Germany before 1884 when under the sponsorship of the German Colonization Society, Karl Peters set out on a round of visits to tribal chiefs on the east coast of Africa. He entered into "treaties" with them by virtue of which the latter almost ceded their territories "for all time" to Karl Peters who, in return, undertook to give special consideration to them when "colonizing" them. The German Chancellor, Bismarck, who did not initially approve of the activities of Karl Peters, however changed his attitude under pressure of public opinion when Peters returned to Germany with the bundle of "treaties".¹⁵

The Anglo-German Agreement of 1886 recognized the spheres of influence of the signatories and regulated "various questions connected with the Sultanate of Zanzibar and the opposite East African mainland by means of a friendly understanding". This "friendly understanding" between Great Britain and Germany culminated in the disintegration of

the Sultanate of Zanzibar and brought the mainland, despite the protests of the Sultan of Zanzibar, under German subjugation and control. The German East Africa Company governed it until 1891 when the territory—christened German East Africa—was taken over by the German Government. The German colony consisted of Tanganyika, Rwanda and Burundi. The Zanzibar island was declared a British protectorate in 1890.

The impact of the emergence of Germany as a colonial power in East Africa on Indian influence and contacts is not easy to assess. R. L. Buell believes that the Indian trader continued to be welcomed by the Germans as he was considered to be “indispensable to trade.” The Indians also had some freehold titles to land under the Germans.¹⁶ There is also evidence that Indian labour was welcomed into German East Africa although the Indian Emigration Act, XXI of 1883, prohibited emigration to the German colony. On this question the German Government made repeated requests to the British Government but they were rejected on the ground that it would be “inadvisable” to permit recruitment of labour in India for German East Africa where there were “not very squeamish or tender-hearted” white colonisers.¹⁷

There is however evidence that the Germans carried people from India through Goa—part of India that was then under Portuguese colonial rule—on the pretext that they were “artisans” when in reality they were made to work as ordinary labourers on their arrival in German East Africa.¹⁸

It might be of interest to mention here that there is evidence tending to show that during the famous Maji-Maji rising of 1905-1907 in German East Africa the Indians enjoyed the confidence and goodwill of Africans and that some Indians openly expressed their sympathy for them. The African “rebels”, who put to death even Arabs and “Swahilis” at Kilwa Kivinje, did not harm Indian lives and property there.¹⁹ This writer was informed by some prominent Indian residents of Dar-es-Salaam during his visit there in 1961 that five or six Indians were “deported” from Kilwa on suspicion of being sympathetic to the Maji-Maji rising, and were brought to Dar-es-Salaam by the Germans. The last of the “deported” Indians, Ismail Bhallu, died in Dar-es-Salaam.

Although the popular rising failed, German colonial rule was nearing its end. But the end did not bring about the emancipation of the people of Tanganyika. For German East Africa had also been involved in World War I and the disposal of this “enemy” colony was governed by Article 119 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, under which Germany renounced in favour of the

Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights over her overseas possessions, including German East Africa. German East Africa was placed under the mandate system envisaged in the Covenant of the League of Nations with Great Britain as the Administering Authority.²⁰ The territory was renamed Tanganyika Territory, which, according to Dr. Ingham, means the bush country behind Tanga.²¹

Proposal for Indian Colonization

During and after World War I, in which the then British Government of India had declared war on Germany and assisted the Allied war effort with men and money, a proposal was mooted for earmarking Tanganyika for Indian colonization in the belief that such an arrangement would soften the indignation and resentment among the people of India at the bad treatment meted out to them in different parts of the British Commonwealth.

The proposal appears to have come, in the first instance, from Sir Harry H. Johnston.²² Evans Lewin²³ supported it. The proposal was echoed at the Imperial War Conference of 1917.²⁴ Sir Theodore Morrison, a former member of the Viceroy's Council, went a step further and suggested that the former German colony be placed under the tutelage of India.²⁵ In return he wanted the Indians to renounce all interest in the immigration policy of the white Dominions.²⁶

Thus we find that the suggestion for an Indian colony or Indian colonization of Tanganyika came from the British. The Indian people never demanded it. In this connection, it may be of interest to note that the American historian, Dr. Robert G. Gregory, has tried to make out a case that the Indians asked for a colony in East Africa.²⁷ His observations are not based on all the facts available. If there was any initial, favourable response to the suggestion of Sir Theodore Morrison among the Indian residents in East Africa it was said to be entirely due to the personal influence of Sir Theodore.²⁸ The Indians never seriously canvassed for it. In fact, soon after, the Indian organizations in East Africa, namely, the East African Indian National Congress and the British East Africa Indian Association, rejected the idea of Indian colonization of Tanganyika.²⁹ They declared that what they wanted was "equal treatment" for all.³⁰ Public opinion in India and popular Indian leaders too disfavoured the proposal. Mahatma Gandhi, according to his close associate, C. F. Andrews, "condemned the proposal from the very beginning."³¹ In conformity with public opinion in India, the Government also rejected it.³²

Contacts during British Rule, 1914-1961

The period of British rule over Tanganyika, from the viewpoint of Indians,³³ has been one of a continuous struggle to resist the pressure of the whites and oppose all such measures as tended to strengthen their position. Whether it was the question of representation in the Government or of jobs in the civil service or the question of a "closer union", trade regulations or other privileges in the country, the Indians were steadfast in their uncompromising attitude towards the British administration. This largely thwarted attempts to sow the concept of white superiority in Tanganyika. Indian spokesmen enunciated principles aiming at majority rule in the country. Contrary to the general belief, they championed the interests of the Africans as far back as the twenties when the latter were not well-organized to fight for their rights. They asserted that "East Africa is not a white man's country" and that "when conflicts of interests between natives and non-natives arise, the interests of natives should be paramount."³⁴ The Indians did not mind the concessions given to the African traders although they themselves were most likely to be affected by them. No wonder this approach was appreciated by African intellectuals and leaders. Dr. B. T. G. Chidzero rightly observes that their reactions had "generally been closer to the African" and they were "generally sympathetic to the African cause".³⁵ Dr. Julius Nyerere, President of the Republic of Tanzania, had this tribute to pay to Indians in 1957: "There is something remarkable and perhaps unique in Tanganyika and that is that this organization (the Asian Association), which is a racial organization in membership, like our own (TANU), stands virtually for the same principles as we stand for. It would like to see introduced into Tanganyika universal adult franchise immediately. It would like to see fears removed about our country becoming in future a democratic state."³⁶

The efforts of the Indian community to prevent entrenchment of the concept of white superiority during the earlier period of British rule in Tanganyika did not fail to evoke sympathetic support in India. The struggle of Mahatma Gandhi against the discriminatory policies and practices of the white Government in South Africa had already brought Africa politically and emotionally closer to the people of India across the then barriers of British colonial rule in India. On more than one occasion, the pressure of public opinion in the country had forced the British Government of India to throw its weight on the side of reason and justice, which to some extent must have helped in stemming the tide of white superiority in Tanganyika.

Thus we find that the then British Government of India was successfully pressurized to intervene in the first headlong clash³⁷ between the Indian community and the British Administration in Tanganyika

over the commonly known "Profits Tax" in 1923.³⁸ The British Government of India, although disinclined to go to the League of Nations or any other international forum for the reason that it would be "undesirable that (British) India should raise at the League of Nations criticism" of other parts of the British empire, nevertheless sent anxious despatches to London regarding the undesirable policies of the British Administration in Tanganyika which aimed at hurting the Indians.³⁹ The British Administration had to retrace its steps and the "Profits Tax" was abolished.⁴⁰ It may be mentioned here that in the twenties the Indians comprised the only non-European community in Tanganyika which could offer organized resistance to British imperialism. The Africans were not well organised till after World War II. Under the circumstances, any subduing of the Indian community through the discriminatory practices pursued by the British Administration would have helped those believing in the supremacy of the whites and strengthened the hands of the protagonists⁴¹ of a great white dominion in East Africa.

After the "Profits Tax" controversy was over there arose a larger issue of far-reaching consequence. This was the question of a "closer union" between Tanganyika and the adjoining British territories of Kenya and Uganda. From the statements of representatives of European settlers in East Africa, it was clear that what they wanted was a great white dominion in East Africa.⁴² The Africans did not like it. Their spokesmen expressed the fear that it would be dangerous for Tanganyika to be associated with the then European-dominated Kenya.⁴³ Spokesmen of the Indian community in all three countries fought vigorously against all attempts at a "closer union" among these East African countries.⁴⁴ In the beginning the attitude of the then British Government of India towards this move was favourable. Under the pressure of public opinion, however, the Government changed its stand and disapproved of a closer union. It also demanded that Africans should be given representation in their country's legislature.⁴⁵ Public opinion in India also favoured the principle that the interests of the natives should have precedence over the interests of the immigrant communities.⁴⁶ The movement for a "closer union" came to an end in 1931 on the recommendations of the Joint Select Committee.⁴⁷

Thus we find that the people of India, despite their being in servitude, evinced interest in the various developments in Africa. They sought to help the people of Tanganyika in resisting the pressures of European settlers and colonialists. After India became independent in 1947, it showed greater interest in the emancipation of other peoples in Asia⁴⁸ and Africa. Although Asia engaged its immediate attention, it did not lose time to support the cause of the people of

Africa as and when the occasion demanded. Speaking at the concluding session of the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, on 24 April, 1955, the Prime Minister of India said there was "nothing more terrible than the infinite tragedy of Africa....the tragedy of Africa is greater than that of any other continent, whether it is racial or political. It is up to Asia to help Africa to the best of her ability because we are sister continents."⁴⁹ Again, speaking in New Delhi on 6 March, 1957, the Prime Minister hailed the independence of Ghana as symbolic for the whole continent of Africa and said that "to see Africa....turn its face towards dawn after the dark night is indeed something exhilarating."⁵⁰

By the fifties, Africa was wide awake. In Tanganyika a strong nationalist movement was growing under the leadership of Julius Nyerere. Although the Administering Authority for Tanganyika, the U.K., stood committed—under Article 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement and Article 76(b) of the U.N. Charter—to grant freedom to the people of Tanganyika, the manner in which it transferred power was all important. In this connection one cannot help recalling the peculiar circumstances in which sovereign power was transferred to the people of India. The U.K. had fanned communal feelings in India for such a long time that the country found itself in the midst of riots at the dawn of independence. Spokesmen for India were therefore quite sceptical of any racial approach to the question of Tanganyika's freedom on the part of the British in Africa. They expressed doubts about the efficacy of the parity formula enunciated in Tanganyika in 1951 by the British Administration by which the Africans, Indians and Europeans were to have equal representation in the Legislative Council. The formula emphasized, as India pointed out, the division of the population of Tanganyika on a racial basis.⁵¹

The transfer of power in Tanganyika was smooth and peaceful. This was primarily due to the non-racial atmosphere which the Indian community and the Africans had helped to establish in the country. On 9 December, 1961, Tanganyika became independent.

Free Tanganyika and India

Although it would be difficult to assess in categorical terms Tanganyika's relations with India during the past few years—too short a period for a young nation to stabilise its international relations—some trends are noticeable in the policies of the Nyerere Government seeking to establish friendly ties with freedom-loving democratic countries in the world, including India.

The adherence of India and Tanganyika to the ideals of democracy, non-alignment and world peace offers wide scope for co-opera-

tion between them. It may be of interest to observe that India was one of the countries in the world—and the only one in Asia—where Tanganyika established its diplomatic missions immediately after independence. Dr. Julius Nyerere himself was to represent Tanganyika at an international conference convened in India in 1961 to discuss the problem of Portuguese colonies, but as the pressure of events in East Africa did not allow him to leave the country, he sent one of his cabinet colleagues, Mr. N. Swai, to the conference.

Under present conditions, there is still greater scope for closer co-operation between the two countries in various fields. India can help establish industries in Tanzania. When asked by this writer what impressed him most in India during his two private visits there, the Vice-President of Tanzania, Mr. Rashidi Kawawa, replied that cottage and small-scale industries had aroused a great deal of interest in him. He would like such industries started in Tanzania.

The emergence of China as a political force in East Africa appeared to shrink Indian-Tanzanian relations. But it seems that China has not had much of a success in making headway in Tanzania. Let us not forget that India too had been a friend of China and yet had been able to maintain a positive democratic and non-aligned posture in world affairs.

Democracy in Tanzania is more stable than in some other parts of Africa. Non-alignment and peace continue to be the sheet-anchor of Tanzania's foreign policy. The words of Julius Nyerere that Tanzania would not allow its friends to choose enemies for her still rend the air.

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
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Roman Economic Expansion and Exploitation in the Maghrib

D. A. PENFOLD

THE province of Africa was one of Rome's earliest acquisitions, falling to the Romans in 146 B.C. after the sack and extinction of Punic Carthage. During the period of the Republic it remained a small province with occasional sales of land to wealthy Romans and a few colonial settlements. It was surrounded by the rich yet client state of Numidia. Under the Empire, with the new foundation of Carthage, Africa Proconsularis took on a new importance, becoming one of the most highly urbanised provinces of the West and, as a granary, vital to Rome. The province reached its peak of development under the Severi, in the late second and early third centuries A.D.¹ Moreover, its prosperity lasted long after the other western provinces had fallen into decay; the Maghrib, while it was in close touch with Italy through Sicily, which forms a bridge across the Mediterranean, was isolated from the barbarian pressures in the north and was protected along its southern borders by the desert waste of the Sahara.² Africa was, in fact, one of Rome's most successful attempts at the economic development and exploitation of a country's agricultural wealth.

Yet the taming and nurturing of the Maghrib was not conducted by a large Italian settler community as perhaps took place in Spain. Under the general guidance of Rome, backed of course by her military might, it was the Punic and native Berber population who became thoroughly 'Romanised'.³ Albertini has suggested: "Le moment ou Rome acheve d'annexer l'Afrique a son Empire et affirme sa volonte de la coloniser coincide en effet par une rencontre qui fut tragique pour les dirigeants de l'etat romain, avec le moment ou la depopulation de l'Italie se manifeste comme un fait incontestable. On dut renoncer a faire de l'Afrique une colonie de peuplement, a poursuivre l'importation de colons non-africains telle quelle avait commence au dernier siecle de la republique et dans les premieres annees de l'Empire Une solution s'imposait, et les Romains l'accepterent delibere-ment: *pour peupler et mettre en valeur l'Afrique, on ne pouvait avoir recours qu'aux Africains eux-memes.*"⁴




ROMAN AFRICA
AT THE TIME OF THE SEVERI

Rome's first involvement in the Maghrib was the power struggle with Carthage in which the supremacy of the Mediterranean was at stake. By the middle of the third century B.C. Rome had extended her influence over the whole of peninsular Italy while Carthage was seeking a *mare clausum* in the western Mediterranean. Thus, if Carthage were to gain full control over the whole of Sicily she would be in a position to interrupt the trading activities of the Greek cities of southern Italy. These city states might then ally themselves with Carthage to avoid such a contingency and thus leave their alliance with Rome.⁵ For the Carthaginians, commerce and the freedom of the seas for themselves alone was the basic motivation for war with the Romans; for Rome, the threat was to her newly acquired hegemony in Italy. The result of the two great wars, lasting from 264 B.C. to 202 B.C. was vast extension of Roman territory; Sicily, Spain, Sardinia and Corsica came under her sway; the Carthaginians were confined to a small area in the north-eastern corner of the Maghrib,⁶ which fell to the Romans in 146 B.C., after the third Punic War.

Thus Rome obtained her first territorial footing in North Africa. This region inherited by the Romans was agriculturally one of the richest parts of the Mediterranean area; upon its fertility the Carthaginian economy had been based after Sicily, and thus all hope of a *mare clausum* had been lost. Before the first war between Carthage and Rome the Punic cities of Africa had devoted themselves almost entirely to commerce. They had produced wine, olive oil, and fruit, obtaining their corn from the Carthaginian province of Sicily and Sardinia.⁷ After Carthage's defeat in this war, with Sicily and Sardinia lost to her, she had to produce her own corn. This, according to our sources, they were well able to do.⁸

After the second Punic war, Carthage, with her territory much reduced and her activities circumscribed, turned her attention to intensive gardening and plantation farming.⁹ Her general agricultural success seems to have caused considerable disquiet among Italian landowners who, led on by the implacable Cato, probably saw a definite threat to Italian agriculture and thus their own well-being. In Italy too scientific methods of farming were being developed to produce oil, wine and fruit on a mass scale. It would no doubt be much more desirable if the Romans had no competitors in this field. The landowners were not the only people ready to listen to Cato's arguments. The merchant class, after Zama Regia, suddenly found themselves without any serious trade rivals, with the whole of the Maghrib, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, southern France and a large part of Spain opened up to their activities.¹⁰ They would hardly be likely to wish their freedom to trade to be jeopardised by a resurgent Carthage. With these interests at stake, together with the evocation of the ghost of Hanni-



bal, Cato would find ready ears for his proposal "ceterum censeo Carthaginem esse delendam."¹¹ The war resulted in the complete destruction of Carthage, and a solemn curse was laid upon its site. The land of Carthage became *ager publicus* and was leased by the senate to investors. The province of Africa was instituted, with Utica, which had wisely defected to the Romans before the war, as the administrative centre.¹² So ended six hundred years of Punic Carthage.¹³

Nevertheless, the site upon which so solemn a curse had been laid, situated as it was around the lower reaches of the Bagradas valley (mod. Oued Medjerda) was an obvious one for settlement.¹⁴ In 125 B.C. the province was hit by a plague of locusts, and, according to Orosius, more than 200,000 inhabitants of the region round Utica and old Carthage died of famine.¹⁵ This left derelict one of the most fertile tracts of land in the Roman world. Apart from the rich farmland of the Bagradas valley, there was also Carthage's site as a trading city with its excellent harbour. It was irrational to leave such a position, fertile and open to the sea, as useless, merely in deference to the gods. No doubt with an eye to the site's potential, Gaius Gracchus proposed in his Lex Rubria of 122-3 B.C. the colony of Iunonia, of 6,000 settlers on the site of old Carthage. The allotments were to be of 200 iugera each, and to be held, not under the law, *solum provinciale*, but *unde optimo iure Quipitum*. The Lex Rubria became law, and in the spring of 112 B. C. G. Gracchus went to Africa to organise the foundation of this colony. The colony did not come to full fruition, because of Gracchus's assassination, but some of the original settlers must have stayed on, since the Lex Agraria of 111 B.C. confirms their tenure.¹⁶ One of the reasons for the opposition to Gracchus's settlement in Africa may have been that landowners were beginning to see the province as a potential field for private investment. After the last Punic war, there was little rush for land in Africa; Italian landowners were doing quite well in Italy. The Gracchan legislation, however, ensured that a large number of the *latifundia* owners in Italy lost a lot of land. Again, with the colonial settlement of Gaius Gracchus and Livius Drusus there were no more, or few, public lands left in the peninsula, except for the '*agri Campani*'.¹⁷ Unable to expand any further in Italy, wealthy men must look elsewhere, and Africa was one possible area. In 111 B.C. the Lex Agraria was passed under which land was to be sold in Africa.¹⁸ Thus the way was laid open for the growth of large estates in Africa, which became a feature of the province under the Empire.¹⁹

The destruction of Carthaginian power after Zama Regia had left a power vacuum in North Africa that was filled, not by the Romans, but by the Maghribian kingdom of Numidia. Masinissa may truly be called the founder of this state. Apart from extending his kingdom

at the expense of Carthage in the first half of the second century B.C. he had fostered agriculture on the plains around Cirta, his capital, and in the upper Bagradas valley. He captured the towns of the Emporia from the Carthaginians in 19 B.C.²⁰ and was continually at diplomatic odds with Carthage until the dispute was solved in 146 B.C. by the elimination of the latter city altogether. Polybius has a eulogy of Masinissa, and Charles Andre-Julien has said, "il fut l'auteur essentiel de la transformation economique du Maghrib central. Il fallut certainement fixer des tribus en leur donnant la propriete du sol et les proteger contre l'incursion des nomades."²¹ It was perhaps under Masinissa that the cult of Ceres, the corn goddess, became widely practised in Numidia. During the Jugurthine war (111-105 B.C.) we read of a colony of Italians at Cirta and in 107 B.C. Marius advanced up the Bagradas valley, "in agrum fertilem et praeda onustum".²² Yet it was this war that ended Numidian independence; though still a rich and prosperous state, she became a client of Rome, and the way lay open for future annexation of her territory.

After the Jugurthine war, in 103 B.C., the tribune, Saturninus, had his bill passed giving plots of land of 100 iugera each to Marius's veterans.²³ The settlements were in the hill country south of the Bagradas; as late as the third century A.D. there were towns still including among their titles the word '*Nariania*' Thuburbitana celebrates Marius as *conditor coloniae*. A commission set up by Saturninus and Marius founded a *colonia* on the island of Carcina.²⁴ The Jugurthine war made it apparent that Rome, as the supreme power in the Mediterranean, with extensive trading interests, would inevitably be brought into any conflict in North Africa. Numidia, fostered by its friendship with Rome, during the second century B.C. had become a powerful kingdom. Eastern Numidia, in the Bagradas valley, appears to have been a rich and thriving territory. The city of Vaga was the most frequented market in the whole kingdom where there was, as at Cirta, a large number of Italian traders. Sicca was another town where Marius went to obtain corn. Lares, another, eleven miles south of Sicca (mod. le Kef); also near Sicca was the town of Zama Regia. Capsa, according to Sallust, was an important and strongly defended city. Its cultivated territory must therefore have been fairly extensive. There also seems to have been considerable grazing. Thala was a large and rich city, although in the midst of waterless desert.²⁵ Thus we see the Bagradas valley as a thriving and well-populated area with, elsewhere, pockets of habitation, apparently surrounded by wild and inhospitable territory save for the agricultural development on the plains of Cirta.

In 82 B.C. Pompey, with the senate's support, was given the praetorian *imperium* with the task of expelling the Marian faction from

Sicily. After successfully completing this assignment, Pompey crossed to Africa.²⁶ The campaign ended in complete victory for the general. Many of the men in Domitius's army, opposing Pompey, were probably Marian settlers who had been settled there after the Jugurthine war under Saturninus's commission. After his victory Pompey made a victorious march through Numidia, displacing one Iarbas, who had usurped the throne, and restoring the rightful occupant, Hiempsal. His march was an impressive show of Roman military power, as well as earning for Pompey the lasting friendship of the Numidian dynasty; a fact of great importance to Numidia's later history, involving her in the Civil War on the Pompeian side.²⁷

In 49 B.C. Caesar crossed the Rubicon. In the same year, the Caesarian general, Curio, landed in Africa with two legions and five hundred cavalry. He was opposed by P. Attius Carius, the governor of Africa, who also had two legions under his command one stationed at Utica and the other at Hadrumetum. Juba, King of Numidia and son of Hiempsal, gave support to the Pompeian forces, as did Masinissa, a king who appears to have ruled a small domain, sandwiched between Numidia and Mauretania. The Caesarians received help from Bogud, king of Mauretania, and from the Roman adventurer, Publius Sittius, who for more than twenty years had served the kings of Mauretania with an army and a small fleet.²⁸ Curio was decisively defeated and himself killed. The Pompeians, however, by this success, gained only a short reprieve for, with Pompey dead, Caesar arrived in Africa. After a short campaign the *dictator's* army won a complete victory in the battle of Thapsus. In Numidia, Sittius defeated Juba's general, Saburra, and Juba, together with his lieutenant, committed suicide.

A new settlement had obviously to be made in the Maghrib. An independent Numidia was a danger to Roman law and order in the western Mediterranean. Not that it could pursue any longer an entirely independent policy, but it could throw its considerable weight on the side of any Roman faction, as it did with Domitius and later with the Pompeians. The greater part of Juba's kingdom became the province of *Africa Nova*, while the old province was named, appropriately enough, *Africa Vetus*. The western dominions of Masinissa, who now just disappears from the scene altogether, were given to Bocchus of Mauretania. The eastern part of Masinissa's kingdom was given to Sittius, who also gained a strip of territory that had belonged to Juba.²⁹ At the close of the campaign, Caesar assigned land to a number of his troops who had fought with him in Africa, together with a number of those who had fought with him elsewhere. Carthage was refounded with a small settlement at La Malga, an act of great importance to the future development of Africa.³⁰ Once again the harbours of Carthage might be used. Situated at the mouth of the Bagradas

valley, Carthage was a natural port for this vast and rich agricultural area. Once refounded the city inevitably outstripped its neighbours and became one of the four largest urban centres of the Empire, together with Rome, Antioch and Alexandria. The marble quarries at Henchir Schemtu were perhaps taken over at this time.³¹ Other Caesarian *coloniae* were Curbis (mod. Korba), Clupea (Kelibia), Carpis (Henchir Mraissa), Hippo Diarrhytus (Bizerte), and Thysdrus (mod. El-Djem).³² In the territories held by Sittius, there were colonies at Cirta and probably at Rusicade, Chullu and Milev. This general settlement however had little time to develop for Caesar was murdered in 44 B.C.

Nor did Africa escape the ensuing military anarchy. Titus Sextius, the governor of Africa Nova, was friendly to Anthony. The Republican cause, which had suffered a great defeat at Thapsus, was not yet dead. The antagonism toward the Caesarian party had perhaps been aggravated by the high-handed methods of the historian and first governor of Africa Nova, Sallustius Crispus. The two Republican leaders, Quintus Cornificius and Decimus Brutus, lent their support to Sextius. The governor of Africa Vetus supported the Octavian faction. By 40 B.C., however, on the arrival of Lepidus who took the two provinces, the trouble appears to be over. After Lepidus's defection from the Triumvirate, when in 36 B.C. he took part of his army to Sicily, Statilius Taurus was sent out to Africa to organise both provinces in which task he appears to have met with little opposition.³³ Sextius Pompeius, son of the great Pompey, since he had command of the seas, used his navy to cause famine in Rome by cutting off its corn supplies. According to Appian, Italy at this time obtained its corn from the Orient, Sardinia, Corsica, Sicily and Africa. Africa is mentioned last in his list, and there is no indication that that province was yet vital to Rome as a corn supplier. Octavian had no compunction about letting Lepidus take Africa as part of his share when the Triumvirate divided up the Empire among themselves. A very different picture is given by Tacitus, writing of the reign of Claudius: "at hercule clim Italia legionibus longinquas in provincias commeatus portabat nec nunc infecunditate laboratur, sed Africam potius et Aegyptum exercemus, navibusque at casibus vita populi Romani permissa est." Again Herod Agrippa is reported by Josephus to have said that Rome was supported by Egypt for four months in a year and by Africa for the other eight.³⁴

In 25 B.C. Octavian, now Augustus, made a more permanent political settlement of Africa. It is from this time onward that we get a conscious development of Roman power in the Maghrib, of the resources of the area as a whole, in contrast to the piecemeal development so far with occasional colonial settlements, usually after a war, and

sporadic sales of land. We can now trace a steady and logical development. In 33 B.C. Bocchus of Mauretania had died leaving his kingdom to Rome. Juba, the son of that Juba who had aided Pompey, was given this country as his own together with a large slice of Numidia. The whole now became the kingdom of Mauretania, which entered upon its last brilliant phase as an independent monarchy with its capital at Iol (mod. Cherchel); which city took the epithet Caesarea in deference to Augustus under whose protection the monarchy flourished. The two separate provinces of *Africa Vetus* and *Nova* were abolished, and with its boundaries enlarged the province now became *Africa Proconsularis*. Yet Augustus was not interested in a merely political settlement. Following in his adopted father's footsteps, he laid more fully the foundations of further expansion. In 29 B.C. the *colonia* Julia was founded at Carthage, thus making sure that Carthage was to grow once again into Africa's leading city. In *Africa Proconsularis* there were other colonial foundations at *Sicca Veneria*, *Thuburbo Maius* (mod. Henchir Kasbat), and *Uthina* (Oudna). In the Mauretania of Bocchus colonies were founded at *Igilgili* (mod. Djidjelli), *Saldæ* (Bougie), *Rusazus* (Aseffoun), *Rusguniae* (mod. Algiers), *Gunugu* (Kouba de Sidi Brahimir. Gouraya) and *Cartenna* (Tenes) all of which were on the coast. In the interior there were only three foundations, *Tupusuctu*, *Aquæ Calidæ* and *Zucchabar*. In the Mauretania of Bogud were *Zulil*, *Bubba Campestris* (site unknown) and *Valentia Banasa* (mod. Sidi Ali bou Djenoun). Thus, although the Mauretania of Bocchus and Bogud were still nominally independent under Juba, there were a number of settlements of Roman citizens in the kingdom, most of whom pensioned soldiers, battle-hardened in the years of civil war—a strong safeguard against Juba or anyone else who might take their independence too literally, and a preparation for eventual annexation. *Africa Proconsularis* was given a standing army, although a senatorial province; one legion, the *Legio 111 Augusta*, stationed at *Ammaedara*.³⁵ Occupation of the Maghrib coast, however, does not mean mastery of the whole country. Augustus cannot have fully realised the nature of the terrain. The natural lines of communication run roughly in an ENE-WSW direction. Expansion in Africa depended on the control of these lines. The Augustan settlements on the coast were not going to make Rome mistress of the Maghrib. The ruler of Algiers is not the ruler of Algeria, as the French found to their cost. The tribes of the interior rose against this creeping Roman encroachment and widespread raiding, directed primarily against the Roman settlements, seems to have taken place. In 21 B.C. *Lucius Sempronius Atratinus*, the proconsul of Africa, celebrated a triumph, but not it appears for a decisive victory.³⁶ *Lucius Cornelius Balbus*, the proconsul for 20 B.C., was still faced with a rebellion from Mauretania to Cyrenaica, of the *Musulamii*, *Gætuli* and *Garamantes*. He

joined in his campaign with Quirinus, governor of Cyrenaica, and marched south into the Fezzan.³⁷ There they won a great victory, capturing Garama, the capital of the Garamates, together with a number of other towns. Yet in 3 A.D. we still find raiding continuing. The proconsul for this year, Passienus Rufus, was awarded the *ornamenta triumphalia* and received the title of *imperator*³⁸. In 6 A.D. the Gaetulians rebelled against Juba, no doubt because of his pro-Roman sympathies, although he cannot have had much choice in the matter. This rebellion was finally crushed by Cornelius Cossus, who received the title *Gaetulicus* and *ornamenta triumphalia* for his services.³⁹ The Maghrib was, for a short time, peaceful.

Despite the internal troubles, economic development had been steadily progressing. Juba's capital, Iol'Caesarea, drawing grain from the farmlands of its hinterland in the Cheliff river valley, became a flourishing port, embellished with statuary and architecture in the classical style.⁴⁰ Second century inscriptions refer to *officinae Agrippae*.⁴¹ Perhaps therefore new quarries were opened under the auspices of Agrippa. Road building this period, primarily for military purposes yet a prerequisite of economic expansion on any scale, must have been begun. The coastal colonies seem soon to have been joined up by roads. There was an important road linking Carthage with Simitthu which must have been for economic reasons as much as for military. Through Carthage *'marmor Numidicum* was shipped to many places in the Empire.⁴² A road to link Uthina, Thuburbo Maius, Assuras and Elles was begun.⁴³ In 20-19 B.C. Cornelius Balbus had conquered in the region of Biskra, and road building here for military purposes may well have been begun at this time.⁴⁴ In 6 A.D. the Gaetulians had been pushed back from Gabes, and in 14 A.D. the laying of the military road from Ammaedara to Gabes was commenced. The native Libyans could now see the inevitable progress of Rome westwards and southwards. This must have been one of the important factors governing the rebellion of Tacfarinas. The episode should not be seen in isolation but as the last violent effort to throw back the encroaching yoke of Rome. The battle of the Libyans to preserve their independence begins with Jugurtha and ends with Tacfarinas.⁴⁵ This man, who had received training as a Roman auxiliary, succeeded in uniting the Libyan tribes from the Atlas in the west to the Tripolis in the east in a last desperate attempt to keep their freedom. It took the Romans seven years and an extra legion to crush the rebellion.⁴⁶ Publius Dolabella, proconsul of 24 A.D., finally drew Tacfarinas into a pitched battle at Auzia and destroyed his army. Tacfarinas died fighting. All serious resistance to Rome in the Maghrib was now over. There was continual sporadic guerilla warfare, but nothing that might endanger Rome's hold over the country.

Under Tiberius, the extension of Roman rule and Roman civilization continued. A new centuriation was laid out with its master lines from a point between Philippeville and Bone, to near Gabes, and from Cape Bon, cutting the other line at Ammaedara, to the Tunisian chotts.⁴⁷ The Romans were renouncing a defence of Africa Proconsularis as it now was and were moving in to annex the neighbouring countries. The rebellion of Tacfarinas must have shown to them that the Maghrib, because of its peculiar geographical make-up, must be conquered as a whole, if there were to be any lasting settlement just as once the French had lost Tunisia it was impossible for them to hold Algeria.

Another political lesson to be learnt from the war against Tacfarinas was that the senate would not or could not choose capable generals. The incompetence of the senatorial proconsuls was one of the prime reasons for the insurgents holding their own for as long as they did. In 37 A.D., with this factor probably in mind, Caligula's administration removed the command of the army from the proconsul of Africa, investing it in a military *legatus* stationed in Numidia, who was directly responsible to the Emperor.⁴⁸ The next move can be seen as a logical extension of Roman power, although it was effected somewhat brutally. Juba II's son, Ptolemy, who had succeeded his father as king of Mauretania, was murdered in 40 B.C. by the Roman authorities and his kingdom annexed.⁴⁹ This action gave rise to a revolt led by a freed man of the murdered king, Aedemon. It took four years of fighting to crush the revolt with Roman armies serving under Hosidius Geta and Suetonius Paulinus. Under Claudius, Galba was appointed proconsul for the years 44-46 A.D. with command of the army as well as the rising was finally quelled. A glance at the map of the terrain of the western Maghrib shows that the western part of Mauretania was allied geographically much more closely to Spain than to the rest of North Africa. This Claudius's administration recognised by dividing Mauretania into two procuratorial provinces, Mauretania Caesariensis with its capital at Iol Caesarea, and Mauretania Tingitana, with its capital at Tingi (mod. Tangiers).⁵⁰ Coloniae of veterans were settled at Iol and Tipasa in Caesariensis, and at Lixus and Tingi in Tingitana.⁵¹ The whole of the Maghrib was now directly under Roman control; 'pacification' and development could now get fully under way. We must remember, however, that Juba II's reign in Mauretania-Numidia had been a highly successful one and much progress in the field of agriculture had been made.

In the reign of Nero, we have the famous case of the confiscation of estates in Africa. Six men, who owned over half the land of Africa Proconsularis, had their property confiscated and themselves put to death.⁵² Pliny is perhaps exaggerating the proportion of land that

these men owned, but it surely is an illustration of the process that had been going on since the time of the Gracchi. Under the Lex Rubria there were some who settled near the site of old Carthage. They held the land *iure optimo Quiritum*. In 111 B.C. there was the sale of *ager publicus* in Africa. Marius's veterans were given 100 iugera each (62.5 acres). These must have been large plots for one man to farm; similarly with grants of 200 iugera given to the Gracchan settlers. Many of Marius's men, until joining his new proletarian army, had been living on corn doles or casual employment in Rome, and had little knowledge of practical farming. Thus many, after a short struggle, would sell up and drift into the towns or go back to Italy. The more successful of the settlers would thereby gradually build up estates, perhaps in turn to be bought out by some wealthy Roman capitalist. The civil wars in Africa, Pompey in 82 B.C., Curio in 49 B.C. and Caesar in 47 B.C. must also have driven many off the land, leaving their farms to be bought by others more fortunate. That Africa was a place in which wealthy men might invest is shown in the Satyricon of Petronius Arbiter, where one Eumolpius, wishing to pass himself off as a wealthy businessman, pretends to have 30 mHs invested in the province.⁵³ Another factor involved in the amassing of large estates was the gradual urbanisation during the period of the Julii and Claudii. This meant the formation of a city bourgeoisie. Wealth was, in Roman times, usually based on agriculture, particularly so in Africa; hence we get the introduction of capitalist husbandry, where the land must, in addition to feeding those who actually work it, produce a surplus for the town populations. Further, with the growth of these large estates came the more profitable forms of agriculture, olive and viti-culture.

Africa was only marginally involved in the civil wars that wrecked the Empire on the death of Nero in 68 A.D. that year, with Galba declared Emperor by his troops in Spain, the frightened Nero sent his mistress, Calvia Crispinilla, to Africa to urge Clodius Macer, the *legatus* of the third legion, to intervene. Crispinilla does not appear to have taken her loyalties very seriously. Clodius, instead of backing Nero, rebelled against him, with the 'Restoration of the Republic' as his slogan.⁵⁴ Rome's corn supply was threatened.⁵⁵ No longer could Africa be left in the hands of an enemy of the government. Whoever wished to rule at Rome must hold Africa. A far cry from the time when, as a sap to his pride, Lepidus could be palmed off with that province. On Galba's accession, Macer was murdered by an imperial agent Trebonius Garutianus. With this problem summarily settled, further trouble arose in Numidia and Mauretania. When Vitellius became Emperor, the additional legion raised by Clodius Macer and abandoned at his death resumed service again. Vitellius appears to have been popular in Africa,

while Vespasian was disliked.⁵⁶ Valerius Festus, the *legatus* of the Third Legion, was a kinsman of Vitellius, but apparently a man who swam with the current. Lucceius Albinus, the pro-curator of Mauretania Caesariensis, declared himself independent. Festus, however, was not called upon to make the difficult choice between loyalty to a failing Emperor and open rebellion, since Albinus marched westwards hoping to get reinforcements from Spain. But Spain was closed to him. Consequently he set himself up as King Juba of Mauretania perhaps hoping to appeal to the nationalist sentiments of the native population, who were probably still smarting under the murder of Ptolemy and its result. If so, he was unsuccessful, for he had his throat cut. The entire Maghrib was now theoretically in Vitellius's hands. Festus, however, was wavering. While overtly loyal to Vitellius, he was making a secret treaty with Vespasian. On the latter's accession, Festus promptly put Calpurnius Piso, the proconsul, to death on suspicion of supporting the Vitellian faction.⁵⁷

Vespasian's reign, throughout the Empire, was one of consolidation. Yet the first years saw disturbances between the two cities of the Tripolis, Oea and Lepois Magna. The Garamantes took advantage of the situation and, joining in on the side of Oea, devastated the cultivated lands round Lepois Magna. Valerius Festus marched against them and succeeded in asserting law and order. During the course of his campaign, a new route from Oea to Mourzouk, through Hammada el Homra was discovered.⁵⁸ In keeping with the westward expansion, the Third Legion moved its headquarters from Ammaedara to Theveste in 75 A.D. and in its place a veteran colony was settled there.⁵⁹ A road was built from Theveste to Hippo Rigijs, giving the military direct access to a port. It has been suggested that the *fossatum* and *limes* system may have been conceived and begun during Vespasian's reign with the building of the Djebel Tebaga section. The same Emperor succeeded in organising the vast imperial and public estates, fusing them together.⁶⁰

Under Domitian the military was called upon once again to put down rebellion. In 85-86 A.D. the Nasamones rose against the extortionate demands of the tax-gatherers. The Third Legion, under its *legatus*, Suellius Flaccus, having suffered a preliminary defeat eventually annihilated them. So much so that Domitian is reputed to have announced to the senate that the Nasamones had ceased to exist.⁶¹ Following upon the campaign of Valerius Festus into the Fezzan, there are recorded two expeditions for Domitian's reign. Septimius Flaccus, with his troops, marched as far as Garama and then made a three-month journey to the land of Ethiopia. This was perhaps a

military reconnaissance; the second expedition seems to have been more like a trading expedition. One Julius Maternus of Leptis (perhaps a merchant) accompanied by the king of the Garamantes travelled for four months and came to Agisymba, the assembly place of the rhinoceros. This latter is generally thought to be Lake Chad.⁶² With North Africa now safely in their hands, and the Saharan Garamantes cowed, the Romans were looking to the old trade routes across the desert, whence came slaves, ivory, gold and precious woods. In the office of the Sabrathan merchants at Ostia, the floor has a mosaic showing an elephant.⁶³ In 85-4 A.D. there was further trouble in Mauretania. Velleius Rufus, commander of the urban cohort at Carthage, taking a detachment from the Third Legion, suppressed the insurgents without any apparent difficulty. There was, however, a shortage of corn in Italy, perhaps a result of the troubles of the reign, but, considering the measures taken to deal with the problem, the trouble was more deep-seated than a mere interruption of supplies. Domitian introduced a bill forbidding the planting of any more vine-yards in Italy, and ordering half the vine-yards in the provinces to be cut down. Suetonius says that this bill was never put into practice; but Rostovtzeff is quite definite that it was carried out in Africa.⁶⁴ We have seen how, under the Julii and Claudii together with urbanisation and the growth of large estates, plantation farming was introduced, as being more profitable. The same process had been going on in Italy since the second century B.C. while corn had been brought from provinces. Egypt and Africa were now the two main suppliers of Italy's grain. If African agriculture followed the same pattern as the Italian, then corn would be in very short supply in Italy.

With the death of Domitian comes the Antonine period, the Roman Empire at its height. But for Africa, the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian were still times of expansion. Roads were built and colonies founded. The army was moved west again, from Theveste to Thamugadi (mod. Timgad), remained there for a brief period, and was moved on again to Lambaesis, whence it could survey the much frequented passage between the Sahara, the Tell and the Aures.⁶⁵ The Roman frontier was extended to the south of the Aures. This mountain massif was surrounded by roads. Thamugadi to Theveste, Sitifis to Zarai, hence south of the Aures to the new fortress of Ad Maiores.⁶⁶ Also organised was the system of *praefecti gentium*. These were *praefecti* whose duty was to oversee the affairs of the various tribes. Much of the tribal land was taken away from its previous occupants, and sold to private landowners. In the territory of the Musulamii military colonies were founded at Ammaedara and Madauros. These two would need land. What remained became tribal domain. It thus became obvious that many tribesmen could no longer obtain a living from the tribal lands and must become a source of cheap labour.

It shows the grip that Rome now had on the Maghrib, in that these measures did not precipitate any serious rebellion.

Yet ever since the murder of Ptolemy unrest seems to have been endemic among the Mauri tribes of the mountains. Under Hadrian they rose once more against their Roman rulers, and were again suppressed by a Roman army, this time under Marcus Turbo, who was probably procurator of the two Mauretaniae for the duration of the emergency.⁶⁷ The great road linking Carthage, Thesveste and Lambaesis was completed in this reign, thus joining up the headquarters of the *legatus* with that of the proconsul. Hadrian set up three military centres: Rapidum in Mauretania Caesariensis, with road connections into Africa, Gemellae in southern Numidia on the Oued Djedi, and Lambaesis itself.⁶⁸ Finally, this most energetic of Emperors himself visited Africa and Mauretania, where he stayed for about four months of the year 128 A.D. At Lambaesis he delivered his famous address to the troops.⁶⁹ Perhaps as a result of this visit, Hadrian saw how fields were being allowed to decay, since the *conductores* lessees of Imperial estates were finding that pasture farming produced greater profits. The Emperor tried to reverse this process by a law, the *Lex Hadriana*, which offered a number of concessions to persons who would bring back under cultivation land which had been allowed to relapse into its natural state.⁷⁰

Under Hadrian's successor, Antoninus Pius, another revolt, this time more serious, broke out among the Mauri. The Legio VI Ferrata was sent from Syria. This legion, while the Third was engaged in Mauretania, was operating in the eastern Maghrib, penetrating the Aures and checking the tribesmen of the desert. The army of Spain under Titus Varius Clemens took the Mauri in the rear. In 149 A.D. the Mauri were defeated, and for the time being lay quiet. The main result of the war, however, was that the Aures, for the first time were really penetrated, and the inhabitants reduced to submission.⁷¹ The work of road building and, by now road repairing, continued. Varius Clemens' defeat of the Mauri had only been temporary. During Marcus Aurelius's reign, they took up arms again, this time even ravaging the coast of Baetica. Baetica was declared an Imperial province, troops were sent and the rebels crushed.⁷² A Mauri fleet in operation must have interfered to some extent with the corn supply. Yet Africa's troubles were small compared with the crisis on the northern frontiers of the Empire; it was more likely this crisis, rather than the Mauri revolt, was the reason for the apparent lack of development in the Maghrib at this time. No new roads are known to have been built, and we have to wait until the reign of Commodus for a resurgence of activity. Military works were repaired and new ones built. New roads were laid and the Tripolitanian *limes* perhaps begun.⁷³

The anarchy that followed Commodus's reign, comparable to 69 A.D., again scarcely touched Africa, but it did result in an African Emperor, the first true provincial to become Emperor of Rome.⁷⁴ Septimius, a native of Lepois Magna, always seemed to have been conscious of his African birthplace, and under this man and his successors, Caracalla and Alexander Severus, Africa reached its height at a time when most other provinces of the Empire were beginning to see their economies decay. Immediately after his accession, Severus had to march against Pescennius Niger, the claimant for the throne from the armies of the east. Before moving against him, however, Septimius had to secure the province of Africa; there was a corn shortage at Rome, and it may have been at this time that Severus commenced his reorganisation of the corn and oil supply from Africa, which, according to the *Historia*, left Rome, at the Emperor's death, with a surplus of corn amounting to seven years' tribute, and of oil amounting to five years' tribute. He may well have utilised the Imperial cornfleet, organised under Commodus, to ensure regular supplies.⁷⁵ The Nasamones who, after all, had not ceased to exist despite Domitian's boast together with the Garamantes rose against the Romans, perhaps encouraged by the somewhat unstable situation of Imperial politics in the early years of the reign. These two peoples raided the Tripolitanian coastlands, but again Rome's hold was not shaken. The result was radical reorganisation of the defences of Tripolitania. Rome was no longer to depend on an occasional punitive expedition into the Fezzan to maintain the loyalty of the Garamantes and protect the coast. The forts of Bu Ngem and Garama were built well to the south in order to protect the trans-Saharan trade routes and to prevent any hostile tribes from the desert from even reaching the coast. As in the Maghribian part of the province, the *limes* system was developed. The forts were joined by lateral roads and a system of defence in depth was provided by the settlement of veterans on fortified farms. These were self-supporting establishments, which at the same time could help in the defence of the Saharan frontier,⁷⁶ particularly in Caesariensis.⁷⁷ The frontiers of Africa reached their greatest extent at this time. Castellum Dimmidi was founded far to the south of Numidia.⁷⁸ Under the encouragement of the Emperor, the cities of Africa were beautified. At Lepois Magna, which received the particular attention of Severus, a complex of buildings, a forum, basilica, theatre and colonnade were constructed together with a large new harbour. It was now that the logical step of dividing Africa Proconsularis from Numidia was taken. The two became entirely separate provinces.

So Africa had arrived at the peak of its glory. Throughout the Later Empire, it remained comparatively stable and wealthy. It became one of the strongholds of Christianity, producing in St. Augustine of Hippo Regius the one figure who, after St. Paul, did more than

any other person to shape European Christianity. The province fell with little fighting to the Vendals, but was retrieved for the Empire from Byzantium by Justinian's general Belisarius. Thus Africa remained. The first Arab invasion seems to have taken over where the Romans had left off. It was not until the invasion of the primitive Hilalian Arabs in 1000 A.D. that the Maghrib lapsed once again into the nomadism from which it is only now re-emerging.

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1. The African dynasty : Septimius Severus, 193-211 A.D.; Caracalla 211-217 A.D.; Alexander Severus, 22-235 A.D. Septimius's sister could scarcely speak Latin, much to that Emperor's embarrassment, when she visited him in Rome. *Scriptores Historiae Augustae*, 'Vita Severi' XV, 7.
2. The Arabs called it 'Djezirat-el-Maghrib', Island of the West'.
3. Rome at a few times in the history of the Early Empire kept more than one legion, the Legio III Augusta, to cover the whole territory from the Tripolis in the east to Morocco in the west.
4. E. Albertini, "L'Afrique du Nord Française dans l'Histoire," (1937), Editions Archat, Paris, 1955, ch. III, pp. 5-6. *Italics author's*.
5. For the causes of and the events leading up to this war, v. B.H. Warmington. 'Carthage', Robert Hale, London, 1960, pp. 146-150
6. The cities of the Emporia over which Carthage claimed suzerainty, were included in the kingdom of Masinissa in 193 B.C. Repeated Carthaginian diplomatic missions to Rome met with little sympathy, Livy, XXXIV, 1xii, & Appian, 'Libyca', X
7. M. Rostovtzeff, "A Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire", O.U.P., Oxford, 1957, Vol. 1. ch. 1. p. 9.
8. Immediately after her defeat in the Second Punic War, Carthage was able to give 400,000 modii of corn to the Romans: Livy XXXI, xix, 2. In 201 B.C. P. Scipio sent a large quantity of grain from Africa to be sold at Rome for 4 asses per modius : Livy, XXXI, iv. 6. In 191 B.C. for the war against Antiochus, the Carthaginians promised a further 500,000 modii of wheat and the same amount of barley : Livy XXXVI, iv, 5-9. Carthage's successful recovery after the battle of Zama Regia is finally attested by the fact that in 170 B.C. the city sent to the Romans 1m. modii of wheat, and 500,000 modii of barley: Livy XLIII, vi, 11-14.
9. M. Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.* Vol. 11. ch. 1, note 15. But not entirely, as Rostovtzeff seems to suggest. Large areas must have been devoted to cereal crops, although it was probably in the plantation farming that Italian landowners saw competition (v. xx *supra*, n. 8).
10. There were large colonies of Italian traders at Cirta and Vaga at the time of the Jugurthine War. v. *infra*. 166-157 B.C. Camanian wine was being exported to Africa. *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* XIII, 22637. 62; 8051.20; Stephane Gsell, "Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord", iv. p. 150.
11. I cannot agree with B.H. Warmington, who says that "there is no real evidence of an economic motive." This presupposes that Italian merchants were not aware of Africa's potential, at a time when numbers of them were going to Cirta and other cities of the Maghrib, for purposes of trade. Obviously a resurgent Carthage would hinder the freedom of Italian merchants. That there was no intensive exploitation of the land of Africa during the days of the Republic was surely because in 133 B.C. Rome and Italy were plunged into a violent political and social revolution from which they did not emerge until after the Augustan settlement. Moreover, the elimination of a competitor does not necessarily mean one desires to use that competitor's resources.
v. B.H. Warmington, *op. cit.* ch. IX, p. 203.
12. For Utica's alliance with Rome, v. Appian *op. cit.* XI, 75; for the settlement after the war v. Appian *op. cit.* XX, 134. Utica received an extension of her territory.
13. Taking B.H. Warmington's eighth century dating.
14. v. Appian, n. 10 *supra*.
15. Orosius, V. 11, 2. The figure is perhaps exaggerated.
16. Hugh Last, 'Gaius Gracchus,' Cambridge Ancient History, Cambridge 1951, Vol. IX. ch. 11, xi, p. 74, says some, but certainly not all allotments were as much as 200 iugera (125 acres)
The Lex Agraria of 111 B.C. C. 1. L. 1, 2585, 59-65.

17. Tenney Frank, "An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome", (1933), Pageant Books, New York, 1959, "Rome and Italy of the Republic" ch. iv. p. 252-53. "It is not impossible that they lost an aggregate of one million acres of arable land."
18. Hugh Last, *op. cit.* ch. 11. xvii, p. 100. Cicero, 'Brutus', 36, 136; Appian, 'Civil Wars' 1, 27, 122.
19. Cicero, "Epistulae ad Familiares, 12; 21; 24; 26; 27; 29; C. Anicius, Pinarius, Quintus, Turius, Aufidius and Aelius Lamia are all mentioned as having large investments in Africa.
Lamia is perhaps the founder of the Imperial estate of Hadrian's day, the 'saltus Lamianus,' v. J. Carcopino, "Melanges de Rome," 1906.
20. Livy XXXIV. 1xv.
21. Polybius, 36, 16. Repeated by Diodorus Siculus XXXII, 16, 1. Charles Andre-Julien, "Histoire de l' Afrique du Nord", Payot, Paris, 1961, Vo..1, ch. III p. 98.
22. Colony at Cirta: Sallustius Crispus, 'Bellum Jugurthinum' 21, 1-25, 5 well-farmed land: *ibid.* 47.
23. 'de viris illustribus,' 3, 1. Hugh Last, "The Enfranchisement of Italy", Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. IX, ch. IV. iii, p. 166.
24. Dessau 'Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae': 1334, 9405: Uchi Maius; 6790; Thibaris, et v.F.B. Marsh, "A History of the Roman World, 146-30 B.C." 1963, Additional notes. by H.H., Soullard, re p. 91, p. 419. Cercina: Marsh *op. cit.* p. 419.
25. Vaga, Sallustius Crispus, *op. cit.* 30, 3; 47, 1; Sicca; *ibid.* 56, 9; Lares: 90, 2; Zama Regia : 56, 6-6, 1; Capsa ; 89, 2-92, 4; Thala: 75, 1-76, 1.
26. For the details of this war, v. Hugh Last, 'Sulla', *op. cit.* ch. VI, v.p. 278-9.
27. Plutarch : Pompey X11
28. For the details of this war: v. Appian, 'Civil Wars', 11, VII, 44-46.
F.E. Adcock, *Civil War*, Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. IX ch. XVI, iiii. 651 & ff,
29. For the settlement v. F.E. Adcock *op. cit.* ch. XVI, viii, p. 688.
30. 3,000 men, v. Appian, 'Civil Wars', 1,111,2.
31. J. W-Perkins, "Tripolitania and the Marble Trade," *Journal of Roman Studies* 1941, Vol. XXXI. Two inscriptions speak of these quarries as 'officina regia' and presumably belonged to the kings of Numidia. They were perhaps taken over by Julius Caesar at the time of his settlement of Africa.
32. Charles Andre-Julien, *op. cit.* ch. V. iii, p. 123
33. For the details of the disturbances which followed the death of Caesar v. Dio Cassius 'Epitomes' XLVIII, 21-23. Appian *op. cit.* 111, LXXV, 351; IV. L111, 226-56.
34. Tacitus, 'Annales,' X11, 43, 4; Josephus, 1, 2, 16, 4. It is perhaps Caesar who first recognised that Africa could become the granary of Rome. On his return from Africa he is reported to have said that he had conquered a territory large enough to supply the Roman public every year with 200,000 Attic bushels of grain and 3m. pounds of olive oil. Plutarch, *Julius Caesar*, LV.
35. For the Augustan settlement v. Charles Andre-Julien, *op. cit.* Vol. 1 ch. V., pp. 124-39 of. *supra.* n. 3
36. R. Cagnet, "L' armee Romaine d'Afrique et l' occupation militaire de l' Afrique sous les empereurs." Imperimerie Nationale, Paris, 1912.
37. Elder Pliny, "Natural History", V. 5,36.
38. Dessau, *I.L.S.* 120. Velleius Patarculus, 11, 16, 2.
39. Dio Cassius *op. cit.* LV. 28, 4
40. Charles Andre-Julien *op. cit.* ch. p. 125, "il l' embellit par les monuments de style classique, en pierre de taille, parmi lesquels les ruines permettent de deviner un vaste ensemble de constructions avec temple et palais et un theatre."
41. *C.I.L.* VIII, 14564, 14580-1 A.D. 133-150, et. v. J.B. Ward-Perkins, *op. cit.* p. 96.
42. The first large-scale use of *marmor numidicum* was in the Forum of Augustus, but it was not used again on such a scale until the *domus Augustana* was built in the reign of Domitian, where it was used in the columns of the peristyle. J.W. Ward-Perkins, *op. cit.* During the first century there are numerous instances of the marble being

- used in private houses : Statius, '*Silvi*', 1, 2, 148; 1, 5, 36; IV, 2, 27. Martial, VI, 42, 13. Juvenal, '*Satires*., VIII, 182.
43. P. Salama, "*Les voies romaines de l'Afrique du Nord*". Paris, pp. 22-29
 44. P. Salama, *op. cit.* Elder Pliny, *op. cit.* V. 5. 36.
 45. v. Tacitus ; '*Annales*', 11, 52; 111, 20; 35; 72 & ff; IV., 23-4
 46. The Legio IX Hispania, which had been stationed in Pannonia, v. *supra*, n. 3.
 47. Charles Andre-Julien, *op. cit.* p. 130.
 48. For the territorial division between Numidia and Africa Proconsularis, v. Ch. Andre-Julien, *op. cit.* p. 144.
 49. C.I.L. VIII, 8630, Stephane Gsell, *op. cit.* VIII, p. 284, & ff.
 50. Ch. Andre-Julien, *op. cit.* Vol. 1. ch. vi. iii, p. 145.
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 52. Elder Pliny : *op. cit.* XVIII, vii, 35, J. Carcopino, "*Melanges Archaeologiques d' Histoire*." Paris, XXVI, 1906, p. 435.
 53. "Praeterea habere in Africa trecenties sestertium fundis nominibusque depositum; iam familiam quidem tam magnam per agros Numidiae sparsam, ut possit vel Carthaginem capere," Petronius Arbiter, "*Satyricon*", 117.
 54. H. Mattingly & E.A. Sydenham, "*Roman Imperial Coinage*," Spink, 1936, Vol. 1, pp. 193 & ff; vol. of plates : IV. p.208, a & b. Coins bear the slogan "*re publica restituta*".
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 57. Tacitus, '*Histories*,' 11, 7, & 98.
 58. Tacitus, *op. cit.* IV, 49-50, Elder Pliny, *op. cit.* V. 38
 59. Ch. Andre-Julien, *op. cit.* Vol. 1. ch. VI, ii. 14.
 60. For the roads, v. P. Salama, *op. cit.* pp.22-29. '*Limes*' and '*fossata*': for a fuller investigation of this system of defence in depth v. J. Baradez, "*Fossatum Africae*," Paris, 1949. For the organisation of the Imperial Estates, v. M. Rostovtzeff *op. cit.* Vo. 1. ch. iv. p. 110
 61. Dio Cassius, LXVII, IV, 6-7.
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 63. Above the notif are the words '*stat Sabratensium*'. Tenney Frank, *op. cit.* F. Haywood, '*Africa*', ch. 11, iv. p. 6203.
 64. Suetonius, "*Domitian*," VI1, 2. M. Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.* Vol. 1. ch. VI, p. 202
 65. Ch. Andre-Julien, *op. cit.* Vol. 1. ch. VI, ii, p.140.
 66. M. Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.* Vol. 1 ch. VI1, p. 321. They were by no means all thus automatically pauperised. There seems to have been a demand for labour at certain times of the year. Apuleius, '*Apologia*' 171, speaks of the exchange of labour at busy times. C. I. L. VI11, 11824 concerns a man who was able to make a good living by selling his labour. He had been born of poor parents, and cultivated a small patch of land. In the fall he had a gang of reapers wherever there was harvesting to be done, and finally became a wealthy and honoured man.
 67. S.H.A. '*Vita Hadriani*' V. 8; VI, 7.
 68. P. Salama, *op. cit.* pp. 22-29.
 69. S.H.A. '*Vita Hadriani*', XIII, pp.4-5. Cohenz ii, 2, p. 107 ff. Nos. 5-8 & p. 209 ff. Nos. 1221-1232. p. 111, Nos. 63-71.
 70. M. Rostovtzeff *op. cit.* Vol. 1. ch. vi, p. 202 & ch. VI11, p. 366. '*Lex Hadriana*' C. 1. L. VI11, 259431, iii.
 71. S.H.A. '*Vita Pii*', V, 4
 72. S.H.A. '*Vita Antonini*,' XXI, 1: XXI1, 9-11; '*Vita Severi*', 11, 3-5.
 73. P. Salama, *op. cit.*
 74. v. *supra*, n. 1.

75. Surplus of corn and oil '*Vita Severis*' XXX111, 2, corn fleet ; *Vita Commodi*', XV11, 7-9, Cassius Dio.
76. J. Baradez, *op. cit.* J.B. Ward-Perkins, "The Limes Tripolitanus in the Light of Recent Discoveries', *Journal of Roman Studies*, XXXIX, 1949, pp. 81 ff. R.G. Goodschild, "The Limes Tripolitanus, II", *ibid*, XL, 1950, p 30 ff.
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OAU: Promise and Performance

RAMESH DUTTA DIKSHIT

“THIS restlessness all over Africa stands for self-discovery, self-realization... It tells of power just breaking through. The great giant has been asleep for a long time. He is now awoken. This Niagara, if allowed to sweep through the land, may deluge and inundate cities and towns. If harnessed.....may generate a dynamo that will illuminate and chase away utter darkness from the continent”. said the Aggrey of Africa in 1925. Today the whole of Africa is striving for political, economic and social equality.

At a time when anti-colonialism was in full swing a powerful movement of African and Afro-Asian solidarity developed in Africa under the impact of the Bandung and Belgrade conferences. African countries expressed their desire to unite in their struggle for freedom and secure full independence. Solidarity in the struggle against colonialism stimulated a greater awareness of their common interests, of the need to unite and coordinate their efforts to overcome their economic and social backwardness. The problem facing these countries from the first days of decolonization was whether this solidarity would overcome the economic, political and other contradictions which were bound to emerge after their attaining independence.¹

In practical terms African solidarity has showed itself in the past in the development of pan-Africanism. The first pan-African Congress was held in 1919. But pan-African and African nationalism took a concrete expression when the fifth pan-African Congress met in Manchester in 1945, attended by over 200 delegates. “Instead of a rather nebulous movement concerned vaguely with black nationalism, the pan-African movement had become an expression of African nationalism”, wrote Kwame Nkrumah, one of the most active members of the movement since 1945. Nkrumah cherished the ambition of “using Gold Coast (Ghana) as the staging-off point for African independence and unity”.² Thus when Ghana achieved complete freedom in 1957 it declared that “there would be no meaning to the national independence of Ghana unless it was linked with the total

liberation of the African continent". It was with this view that a Conference of Independent African States was called at Accra in April 1948. Thus "at last pan-Africanism had moved to the African continent where it really belonged.... The Accra conference resulted in a great upsurge of interest in the cause of African freedom and unity".²

Soon after, the first All-African People's Conference met at Accra in December 1948. It was attended by delegates from 62 African nationalist organizations. The delegates agreed that "as a first step toward the attainment of the broad objective of an African commonwealth, the independent states of Africa should amalgamate themselves into groups on the basis of geographical contiguity, economic interdependence, linguistic and cultural affinity". Informally it was suggested that five regions of Africa should form the first tier of the proposed commonwealth.

At the Accra conference of independent States "it was generally felt that a sense of oneness should pervade the political, social, cultural and economic affairs of all the countries of Africa in their relations with the countries of Europe, America and Asia and that the African Personality must be projected on a continental, rather than territorial, basis. But even before the conference concluded there were signs of strain... There were grumblings about some intended or unintended offence offered to certain delegates from East Africa by certain Ghanaians. The strain has widened ever since".⁴ Another sign of strain was the struggle among the delegations to obtain the consent of the conference to hold the next conference in their own countries rather than in Ghana. In the end victory went to Ethiopia and the second conference was held at Addis Ababa in the middle of 1960. The conference decided to set up an Organization of Economic Cooperation and recommended that all participating states should exchange views on their foreign policies with a view to evolving a common foreign policy to safeguard their "independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity". It also called for the establishment of a council for African educational, cultural, scientific and economic cooperation.

Nkrumah had in the meantime begun to think aloud about the power and influence which a large and progressive country could exercise.⁵ He turned to the idea of a United States of West Africa as a prelude to the political unification of the continent and organized a meeting between Ghana and Liberia in Monrovia. It was decided to wait for the independence of Nigeria and Sierra Leone before taking further steps for a political union. In May 1960, shortly after the break-up of the Senegal-Mali Federation there took place another meeting in Accra where a joint communique proclaiming the

formation of a Ghana-Guinea-Mali Federation was issued. "Our union was named the Union of African States (UAS) and was to form the nucleus of the United States of Africa," said Nkrumah.⁶

In January 1961 the so-called Casablanca States—Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Libya, Egypt, Morocco and Algeria—met at Casablanca, the Moroccan capital. The central theme of the conference was the situation in the Congo and the failure of the UN to deal with it effectively. The conference proposed the establishment of a permanent African Consultative Committee and permanent functional committees on political, economic and cultural subjects. A joint African High Command comprising the Chiefs of Staff of independent African nations was also provided for "with a view to ensuring the common defence of Africa in case of aggression against any part of the continent and with a view to safeguarding the independence of African States". The conference charter ended with an "appeal to all independent African States to associate themselves with our common action for the consolidation of liberty in Africa and the building up of its unity and security." At the closing session of the conference, Nkrumah observed: "African States must unite or sell themselves out to imperialist or colonist exploiters for a mess of pottage, or disintegrate individually". The participants declared their intention to withdraw their troops from the Congo. But in spite of the declaration Ghana and its African allies did not withdraw their troops from the Congo. One may describe the distinguishing marks of the Casablanca powers as "more or less excitedly pro-Lumumba.... probably communist-inspired, certainly anti-West".⁷

The French community states, which held meetings in Abidjan and Brazaville at the end of 1960, were not invited to the conference. "There seemed, therefore, justification for the view that three different blocs were emerging in Africa."⁸ This became clear when a conference took place at Monrovia where 20 out of 27 independent African states were represented, the absentees being the six Casablanca powers and the Congo. The conference was strongly against any idea of political union among African States at this stage; instead it decided that cultural, economic and scientific cooperation should be actively promoted and encouraged and that political merger should be left to the future. The Monrovia group of states has been described as "pro-Kasavubu, having little sympathy for communism and certainly pro-West."

Further differences between the groups were noticed when the Conference of Independent States of Africa was held at Lagos in January 1962. The Casablanca powers and the Sudan boycotted the conference, which was attended by 20 out of 28 independent states. Another point of interest was that although in 1958 the All-African

People's Conference at Accra had decided in favour of small groupings of states as a first step toward ultimate unity, in February 1962 Ghana declared that "regional commonwealths and territorial groupings will be just another form of balkanization unless they are conceived within the framework of a larger union based on a model of the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R."

In May 1963 efforts to weld these groups together were made at Addis Ababa where 31 African states signed a charter setting up the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The summit was preceded by a meeting of Foreign Ministers from May 15 to 23, 1963, which prepared an agreed agenda and drafted resolutions for consideration by the heads of states. After four days of deliberations the OAU Charter was signed. The Charter embodies the principles of sovereign equality of all member-states; non-interference in the internal affairs of states; respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member and for its inalienable right to independent existence; peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation or arbitration; unreserved condemnation of political assassinations and subversive activities on the part of neighbouring or any other states; absolute dedication to the total emancipation of African territories which are still dependent; and affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.⁹

The supreme body of the OAU is the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments which meets once a year. Then there is the Council of Ministers consisting of foreign ministers or such other ministers as are designated by the member-states. The council, which meets twice a year, coordinates inter-African cooperation. The Assembly has set up five commissions; economic and social; educational and cultural; health, sanitation and nutrition; defence; scientific, technical and research.

Many provisions of the OAU Charter were common to the Casablanca and Monrovia groups but the position the organization adopted with respect to achieving unity followed the moderate line taken by the Monrovia group. Nkrumah pleaded for complete political unity, some sort of a union Government of African states, but he received little support. His only strong supporter was Milton Obote of Uganda, who declared: "However nice one may feel as complete master in one's own house, the time has come for African independent states to surrender some of their sovereignty in favour of an African central legislature or executive body". The Emperor of Ethiopia in his keynote speech said: "While we agree that the ultimate destiny of this continent lies in political union, we must recognize that the obstacles to be overcome in its achievement are numerous and formi-

dable No clear consensus exists on the 'how' and 'what' of this union. Is it to be federal, confederal or unitary? On these and other questions there are no agreements and if we wait for agreed answers, generations hence matters will be little advanced, while the debate still rages . . . The union can only come gradually. A period of transition is inevitable. The regional organizations may fulfil legitimate functions and needs which cannot yet be otherwise satisfied. . . There is . . . much we can do to speed this transition. There are issues on which we stand united and questions on which there is unanimity of opinion. Let us seize on those areas of agreement and exploit them to the fullest."

The Emperor's speech and the draft charter submitted by his Government provided the guidelines for the conference. Certain Western observers commented; "So the pattern was set along the OAS model."¹⁰ In support of their opinion they mentioned the fact that the Ethiopian Government had engaged the services of a former Chilean Secretary-General of the OAS to advise on an administrative structure for the OAU. As a matter of fact there is little to support this view. "Apart from the plans and hopes linked with it, the OAU was both conceived and realized as the expression of African unity, as a general African organization for attaining the common goals of African policy, for mutual cooperation and joint resistance to former, present or future colonial powers."¹¹ "The organization does not bear either in structure or in objectives and interests any resemblance to any blocs or similar groupings of states".¹²

Soon after the historic Addis Ababa conference a meeting of Foreign Ministers was held at Dakar in August 1963. It was attended by all independent states of the continent. At the conference a discussion developed over what constituted a legitimate regional grouping. A resolution proposed by Guinea recommended abrogation of all charters prior to the OAU. The resolution laid down that "geographical realities and economic and social conditions common to neighbouring states be the sole justification for such groupings and sub-groupings". The chief target was the UAM, which could hardly be justified as a "geographical reality", leap-frogging as it does across the continent from Senegal to Chad, Rawanda and Malagasy. The UAM leaders had met before the Dakar conference to discuss the future of their organisation and decided that it should remain in existence, at any rate temporarily, even though a progressive fusion of the UAM with the OAU was bound to take place. As a first step they dissolved the UAM group at the UN. But this did not satisfy the leaders at Dakar. The UAM was condemned as "an enterprise of sabotage" and as "draining" the OAU Charter of its "essential dynamic content". The leaders of other African states saw danger

in the UAM's close links with France through its defence cooperation and military pacts and also by its members' special relationship with the European Common Market. Through these arrangements 20,000 French troops are stationed in UAM countries and the greater part of the EEC's overseas development funds is given to them. But despite the criticism the UAM has stood firm.

The conference of Heads of States and Governments of African countries representing the supreme body of the OAU met in Accra from 21 October 1965. This was the second or, counting from the inaugural assembly of the OAU, the third African summit which preceded the Cairo meeting held in July 1964. During the preliminary talks for the meeting in Accra disagreements became more evident. The target of attack was Ghana. The disagreements between Ghana and Guinea on the one hand and neighbouring countries on the other cover both personal issues and those of principle. The pan-Africanism and integrationism of Ghana faces the particularism and pro-Western tendencies of the French-speaking Africa. All neighbours of Ghana suspected its (former) President of giving aid and protection to the opponents of their governments. This explained why certain French-speaking states opposed the holding of the conference in Accra and why there were fears until the last moment as to whether there would be the necessary quorum for the conference.

Although it met in rather unfavourable circumstances and amidst disputes and antagonism among a large number of countries, the third African summit at Accra was a further step towards the consolidation of the OAU. The absence of nine French-speaking countries however narrowed the scope of the conference and minimised the weight of its decisions to a certain extent. But despite the differences, there was an awareness of the need to further strengthen African unity and increase the influence of independent Africa in international affairs.

The participants' agreement on the issue of anti-colonialism enabled the conference to approach successfully the problems of inter-African relations. Of special significance were the resolutions on political refugees and cooperation among African countries which opened fruitful prospects of dissolving differences and making united efforts for the achievement of the common aims and interests of free Africa. According to Sekou Toure of Guiana these decisions represented not only the views voiced by the 23 participants but also the desire of all countries of Africa to achieve unity and progress. The current differences and the process of disintegration that has set in cannot jeopardize the idea of African solidarity on questions of crucial significance for the emancipation and independence of the continent.¹⁴

The unilateral declaration of independence in Rhodesia came as a test for the OAU soon after the Accra summit. An emergency ministerial meeting of the OAU was called at Addis Ababa. Emperor Haile Selassie called upon the delegates from 34 countries to sink their differences and make concerted efforts to rescue their brothers in Rhodesia. The Foreign Ministers of the OAU decided on 3 December that if Britain did not crush the breakaway Rhodesian regime before 15 December all OAU member-states would cut off diplomatic relations with her. The conference unanimously agreed in principle to use military means to crush the illegal Smith regime if Britain failed to end the revolt. But as the day of the threatened break with Britain approached, nearly all countries of the OAU were in two minds. Upper Volta declared that it was not in favour of the break. Tunisia, Libya and Morocco questioned the wisdom of the OAU decision. Ethiopia and Kenya indicated that they would not implement the OAU resolution if there was no united action by all African countries. A new element was injected into the situation by Nigeria which proposed a meeting of heads of Governments of the Commonwealth to discuss how to end the Rhodesian rebellion. This heightened the mood of indecision in many African capitals.¹⁶

On 15 December Guinea became the first country to declare that it had cut off relations with Britain. About 12 hours later Tanzania announced it was also going to take similar action. Two days after the expiry of the ultimatum only seven African countries had broken off ties with Britain. They included two Commonwealth countries, Tanzania and Ghana. The other five were Guinea, Mali, the UAR, Mauritania and the Congo (Brazzaville). "What had been planned as a grand flood of protest against Britain's half-hearted measures in Rhodesia thus became a trickle when the hour of implementing the threat came. But this was not unexpected. Many African nations had started showing their reluctance to implement the OAU decision only days after it was taken unanimously on 3 December. The first few voices of discord later became almost a chorus till it was openly admitted that those countries which would break off ties would be doing only for the empty consideration of prestige."¹⁷

The military weakness of African countries and British unwillingness to apply effective measures to terminate the Rhodesian rebellion have put President Kaunda in a quandary. Economically Zambia is unprepared for a complete break with Rhodesia. Militarily it has little defence preparedness against Rhodesia's armed forces. The OAU countries are incapable of mustering an effective joint force against the combined forces of Rhodesia (regular forces 43,000, reserves 28,000), South Africa (armed forces 26,500 besides 87,000 para-military forces and commandos), and Portuguese Africa (30,000 Portuguese troops

in Mozambique.)¹⁸ Many observers believe that the Rhodesian rebellion has created schisms in the OAU. It is true that the OAU states could not agree upon a unanimous approach to the problem of Rhodesia but that does not mean they have drifted away from their aim of unity. There can be differences of opinion as to the way the African states should have acted after the UDI but there can be no doubt about their sincerity of purpose.

Many of these developments show that faced with clashing national and political interests, the African states' efforts for wider regional solidarity have begun to weaken. This is not an unexpected feature because it was evident that after doing away with direct colonial pressure different interests and ideas would emerge. Differences were bound to arise over methods of organizing political action, over personal or party aspirations in newly liberated countries as well as in their mutual relations. But there is a considerable area of common interests where African countries can cooperate with each other and promote unity. They have yet to complete the process of decolonization and solve problems connected with the eradication of the economic and social effects of colonization. They can cooperate in achieving economic progress and fighting backwardness. It is only by expressing their unity and common aims that African countries can make an effective contribution to the solution of world problems.¹⁹

In its short history the OAU has achieved several important successes. It has successfully mediated in the border disputes between Algeria and Morocco and between Somaliland and Ethiopia. The decision to replace British troops by African contingents in Tanzania was a step towards the achievement of full independence and an example of mutual aid. What deserves appreciation is the unanimous determination the OAU has shown in preventing intervention in African affairs from quarters that are not African and in settling internal issues. To think that Africa has realized her personality will be to close one's eyes to reality, but there is no denying the fact that African countries are progressing slowly towards unity. They are facing several problems, one of which is the impatience of some extremist leaders to form a federation of African states overnight. But it is a matter of satisfaction that there are responsible leaders who, mindful of the real situation, want to march forward cautiously but firmly. Many have mistaken this attitude for a drift to the right.²⁰

Commenting on the inaugural session of the Addis Ababa conference, Clyde Sanger²¹ observes : "More important than any of the details of the agreements was the infusion of what has become known as the 'Addis spirit' — best defined in the Emperor's exhortation to 'seize on the areas of agreement and exploit them to the fullest'. This

is and this only could be the key to the success of the OAU. Unity of a continent is a colossal affair. It cannot be accomplished in weeks or months. Many controversial issues are bound to crop up at every step and it will require time and patience to tide over the problems." One of the problems is the coup in Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Tanzania are reported to have walked out of the ministerial council meeting of the OAU at Addis Ababa.²² But we believe African leaders have the patience and prudence to seize upon the areas of agreement and in due course project a distinct African personality.

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The African Development Bank

S. KRISHNAMURTHY

The first regional financial institution in Africa, the African Development Bank, began to function at Abidjan in Ivory Coast a year ago. A year is perhaps too short a period to assess the work of such a complex institution but judging from its growing popularity one can confidently predict that the Bank would continue to grow in importance and would soon begin to play an important role in the economic development of the continent. The activities of the Bank would go a long way in forging unity among African countries. In establishing this institution African leaders have taken one more decisive step towards the realization of their dream of creating a united continent.

The economy of Africa is dominated by what is generally called "extractive activity." The largest part of commercial production is sent outside the continent. Until recently there had been very little trade among African nations themselves. Depending heavily on one or two commodities whose prices fluctuated violently, most African nations were badly hit whenever their exports fell or failed to get reasonable prices. It was widely recognised that industrialization would solve the problem to some extent but a number of difficulties stood in the way.

- The leaders of Africa realized that unless they made coordinated efforts their countries would continue to lag behind. As early as 1961 the French-speaking states of Africa formed the OAMCE (Organization Africaine et Malgache de Cooperation Economique) with a view to achieving economic cooperation. The experiment met with some success and led to further efforts in this direction. The Casablanca Conference, the Monrovia Conference and the Lagos Conference raised high hopes of collaboration among African nations. The heads of 30 African States, when they met at Addis Ababa to sign the Charter of African Unity in May 1963, expressed their determination to take positive steps for the betterment of the African people.

The Economic Commission for Africa had always stressed the need to establish a regional machinery to study economic problems

facing the continent and implement schemes for development. At one of its sessions in February 1961, the Economic Commission passed a resolution asking the "Executive Secretary to undertake a thorough study of the possibilities of establishing an African Development Bank." As the preamble to the agreement establishing the Bank later made it clear, the Economic Commission was convinced that the best way to achieve an accelerated development of the extensive human and natural resources of Africa was to establish a financial institution common to all African countries. Such an institution would ensure proper utilisation of the resources available and implementation of schemes for social progress. It took two years to give a concrete shape to the institution.

As a first step, the Executive Secretary appointed a panel of experts to explore the possibilities of establishing such a bank. The panel, in its report, stressed the need for such a bank and recommended that various problems should be carefully studied before further action on the proposal was taken. On the basis of this report, the Economic Commission accepted in principle the proposal to set up a common financial institution and proceeded to appoint a Committee of Nine to study it in detail. The Committee held three sessions between June 1962 and January 1963. It held a series of consultations first with African states and later with certain non-African Governments and financial institutions in major capital exporting countries. The Committee found general support for and interest in the proposal. African states welcomed it and non-African Governments showed "sympathy for an African initiative on the lines proposed, and a widespread desire to help such an institution when established."²

According to Romeo Horton, of Liberia, Chairman of the Committee of Nine, three basic ideas dominated the preliminary discussions: the idea of solidarity and self-help among African states; the need to mobilize additional financial resources and those already available through existing channels and institutions; and the need to operate the bank on sound banking principles. There was general agreement that the Bank should be operated by Africans and that its share capital should be in African hands. It was felt the Bank should concentrate on projects which could not be expected to attract private capital, in particular on projects of multi-national importance which would promote further cooperation among African countries. The Committee of Nine tried to dispel the fear that the operations of the Development Bank might clash with those of central banks in individual countries. It explained that the Development Bank would closely cooperate with national development banks and "would contribute to the scope and quality of their activities as well as their financial strength."³ Even during the preliminary discussions the Inter-

national Bank for Reconstruction and Development evinced considerable interest in the project and expressed its willingness to help the bank in training staff for it.

The proposals of the Committee of Nine were discussed in detail at the conference of African Finance Ministers at Khartoum in July-August 1963, attended by observers from the Inter-American Development Bank, France, the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Economic Community. A question discussed at the conference was whether the Bank should be allowed to be dominated by the bigger countries of the continent who would be able to subscribe more capital to it and would insist on exercising greater control over it. While this might be a sound banking principle, it was argued that such domination would work against the interests of the smaller nations. It was said "that the Bank was more than a business concern; it was a political offspring of Addis Ababa."⁴ It would be necessary to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence. The Committee of Nine had closely followed the example of the World Bank and had proposed in its draft that "each member shall have 625 votes and, in addition, one vote for each share of the capital stock of the Bank held by that member."⁵ Thus a member having 100 shares would have 625 plus 100 votes, that is, 725 votes. While no definite decision was taken on this question, it was apparent that the smaller countries were greatly concerned and needed assurances from the bigger ones that the Bank would take their interests into consideration.

The Finance Ministers recognised the value of the Bank and in general endorsed the suggestions of the Committee of Nine and accepted the draft agreement. The agreement required ratification by the governments concerned. At least 12 of the countries subscribing 65% of the authorised stock were required to deposit the instruments of ratification with the OAU Secretary-General before the agreement came into force.

It was proposed that the Bank should have an authorized capital of \$250 million and that the capacity of the countries to contribute share capital would be assessed after taking into consideration factors like gross domestic product, government tax revenue and export earnings.⁶ It was also decided that subscriptions from African governments should be determined on the basis of their economic capacity, with a minimum contribution of \$1 million and a maximum of \$30 million. In addition to the share capital, the bank would borrow local currencies from its members up to an amount equal to their subscriptions. This provision was intended not only to increase the Bank's resources but also promote use of African products and services in carrying out development projects sponsored by the Bank. By

the middle of March 1964 Kenya, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Tanganyika had completed the instruments of ratification while the Cameroun, Congo, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Togo, Tunisia had ratified the agreement and were completing other formalities. Chad, Madagascar and Gabon decided that they would not subscribe any capital since they felt that the bank, "dominated" by Egypt and Nigeria, would be prejudiced in favour of "certain countries."⁸

The agreement establishing the African Development Bank formally came into force on 10 September 1964. By that date 20 signatory governments had deposited their instruments of ratification. The total of initial subscriptions from governments who had deposited their instruments of ratification exceeded 65% of the authorized capital stock of the Bank, thus satisfying the conditions of the agreement. The progress achieved was mainly due to the efforts of the Committee of Nine. The Committee was now entrusted by the Finance Ministers Conference with the task of bringing the Bank into reality as soon as possible. It prepared a set of regulations governing the functioning of the Bank's main organs, namely, the Board of Governors and the Board of Directors; prepared a set of documents covering staff rules and regulations and conditions of service of the principal officers of the Bank, the President, Vice-President and Directors. It also prepared an organizational chart to enable the Bank to set up its most essential departments as soon as possible and the text of the Headquarters Agreement between the Bank and the host country. All this was done in record time and the first meeting of the Board of Governors took place at Lagos in November 1964. Each member country had appointed a Governor as required.

At their Lagos meeting the Board of Governors selected Abidjan as the headquarters of the Bank and elected nine directors. They were: Kara Ali Mustapha (Algeria), Marcel Tokpanon (Dahomey), M. Mangasha (Ethiopia), Clement Ayikuma (Ghana), Philip Clarence Parker (Liberia), Lamarani (Morocco), Akinrele (Nigeria), Salim Rashid (Tanzania) and Bana Abdel Moneiri (United Arab Republic). Chief Festus S. Okotie-Eboh was elected the first Chairman of the Board of Directors. Marie Kone of Mali and Bomani of Tanzania were elected Vice-Chairmen. In due course M. Bahery was installed as President of the Bank.

As early as 1964 there was talk that the African Development Bank might be approached for construction of the Trans-Saharan Highway. It was reported in December 1964 that the stupendous cost of this important route, which would serve Mali, Niger and Tunisia, could be met only from the United Nations Special Fund and African Development Bank.

Many of the fears entertained by the smaller countries were set at rest when it was decided to incorporate articles stressing the international character of the Bank in the agreement itself. Article 38 of the agreement laid down that "the Bank, its President, Vice-President, officers and staff shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member ; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions. Such considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve and carry out the functions of the Bank."

The Finance Ministers' Conference unanimously decided that South Africa should not be allowed to become a member of the African Development Bank. They passed a resolution that "notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3 of the agreement establishing the African Development Bank, in view of the apartheid policies pursued by the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the universal condemnation of such policies throughout the civilized world, it should not be qualified for membership of that Bank until its Government has terminated its apartheid policies."

The African Development Bank will undoubtedly help unite African countries by assisting them in early execution of their development plans and by financing multi-nation projects.

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Science in Development of Natural Resources-III

G. S. PURI

THE population of Africa, at present nearly 280 million, is increasing at the rate of 2-2.5 per cent a year. The density of population varies from country to country. Except in Egypt and Nigeria, the population per sq. mile is less than 100. In Zambia and many countries of North Africa, however, it is less than 50 people per sq. mile.

Most of the population in African countries is of African origin. In Algeria, however, there are 1,050,000 Europeans. In Morocco and Rhodesia there are 715,000 and 178,000 Europeans respectively. In 1956 in Kenya there were 58,000 Europeans and 185,000 Asians. The number of Asians in Tanganyika was 93,000 and in Uganda 56,000. On the whole, the French African countries have a little higher percentage of European population than the English-speaking areas. Most of the foreigners in African countries are engaged in education, missionary work and similar activities. There are very few Asians and Europeans who have settled permanently. In evolving future programmes of urbanisation and industrialisation it is important to bear in mind that mixed communities are more productive than communities of one race, religion or background.

Mixed communities are more virile and dynamic as has been the experience of the Americas. Experience in plant and animal communities should be taken advantage of in human communities. In India the mixing of populations in the northern areas in the past has produced beneficial effects.

The bulk of the African population lives in rural areas. In Cameroons 98% of the population is rural. Egypt, however, had 24.2% urban population in 1957 and Morocco 15%. Very little industrial development had been achieved in African countries up to 1960-62. Rapid industrialisation and development

of multi-purpose water development programmes are increasing prospects of urban communities getting employment from sources other than agriculture.

We have already discussed the standard of agricultural and forestry development in African countries. The urbanisation and industrialisation programmes will result in greater emphasis on educational development and it is most likely that university and other educational towns may spring up in different parts of the continent, with mixed populations setting up healthy traditions. In Ghana a suggestion has been taken up for the development of a science city.

Africa has a very low standard of literacy at present and education at primary, secondary and university levels is receiving priority in many countries. The UNESCO/ECA Tananarive Conference expressed the view that a minimum of 5,000 students should be considered desirable for any university institution in Africa. For training students in science and technology it was considered that the cost per student will increase in 1980 to \$10,000 against \$8,000 in 1961. Estimated recurring expenditure on higher education in different parts of Africa as compared to students abroad for the period 1961-1980 is given below to show the probable scale of future investment in education.

	(in thousand dollars)				
	1961	1965	1970	1975	1980
Cost per student in Middle Africa	1.6	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.0
Cost per student in N. Africa ..	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Cost per student abroad ..	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0

It is clear that training facilities will increase in time and that only after 1980 or so the universities in Africa may be able to take up an average of 5,000 students.

The advantages of mixed human communities in Africa should be studied on a priority basis. Such communities will not only rejuvenate human resources but will also help in the attainment of unity between Africans and Asians. The latter have similar problems and have contributed considerably to human welfare in African countries. Narrow nationalism, though necessary, has its disadvantages.

The ecosystem in Africa in most places still has easily accessible natural resources of every type. Some of these resources are within

easy reach of man and can become available without much effort. The hoe-plough type of agriculture, or axe-felling of trees, or transport of materials can give man at least a subsistence level of existence. But in most cases minerals, especially coal and petroleum, are out of the reach of man and it is here that technological methods have to be applied. It requires scientific knowledge to undertake mineral prospecting which is often very expensive. Similarly, advance in agriculture and forestry can be achieved through the application of new techniques. Production of better seeds, fertilization of land by cheap and effective fertilizers are all ecological problems that can be tackled only through the application of science.

Similarly the development of fisheries, domestic animals, elimination of disease and purification of water can only be achieved through extensive use of scientific techniques and methods. The problem of natural resources development is really a problem of the ecology of man. It is man who is to be trained in methods of science so that he can appreciate the role of the ecosystem in development.

There are seven basic types of food—wheat, barley, polished rice, vegetables and fruits, oil, meat, dairy products and fish and fowl. In Africa today 60 to 80 % of calories are derived from the staple food of root-crops and cereals. In Savanna areas cereals form 80 % of total calories. Sorghum and millet are poorer in proteins and vitamins than wheat and rice. Nearly 10 to 20 % of total calories are derived from palm oil. The total amount of food consumed per day in most parts of Africa has 2,153 calories. This food is not of the right quantity or quality.

Although for vigorous growth a diet of more than 3,000 calories and 70 gm of protein is usually recommended, it has been found that food requirements in hot climates are less than in temperate regions. A smaller amount of food is needed to maintain body temperature in tropical areas.

The facilities for teaching science, especially biology and earth sciences are very limited in schools all over Africa. The syllabus for biology is at present largely based on European standards which, though high, are of limited use in tropical conditions. This is unfortunate as African problems are largely ecological and regional, being related more to Asia and Latin America than to the temperate lands of Europe and N. America. As a result, biology and earth sciences are not popular in African universities that were started as university colleges of the University of London soon after World War II. For example, in the University of Ghana, which awarded its first degree in 1951, only 13 students have so far taken the degree in botany with the

B.Sc. special degree. There have been two such graduates in geology and one in geography over the last 18 years. The University of Ibadan has only recently started M.Sc. and Ph.D. courses in botany and zoology. Research facilities are very limited. There are at present 32 university institutions in Africa and it has been suggested that during the period 1960-1980 these should be expanded and no new universities established. But plans are already being made for the establishment of a University College of Agriculture in Ghana and universities in Zambia and elsewhere. It is hoped that these universities will take special interest in training scientific and technical manpower for programmes of natural resources development.

For such programmes botany and zoology, especially applied ecological sciences, should be given high priority. Environmental studies, including land surfaces, climate, soil water, and other inorganic resources should be given a proper place in the curricula for degree and pre-university courses. Studies on plant and animal resources should include the fundamental and applied aspects of productivity of the ecosystem, including the effects of insects and other disease-causing organisms. A university teaching programme should include the study of man as a natural resource and his impact on the development of the ecosystem. Such a programme has been recently drawn up for the proposed School of Natural Resources for Ghana. It may be desirable to develop this institution on a regional basis since the natural resources of Africa are not national in character. They follow latitudinal lines and cut across national boundaries. This, however, involves questions of politics, sociology and economics which can only be resolved if African countries cooperate with each other. It is to be hoped that the programme for training scientific and technical personnel for exploiting natural resources will receive a fresh impetus from politicians.

There is no denying the fact that a large number of scientists, technologists and technicians are needed urgently for the development of natural resources in Africa.

It has been estimated that Africa at present needs 40,000 trained men and in 1970 will require 80,000. Any university development programme today cannot produce such a large number of trained personnel. There is, therefore, an obvious need for international cooperation. U.N. Special Agencies, such as UNESCO and FAO, have a great responsibility in sponsoring regional programmes for training scientists in biology and earth sciences. Both vertical and horizontal training has to be planned. A large number of foreign scientists will be needed to work in Africa. It is therefore the duty of scientists and scientific organisations in developed countries to help in the promotion of science in developing countries. Employment of experienced scientists from

different parts of the world would bring into the picture the World Federation of Scientific Workers, which has a special responsibility in this matter. I would therefore venture to suggest an international committee should be set up by the Federation to examine this question. The membership of the committee should be limited to 10 or 15 and scientists from both socialist and capitalist countries invited to serve on it. I earnestly hope that the scientists assembled here will make possible the establishment of such a commission. The commission should work in cooperation with the Scientific Commission of the Organisation of African Unity.

—Concluded

Quarterly Chronicle

RHODESIA TALKS

AFTER walking round the problem of Rhodesia in London and Salisbury, Britain and Rhodesia have suspended the informal talks they began six weeks ago "to see whether a basis for negotiations genuinely exists." The "little talks" seem to have failed to bridge the gap between the two sides. On such major points as African political advancement, the guarantees required to prevent anti-African constitutional changes after independence and methods of consulting Africans as a whole, the differences remained as large as in October last year. The basis for most of the talking was reported to be the 1961 constitution and its amendment to secure more African representation and more Africans on the electoral rolls.

Mr. Wilson's announcement on April 27 that talks would be held with Rhodesia "without commitment on either side" was a climbdown for the Labour Government which had declared that it would not enter into negotiations with the rebel regime. The decision to open talks amounted to recognition of a regime which it was the duty of Britain to bring to heel. African Commonwealth Governments received the news with grave misgivings and described it as a "shameful act." They had expected the Labour Government, after its convincing victory at the polls, to take stronger action to topple Smith. The Left wing of the Labour Party reacted strongly to the Government move, calling it a "sell-out". The Tories were jubilant to see Labour doing what they had suggested in February.

India, which was among the countries informed about the talks, conveyed to the British Government its view that any negotiations with Smith should lead to an African majority rule in Rhodesia and that steps, including the use of force, should be taken to overthrow the rebel regime.

While the informal talks were under way, Britain made a move to postpone the forthcoming Commonwealth conference from July to some time in September. This was contrary to its own decision, taken

at the Lagos conference, that the Commonwealth Premiers would meet in July if by that time economic sanctions had failed to overthrow the Smith regime. The Africans vehemently opposed the Wilson move and President Kaunda threatened to seek expulsion of Britain from the Commonwealth if the rebellion was not ended by July.

Dissatisfied with Britain's weak policy, the Africans at an 11-nation summit conference called by President Kenyatta in Nairobi on April 2 urged Wilson to take effective action, including the use of force, against Smith and called for the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia as the measures taken so far had proved ineffective.

The African States, in a further bid to put pressure on Britain, called a meeting of the U.N. Security Council on May 17 to discuss the Rhodesian question. They put up a resolution calling upon Britain to use force to end the rebellion. India, which was asked to participate in the debate without voting rights, suggested a six-point programme to solve the problem. The Indian delegate, Mr. G. Parthasarathy, said: (1) Britain should make it clear to Smith and his colleagues that they could not reap any benefits from the treasonable act of unilateral declaration of independence; (2) Britain should declare that the use of force to end the illegal minority regime was by no means ruled out. It should, in fact, be made clear that further continuation of rebellion would make use of force imperative; (3) Britain should declare unequivocally that the dictatorial and reactionary constitution would be abolished; (4) A definite date should be set for the people of Rhodesia to attain freedom under a freely chosen constitution; (5) The U.K. Government should declare that elections would be held on the basis of a Constituent Assembly charged with the task of framing a constitution which would contain adequate safeguards for the minorities; (6) In the intervening period Rhodesia would be administered by an interim Government with the participation of representatives from all sections of the community in proportion to the strength of their population.

Mr. Parthasarathi said the failure of economic sanctions was due to the fact that many countries had considerable investments in Rhodesia "and their primary concern appears to be to protect those investments through a smokescreen of limited economic sanctions." He mentioned the leakage of oil to Rhodesia from its neighbours, Portuguese Mozambique and South Africa. "The experience of the working of the oil embargo thus proves beyond doubt that unless it is applied to all areas surrounding Rhodesia it will not succeed."

The African resolution fell through as it failed to secure the nine affirmative votes required for its passage. The vote was 6 (Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, Bulgaria, Russia, Jordan) to 1 (New Zealand) with 8 abstentions (Argentina, Britain, China, France, Japan, the Netherlands, the U.S. and Uruguay).

The Afro-Asians kept up pressure against Britain in the U.N. when they took up the issue in the Colonialism Committee. The Committee on May 31 appealed to Britain to take all measures, including force, to topple the rebel government. Britain, which had refused to participate in the Committee's African tour, ignored the appeal obviously because it was opposed to any military intervention in Rhodesia.

In April, the logic of its sanctions policy took Britain to the Security Council to plug the oil leakage to Rhodesia. The Council resolution authorising Britain to use force to prevent oil from reaching Rhodesia by way of Beira was more a face-saver for Britain than a blow to Smith who has been getting enough oil from South Africa which, under the pretence of a policy of neutrality, was defying the oil embargo. The logical corollary to the Council's resolution must be a blockade of oil shipments to South African ports. By evading the issue Britain has laid itself open to President Nyerere's charge that it is playing a double game of being advocate and opponent of economic sanctions. It is doubtful whether the Rhodesian economy would break down if even the oil embargo was to be fully enforced.

With Britain reluctant to use force and playing for time and with economic sanctions half-heartedly applied by many countries who want to safeguard their investments in Rhodesia, it is the African nationalists who must close their ranks and be prepared for a measure of sacrifice to achieve their ends. The ZAPU and ZANU, though agreed on the demand for majority rule, are hopelessly divided among themselves to be able to mount any significant pressure on Smith. Their leaders are still in detention. A similar division exists in OAU ranks.

INDIAN POLICY STATEMENT

In the Indian Parliament, Mr. Swaran Singh, Foreign Minister, made the following statement on March 9 :

"Honourable Members have shown considerable interest in the situation in Rhodesia and I should, therefore, like to take this opportunity to give them further information. Since my last statement made in the House on 12 November, 1965, following UDI, which should more appropriately have been called IDI, illegal declaration of

independence by the White minority regime in that colony, several developments have taken place.

"It will be recalled that in my earlier statement I gave expression to the Government of India's strong condemnation of the illegal seizure of power and offered full cooperation to the Security Council, the General Assembly and the OAU in whatever steps they may propose to deal with UDI. Further, in addition to having already withdrawn our Mission from Salisbury, as a manifestation of India's adherence to basic principles and solidarity with the African people, we imposed a total embargo on all trade and economic relations with Rhodesia. The reaction of the Government of India to UDI and the unequivocal expression of full solidarity with and support for the people of Rhodesia in the present situation created a very favourable impact among the friendly countries of Asia and Africa in particular and the world in general.

"Our late Prime Minister, Shastriji, was also in correspondence with Mr. Wilson on this subject. He laid stress on the gravity of the situation and reiterated that it was Britain's responsibility to end the rebellion and create conditions for a democratic regime to function in that country. He stressed that the susceptibilities of the Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth on this explosive question deserved the most serious consideration by the Government of Britain. Moreover, he expressed the fear that the imposition of partial economic and financial measures may not have the desired effect and may indeed give the illegal regime time to consolidate itself. Our late Prime Minister had also been in correspondence with his Commonwealth and other colleagues on this important issue.

"The situation in Rhodesia and the failure of Britain to bring about an early termination of the illegal regime has naturally had a powerful reaction among African countries. The Organization of African Unity has been seized of this question and we understand that at the Addis Ababa meeting on 3 December, 1965, a recommendation was made to member states to break off diplomatic relations with Britain if the illegal regime was not brought down by 15 December 1965. Since that OAU meeting nine African countries have broken off diplomatic relations with Britain of which Ghana and Tanzania belong to the Commonwealth. It was to consider these serious developments of far-reaching nature that the late Prime Minister of Nigeria, Mr. Balewa, proposed a conference of Heads of Commonwealth Governments in Lagos. The Honourable Members are aware that India participated in this meeting on 11 and 12 January, 1966, where all Commonwealth Governments were represented except Ghana and Tanzania. Australia chose to be represented only by an observer. Shastriji could not attend this conference due to his pre-occupation

with the Tashkent meeting where my presence was also required. He was represented by Shri A.K. Sen. At Lagos the Indian delegation while welcoming Mr. Wilson's statement that the action of the Smith regime was treason reiterated our view that the primary responsibility for ending this rebellion continued to rest with Britain. It was also stressed, and in this we had the support of the majority of other Commonwealth Governments, that partial economic sanctions against Rhodesia had not had the desired result and that there was the need for a total embargo on all trade. Hon'ble Members are already aware that India was one of the first countries to impose a total embargo on our trade with Rhodesia even though this has been at a considerable sacrifice to our economy. The Indian delegation in Lagos stressed that the present evils in Rhodesia stemmed from the unwise policies followed by Britain since 1923 culminating in the imposition of the 1961 constitution against African opinion and interests. That Constitution should not be abrogated; it is the objectionable features of this Constitution which have created the present situation, and there should be no attempt to revive it. The Indian delegation further stressed the need to enforce effectively the embargo on oil urged by the Security Council and to keep under review the impact of trade and economic sanctions already imposed. It stressed that if within a reasonable period, say 6 to 7 months from UDI, the trade and economic sanctions do not produce any decisive effect, further measures must be undertaken, not excluding the use of force. The use of force, if necessary, was a key to the problem because this ultimate sanction alone would undermine the confidence of the rebels and hasten the end of the illegal regime.

"The difficulties resulting from the economic sanctions against Rhodesia faced by Zambia, with which country we have the friendliest of relations, have naturally been a matter of concern to us. We have indicated to the Government of Zambia our readiness to render necessary assistance within our means for Zambia's Contingency Planning. We have provided the services of an expert on relief and rehabilitation of refugees and arrangements have also been made for the supply of steel drums for transportation of petroleum products by air. The Sanctions Committee set up during the Lagos Conference has since met in London on 25 January and the Government of Zambia have indicated their requirements under Contingency Planning which will be examined by individual Commonwealth Governments. Government will remain in direct touch with the Government of Zambia on the question of further aid on a bilateral basis.

"The text of the communique issued at the conclusion of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in Lagos is laid on the table of the House. I may summarise the results of the Lagos Conference as follows :

“(1) Re-affirmation that the primary responsibility for guiding Rhodesia to independence lay with Britain, but acknowledgement by Britain that the problem was of wider concern to Africa, the Commonwealth and the world. The British view that the economic and financial sanctions would bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks rather than months was noted but many participants had misgivings in this regard. It was agreed that the Sanctions Committee will recommend the reconvening of the Prime Ministers’ meeting when they judge this necessary; (2) acceptance that the use of military force in Rhodesia could not be precluded if this proved necessary to restore law and order; (3) agreement to hold another Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in July 1966 if the rebellion has not ended by then, or even earlier if recommended by the Sanctions Committee; (4) appointment of two committees composed of representatives of all Commonwealth Governments to (a) regularly review the effect of sanctions and steps taken to give concerted assistance to Zambia, and (b) co-ordinate a special programme of Commonwealth assistance in training the African people of Rhodesia; (5) finally, expression of the hope in the context of the worldwide problem of race relations that a just solution to the Rhodesian question would be found thereby promoting greater harmony between nations and recognition of the dignity of man.

“The Honourable Members may be interested to know that following the Lagos Conference the Sanctions Committee has started functioning in London and the British Government have announced from 2 February a total economic ban on imports and further curbs on exports to Rhodesia. The exceptions made in the case of British exports as stated by the U.K. Government pertain to goods for essential needs of services operated jointly by Rhodesia and Zambia or for essential humanitarian purposes. We earnestly hope that these measures along with any further steps that may be taken will be successful in bringing the illegal regime to a speedy end so that a representative Government of the people of Rhodesia based on the principle of one-man-one-vote can be established as early as possible in that country. Any attempt by Britain to negotiate with the existing illegal regime resulting in or otherwise bring about the imposition of another period of white minority rule in Rhodesia would be wholly unacceptable. Neither would we favour any delay in the convening of a Constitutional Conference representative of all sections of the people of Rhodesia nor the re-imposition by Britain of the 1961 Constitution after the termination of the rebellion. Government are closely watching the situation and will continue to take such measures as may be called for in collaboration with other friendly powers, specially those in Africa.

"The following is the text of the communique issued at the conclusion of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in Lagos on 12 January 1966: The meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Governments under the chairmanship of Alahaji the Right Hon. Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister of Nigeria, ended today in Lagos. Cyprus was represented by its President and Zambia by its Vice-President. In addition to Nigeria, Britain, Canada, Zambia, Malawi, Malta, Sierra Leone, Singapore and Uganda were represented by their Prime Ministers; Jamaica was represented by its acting Prime Minister; while Malaysia, Trinidad and Tobago were represented by their Deputy Prime Ministers; Ceylon was represented by its Minister of Justice; India by its Minister of Law and Social Security; Kenya by its Minister of Finance; and New Zealand and Pakistan by their High Commissioners. There was an Australian observer.

"On the eve of the meeting news was received of the death of the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri. The Prime Ministers paid tribute to the work of the late Mr. Shastri and a message of condolence was sent by the Chairman on behalf of the meeting.

"The Prime Ministers welcomed Singapore to their discussions as an independent member of the Commonwealth. They expressed their special appreciation of the invitation from the Prime Minister of Nigeria to meet in Lagos. Observing that this was the first meeting to be held in Africa, they agreed that to assemble from time to time in different Commonwealth capitals would underline the essential character of the Commonwealth as a free association of equal nations, spanning all races and continents. The Prime Ministers noted that this was also the first meeting to be held after the establishment of the Commonwealth Secretariat and were glad to welcome the Secretary-General.

"This was the first meeting called to deal with a single political issue and was devoted entirely to the question of Rhodesia. The Prime Ministers discussed in particular the ending of the rebellion; the need for cooperation with and assistance to Zambia; and the future of Rhodesia under constitutional rule. A working party of officials discussed in greater detail the nature and efficacy of economic measures against the illegal regime in Rhodesia; ways in which Zambia could be helped in its cooperation in these measures; and the question of Commonwealth assistance in training Africans in Rhodesia. They reported their conclusions to the meeting.

"The Prime Ministers reaffirmed that the authority and responsibility for guiding Rhodesia to independence rested with Britain, but

acknowledged that the problem was of wider concern to Africa, the Commonwealth and the world.

"The Prime Ministers recalled their statement, first made in 1964, that 'for all Commonwealth Governments, it should be an objective of policy to build in each country a structure of society which offers equal opportunity and non-discrimination for all its people, irrespective of race, colour or creed. The Commonwealth should be able to exercise constructive leadership in the application of democratic principles in a manner which will enable the people of each country of different racial and cultural groups to exist and develop as free and equal citizens.'

"They further recalled that in their 1965 communique they stated that 'the principle of one-man-one-vote was regarded as the very basis of democracy and this should be applied to Rhodesia'.

"They expressed their concern at the danger to all multi-racial communities in the Commonwealth, particularly in East and Central Africa, and at the danger to the future of the multi-racial Commonwealth itself if the situation in Rhodesia were to continue.

"The Prime Ministers declared that any political system based on racial discrimination is intolerable. It diminished the freedom alike of those who imposed it and of those who suffered under it. They considered that the imposition of discriminatory conditions of political, social, economic and educational nature upon the majority by any minority for the benefit of a privileged few was an outrageous violation of the fundamental principles of human rights.

"The meeting agreed that the goal of future progress in Rhodesia should be the establishment of a just society based on equality of opportunity to which all sections of the community could contribute their full potential and from which all could enjoy the benefits due to them without discrimination or unjust impediment.

"To this end several principles were affirmed. The first was the determination of all present that the rebellion must be brought to an end. All those detained for purely political reasons should be released. Political activities should be constitutional and free from intimidation from any quarter. Repressive and discriminatory laws should be repealed. The Prime Ministers noted the statement of the British Government that a period of direct rule would be needed, leading to the holding of a constitutional conference. This conference representing all sections of the Rhodesian people would be for the

purpose of recommending a constitution leading to majority rule on a basis acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

"The Prime Ministers reviewed and noted the measures taken by Commonwealth and other countries against the illegal regime. Some expressed concern that the steps taken so far had not resulted in its removal. They called on all countries which had not already done so to act in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council Resolution of 20 November, 1965, making at the same time necessary arrangements to provide for the repercussions of such further measures on the economy of Zambia.

"The Prime Ministers discussed the question of the use of military force in Rhodesia and it was accepted that its use could not be precluded if this proved necessary to restore law and order. In this connection the Prime Ministers noted the statement by the British Prime Minister that on the expert advice available to him the cumulative effects of the economic and financial sanctions might well bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks rather than months. While some Prime Ministers had misgivings in this regard, all expressed the hope that these measures would result in the overthrow of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia within the period mentioned by the British Prime Minister.

"The Prime Ministers decided on the following measures of Commonwealth action, starting now: (1) To appoint two continuing committees composed of representatives of all Commonwealth countries to meet with the Secretary-General in London. The first will review regularly the effect of sanctions and also the special needs which may from time to time arise in honouring the Commonwealth's undertaking to come to the support of Zambia as required. The second will co-ordinate a special Commonwealth Programme of Assistance in training Rhodesian Africans as set out below; (2) The Sanctions Committee will recommend the reconvening of the Prime Ministers' meeting when they judge that this is necessary. In any case, the Prime Ministers agreed to meet again in July if the rebellion has not been ended before then; (3) The sanctions Committee will advise the Prime Ministers if it considers action by the United Nations is called for; (4) Some Prime Ministers indicated that they reserved the right if need arises to propose mandatory United Nations action under Article 41 or 42 of Chapter VII of the Charter. This statement was noted by the other Heads of Governments.

"The Prime Minister of Britain informed his colleagues of British actions in support of Zambia. The Prime Ministers welcomed the effort made by Commonwealth and other countries in organizing the

emergency transport of oil and vital supplies. The meeting agreed that members of the Commonwealth should give full consideration to concerted assistance to Zambia and that this assistance should be extended to include Malawi, if necessary.

"The Prime Ministers were agreed that planned assistance to the lawfully constituted Government of Rhodesia should begin at once. They therefore approved the establishment of a special Commonwealth Programme to help accelerate the training of Rhodesian Africans and directed the Secretary-General to arrange as soon as possible a meeting of educational and technical assistance experts to consider detailed projects of aid by Commonwealth countries, including the early establishment of an administrative training centre in Rhodesia.

"Finally, the Prime Ministers saw the Rhodesian question in the context of the worldwide problem of race relations. They reaffirmed the declaration made in their communique of July 1964 and expressed the hope that a just solution to the Rhodesian question would light a ray of hope for men and women of all races throughout the world for a future giving assurance of greater harmony between nations and recognition to the dignity of man."

KENYA "LITTLE ELECTION"

The significance of the "little election" in Kenya in June lies not so much in the defeat of the Kenya People's Union (it won only 9 out of 29 seats) as in the emergence of a national political opposition in the country. The opposition has a "national" character because it has a multiracial base. In the KPU parliamentary wing there are, besides the Luos (Mr. Odinga's tribe), two prominent Kikuyus and two Kambas and representatives of several smaller tribes. Its politics have a socio-economic basis, differ as they do from the KANU over the question of distribution of domestic wealth concentrated in the hands of an upper class which had its origins in the country's colonial past. Africanization of the civil services and the creation of more jobs have not helped in eliminating this upper class. The differences these policies have made is that while the upper class at the time of independence had a racial base—the best of rich land and very lucrative posts were held by Europeans and Asians—the upper class that has emerged after independence has more Africans in it. The Government White Paper on African Socialism seeks the elimination of antagonistic classes which have had a racial basis, but does not rule out classes which are indigenous. In foreign affairs, the KPU wants the Government to develop greater relations with socialist countries and "lean to the East to get to what it calls the centre of non-alignment."

The emergence of Left-wing politics with the formation of the KPU marks a turning point in the post-colonial politics of Kenya. It ends the system of national consensus and one-party state which came into being in November 1964 with the dissolution of the KADU. Until then the radical elements in the KANU did not dare to come into the open for fear of weakening the party. The merger of KADU, which had sought to protect the interests of tribes of the Coast, Rift Valley and Western Provinces against the politically advanced Kikuyus and Luos, ended the argument of regionalism vs. centralism because the KADU found greater security in a central set-up and encouraged the KANU back-benchers to be more vocal and critical of the Government. This however did not last long for the back-benchers began to lose ground soon after the assassination of PIO GAMA PINTO. The parliamentary moderates formed a coalition and in the elections to fill the two posts Pinto had held — he was a member of the Kenya and East African legislatures — Odinga's candidates were defeated. A number of organisational and leadership changes followed. In June last year Ngala, former KADU president, was elected President of the Backbenchers' Association. In July the Backbenchers' Organisation was dissolved and Ngala replaced Odinga as Vice-Chairman of the all-powerful Parliamentary Group. Bad luck followed the Left Wing outside Parliament also. They tried to strengthen their hold over the party through the Lumumba Institute set up to train party cadres. But the first batch of students passing out from the institute staged an abortive coup which helped their enemy rather than hit him. In the branch elections of 1965-66 in the provinces the moderates emerged victorious.

The climax came at the party reorganization conference held from March 11 to 13 this year. Tom Mboya proposed constitutional changes abolishing the post of Deputy President, held by Odinga. One month after the conference, on April 14, Odinga resigned from the Government to form a new party. He was followed by two Assistant Ministers, 28 MPs (two of whom recanted the same day) and the Information Minister, Mr. Oneko. In public statements, they criticised the Government saying it was subject to neo-colonial influences (the "invisible" government) and had made non-alignment meaningless by entering into defence arrangements with Britain, dragged its feet on the East African Federation issue, allowed private ownership of public utilities to continue and failed to provide the promised free education and land for the landless.

The emergence of the KPU also has had its effect on the Cabinet. The four vacancies caused by the resignation of the dissidents needed to be filled. President Kenyatta used the occasion for a thorough reshuffle, the second in five months. An intriguing feature of the

change was the disappearance of the Foreign Office from the list of 21 Ministries. The Foreign Minister, Mr. Joseph Murumbi, was elevated to the Vice-Presidency. The Assistant Foreign Minister, Mr. Robert Matano, was shifted to the Health Department. The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry was moved to the Department of Local Government. There is no official statement to indicate whether Mr. Kenyatta will himself handle foreign affairs or leave it to Mr. Murumbi, who is also described as "Minister with Portfolio" (in contrast to Mr. Odinga's designation of "Minister Without Portfolio"). Another interesting point about the new team is its size—51 members, counting the President, the Vice-President and the Attorney-General. This is more than three times the size of the Ministry at the time of Kenya's independence and accounts for two-fifths of the total membership of the Lower House, from which it is exclusively drawn. The opposition has naturally attacked it as a top-heavy set-up for a poor and small country of nine million people.

An unfortunate impression has been created that the Government has been reacting with vindictiveness. Soon after the KANU reorganisation, a series of four public meetings which were to be addressed by the Vice-President of the Republic were banned on technical grounds. Mr. Odinga's statement giving reasons for his resignation was completely kept out of radio and television while there were special readings on both media of a KANU spokesman's reply running to 15 minutes. This was also the case with the statements of the group of MPs and Mr. Onyiah. The passports of several dissidents have been seized and several KPU leaders detained for interrogation. Some dissident MPs who were in Government Corporations and committees have been asked to vacate the posts. There are allegations of the police trailing some dissidents and of "witch-hunting" among civil servants suspected of sympathising with the Opposition. The constitutional amendment was a hurried affair. The Bill certainly looked invidious because no such move was made when the KADU was dissolved and its members joined the KANU.

IRONSI'S REGIME

The May 24 decree abolishing the Nigerian federation led to tribal violence in the former northern region which dominated the federal set-up before Gen. Ironsi took over the Government of the country. Ibos of the eastern region who had settled down in the north have fled the region in great numbers. With the acceptance his regime still enjoys, Gen. Ironsi, himself an Ibo, was able to control the situation without resorting to extreme measures which would have made him more unpopular with the Hausas of the north. His conciliatory attitude was also due to the tribal composition of the army. Gen.

Ironsi has described the change-over from a federal to a unitary state as an administrative convenience. A decision on whether the future constitution should be federal or unitary has yet to be taken by the constitutional study group, a constitution assembly and a referendum. But the May 24 decree and Gen. Ironsi's condemnation of regionalism as the bane of Nigeria are signs showing which way the wind is blowing. This is not obviously to the liking of the northerners as is the integration of the five civil services, also described as a matter of administrative convenience. They obviously fear that the better educated Ibos may come to dominate the northern region. There have been dark hints that if a unitary state comes into being the northerners will press for secession. It is thus for Gen. Ironsi to reconcile the claims of the regions and, at the same time, to see that the country has a strong central government. The regions had enjoyed too much power and this was one of the causes of the January trouble.

No date has been set for the return to a civilian government. The tasks which the military government wants to accomplish before relinquishing power were listed in the May 24 decree which is intended to remove "the last vestiges of the intense regionalism of the recent past, and to produce that cohesion in the governmental structure which is so necessary for achieving and maintaining the paramount objective of the National Military Government, and indeed of every true Nigerian, namely, national unity."

The highlights of the decree are : (1) The former regions are abolished and Nigeria grouped into a number of territorial areas called provinces ; (2) Nigeria ceases to be what has been described as a federation. It now becomes simply the Republic of Nigeria ; (3) The former Federal Military Government and the Central Executive Council become respectively the National Military Government and the Executive Council. All the Military Governors are members of the Executive Council ; (4) A Military Governor is assigned to a group of provinces over which and subject to the direction and control of the Head of the National Military Government, he shall exercise executive power. In order to avoid any major dislocation of the present administrative machinery, the grouping of the provinces has been made to coincide with the former regional boundaries. This is entirely a transitional measure. The present grouping of the provinces is without prejudice to the constitutional and administrative arrangements to be embodied in the New Constitution in accordance with the wishes of the people of Nigeria ; (5) The National Military Government assumes the exercise of all legislative powers throughout the Republic subject to such delegation of functions to Military Governors as are considered necessary for purposes of efficient administration ; (6) The public services of the former federation and regions become unified into one

national public service under a National Public Service Commission. There is a provincial service commission for each group of provinces to which are delegated functions in respect of public officers below a given rank. This rather drastic change will probably involve a reconstitution of the existing commissions, and the National Military Government reserves the right to do so in the manner stipulated in the decree. Until this is done, the present Commissioners continue to act in their posts. Every civil servant is now called upon to see his function in that part of Nigeria in which he is serving in the context of the whole country. The orientation should now be towards national unity and progress.

On the economic front, the military regime is going ahead with the formulation of the Second National Development Plan to be launched at the end of the current Plan. The Government has considered and approved the general outline of the Plan indicating the main objectives to be borne in mind in drawing up the next Plan. The outline, known as the **GUIDEPOSTS FOR THE SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN**, is meant to be a guide to those engaged in the task of formulating and implementing the Plan. An important departure from the present practice is that there will be very close consultation with the local communities, public corporations and the private sector which will also be taken into confidence. The Plan, like the current one, will be a medium-term Plan but will have a duration of five years covering the period 1968-1973. It will be a part of a perspective Plan of 20 years' duration covering the period 1968-1988. The Perspective Plan will only indicate, in very broad terms, the expected development of the economy during the 20 years period covered. The main objectives of the next Plan will be a high overall rate of growth with a view to achieving "self-sustained growth" before the end of the Perspective Plan; rapid industrialisation of the economy; increased production of food for domestic consumption without relaxing efforts in the export sector, and drastic reduction in the magnitude of the present unemployment problem. Other objectives include increased diversification of the economy, a more equitable distribution of incomes among people and the maintenance of a reasonable measure of stability through appropriate instruments of policy.

OBOTE—KABAKA CLASH

Although the methods used by Milton Obote to introduce a new constitution in Uganda may be questionable, the constitution itself is more suited to the country's needs to become a modern cohesive state. The traditional rulers have been a divisive force and what Obote has sought to do is to remove their influence on the Central Government. National MPs from Buganda will in future be elected directly and not

appointed by the Lukiko. However, the constitution was rushed through Parliament and approved by 55 to 4 votes, and Obote sworn in President on April 15. The DP (Democratic Party) rejected it though members belonging to the party later took the oath of allegiance to it. But 6 KY MPs, who refused to do so, were ordered out of the National Assembly and charged with contempt of Parliament.

The suspension of parts of the old constitution on Feb. 24 and Obote's assumption on March 2 of powers vested in the President and the Vice-President was bound to lead to a showdown between the Kabaka and the President. The Lukiko reacted violently and on March 6 adopted a motion that the Kabaka was still head of the State. On April 17, it rejected the constitution. In great anger, the Kabaka approached foreign diplomats for troops and on May 3 sent an appeal to U Thant for the restoration of the old constitution. A trade boycott was organised in Buganda on May 11. The climax came with the Lukiko passing the rebellion resolution asking the Central Government to quit Buganda. This led to the Central Government declaring a state of emergency and imposing curfew in Buganda on May 23. More than 20 people were killed in the incidents that broke out. Three Saza chiefs were detained. Next day the army took over the Kabaka's palace after stiff fighting. The Kabaka, Sir Edward Mutesa, escaped. On June 10 Uganda was split into four divisions.

The first shot in the fight was fired on Feb. 4 in the National Assembly when Daudi Ocheng (DP) moved for the suspension of the Army Chief, Col. Amin. He alleged that Amin, Obote and two other ministers had shared gold looted from the Congo. On Feb. 16 a judicial commission was appointed to inquire into the allegations. A few days later Ocheng threw a bombshell when addressing a party rally he spoke of a political wind of change in the country. Police reported the matter to the Kabaka but the latter dismissed the warning as of no consequence. The matter was then taken up with Obote who acted swiftly and arrested on Feb. 22 five Ministers and took over all powers of the government.

The struggle in Uganda is not between the 2 million or so Baganda and the 5 million non-Baganda because among the former are several Bantu tribes who support the Nilotes, the less developed northern tribes backing Obote. The fight is over Baganda's attempts to establish a special position and dominate the country. Obote seems to have won the fight. There is little likelihood at present that the Kabaka, who staged a successful comeback after his banishment in 1953, will be able to return to the country in the near future.

ASIANS IN TANZANIA

As expected there has been no big exodus from Tanzania of Asians who make over 2 per cent of the country's population and of late have been under great pressure to adopt Tanzanian citizenship. In April they were asked to justify their residence at the expiry of entry permits granted to them. According to one estimate 40 per cent of the Asian community are affected by this order which requires them to give their employment and other details and apply for new permits. More than once Asians have been publicly urged to associate themselves more closely with the country's developments. The Vice-President, Sheikh Karume, even suggested that licences of shopkeepers refusing to contribute labour to the national cause be reviewed. Other members of the Government have expressed concern over the proportion of Tanzanian commerce in Asian hands and the money sent out of the country.

In India these measures have caused deep concern. On May 18 a call-attention motion was moved in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of Parliament) about Sheikh Karume's May Day speech. Several MPs protested at the treatment meted out to Indians in Tanzania who were "being squeezed out" of the country and treated as second rate citizens even if they had acquired Tanzanian citizenship.

INDIA—UAR COOPERATION

India and the UAR have taken a number of measures to promote scientific collaboration between them. These were decided upon by the Indo-UAR joint scientific board which met in New Delhi under the chairmanship of Mr. M.C. Chagla, Education Minister. The board noted that last year's programme could be implemented only in part. While from the UAR three senior scientists and nine research assistants visited this country, no Indian scientist could go to the UAR. During the current year, India would send four or five senior scientists to the UAR. It was also agreed to send persons engaged in teaching science and technology to participate in teaching and research programmes. Besides offering scholarships in various scientific and technological institutions, India would train UAR scientists in subjects like baby milk food processing, nutrition, radiation, petroleum and drug research. In return Indian scientists were invited to visit research laboratories and institutes in the UAR to study the possibilities of co-operation in the fields of medicine and agriculture.

ANGOLAN TRAINEES ARRIVE

Under the Government of India's technical cooperation programme, 24 Angolan students arrived in India in June for

vocational training and training in other crafts. The women students among them will do nursing courses.

BRITISH BETRAYAL

The three High Commission territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland will achieve their independence this year only to become helpless states at the mercy of white South Africa. Economically neglected ever since they became British protectorates at the end of the 19th century, the territories will now be financially dependent on South Africa for which they have been serving as reservoirs of cheap labour. Not only that. They will also be politically insecure as Britain is quitting them without making any defence arrangements with them. In withdrawing from the struggles around South Africa, a policy formulated by the Tory Government in 1962 and carried into action by Wilson's Labour Government, Britain has not disengaged itself from South Africa where it has huge investments. It has only betrayed the Africans.

In Basutoland, which becomes independent on Oct. 4, Britain will be transferring power to a minority government amidst conditions of insecurity. The ruling party, which Chief Jonathan's Basutoland National Party, supported by Roman Catholics anti-Establishment Chiefs, has a majority of two in an Assembly of 60. It polled during the last elections 41 per cent of the votes. There are two other strong groups in the Assembly: Pan-Africanist Mokhehle's Basutoland Congress Party, supported by traditionalists and senior chiefs. During the elections the BNP received aid from South Africa and Catholics in West Germany. Russia, China and Ghana helped the opposition. Britain should have held elections before transferring power but this has not been done for fear that the pan-Africanist BCP may emerge victorious.

Bechuanaland, which will get its independence on Sept. 30, will also be financially violable. In Swaziland, under the independence constitution a strange thing has been done. The mineral wealth of the country has been vested in the king, thus creating a divisive force.

Activities of the Council

The following is an account of the activities of the Council during the quarter:

Trainees from Africa

The first batch of African nationals who completed their in-plant training under the India-Africa Development Association's scholarship scheme have returned to their countries. They are Mr. James Wandia and Mr. James Warike Warilway, both of Kenya, who were trained in sugar technology at the Mawana Sugar Works, Mawana, and Mr. Binzanza, of Uganda, who worked in the sugar factory at Vuyyuru, in Andhra Pradesh, managed by Messrs K.C.P. Ltd.

Scholarship

The Council has received an offer of a scholarship for training in electrical engineering in the name of the late Mr. Balvantray G. Mehta, President of the Indian Council for Africa, through his son, Mr. Prabhakarbhai Mehta. The Council has awarded a scholarship in domestic science for the year 1966-67 to an African lady.

Books Received.

The Council acknowledges with thanks the receipt of a number of books on Africa from Mr. J. Rameshwar Rao, Vice-President of the Council.

Publications

A book on Nigeria, the first in a series on independent African countries, will be soon out of the press. The Council had to delay publication of the book because of the changing political situation in that country. Next in the series will be books on the UAR and Kenya.

Visits to Africa.

Mr. I. K. Gujral, M. P. and a member of the Executive Committee of the Council, visited Malawi as a member of the Indian Delegation which participated in the celebrations marking Malawi's becoming a Republic.

Col. B.H. Zaidi, M. P. and a member of the Council, paid a goodwill visit to Africa in June. He visited Kenya and Tanzania.

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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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



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July—September 1966

No. 2

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Note to Contributors

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AFRICA QUARTERLY

(A Journal of African Affairs)

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AFRICA QUARTERLY is published in January, April, July and October every year.

AFRICA QUARTERLY is devoted to a study and objective understanding of African affairs. It publishes contributions from outstanding writers, experts and specialists on various political, economic, social, cultural and literary subjects of interest to the people of Africa. Apart from these, it carries documentation on different specialised African subjects.

Contents Copyright

Subscription (*in India*): Rs. 10 per annum

Subscription (*Foreign*): £ 1. 10sh. or \$5

Single Copy : Rs. 3

Single Copy : 9sh. or \$ 1.50

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The World Court Judgment on South-West Africa

RAHMATULLAH KHAN

ON 18 July 1966 the International Court of Justice handed down a judgment which is likely to be subjected to severe scrutiny and sharp criticism for years to come. It rejected by the casting vote of the Court President, Sir Percy Spender of Australia, the Bench being divided 7-7, the applications of Ethiopia and Liberia on the ground that they "cannot be considered to have established any legal right or interest appertaining to them in the subject matter of the present claims and that, accordingly, it must decline to give effect to them." It will be remembered that the applicants, both members of the League of Nations, had filed on 4 November 1960 concurrent applications in the World Court alleging a number of contraventions of the League of Nations mandate for South-West Africa committed by the Republic of South Africa as the administering authority. For a correct assessment of the World Court ruling the whole question of South-West Africa must be placed in the proper perspective.

The mandate system of the League of Nations sprouted out of the seeds of disenchantment sown by enlightened opinion at the beginning of the present century against the Kiplingian conception of "white man's burden" and the imperialist-colonial rule. J. A. Hobson who spearheaded the movement in his classic treatise, *Imperialism, A Study* (London, 1902), remorselessly brought out the evils inherent in the imperialist policies of the colonial powers, viz., exploitation of the native populations and the international tensions and wars that result from the race for colonial possessions. Also, the growing nationalist sentiment among the subjects of colonialism contributed not a little to this trend of thinking. But it could not be gainsaid that the people under colonial rule were politically incapable of assuming the responsibilities of independence or self-government at that time. Therefore, an honourable solution was sought in the mandate system.

Another aspect of the mandate system worth noting at this stage was the means it provided to stop the clamour for the spoils of the war. During World War I the Allied and Associated Powers had waged war against the German and Ottoman empires on various fronts. There was a tendency to claim as their own whatever had been wrested out of these Powers. The Union of South Africa had conquered South-West Africa

from Germany and wanted to annex it, but under pressure fell in line with others to place the territory under the mandate system.

By the time the mandate system came to be evolved in detail in the League Covenant only the colonial possessions of the defeated powers exempted their own from its jurisdiction. Article 22 of the Covenant proclaimed that since those people who inhabit such territories were "not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization." The "tutelage" of such peoples was entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, experience or geographical proximity were considered best suited for the purpose. This tutelage, it must be emphasized, was to be exercised by them "as Mandatories on behalf of the League." The language was couched in the legal terminology of an international trust, with trustor, trustee, beneficiary and all. A fair degree of supervision was envisaged in so far as the mandatory was required to render to the Council an "annual report" in reference to the territory committed to its charge. The degree of authority, control or administration which the mandatory enjoyed was to be "explicitly defined" by the Council. A Permanent Mandates Commission was constituted to "receive and examine the annual reports of the mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the "observance" of the mandates. In fine, the League while *delegating* administrative powers to the mandatories set itself as the watch-dog to see that the "sacred trust" was being effectively carried out.

The mandates thus established under the League were of three categories, A, B and C, according to the stage of development reached. There was no express provision in the Covenant in regard to the termination of the system. But, for those in category A (e.g., Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq) it was clearly implied that independence would eventually be granted; for those in category B (Tanganyika, the two Togolands, the two Cameroons under UK and French authority, Ruanda Urundi) the implication was not so clear. As for territories under category C (Western Samoa, Nauru, New Guinea, North Pacific Islands and South-West Africa—the last two were specifically mentioned in Article 22 of the Covenant) which, owing to the sparseness of their populations, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the mandatory, and other circumstances, it was felt that they could best be administered under the laws of the mandatory "as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population." The safeguards were that the mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which would guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses, such as the slave trade, the arms traffic, and prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of the territory. The mandatory also undertook to secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League. Were territories under category C envisaged to have the right to ultimate independence? A fair inference would be in the affirmative. For, it was only a delegation of administrative authority and not a transfer of

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ownership which would have entailed the right of annexation. Sovereignty still rested with the people of these territories.

Though in actual practice the mandate system was sometimes criticized as being little more than an attempt to give added respectability to old fashioned colonialism, it was nevertheless widely realised that it was a bold initiative in the direction of international accountability for the welfare of dependent peoples. The machinery of supervision was not perfect in view of the need for unanimity over any action of the League Council. Still, the League did improve the standards of administration. One mandated territory (Iraq) was granted independence and Syria and Lebanon were on the threshold of independence when World War II broke out.

World War II witnessed a gathering momentum in the nationalist aspirations of the dependent peoples. In order to meet this revolution of rising expectations a similar system was established under the United Nations with wider potentialities and stricter international accountability. Article 77 of the Charter contemplated three categories to which the trusteeship system applied : (i) territories held under mandates; (ii) territories detached from the Axis Powers; (iii) territories voluntarily placed under the system. The last category was expected to accommodate conscientious colonial powers on the victorious side, such as Britain, Spain, France and Portugal. But they refused to place their colonial empires under the trusteeship system. Under the second category only one territory, Somaliland, was placed under trusteeship by Italy. Thus, the trusteeship system virtually came to be composed of the former mandates.

Since the wording of Article 77 was not mandatory ("may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements") South Africa moved the UN to consider annexation of its mandate, South-West Africa. It did so on the grounds that the demise of the League had brought the mandate system to a close and consequently its international responsibility. It was argued that since the UN was not a legal successor to the League the question of UN jurisdiction over South-West Africa did not arise. The issues raised by South Africa were of such vital importance to the very existence of the trusteeship system that the General Assembly referred the matter to the International Court of Justice thrice for legal guidance.

In 1950 the Court, at the request of the General Assembly, gave an advisory opinion concerning the international status of South-West Africa. It brought out three salient features of this status. First, that South Africa's rights over the territory and the present status of the territory arose from Article 22 of the League Covenant and the mandate itself; South Africa had therefore no power to modify the international status unilaterally and that such competence lay only with the Union of South Africa acting with the consent of the UN. Second, that the placing of the mandated territory under trusteeship was not compulsory since the language used is permissive in its phrasing and clearly envisages this step to be by way of an agreement. Third, that in the case of a territory remaining under mandate, the supervisory functions previously exercised by the League now rest with the General Assembly of the UN, provided that the degree of supervision should not exceed that which

applied in the mandate system and should conform, as far as possible, to the procedure followed by the Council of the League. This proviso, that the degree of supervision should not exceed that under the mandate and the procedure should be similar, led to two further opinions. Under Rule F of its rules of procedure the General Assembly's decisions on reports and petitions on South-West Africa require a two-thirds majority vote, whereas under the mandate system the League Council had required unanimity. The World Court by an advisory opinion of 7 June 1955 took the view that the Assembly's rule was permissible, for the "degree of supervision" as used in the Court's earlier opinion referred to the "extent of the substantive supervision thus exercised and not to the manner in which the collective will of the General Assembly is expressed." In 1956 the Court gave an opinion on yet another question, namely, whether the Assembly's Committee on South-West Africa could grant oral hearings to petitioners (a practice never followed by the League). It held that it could since the League always had the right to grant oral hearings, even though it had not exercised it, and, moreover, the practice did not increase the obligations placed upon the mandatory power.

The effect of these advisory opinions was enigmatic. South-West Africa's international status was recognized. The mandatory was bound with international obligations created under the Covenant. The supervisory functions of the League were transferred to the UN. The Union of South Africa was prevented from altering unilaterally the status of the mandate by way of annexation. Yet the Union was declared to be under no compulsion to place the mandate under the trusteeship system. The reasons lie in two directions. To do so, firstly, would have amounted to a virtual recognition of the UN as a legal successor to the League and, secondly, such a course would have created unending regimes of law perpetrating even after the death of international organisations. We will elaborate this a little.

The issue of UN succession to the League was thoroughly examined at the San Francisco Conference. The consensus was that the new organisation must be allowed to have a fresh and clean start unencumbered by the rights and obligations of the imperfect League. This was again emphasized in the Preparatory Commission which was, *inter alia*, seized of the question of the transfer of assets and functions between the two organisations. The League of Nations Committee of the Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission drew a distinction between the political and other functions and the assets of the League. It recommended to the General Assembly to reject the former and accept the latter subject to the exceptions and qualifications proposed in its report. The Soviet Union was particularly sensitive to any suggestion which made the UN appear as the legal successor to the League. So, even where non-political functions were concerned UN succession was termed a "talking-up or assuming" of the functions of the League instead of a "taking-over of these activities."

On the second count, namely, that international organisations cannot create regimes in perpetuity, the World Court had a difficult choice to make. An affirmative answer to the question whether the mandate system ceased to exist with the closure of the League would have meant

a mockery of the whole development in the direction of the amelioration of the dependent peoples and phraseology of the type of "sacred trust" etc. On the other hand, a negative answer would have led to the creation of unending regimes of law not necessarily limited to the physical existence of their originator institutions. The Court obviously was not prepared to go all the way to either extreme. It said :

"The necessity for supervision continues to exist despite the disappearance of the supervisory organ under the Mandate System. It cannot be admitted that the obligation to submit to supervision has disappeared merely because the supervisory organ has ceased to exist, when the United Nations has another international organisation performing similar, though not identical, supervisory functions."

A reasonable deduction from the above would be that for purposes of supervisory functions (political or otherwise depending on the viewpoint one takes) the UN was assumed to have succeeded to the League of Nations. On questions about the ultimate destiny of the people of this territory also the UN was given a collaborative status for the Union was declared to be incapable of altering the status of the mandate unilaterally. But the actual administration of the mandate by the mandatory "as an integral portion of its territory" and its discretion to place the same under the trusteeship system were upheld by the Court.

South Africa refused to abide by the opinion of the Court in regard to its obligation to submit to the supervisory jurisdiction of the UN. It proceeded to negotiate a new instrument for the mandated territory with the principal Allied and Associated powers of World War I, i.e. Britain, France and the USA. The UN refused to recognize this arrangement and appointed an *ad hoc* committee to negotiate with South Africa. The negotiations bore no fruit with the result that the South-West African question has become a thorny feature of the UN agenda over the years. The General Assembly time and again tried to influence the South African Government to submit to its jurisdiction through a series of resolutions. The last of these resolutions (2074, XX of 1965) reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of South-West Africa to freedom and independence and called upon the Government of South Africa to remove immediately all bases and other military installations located in the territory of South-West Africa.

Meanwhile the UN Committee on South-West Africa was engaged in working out ways and means to ensure that South Africa fulfilled the obligations assumed by it under the mandate until such time as it was placed under the trusteeship system. It found it advisable to challenge before the World Court the question of South Africa's extension of its apartheid laws to South-West Africa and thus open afresh the whole issue of the international obligations of the mandatory for legal evaluation. The General Assembly approved the suggestion and as a result Ethiopia and Liberia, which were original members of the League, filed in 1960 concurrent applications in the International Court of Justice. The General Assembly commended the initiative of the two countries.

The contentions of the applicants can be subsumed under two heads. First, the extent to which the UN succeeds the League of Nations as the administrative authority responsible for supervising compliance with the mandate. Second, the charge that the imposition of apartheid on South-West Africa is incompatible with South Africa's obligations under the mandate to promote the well-being of the inhabitants. As for the first contention the World Court's line of thinking could very well have been discerned from the earlier advisory opinions. The Court was inclined towards the view that the South African Government must be allowed to work out the modalities of achieving the maximum effect in its obligation to promote the development and well-being of the people. Article 22 of the Covenant which authorizes the mandatory to administer such territories "as integral portions of its territory" must be read with Article 2(2) of the mandate, which was drawn up between South Africa and the League. This article reads: "The Mandatory shall have full power of administration and legislation over the territory subject to the present Mandate as an integral portion of the Union of South Africa and may apply the laws of the Union of South Africa to the territory, subject to such local modification as circumstances may require."

Now, the League is given supervisory functions to ensure that the terms of the mandate are being observed. Does it mean that the organization can go deeper into the issue and enquire if particular domestic legislative enactments or systems extended by the mandatory to the mandate do promote the well-being of the inhabitants of the mandate? Would it not open up the whole spectrum of municipal legislation, a subject solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the administering authority, to international scrutiny? Somewhere a line had to be drawn between the international commitments of a mandatory and the sanctity of its domestic jurisdiction. It would help to bear in mind that the mandatory is certainly given a degree of discretionary authority to develop and promote the well-being of the inhabitants in the omnibus clause, "can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory." South Africa claimed that it alone had the legal right and duty to determine what the well-being of the inhabitants required. It produced an assortment of exotic witnesses (experts on "Native Affairs", social scientists, including two American professors, and theologians) and employed exceptional legal talent to prove that apartheid works for the benefit of South-West Africa and that its abolition would produce bloodshed and chaos.

The response to this line of argument was imaginatively prepared by the energetic American lawyer, Ernst A. Cross. Dispensing with witnesses, he relied entirely on the UN resolutions and attitudes to prove the evils of apartheid. Great stress was laid on the law-creating role of the will of the international community manifesting through the virtually unanimous condemnation of apartheid by formal action of organs of the UN. The South African euphemism of "separate development" for apartheid was exposed to the remorseless glare of international condemnation. By clever cross-examination he highlighted such facts as merciless exploitation of a black majority by a privileged white minority; the disparity in per capita income between the two groups (whites: 352 Rands; non-whites: 17 Rands—a Rand being equal to Rs. 20); a caste system in which the blacks supply cheap labour and

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servants for the white inhabitants; denial of the right of free travel or free employment to the natives; the zonal system which condemned the natives to live in black ghetto towns—all the evils, economic, political, social etc. of the abominable system that goes under the name of “separate development”. The effort, in short, was to prove a callous denial of human rights to indigenous inhabitants, to invest the condemnatory resolutions of the political organs of the UN with legal authority and to create a nexus between moral wrong and legal remedy.

Sir Percy Spender, who read the judgment, reacted very strongly to the last of the above mentioned suggestions: “This is a Court of Law and can take account of moral principles only in so far as they are given sufficient expression in legal form..... The Court can do so only within the limits of its own jurisdiction.” Is condemnation of apartheid merely an exercise in morality? No doubt, the resolutions of the political organs of the UN in matters of human rights are only of a hortatory character. It is also true that the very delegates who would not hesitate a moment to denounce the policy of apartheid would refuse to make the Human Rights Conventions legally binding. But does not Article 22 of the Covenant create sufficient ground to investigate the actual practices of the administrative authority to promote the welfare of the inhabitants of the mandate? Judge Jessup’s dissent seems irrefutable:

“In my opinion the Court is not legally justified in stopping at the threshold of the case, avoiding a decision on the fundamental question whether the policy and the practice of apartheid in the mandate territory of South-West Africa is compatible with the discharge of the ‘sacred trust’ confided to the Republic of South Africa as mandatory.....

“Most important is the fact that the Court has not decided that the applicants are in error in asserting that the mandatory, the Republic of South Africa, has violated its obligations as stated in the mandate and the Covenant of the League of Nations. In other words, the charges by the applicants of breaches of the sacred trust which the mandate imposed on South Africa are not juridically refuted or rejected by the Court’s decision.”

Was the Court then abdicating its functions by refusing to look the facts in the face? To be fair, the Court had weighty reasons to do so. On several occasions the World Court had claimed itself competent to pronounce upon issues with political overtones. The standard argument had been that every legal interpretation of matters relating to two or more states would have political implications or consequences but that should not prevent the Court from issuing legal clarifications of the problems. This attitude is particularly evident in its earlier advisory opinions. In the *Admissions* cases and in the *Expenses* case especially the Court was emphatically urged to refuse to get embroiled in the controversies. Clearly these were cases where the Court was being made a party to what were called the pre-eminently political disputes. The Court nevertheless allowed itself to give the appearance of taking sides. Fortunately for it, the legal ground on which it could base its opinions was firm.

To provide legal guidance, through non-binding advisory opinions, to the UN, of which it is "the principal judicial organ", however, is one thing and to decide through a binding judgment between individual members is another. Under Article 94 of the Charter each member of the UN undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party. The following paragraph of this article states:

"If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment."

The Court's judgments in contentious cases thus have a binding character. A sanctions machinery also is provided in that the Security Council "may, if it deems necessary", make the parties oblige. Obviously this is not the case with advisory opinions. Now, what would happen in a case like the one brought by Ethiopia and Liberia?

The Republic of South Africa was not a willing party to the dispute before the Court. It was dragged to the Court under the so-called "compromissory clause" contained in the mandate whereby any member of the League was entitled to bring a dispute with the mandatory to the World Court. The case not only smacked of compulsion but was evidently of a condemnatory character. Would South Africa abide by the decision of the Court? None, not even the applicants, believed that it would. It was clearly an exercise in building up world opinion. The Court was being moved to assume the posture of a brooding omnipresence in the skies pointing its condemnatory finger at South Africa's racial policies. For, what else did it mean in the absence of an enforcement machinery at the disposal of the Court? The sanctions machinery was within the hands of that highly political organ of the UN, the Security Council, which had the discretion to set sanctions in motion through its recommendations or decisions.

The whole history of the apartheid issue in the political organs of the UN is an eloquent testimony to the ambivalent attitude of its members—an all-too-ready willingness to pass wordy resolutions and refusal to countenance forcing the issue through sanctions. Britain, France and even the US in the Security Council do not see eye to eye on the issue of sanctions with the Soviet Union. That the one organ that is capable of putting the sanctions machinery in motion is divided can be seen by anyone with the slightest knowledge of this matter. Ironically, it was a US judge (Phillip Jessup) who urged the Court to take a positive stand and it was a Polish judge (Winiarski) who blocked a decision of the Court. Judge Jessup should have known that the US would vote against sanctions in the Security Council. Poland (Judge Winiarski's country) would have rejoiced in the event of a positive decision. A decision by the World Court in favour of the applicant states would have brought the ball bouncing in the Security Council's court. And, to change the metaphor, the Security Council would have dropped it like a hot brick.

The crux of the problem before the World Court was therefore one of enforcement. An oracular pronouncement by the fifteen wise men on the Bench would hardly have contributed to the solution of the problem when high-power delegations from 115 member states of the UN (leaving the Great Powers which are unwilling to force the issue) have been unable to tackle it. The point is that the system of apartheid, including the issue of its extension to South-West Africa, is pre-eminently a political question susceptible only to a political solution by the political organs of the UN. It is unfortunate that the principal judicial organ of the UN was approached for help in the crusade against racism. If this is borne in mind, technical inconsistencies in the latest World Court ruling, like *res judicata*, would appear mere triviatles.

Asians in Kenya : a Political History

ROGER K. TANGRI

IN a world where the interaction of racially and culturally diverse peoples in societies is growing and is likely to increase in the future, studies are required to know more about facts which are often obscured by ignorance and prejudice. In this paper, a study is made of Asians as functioning members in the plural society of Kenya.

In spite of their ancient links¹ and the undoubted influence they have had on the development of Kenya, the Asians have, strangely, made very little impact on the historiography of their adopted country. The Europeans, on the other hand, outnumbered three to one by the Asians, have attracted a voluminous literature and the Africans too have not been neglected. But so far very little has been written about the Asians. One result of this has been that the racial problems of Kenya have tended to be seen as African-European problems. This paper discusses African-Asian relations.

The present study is limited to the period of British colonial rule. During the 19th century, in the period of Arab rule, there is no record of any Indian political organizations. There were religious-cum-social organizations but these were concerned with marriages, deaths and celebration of religious rites and were not of a political character. "Politics, as the Greek root indicates, is an occupation of cities. By implication modern style politics—certainly in its European guise—could only come to present-day Kenya with the 20th century."²

(a) Politics 1902—1923

Before 1919, both the Asians and Europeans for the most part discussed the political future of Kenya as if the Africans did not matter. The political controversy during the period 1902-1919 was mainly between the Asians and Europeans and the interests of the Africans seemed to have been overlooked. The European settlers were attempting to found a colony that would resemble their homelands but without their disadvantages. They had migrated to East Africa because they wanted to make money or because Kenya seemed to offer them a congenial refuge, free from the disagreeable conventions and restrictions at home. They were however always a tiny minority, outnumbered by the Asians of the towns and the Africans of the countryside. They feared that they would be "swamped" by the Asians or massacred by the Africans. It was for these reasons that the European settlers tried to found their "white man's

colony" especially in the South African image. The basis of Asian policy on all the numerous issues of conflict with the Europeans (political representation, the Highlands, segregation and immigration) was one of equality. Asians opposed any privileges for Europeans which were not also available to themselves. They demanded that every individual, whether African, Asian or European, should have the same rights irrespective of race or colour.

The Asian claims against European assertions had little force behind them before 1919. Nine out of ten Asians took no interest in 'politics'. It was not until the nationalists from India took a hand in the affairs of Kenya that any real political feeling was created among the Kenya Asians. The necessary stimulus came soon after the 1914-1918 war. India too had fought in the war, Indian troops having helped to defeat the Germans and thus retain East Africa for Britain. India's statesmen, in demanding compensation for India's efforts in the war, wanted equal rights for Indian subjects of the Crown. As a result of this support, Kenya's Asians began to demand with greater assurance equality of treatment with Europeans. This developed into a very bitter struggle between the Asians and the Europeans during the period 1919 to 1923.³

Both these antagonists in order to enhance their positions began to compete in their show of support for the Africans. Much of this was insincere and both tried to make use of expressions of native opinion to support their own cases. The Europeans referred in disparaging terms to the contrast between themselves, the missionaries of 'civilization,' and the Asians whose influence upon the Africans they denounced as degrading and corrupting.⁴ C. K. Archer and Lord Delamere, two prominent European settler leaders, published in 1921 a manifesto in which they asserted that Indian domination would result in the removal of Europeans and its effect on the natives would be disastrous morally, physically, intellectually and economically.⁵

In 1920, A.M. Jeevanjee, President of the East African Indian National Congress (EAINC), said it was necessary to state the Indian attitude towards the African "because Europeans spoke so much of their sympathy and desire to uplift them."

"We have since the time we first settled in this country lived at peace with and been friendly to them. We have always been in sympathy and tried to encourage them in their aspirations and we now long to assure them of our loyal support and co-operation in all their legitimate claims towards betterment of their status and position."⁶

In 1923, a constitutional conference was held in London to settle the 'Indian Question', the Asians being represented by their own delegates from Kenya as well as by those of the Government of India. The Asian delegates from Africa, unlike those from India, fully realised the three-fold racial problem in Kenya. They had come to realise that the success of any proposed solution depended on its being able to strike a balance among all three communities. To promote their own case for equal rights with the Europeans, they began to emphasise African interests. Before the Asian delegates left Kenya they declared that the primary obligation of the British Government was not to foster European settlement but to further the welfare of the African community. This, in

effect, was the first expression of the future doctrine of native paramountcy.⁷

Before the Indian delegates from Kenya arrived in London, their statement was reported in the British press. The Indians had for some years maintained close contact with the Indian Overseas Association, their chief lobbying organisation in London. On 17 April, two weeks after the delegates reached London, *The Times* printed a statement by H.S.L. Polak, British-Jewish solicitor who was the founder and honorary secretary of the Association.

"Hitherto the official policy has not been to administer Kenya primarily as a native trust. If a change of attitude and policy is now contemplated, no section of the population will welcome it more warmly than the Indians, whose friendly relations with the natives long antedate the advent of the white settlers. The Indian settlers have quite recently declared that, in their opinion, native interests should override all others, as among immigrants, there should be no preference or privilege given to any community."⁸

Polak also sent a second and similar letter to *The Times* on 30 April.⁹

When V. S. Sastri and other delegates of the Government of India arrived in London, the problems of Kenya had already attracted widespread attention. Moreover, Polak had introduced the doctrine of native paramountcy which was gradually being recognised by liberal British opinion as the most practicable solution. Even *The Times* had accepted it,¹⁰ and in the succeeding weeks notable persons also added their approval. On 8 May, a letter appeared in *The Times* from C. F. Andrews, a missionary who had accompanied Sastri.

"In India to-day there is a unanimous desire to recognise the interests of the African native in Kenya as of the first importance, to which Indian and European claims alike must always give way."¹¹

Sastri too, in an address to the Anti-Slavery Society early in June, expressly advocated the doctrine of native paramountcy.¹² As a recent writer has pointed out, the doctrine of native paramountcy, which was finally accepted by the British Government in the 1923 White Paper, was conceived independently by Indians in Kenya.¹³ The White Paper, which was published in July, denied the European settlers responsible government which was considered to be "out of the question within any period of time which need now be taken into consideration." Moreover, it proclaimed that "... Kenya is an African territory ... the interests of the African natives must be paramount." The White Paper therefore not only denied responsible government to the Europeans but it also asserted Whitehall's sole trusteeship on behalf of the Africans.¹⁴

Indians always reverted to this important declaration of British policy. Though they rejected many other provisions of the White Paper, they did welcome this acceptance of the doctrine of native

paramountcy. The 1929 EAINC President, Pandit H. N. Kunzru, explained that

"However galling the decision of the Imperial Government regarding the claims put forward by Indians might have been to Indian self-respect, it was felt that the acceptance of the paramountcy of native interests as the corner-stone of British policy in East Africa removed the danger of control passing into the hands of an oligarchy of alien settlers."¹⁵

The Indians consequently were able to argue that Britain alone, and not the European settlers, was the trustee of the Africans. Tyeb Ali, the EAINC President in 1927, was able to ask, "What has happened during so short a space of time...Has the Imperial Government or its local agents become suddenly unfit to discharge the duties of trustees for the Africans?"¹⁶ For decades later, any attempt to devolve power upon the local Europeans was met by the Indian charge that the Africans were being betrayed and that the sacred duty of trusteeship was being abandoned. Indeed, if the Africans of Kenya were able to agitate and negotiate for freedom and independence from Whitehall for a "primarily African territory", it was largely due to the resolute struggle by Indians in the twenties and more particularly their effort in 1923 which saved Kenya from going the way South Africa (1910) and Southern Rhodesia (1923) had gone. There is no doubt that negatively the Asian struggle with the European settlers during this period was of the greatest importance to the long-term results of the conflict between the black and the white in Kenya. In Southern Rhodesia in 1923, there was no articulate opponent of white demands for self-government as in Kenya where the Asians, supported by the Government of India, argued point to point with the advocates of white supremacy. "Would the settlers now succeed in making Kenya a typical British colony?" asks George Bennett.

"In this objective they were under challenge from the Indians. It may well be that it was only their rivalry which prevented the Europeans from establishing their position in Kenya as in places further south".¹⁷

It was the existence and activity of an Asian community that caused white political demands in Kenya to receive altogether wider debate than similar European aspirations in Rhodesia.

(b) Politics 1923-1952

Indians after 1923 were often urged by EAINC leaders to improve their relations with the Africans.

".....what have you done for Africans? I say nothing. You have simply passed your time in writing account books and hoarding money in order that it might be spent in your own communities in India.....Try and educate the Africans. Open schools for them."

cried Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, the celebrated Indian writer and EAINC President in 1924.¹⁸ Indeed, the Indian leaders were sympathetic to the plight of the African and perhaps felt a sense of common cause. Mrs. Naidu, again in her 1924 Presidential Address, advised Indians not to

betray the Africans. Indians were the "true guardians" of African interests.

"You are those who have helped, solaced and succoured that black man who to-morrow will be the citizen of the world. The future lies with Africans, but your part is not to betray them by betraying your rights. If your rights are betrayed today, what guarantee is there, in spite of all the pledge of Parliament, that the natives' interests are secure from exploitation at their hands".¹⁹

Again, a few years later in 1927, Tyeb Ali said that

"the interests of the African and our own are indissolubly bound up together. In protecting our own interests we are also protecting the interests of the Africans. Quietly and without undue advertisement we have done and shall continue to do our bit in the uplift of the Africans in whose country we live and make money—both by example and by giving them practical training in various crafts and vocations of life".²⁰

Sheth, EAINC President, went a step further in 1932. He told Indians that their activity in the country should be guided by only two principles, viz., their own welfare and the welfare of the country of their adoption, to do everything possible "to ameliorate the conditions of the children of the land." He also proposed that the EAINC should form a special department to deal with African affairs. In his 1938 Presidential address A. B. Patel said that

"the bitterest opponents of the Congress will have to admit that at no time during its career the Congress has considered it necessary to advocate any measure which will prejudicially affect native interests".²¹

Another Indian leader, Shamsuddeen, in his 1944 Congress Address, wanted complete equality for all races and when that was achieved he was willing "to see even the elimination of the Indian population, if that was desired, not by the white colonists, but the Africans to be in their own interests". Again, in the same year, M. P. Chitale, President of the Inter-Territorial Conference of Indians in East Africa, declared that

"We stand on the platform of equality for all and therefore claim equality with the white and recognise the equality of the Africans....The right we have to be in these parts is not because we are here, but because of our ability to be of real service to the Africans. If that were not so, one could have no right to be here".²²

Different persons, of course, had different degrees of sympathy, but none of the EAINC leaders at any time before 1945 showed real opposition or hostility to the Africans, at least not in their speeches and writings. This general sympathy, which was expressed in the speeches of Congress leaders, was also evident in the attitudes of the Indians towards the specific issues which caused hardships or grievances to Africans. Of these the problems of land, political representation and political parties are discussed here.

(a) **Land**

Tyeb Ali drew attention in 1927 to the fact that

"large tracts of really fertile land are being given away almost daily to new European arrivals, and we very much fear that by the time natives become sufficiently advanced to look after their own interests there would be little left to look after. There will be no security for Native Reserves unless and until it is done by an Act of Parliament."²³

In the same year, the Secretary of State for Colonies, L. S. Amery, gave the Governor of Kenya, Sir Edward Grigg, verbal instructions to report on the final delimitation of the reserves with the best means of securing them permanently. Some form of protection for the native lands had long been sought by the Africans and they had made strong representations to the Colonial Office. Amery approved Grigg's proposals put up in March 1927. Grigg recommended the formation of a Board of Trustees on which European settlers would be included. Grigg's Native Land Trust Bill received white settler support but opinion among Africans and missionaries (supporting their case) was reserved. While they welcomed the fixing of the reserves by law, they were anxious about the proposed local advisory Boards on which, they suggested, Africans should sit or, alternatively, the local Native Council should have to agree to any alteration to a reserve. The Indians agreed. At a meeting of the Kenya Central Indian Association in June 1928, the following resolution was passed unanimously:

"That the Executive Committee on behalf of the Indian community express their strong condemnation of the Native Land Trust Bill as being entirely against the nature of trusteeship enunciated by His Majesty's Government and as exposing Natives to usurpation of their lands by placing them under the control of European officials and non-Europeans (i.e. Indians) without the safeguard of independent advocates, and giving opportunities to non-Natives for penetration by providing for grants of concessions".²⁴

The Bill was suspended when the Conservative Government fell in June 1929 and an amended version was passed a few years later.

In 1938, A. B. Patel stated that the Congress had

"consistently advocated that all necessary land for the present and future development of the Africans should be secured for them and their rights to land made certain and protected in their best interests".²⁵

At the end of World War II in 1945, when it was obvious that the Native Reserves were already over-crowded, Patel, pursuing the line he had advocated several years earlier, asked whether the Africans could be provided with additional land from the uncultivated parts of the 'White' highlands.²⁶ The Congress supported the African demands that they be permitted to purchase land in rural and township areas.²⁷ It also supported, in 1950, an attempt by the Kenya Government to purchase 30,000

acres of undeveloped land from a European company at Teita to make it available to the "heavily overcrowded" Teita tribe. The attempt was, however, abandoned because of opposition from European settlers.²⁸ But the Congress did not relax its efforts. In 1953 it called for the repeal of the Highlands Order-in-Council, promulgated in 1939, and insisted that "any further land needed by the African community should be made available".²⁹

In the 1950's, the Asians supported all the demands put forward by the growing body of African nationalists. In the face of this combined opposition and with the favourable recommendations of the Royal Commission of 1955, even the European settlers began to give way. In 1959, the New Kenya Group led by Michael (later Sir) Blundell, came out in support of ending all racial barriers and opening of the 'white' highlands to land-holding by the other races³⁰. In October, the Kenya Government issued a Sessional Paper which accepted the principles of the Royal Commission that racial barriers should be removed as regards entry into the highlands. A new multi-racial Board was set up and the sole criterion for ownership in the highlands was to be that of good husbandry.

(b) Political Parties and Political Representation

Indians assisted African political parties from the very beginning. In 1921, a Government telephone operator, Harry Thuku, founded the first African political organisation called the Young Kikuyu Association. Thuku organised mass meetings throughout Kikuyu province. Addressing hundreds at a time, he castigated the European settlers. When Indians also began to protest against European privilege, Thuku convened a special meeting at which Africans resolved to support Indian claims against the European assertion of domination by sending a memorandum to the Colonial Office. "Thuku was helped in his activities by the Indian leader, M. A. Desai, editor of the *East African Chronicle*. The paper published in 1921 the Kikuyu grievances. . . . The newspaper office was for a time used by Thuku as his centre. He drove about in a car supplied by an Indian³¹. Several years later, in 1929, Isher Dass, an Indian elected member of the Legislative Council, on his own initiative took the General Secretary of the Kenya Central Association, Johnstone (later Jomo) Kenyatta to England to represent his cause. Dass introduced Kenyatta to left-wing political circles in London³².

As regards political representation in the Legislative Council, from the late 1920's the Congress advocated direct African representation. As a result of the 1923 White Paper, the Indian community was represented on the Legislative Council by five members as against eleven Europeans. Provision was also made for one elected Arab and one European missionary, nominated by the Governor, to represent African interests. Such was the encouragement to the African cause by the Indians that the Governor of Kenya in a despatch to London wrote:

"Indian propaganda is always active amongst the more educated natives in ways that tend more and more to take the native out of his customary tribal life. Litigation is encouraged;

grievances are fostered; the mind of the young native is turned towards political agitation as a lucrative, exciting and not too laborious a career..... If once a common electoral roll is established, the whole class of politically-minded natives, small at present but certain in those circumstances to grow rapidly, will be concentrated on securing their own admission to the roll. It is also inevitable that Indian propaganda should speed them on that course."³³

Indeed, Indian leaders in demanding a common roll desired that Africans too should be encouraged to elect their representatives to the Legislative Council.³⁴ But, should the Government decide that suitable Africans were not available for election, Indians asked that both European and Indian members be nominated to represent African interests.³⁵

In 1932, Sheth, Congress President, welcomed the sympathy expressed by the Joint Committee on Closer Union of 1931 for the proposal for direct African representation, but deplored its suggestion that local Native Councils be consulted as English-speaking Africans would then have little chance of being recommended. But, as long as there were no African representatives in the Legislative Council (the first one was nominated in 1944), Indian members considered it their duty to present the African case. George Bennett has shown that in the debate on the report of the Carter Commission, Archdeacon Burns, the missionary representative of African interests, did not voice the points that had been conveyed to him by African political leaders. It was left to the Indian member, Isher Dass, to do so. "Such indirect representation by an Indian provided the only means for the African political association to be heard." On a number of occasions, Isher Dass claimed to be speaking at the request of Africans and he repeatedly acted as the mouthpiece of the Kenya Central Association. "Dass more than once read into the Kenya Hansard extracts from memoranda of the Kenya Central Association and of the Kavirondo Taxpayers' Welfare Association." But the most striking example of his activity appeared in July 1938 when 1500 Kamba tribesmen marched to Nairobi in protest against the Government's de-stocking measures. Dass acted as a go-between bringing the Kamba leaders to Government officials.³⁶

After World War II, the main political issue facing the organisations of the non-white communities remained in the form of a threat of white domination. In July 1945, the Governor of Kenya, Sir Philip Mitchell, in his proposals for the reorganisation of Government, announced that there would be a Member for Agriculture. This virtual ministerial position went to a prominent European settler, Major (later Sir) Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck. This provoked much criticism. Africans and Asians took this as a sign of European settler control over the future of Kenya. In the next three years, the formation of the East Africa High Commission and the new composition of the Kenya Legislative Council raised communal issues concerning the racial proportion of membership. African and Asian politicians drew together in opposition to European pretensions.³⁷ In the debate in the Legislative Council, both Africans and Asians were critical of the appointment of Cavendish-Bentinck and Vincent, who in defending the introduction of the membership system reported that "the saddest feature was the strange simi-

larity" of expression of a section of the native press with that of the Indian.³⁹

Thus contact was soon made between the Kenya African Study Union (renamed the Kenya African Union in 1946), which was formed in 1944, and the Indian Congress. When the African organisation appealed for funds to the whole population of Kenya, "its Secretary reported that Africans and Asians responded, but not Europeans."³⁹ Both the KAU and the Indian Congress inter-changed speakers at their annual meetings. A number of leading Africans like P. M. Koinange attended the Congress session in 1945 and J. Gichuru, the KAU President, addressed the session which passed a lengthy resolution on "African grievances and needs." The Congress also asked for four Africans to be elected to the Legislative Council and for one African to be elected to the Executive Council by the local Native Councils.⁴⁰ This was repeated in 1946 when African leaders took part in debates on resolutions. A resolution proposed by R.B. Patel and supported by P.M. Koinange declared that it was "vitally necessary to promote full understanding between the African, Arab and Indian communities and that practical steps should be taken as early as possible to create an organisation to work for their general advancement."⁴¹ In addition, another resolution supporting the demand of the Africans for increased representation in the Legislative Council and for the appointment of at least one African to the Executive Council was passed. In April 1947, new proposals concerning the composition of the Legislative Council were published. The official side was reduced to fifteen while the non-official side was increased to twenty-two, of whom eleven were elected Europeans, five elected Asians, four nominated Africans and two Arab representatives. The addition of two members to represent the interests of the African majority (the second African representative was appointed to the Legislative Council in 1944) was welcomed by the Asians. But both the Africans and Asians criticized the institution of parity between the European and non-European non-officials. "Could it be believed that, with the constant social contact between official and settler, the Legislative Council could be anything but a body dominated by European interests and that thus the multi-racial non-official majority would be meaningless from the beginning?"⁴²

A "fraternal delegation" from the KAU also took part in the proceedings of the 1948 EAINC session. A resolution sponsored by Makhan Singh and supported by the KAU delegation stated that it was the "privilege and sacred duty of the immigrant communities to assist the Africans in their rapid development—economic, social and political—so that they may take their rightful place in the country at an early date and become a dominant factor in the Government of this country which their number justifies." It also instructed Indians to "support all legitimate African aspirations," including more land and better working conditions. It was at this Congress that for the first time the "elective principle" for African representation on the Legislative Council was demanded. The struggle for the old Indian goal of the common roll was now delegated "mainly to the African community which is fast gaining political consciousness."

In April 1950, a joint mass meeting of Africans and Asians was held in Nairobi "with the object of presenting an Afro-Asian front to the European objections to the proposed constitutional changes in

Tanganyika." This meeting included Jomo Kenyatta, P. M. Koinange and E. Mathu as the leading African speakers.⁴³ A year later J. M. Nazareth, Congress President, was invited to speak at a meeting organised by the KAU. Nazareth assured the Africans that "the Indians will help you and support you in your claims." In reply, Jomo Kenyatta asked him to tell the Indians that Africans wanted friendship with them (but added that they wanted it to be shown by deeds and not merely by words).⁴⁴ The following month, James Griffiths, Labour Secretary of State for Colonies, arrived in Kenya. The prospect of this visit had engendered much political activity on the part of all three racial communities and to prepare for it a meeting was convened jointly in Nairobi on 13 May by the EAINC and KAU for the purpose of opposing the European policy of maintenance of 'parity' of representation between European non-officials and non-officials of the other races, and a resolution to that effect was duly passed.⁴⁵

African and Asian co-operation was quite evident. Fenner Brockway, British Labour M.P., on his return to Britain after visiting East Africa, wrote the following in a socialist journal:

"There is the closest co-operation between the leaders of the Indian and African communities and a realization that they must act together in the interests of both their peoples..... Because of the close co-operation between the Indian and African communities in Kenya..... I believe that racial equality may yet be established in the colony. Indians have a great responsibility in Africa, and in Kenya they are fulfilling it."⁴⁶

Indian and African members of the Legislative Council also worked closely together and in 1946 Odede, the second African nominated member, openly admitted it.

"I never thought that I would ever side with the Indian community as I now do, but I am forced by circumstances and I cannot help it. I must therefore say that in this Council the Indian members are more helpful to the African community than the Europeans because they think of what the African community desires."⁴⁷

Not only did the Asian leaders in Kenya attempt a closer relationship with the Africans but this was also championed by politicians from India. "The arrival of Mr. A. B. Pant as Commissioner for the Government of India in Nairobi on 18 August 1948 gave a considerable impetus to the efforts being made for political cooperation between Indian and African politicians. Contacts with Kikuyu nationalists were strengthened and in 1949 P. M. Koinange went to India as a guest of the Indian Government in furtherance of Afro-Indian solidarity. The Indian Government financed scholarships for African students in Indian universities.⁴⁸ P. M. Koinange appreciated this Indian help. In a speech at Calcutta he stated that "Africans are grateful to pioneer Indians in Africa who had fought for the rights of the native Africans even when they did not know how to do it."⁴⁹

Pandit Nehru also consistently maintained that Indians in Africa must recognise the paramountcy of African interests. As far back as 1938 he said, "I think the Indians in Africa have done a great deal of

work. Some of them have also derived a great deal of profit. I think the Indians in Africa or elsewhere can be useful members of the community. But only on this basis do we welcome their remaining there, that the interests of the people of Africa are always placed first." After India attained her independence, Nehru reiterated in 1950 that "it has been our deliberate policy to develop Indian-African co-operation: and we have declared often enough that we do not want any Indians in Africa to claim any privileges at the cost of the African. Our definite instruction to them and to our agents in Africa is that they must always put the interests of the indigenous population first."⁵⁰

(c) 1952—1962

But with the outbreak of Mau Mau and after the declaration of a state of emergency in Kenya in October 1952, African-Asian relations at the leadership level deteriorated rather suddenly. The outbreak of lawlessness in the Central Provinces was in its initial stages largely directed against the Asians. The moderates who captured the Congress in mid-1952 were cool towards the idea of an Afro-Asian front as they believed it would antagonise the Europeans still further. They preferred instead to be a bridge between the African and European viewpoints and advocated gradualism and multi-racialism. While denouncing the violence of Mau Mau, Asian leaders still pressed for the success of the "legitimate political aspirations" of the Africans.⁵¹ But these moderates framed their demands less liberally stressing moderation and restraint so that they would also become acceptable to the Europeans. They desired the creation of a genuine multi-racial society which would gradually become independent.⁵² The more extremist Asians, however, still continued to support the African cause wholeheartedly. In 1951, P.G. Pinto, a strong supporter of the African demands and aspirations, had joined the Indian Congress as Congress Clerk and the Congress and KAU officers worked closely together. Even when the Congress leaders began to waver in their support of the Africans, Pinto and a few others gave the KAU every assistance. With the arrest of Jomo Kenyatta and almost the entire KAU leadership in October 1952, the KAU was almost leaderless and it was this group of Asians which assisted the new African leaders, W.F. Odede, W. Awori, etc., before the Union was banned by the Government in June 1953 and no successor colony-wide African organisation permitted. Pinto himself was arrested a year later and the extremist Asian group broke up.⁵³

In March 1954, when the Lyttleton proposals were being discussed, Asian elected members urged that there should be a second African Minister (the first having been appointed in May 1951). During 1955 the Asian members supported the African demands for further representation in the Legislative Council in addition to a second African Minister.⁵⁴ In January 1956, the Coutts Report on the method of introducing African elections for the Legislative Council was published. Coutts suggested that the vote should be given to Africans only on their having certain qualifications such as age, education, experience in posts of responsibility and that additional votes should be given to people possessing more than one of these qualifications.⁵⁵ The African members of the Legislative Council challenged the principle of qualitative

franchise. In this they were supported by the Asians who in their discussions with Coutts had proposed universal adult franchise for Africans on an equal footing with Asians and Europeans. The Asians continued to demand a common roll with a restricted franchise over and above the communal rolls, the number being gradually increased and those elected on the communal rolls being proportionately reduced.⁵⁶ In the debate on the Coutts Report, the Africans emphasised that six members were too few to represent them and asked for an immediate increase to ten. The Government partly agreed to this by increasing the number of African constituencies from six to eight in December 1956.⁵⁷ The Asians welcomed this increase as they had proposed two additional African members for the Legislative Council in 1955.⁵⁸ In the new Legislative Council after the African elections of May 1957, the African members soon began to demand fifteen more seats. The Asians again supported these demands as it would mean that African members would have parity with non-African members.⁵⁹ In 1958, when some Asian seats became vacant and the Asian candidates declared their support for African majority rule, the European *Kenya Weekly News* published an article stating that "it is becoming increasingly obvious that Asians who seek election to the Legislature are playing on African nationalism.....in order not to gain votes but to win African goodwill".⁶⁰ In January 1959 the Asian elected members joined the African elected members in boycotting the Legislative Council over the issue of the 1957 Lennox-Boyd Constitution. Tom Mboya, one of the leading Africans, was thus able to write that "since 1957 the Asians have publicly declared their support for the African demands, and their representatives have consistently voted with the African members on all issues".⁶¹ In April 1958 Lennox-Boyd agreed to the African and Asian demands for a constitutional conference and stated that one would be held well before the next general election in 1960. The imminence of a full-scale constitutional conference precipitated the formation of groups and parties among the Kenya leaders.

In April 1959 the African, Asian and Arab elected members and one European elected member formed a Constituency Elected Members Organisation (CEMO) to work for eventual self-government for Kenya on a democratic basis.⁶² Three months later, an Asian, A. Jamidar, announced in the Legislative Council that a multi-racial Kenya National Party (KNP) had been formed.⁶³ This was virtually a projection of the CEMO and it drafted a programme for advance to full democratic government by 1968. But the moderation of the Asian leaders was not acceptable to the African nationalists. The KNP also recommended the retention up to 1968 of a limited number of Reserved Seats for each of the racial communities to be elected on a common roll with a restricted franchise but low qualifications. In addition, it was proposed that there should be created a large number of Open Elected Seats to be filled by voters on a common roll with universal adult franchise.⁶⁴ The KNP was backed in the first instance only by ten African members of the Council, while prominent African leaders like T. Mboya, A.O. Oginga and Dr. Kiano did not join it. They formed instead their Kenya Independence Movement (KIM) in August 1959 with its membership restricted to Africans. Three months later in November, the KNP also announced that its membership would henceforth be African only and the Asian members were unceremoniously ousted from the party. It

seemed that multi-racialism had no political future among Africans and that African nationalism did not need Asian support to triumph.

Within the Kenya Indian Congress, a minority group had long been unsuccessfully fighting to show a more liberal attitude on the issues of a common roll and political representation. In December 1959, Chanan Singh, a former member of the Legislative Council (defeated in 1956), returned to Kenya from a visit to India. He began to organise support for the old principle of the Asians—a full common roll electorate—thus challenging the moderate approach that the Asians had in recent years been advocating. These militant men were particularly afraid that the Asian delegates at the constitutional conference in London in January would be hesitant to advocate a full common roll especially after the treatment of Asian elected members in the KNP. Indeed, the delegates did seek electioneering safeguards for their future, namely, a communal roll and reserved seats in the Legislative Council. They now feared that if a common roll was introduced they, like the Europeans, would be submerged in the African mass. Only one Asian, I.E. Nathoo, Minister of Works, came out clearly for the common roll. This was condemned by Chanan Singh and his followers in a cable to the Secretary of State during the conference. They attacked especially the principle of reserved seats for Asians.⁶⁵

Chanan Singh and his followers now tried to press their ideas by working as a group inside the Kenya Indian Congress. In February 1960 they formed a splinter group called the Kenya Freedom Party (KFP) to challenge the conservative stand taken by the Congress and to attempt to get Asians admitted as members of African political parties. The KFP contested the 1960-61 elections against the Congress. It is difficult to ascertain how far the Asian electorate was divided between the two since the elections, like all previous ones, were influenced by considerations of communalism.⁶⁶

The constitutional conference had given the Africans a majority in the Legislative Assembly and after the elections they formed a government. In 1962, both the Congress and the KFP decided to withdraw from direct political action. The two African political parties, the KANU and the KADU, were now open to non-African membership and the Asians made their choice. The creation of the KFP left the new African leaders in no doubt that there was a substantial section of the Asian community whose motives in supporting African demands were courageous and sincere. Indeed, the KANU supported all the KFP candidates in the 1961 elections. In addition, I.E. Nathoo, who had "delivered the goods at Lancaster House" by supporting the African demands for a common roll, resigned his position as Minister of Works over the Kenyatta issue. Although African pressure made it evident that Jomo Kenyatta would have to be released, the Governor, Sir Patrick Renison, continued to denounce him as a "leader to darkness and death". Nathoo realised that there could be no political advance until Kenyatta was released (as he was four months later) and resigned when his advice was disregarded.⁶⁷ Such moves may not have had any crucial effect on developments, but they meant that the best Asian political thinking was able to keep pace with the sudden acceleration of political change precipitated by Mau Mau and its far-reaching implications. They meant, too, that no responsible African leader could later claim that the Asians had hindered Africans in their struggle for freedom.

(d) Political Relations

It would, of course, be easy to over-emphasise or exaggerate Asian support for the Africans. The vast majority of the Asian traders and civil servants knew and understood very little about politics. Even among the politically-minded, the majority were primarily interested in the welfare of the Asian community as such and supported Africans only in so far as this helped the Asian cause. But there was always a section who were encouraged, both by prudence and genuine idealism, to assist Africans in their political struggle. It would be more accurate to say that there was no Asian group or leader of any importance who ever voiced any definite anti-African sentiments.

The Asians became increasingly aware that the Africans were not being treated fairly, especially in their own country. In addition, they realised that Africans were not always fully able to voice their grievances. Up to the end of World War II there prevailed a paternal attitude which gradually became translated into a feeling of equality. Allied to this was a feeling of unity with the Africans as coloured persons also discriminated against by the very same Europeans. The Asian leaders always favoured representation of Africans by Africans themselves in the Legislative Council; they almost invariably supported the African demand for increased representation in the Legislative Council; and they always defended the civil rights of Africans and opposed discrimination in keeping with their general policy of pressing for equal rights for all races.

Another reason for this support of African demands was that the Asians realised that they could use their influence with the Africans as a lever in their negotiations with the Europeans. African unrest would weaken European stubbornness; besides, it was pleasing to see them harassed on both sides. The Asians therefore always supported the campaign to increase African representation in the Legislative Council because it was clear that additional non-European representation reinforced much of the Asian point of view. But gradually more and more Asians began to believe that the Africans would eventually gain their independence and become the rulers of Kenya. All that the Asians had to do was to stand firmly in the way of European self-government until the Africans were able to take over so that they might gratefully remember Asian assistance and friendship. At the least the Asians hoped to avoid any clash with the Africans so that any future allegation that they had stood in the path of African political advancement could be dismissed. Many Africans charge the Asians with having failed to fight effectively on behalf of, and later with, the Africans. There is an element of truth in these charges. There are two reasons for the dichotomy between what most Asians felt about African nationalism and the public stand that their leaders took.

The first reason was that the Asians were a separate economic class. A substantial proportion of the trade and commerce of Kenya was in their hands. There was therefore no good reason for them to spurn British rule. The Asians could, in times of crisis, have used economic sanctions in their political struggles with the Europeans. But they had too many economic interests to want to create instability. The Asian control of trade may also provide another reason for the lack of support

of African nationalism by the bulk of Asians. Except for the wealthier members of the Asian community, the Asians would be the first to be displaced by Africans in intermediate positions. The Asians occupied (and still occupy) positions which were the immediate objective of the aspirations of the Africans. With African advancement the Asian position in Kenya was affected and threatened for Africans could now aspire in increasing numbers to jobs such as those held by clerks and artisans. The positions held by Europeans, however, were initially too elevated and remote for the rising mass of Africans. The second reason was that the Asians constituted a minority immigrant community which could easily be identified as belonging to a different race altogether. African nationalism was black nationalism. Self-determination was seen in racial terms by the Africans and not in purely national terms.⁶⁸

We have seen that the Asians had an impressive record of humane policies in the twenties and thirties and that during the period 1945-1952 there were close and amicable relations at the leadership level between Africans and Asians. Further, that despite the moderation of the Congress leaders in the fifties, a substantial number of Asians sincerely and actively supported the African cause and formed the Kenya Freedom Party which challenged the existing Asian leadership. We can conclude that at the worst the Asians were unenthusiastic; they offered no active resistance to African progress to independence. On the other hand, although it is not widely appreciated, it was the early Asian political activity which saved Kenya from going the way Southern Rhodesia had gone in 1923. The Asians resolutely resisted European settler claims that Kenya was a white man's country and this effort resulted in the declaration of the paramountcy of native interests in Kenya. This effect of Asian activity was of cardinal importance not only for Kenya but also for the whole of East Africa. The Africans do not acknowledge this support given by the Asians; just as in economic and social matters, the Africans deny that the Asians have made any significant contribution to their good, they under-rate Asian political contribution. "Their assessment of the Asian political role tends to be coloured by their social and economic relations with the community."⁶⁹

Economic

The Asian control of trade was particularly resented. There was (and still is) a feeling among Africans that the Asian traders had conspired to hinder the participation of Africans in commerce and that were it not for this conspiracy the Africans would have become engaged rapidly and effectively in trade. "Although they are co-victims of discrimination, the tensions between Africans and Asians in the economic sphere are among the most acute in contemporary multi-racial Africa. Many African nationalists regard the Asians as the most immediate obstacle to their advance in the economic sector".⁷⁰ There has also been considerable opposition to Asians on other economic grounds. One of the charges was that of remitting savings to India and thus exporting a great deal of capital. There is no doubt that the Asians have sent savings back to India because to support their poor families at home was one of the reasons why they had left India in the first place. In addition, the joint family system imposed certain obligations on them to support their dependents in India. However, the investment locally made by them suggested that if the economic and political climate in Kenya were hospitable,

a larger proportion of their capital would have remained in the country. It is difficult to say what part of their savings has been sent abroad. A recent estimate by an economist established that in Kenya about 70 per cent of the Indian immigrant households were remitting money to their dependents in India. On an average a household was remitting 730 shillings annually. Another aspect of this charge is that the Asians consequently have less loyalty to Kenya than to India. The same economist showed however that Asians, by being frugal and saving money, purchased 20.8 per cent of landed property in Kenya while only 9.7 per cent bought property in India. Some invested their savings in trade and industrial concerns while others deposited them in banks in Kenya. He concluded that most Asians rarely visited India and that only a small percentage had interests in India.⁷¹

Practice of irregular methods constituted another charge against the Asians. These methods varied from bribery and tax evasion to selling commodities above controlled prices and inadequate book-keeping.⁷² But in the majority of cases, criticism is levelled against the widespread practice of bargaining in Asian shops. "Any system of bargaining must inevitably lead to the charging of different prices to different customers, and thereby to complaints of exploitation and racial discrimination All these malpractices have served only to promote ill-will and distrust between customer and trader. It will be noticed that none of these practices is peculiar to Asian traders in East Africa; indeed they are the stock-in-trade of businessmen all over the world, especially in underdeveloped countries. But in East Africa, because of the dominance of Asians in the wholesale and retail trade, criticism of such practices is often couched in racial terms".⁷³

It has recently been stated that most "stranger-trading" communities, such as the Chinese in South-East Asia and the Asians in East Africa, have found themselves in similar situations. "..... though the ethnically alien trading community may be relatively efficient and may be necessary to the peasant community, there is between them little moral unity. The relationship between them is, or at any rate is perceived to be, purely economic and it is for this reason, perhaps, that the stranger-trader is so often accused—sometimes unjustly from the point of view of the outside observer—of 'exploiting' the villager, of being an 'unproductive parasite, of being morally corrupt'..... The villager's own elite may exploit him far more severely, but here the two parties are members of a common moral system which gives meaning and justification to the relationship. It is just this kind of meaning and justification that the relationship between villager and stranger-trader lacks".⁷⁴ One may admit that the Asians were perhaps often selfish and unscrupulous in trading, but in these characteristics they were not alone. More importantly, one should not lose sight of their role in the development of Kenya. There can be no doubt that the Asians, as traders and marketers of African produce and as artisans, have played a vital part in the development of Kenya. In these roles they have performed a function which the Europeans were not prepared to do and Africans were not qualified to discharge. "Content with a pioneering low standard of living they blazed a trail of trade where prospects of profit were poor and precarious".⁷⁵

African accusations of exploitation by Asian traders, although not unrealistic, were largely based on an exaggerated stereotype. The basic fallacy of the Africans was that accumulated wealth was considered to have been earned solely by the impoverishment of customers or competitors. It was a widespread article of faith that the wealth of the mercantile firms had been extorted from the Africans and had in no way been created by the legitimate activities of the merchants. As for the Asian 'duka-wallas' in remote parts of the country they "live on pitiful margins of profit, work enormously long hours, get the whole family to serve in the shop, live a life of austerity, cut off from many amenities of modern life, and retire after a long life's work with meagre savings. The image of the exploiting, unscrupulous, wealthy Asian class has been so popularised that the very real sacrifice and contribution of these small, up-country shopkeepers has been completely ignored, to be replaced by a long catalogue of sinful practices".⁷⁶

Social

Another reason why Africans are more hostile to the Asians than to their former rulers lies in the Asian social structure, mention of which has already been made. African-Asian relations have mainly been at the shopkeeper-customer or master-servant level, neither of them calculated to inspire sympathetic understanding or good fellowship. Also, on the whole, the Asian communities of Kenya appear to be unassimilated, closed, isolated social groups, for despite the generally admitted lack of colour prejudice, at least in its grosser forms, their sense of community with Africans has been limited, although it may now be expanding. Asian social organisation is closed to outsiders; whereas in towns, schools and universities, the African learns much of the European way of life the Asian ways remain a mystery. Also, while among the Europeans there have been missionaries, school teachers, etc., who have obviously done so much to help the Africans, Asian contribution in these fields has been indirect and almost incidental.⁷⁷ There were separate residential areas for Asians and separate communal schools, which tended to reinforce the closed nature of the immigrant group. More important than these was the fact that the Asians almost always married within their own community and usually within their own religion. Moreover, the Asians maintained these traditional ways and their own culture through the enactment of laws in Kenya providing for the application of personal, religious laws, e.g., marriage, divorce, succession, etc., to the Asian religious communities. All this helped not only to preserve the cultural identity of these communities but also placed obstacles in the path of inter-communal and inter-racial contacts.⁷⁸

These economic and social factors and the political unenthusiasm of the Asians for African nationalism made the general mass of Africans dislike the Asians. Indeed, the Asians were probably a more hated minority than the Europeans with the mass of Africans.⁷⁹ Jomo Kenyatta and other leading Africans were at heart as anti-Asian as anti-European, and Kenyatta often made it clear that he had no intention of being "tied to the coat-tails of India".⁸⁰ Kenyatta made clear his views on the occasions when Asians joined African political figures on a joint platform before 1952. He said the status of Asians in the colony was that of "guests".⁸¹ Indeed, the co-operation between the KAU and the EAINC did not survive the joint meeting of May 1951. "It was not viewed with

any favour by Kenyatta and at a meeting held at Githunguri....Kenyatta warned those present not to allow the Asians, by intrigue, to dominate the position. The destiny of the Africans was the concern of the Africans only".⁸² 'Sinn Fein'—Us Alone, was the cry of the nationalists. The Asians as well as the Europeans were outsiders.

It is difficult not to exaggerate the distance which at present separates the African from the Asian, especially in terms of social and religious customs. If the Asians are to continue to play a vital and progressive role, there will have to be a genuine Asian commitment to the new society of Kenya. Growing African prosperity may also help to reduce some of the tensions that have been generated by economic differences. Integration of schools and other institutions may also promote a better understanding. All these factors may move the Asian community from the constricted place it was forced to occupy under British rule and open out new avenues of co-operation between the Africans and the Asians.

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The High Commission Territories

AJIT GOPAL

ONE outstanding fact about political developments in the Africa of the sixties is that the line of White control has progressively moved south towards the Union of South Africa, reducing in impressive strokes the area under the domination of European reactionaries and racists. This process of White decontrol, of deep significance to the future of Africa and the world, began in June 1960 with the independence of the Congo (Leopoldville). The event took the world by surprise in so far as the Belgian colonialists, after 75 years of absolute undemocratic rule, abdicated their authority in panic and unleashed a new era of political instability and chaos. The freedom of the Congo was nevertheless the greatest setback to the White supremacists of southern Africa who, pretending to be undaunted, marshalled and regrouped their forces further south in the Congolese state of Katanga, bordering the then White-ruled Central African Federation.

Aided by South Africa's Prime Minister, Mr. Verwoerd, Portugal's Salazar and the Federal Premier, Sir Roy Welensky, Katanga, ruled by pro-Belgian Moise Tshombe, waged a gallant fight first against the central regime in Leopoldville and then against the United Nations forces, trying to implement belatedly its mandate to secure the integration of the rebel province with the Congo. Tshombe was overpowered by the UN after one year, shattering the dreams of the racists to the south who had planned to incorporate the mineral riches of Katanga into the vast copper complex of neighbouring Northern Rhodesia.

The second successful onslaught on White hegemony in southern Africa was made when Sir Roy Welensky's Central African Federation was dissolved in December 1963 after ten years of European misrule over the three constituent units of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This was followed inevitably first by the independence of Northern Rhodesia as Zambia in October 1964, then of Nyasaland as Malawi eight months later and, finally, by the unilateral declaration of independence by the White minority of Southern Rhodesia in November 1965. The White racists of the Federation had seldom coveted control of Malawi, often labelled the "slum" of Africa, but the freedom of copper-rich Zambia was certainly the first major blow to their imperial schemes in southern Africa. Only six months before the country was to attain republican status, Sir Roy had threatened to precipitate a major

military crisis by despatching his federal troops to Lusaka to curb widespread political unrest which was a necessary prelude to the British withdrawal. How painful a process the birth of Zambia was can also be gauged from the fact that in 1962, barely two years before the collapse of the Federal structure, the World Peace Brigade sent no less a person than Jaya Prakash Narayan to Dar-es-Salaam to organise a massive peace march to Lusaka to force a showdown between the forces of nationalism led by Kenneth Kaunda, now President of Zambia, and the unholy alliance between the British and Sir Roy Welensky. The much-publicised march did not materialise because of the rapid political transformation that took place in N. Rhodesia in favour of the nationalists.

The Black-White confrontation was simultaneously taken a step further in Portuguese Africa when the nationalists, trained in Tanganyika and other parts of free Africa but under the overall command of Edward Mondlane, opened a new battle front in northern Mozambique. With pressures on them relaxed somewhat in Angola, the first Portuguese colony to rebel in March 1961, Lisbon has now stationed well over 50,000 White troops in Mozambique, currently engaged in a little-publicised intensive guerilla fight with the nationalists operating largely from their camps in southern Tanganyika. It is generally believed by African political tacticians and military strategists that before they can reach Pretoria they must first subdue Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia. The delaying tactics being employed by the British government in S. Rhodesia have not only frustrated the hopes of the four million Africans of the "self-governing" colony but also disillusioned the Afro-Asian world which had come to place implicit faith in Whitehall's *bona fides* in leading the remnants of its colonial empire to complete freedom.

Does the defeat of progressive forces over S. Rhodesia mean that the line of White control has perforce been drawn permanently along the Zambezi River? With the stakes in the liquidation of European control in Salisbury being as high as they are, both in the pan-Africanist world and the Commonwealth context, the enlightened international community cannot be blamed for acquiring a built-in defeatist outlook over S. Rhodesia. But the unfolding panorama of fascinating events in southern Africa does not by any means justify the growing belief, even in the light of the politically-motivated World Court judgment in the South-West Africa case, that the gains of African nationalism have been effectively stifled. In fact, the history of Black nationalism in Africa is now entering an altogether new and more challenging phase with the transplantation of the freedom struggle in the very heart of South Africa, the citadel of *apartheid*. The struggle for African freedom will henceforth be increasingly waged from what have been known as the British High Commission Territories—Bechuanaland, for long a haven for political refugees from the Republic, Basutoland and Swaziland.

The battle has already been joined with the emergence of Bechuanaland (Sept. 30) and Basutoland (Oct. 4) as the independent sovereign nations of Botswana and Lesotho. Swaziland is already in the penultimate stage of independence and is expected to enter the ranks of its free neighbours towards the close of 1970. With the comparatively swollen proportion of Whites (nearly 9,000) in its 250,000 population, combined with South Africa's stranglehold over its land and economy generally,

the road to full freedom is going to be more tortuous for Swaziland whose political institutions have undergone less change than most colonies under British rule.

Although the three territories comprise an area of about 300,000 square miles, one-fourth of India's, they have the ridiculously low population of 1.4 million, or less than half of Delhi's. But the importance of these countries cannot be judged from these deceptive statistical figures. The changing status of these countries, in spite of what Pretoria wills, is bound to have far-reaching socio-economic and geo-political consequences for southern Africa and the continent in general. What is certain is that South Africa, under its new ruler, Balthazar Vorster, will intensify its historic role in trying to engulf, if not incorporate physically, the three territories in pursuance of its undeclared policy of not allowing independent, sovereign states on its borders. In spite of abundant goodwill from Britain and its Resident Commissioners stationed in Mafeking (the new capital is Gaborone), Maseru and Mbabane and the generally pro-Pretoria policies hatched there, authorities in South Africa have always had to contend with stray political and exile movements which have often been backed from both the fervently nationalistic parts of northern Africa and communist sources outside the continent.

The new regimes installed in Botswana and Lesotho are of the type the Vorster government could hope and ask for; though understandably opposed to apartheid they stand for the cultivation of the best possible relations with the Republic. President Seretse Khama of Botswana announced soon after his victory in the first-ever elections in March 1965 that he would continue to pursue his good-neighbour policy towards South Africa. If sprawling Botswana, which has an "international" border with Zambia, albeit only 50 yards long, has reason to proclaim its friendship with Pretoria, Lesotho, fully surrounded by S. Africa and more dependent on it, cannot do otherwise, not at any rate when it has just made its debut on the world stage. Its Prime Minister, burly and good-humoured Chief Jonathan, has been accused by his opponents at home of being a sell-out and subserving the interests of S. Africa. These are not mere labels which opposition parties everywhere are wont to flaunt, in spite of the Chief's pre-eminent position in the nation's political life. What is most remarkable about Lesotho is that despite or, rather because of, its political orientation and physical location it has the reputation of being the most "extreme" of all the High Commission territories. Its powerful opposition parties not only enjoy a sound base at home but also possess strong links with the pan-Africanist organisations outside. These parties, the Congress Party and the Maramatlou Freedom Party, jointly polled more votes than the ruling right-wing National Party at the March 1966 election. To the NP's 30 seats out of a total of 60, the leftist CP captured 25 and the centrist MFP four. As this pattern shows that the general election did not prove to be a clear victory for any side and the bitterness generated by it was carried to London where subsequent pre-independence constitutional talks were held. When the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Fred Lee, signed the independence agreement, the CP and MFP delegates absented themselves from the historic ceremony. Their leaders, Ntsu Mokhele and Edwin Leanya, described the agreement as a triumph for political ex-

pediency over the principles of democracy. They alleged that the conclusions of the London conference had been agreed in advance and demanded fresh elections before complete independence. Mokhele, who was later supported by Leanya, made out a case against the grant of immediate independence to Lesotho on the ground that the British pullout would mean seizure of the infant country's political, economic and military powers by its unscrupulous neighbour. He stressed the importance of Paramountcy and said that powers, now vested in the Crown and the British government's Representative relating to public service, foreign affairs, defence and internal security, should be transferred not to the Basutoland government but to the Paramount Chief who would ordinarily delegate them to Basuto Ministers, except in case of abuse. Fred Lee rejected the Opposition misgivings and merely remarked that the economic position of Lesotho, which gets from Britain an annual budgetary grant of £ 2,750,000, was critical.

The pattern of political delineation which emerged in Botswana after the March 1965 elections was sharply defined in contrast to the situation in Lesotho. Seretse Khama's Democratic Party got 28 out of the 31 seats in the Legislative Assembly; the remaining three went to Philip Matante's People's Party which had put up 24 candidates. The People's Party had received the backing of South Africa's Pan-Africanist Congress, reputedly a "racialist" organisation, while M. Mpho's multi-racial Botswana Independent Party, which suffered total eclipse in the elections, obtained assistance from South Africa's African National Congress. Like the opposition groups in Lesotho, the two Botswana opposition parties, significantly, enjoy the support of the politically conscious urban population.

Swaziland falls under a different category altogether. Though it is the smallest in size with an area of about 6,700 sq. miles, it is potentially the richest of the three territories. Which is a good enough reason why it has lagged behind its sister partners in constitutional development. In the background of what is happening elsewhere it is odd that the Swazis do not expect to be given full independence before 1970. Paramount Chief Sobhuza II, aged about 70, won a landslide victory in the June 1964 elections defeating the African National Party. The right-wing, all-White United Swaziland Association captured four of the seats reserved for the European community, numbering about 9,000. Of the total 28 members of the Legislative Council, 24, including 16 Africans and eight Whites, are pro-Sobhuza; four members would be nominated by the British government. Under the constitutional proposals published in Mbabane in March 1966 Sobhuza II would be recognised as both King and head of State.

Wherever British colonial territories have existed in proximity or in contiguity demands for their unification or federation have been made invariably. There has been the abortive federation of the three Central African countries; in East Africa, Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika have witnessed movements for unity ever since the end of World War I when the administration of the German colony of Tanganyika was handed over to Britain under a League of Nations mandate. In southern Africa the first time a demand for the federation of the three High Commission

territories was voiced by the Communist Party of Basutoland, the only one operating in that part of Africa, in January 1964. Although, for political reasons, this suggestion found favour in pan-Africanist circles all over the continent, it has been spurned by both the British and the South Africans. What the latter are interested in achieving, however, is a total incorporation of the three into the Union. The British have encouraged the illusion that such incorporation could be within easy reach of the South Africans. The British, for instance, neglected the development of the protectorates for fear of offending Pretoria; they carried on their administration through the British High Commissioner in South Africa who acted in close consultation with the host government; until last year the British conducted the preposterous experiment of governing Bechuanaland from Mafeking, in South Africa. To Bechuanaland has belonged the unique but dubious distinction of having had its capital situated out of its frontiers. So cautious have the British been not to "provoke" South Africa that the Labour Government in 1948 deposed Seretse Khama as chief of the Bamangwato tribe because he had committed the supreme indiscretion of marrying a white girl. This episode, however, proved a blessing in disguise for Bechuanaland because, after years of obscurity, it enabled it to shoot into international prominence.

It is nothing short of a miracle that the three Protectorates have not been swallowed up by South Africa. The Basuto escaped this fate at the cost of a major war, known as the "Gun War", which cost the Cape government £5 million; finding it impossible to subdue the Basuto tribes the Cape Cabinet persuaded Britain to make Basutoland a Crown Colony in 1884. In the case of Bechuanaland it was the serious threat from Germany in the west and a visit to Queen Victoria in 1895 by senior chiefs that impelled Britain to extend its protectorate over it. The Swazi evaded incorporation by the accident of the South African war in 1903. The repeated rebuffs administered to South Africa seemed to have given the British some kind of a guilt complex which was why the South Africa Act of 1909, conferring self-government on the White minority, envisaged that the Protectorates could at a future date be annexed into the Union. The Act empowered the King in Council, on an address from both Houses of the South African Parliament, to transfer the three territories to the Union subject to certain conditions for the protection of native rights. Every South African government was determined to exploit this generous provision but soon World War II intervened, forcing Britain to shelve the issue. The subsequent emergence of apartheid-minded Nationalists, as one writer has put it, "virtually set the seal on the question of incorporation". Pretoria has often threatened an economic blockade against the protectorates and the expulsion of workers from these territories—there are at any one time 150,000 of them from Lesotho alone working in diamond, gold and coal mines, sending £800,000 a year back home. That an economic blockade could cripple the protectorates is also clear from the fact that of Lesotho's total revenue of £2.1 million for 1963-64, one-half was derived from its share of customs and excise agreement concluded with the Union 50 years ago. Only last year, Premier Verwoerd, assassinated in September 1966, offered to administer the three territories as self-governing Bantustans, with the promise to lead them to "independence and economic prosperity".

By the time Swaziland gets its independence in 1970 the world will have seen the nature of freedom which Britain has conferred on Botswana and Lesotho and whether they are able to function, not as mere appendages or hostages of South Africa but as sovereign States. It will be facile to assume that the Vorster government would permit Botswana or Lesotho to be used as staging-posts for pan-Africanist freedom movements or allow their governments to fall into hostile hands. Political or economic pressures could always yield quick results. Hired gangsters have been known to slip into the three hostage territories and back into the Union. But, at the same time, Botswana and Lesotho harbour vocal political opposition parties with vast outside connections which may not, particularly in the case of Lesotho, permit easy coexistence between the government in power and the Union. International interests, especially those emanating from the communist countries, could not also be expected to cast away the exciting "revolutionary" portents obtaining in these situations.

Swaziland may be spared the crossfire of these cold war bickerings. At any rate South Africa and the Portuguese in Mozambique adjoining Swaziland would ensure that the tiny enclave is effectively isolated. Already steps are being taken to improve railway and other communications between Swaziland on the one hand and Mozambique and South Africa on the other. The British government, which has a vested interest in not disturbing the economic prosperity of the Whites in Swaziland who own 45 per cent of the land, is an active collaborator in these schemes. In April 1964 Britain signed an agreement with Lisbon for the improvement of rail communications between the protectorate and Mozambique. This agreement provides for the use of the Mozambican port of Laurencio Marques for traffic between Swaziland and the world. The Portuguese government is to extend the existing railway line between Laurencio Marques and Goba (in Mozambique) to a point to be determined on the frontier with Swaziland. From that point the British government would extend the rail to Ngwenya, linking the coast with the rich Swazi asbestos fields. Swaziland's considerable iron-ore deposits around Mbabane are already linked with the sea by a 137-mile railway line. Most of its cost has been borne by South Africa.

It has been suggested that just as South Africa has conducted itself towards Rhodesia after its UDI in November 1965, despite many tempting opportunities to intervene, it will act with caution towards the independent States of Botswana and Lesotho for fear of inviting a UN presence on its own soil. But the similarity, it is submitted, is not too apparent because, apart from the factors listed above, these former protectorates are closely linked with the Union in almost every economic aspect. For example, Lesotho is the natural source of water and power supply for a vast area of South Africa, notably the mining and industrial complex of the Rand. The unparalleled drought in Bechuanaland early this year upset South Africa's calculations equally gravely because the Bechuanas, 90 per cent of whom breed livestock, sell the bulk of it to the Union. Further, South Africa has shown a serious interest in the development of the Okavango Basin which has large reserves of untapped water for agricultural and other uses. Apart from these economic considerations, the physical danger that these strategically-located enclaves could pose to S. Africa would be infinitely greater than from a country like Rhodesia even though it were

Indo-African Joint Ventures

R. K. SHARMA

THE emergence of independent Africa on the international scene has been the most significant event of recent times. How rapid has been the pace of Africa's march to independence! In post-war Africa, only three countries—Ethiopia, Liberia and Egypt (now U.A.R.)—were independent. In December 1951, Libya achieved freedom, followed by Sudan (January 1956) Morocco (March 1956), and Tunisia (March 1956). South of the Sahara, Ghana was the first to get its independence in March 1957. After that came the avalanche and today we have 36 independent countries in Africa.

Political freedom has inevitably made the Africans think of economic independence and advancement. An encouraging phenomenon that strikes one is the will of the African leaders and people to prove themselves worthy of their freedom. As a recent United Nations Report¹ pointed out, "If political independence has been the watchword in Africa for the last ten years, rapid economic growth will no doubt be the overriding pre-occupation for the years to come." In fact, the newly independent States in Africa are now seriously engaged in the task of removing poverty and backwardness. These aspirations, vague in the early stages, are being rapidly transformed into concrete development plans and projects.

India has had close and friendly ties with African countries for many centuries. The emergence of independent African nations enabled India to re-establish with them its traditional links of friendship and co-operation on a new and permanent basis. With its rich experience of planned economic development on democratic lines, India can be a big help to the African countries in their task of economic transformation. The possibilities of Indian co-operation and collaboration in this field are being explored and good results have already been achieved. This policy took concrete shape in 1963 with the formation of an India - Africa Development Association to study, process and effectively deal with proposals received from Africa for collaboration in different industrial fields as also to process proposals for imparting technical training to Africans in Indian factories.

Realising the tremendous scope for Indian collaboration, the Government has formulated a fairly realistic policy on the setting up of joint ventures. The main planks of this policy are :

- (a) Government approves proposals for joint ventures provided Indian investment is limited to the value of indigenous machi-

¹UN Economic Commission for Africa, *Industrial Growth in Africa*, 1963. p. 2.

nery, equipment, tools, structures etc., required for the new venture;

- (b) Government does not allow cash remittances for investment abroad;
- (c) Normally, Government favours minority participation (i.e. up to 49 per cent) by Indian parties. The intention behind this policy is to permit majority participation to foreign (local) parties. However, if in a particular case, the Indian party is in a position to supply machinery, equipment etc. of a value greater than its equity participation, it is welcomed since the excess machinery etc. could be sold straightaway for cash, thereby earning foreign exchange;
- (d) Government does not provide any incentive on machinery or material exported as equity capital for investment abroad;
- (e) Machinery etc. exported under joint ventures should be of Indian make. To keep a healthy standard of such exports, no second-hand or re-conditioned machinery is allowed for export against Indian investment;
- (f) Government favours association of local parties, development banks, financial institutions and local governments with joint ventures;
- (g) As far as possible, Indian business men are advised to propose a turnkey job since this will help to reduce the responsibilities of the local party in African countries;
- (h) Government also favours Indian parties making provision in their agreements with foreign parties for training facilities in India to nationals of the country concerned.

Indian business men seeking collaboration agreements are required to give the Government of India details of all preliminary discussions with foreign parties by correspondence or visits to the countries concerned. They are also required to send an outline of the scheme for collaboration for approval in principle by the Government. The outline should indicate broadly the nature of the project, total cost, details of financing of the project, extent of Indian participation (including the value of machinery, tools, equipment, structures, etc.), and scope for future exports from India of raw materials or components, etc. After approval of the Government in principle has been obtained, the Indian entrepreneur is allowed to work out details of the scheme with the foreign party. It is of course understood that the final agreement reached would be subject to the approval of the Government.

The formulation of policy was followed up with concrete action with a view to exploring the possibilities of joint collaboration projects. A number of delegations led by high government officials visited various African countries for the purpose. In addition, Government, in collaboration with the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and

Industry, sponsored three goodwill delegations of Indian industrialists. Details of these delegations, the periods of their visits and the countries visited are given below :

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Leader</i>	<i>Period of visit</i>	<i>Countries visited</i>
First	Mr. A.M.M. Murgappa Chettiar	20 Sept.—15 Oct. 1964	Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.
Second	Dr. Bharat Ram	4—24 Sept. 1965	Kenya, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo (Leopoldville), Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Central African Republic and Federal Republic of Cameroon.
Third	Mr. Kamalanayan Bajaj	13 Oct.—9 Nov. 1965	Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Sierre Leone, Republic of Guinea and Senegal.

The delegations were (i) to foster and strengthen goodwill between India and the African countries; (ii) to investigate the potentialities of increased economic, commercial and technical collaboration; (iii) to explore the prospects of setting up industries on a joint venture basis; and (iv) to establish and strengthen contacts with business men, commercial and financial organisations as well as with economic departments of the countries visited.

The delegations received a cordial and warm welcome during their visits. They were convinced that because of the similarity of conditions obtaining in India and many of the African countries, there was great scope for joint participation among the developing countries. It also became evident to them that in their own interest they could no longer rely exclusively on the conventional methods of trading. The newer techniques of trade and the rising tempo of industrialisation on the African continent call for India's active participation in setting up joint ventures in various industries. In this task the time element, according to the delegation reports, is extremely important since if we do not take advantage of the available opportunities, others will displace us. As it is we are already late in the field; many a developed country has gone ahead with projects of economic and industrial collaboration in Africa.

Following the formulation of a clear-cut policy on joint ventures, the prospects investigated by Government and the business men's delegations and the interest created by these visits among African countries, a number of proposals for setting up Indo-African joint ventures have come up for consideration of Government. As on May 15, 1966, out of a total of 38 collaboration agreements approved by Government with the

developing and developed countries, as many as 21 were for joint ventures in Africa. Details of these ventures are given in the following table:

Indian Collaboration Agreements with African Countries

S. No.	Country of collaboration	Field of collaboration	Indian collaborator
1.	Nigeria	Engineering goods	M/s. Birla Brothers Pvt. Ltd. Calcutta.
2.	„	Cotton textiles	do.
3.	„	Expansion of existing oil mills	do.
4.	„	Palm kernel crushing plant	do.
5.	„	Pencil factory	Standard Pencil Factory, Madras
6.	„	Razor blade factory	H. L. Malhotra & Sons (Pvt) Ltd, Calcutta
7.	Kenya	Cotton textile mill	R. M. Gokuldas, Bombay
8.	„	Gripe water plant	K. T. Dongre & Co. (Pvt) Ltd., Bombay
9.	„	Pharmaceutical plant	Karam Chand Prem Chand, Ahmedabad
10.	„	Printing ink and allied products	Rainbow Inks Varnishing Co. Bombay
11.	„	Woollen textile mill	Raymonds Woollen Mills, Bombay
12.	„	Florescent fixtures and industries	Premier Lighting Industries (Pvt) Ltd., Bombay
13.	Ethiopia	Razor blade factory	H. L. Malhotra & Sons (Pvt) Ltd. Calcutta
14.	„	Soap factory	Bombay Soap Factory, Bombay
15.	„	Woollen textile mill	Duncan Bros., Calcutta
16.	„	Plastic processing plant	do.
17.	„	Clock assembly plant	do.
18.	Libya	Pipes factory	Indian Hume Pipes Co., Calcutta
19.	Tanzania	Pharmaceutical plant	Sarla Somani, Bombay
20.	Uganda	Sugar factory	Indian Consortium (parties to be decided later)
21.	Zambia	Enamel manufacture	Bengal Enamel Works, Calcutta.

In addition to these joint ventures already approved by Government, there are more than a dozen proposals which are reported to be under consideration. According to the *Economic Times* (May 25, 1966)

these are : Pump factory (Tunisia), vegetable oil processing plant (Tanzania), textile mill (Ghana), paper plant, industrial estate, pencil factory, light engineering complex, engineering complex and jute mill (all in Kenya), sugar farms and factories (Liberia), razor blade factory (Uganda), manufacture of high drafting equipment (UAR) and mechanical brick units (Tanzania).

II

This shows fairly good progress in a relatively short period. This can however be taken as only the beginning of India's collaboration with African countries for which there is vast scope. In this section we shall take a broad view of the African economy and the place of foreign investment in it.

The continent of Africa comprises nearly one-fourth of the world's land surface. Its population of over 275 million accounts for about 8.5 per cent of the world population. Its potential wealth is one of its outstanding advantages. Even the inadequate surveys made so far of its natural resources speak of its vast potential. The continent provides nearly one - seventh of the world's mineral output. Thus, excluding the USSR, Africa produces 98 per cent of the world output of diamonds, 65 per cent of gold and nearly 60 per cent of cobalt. Its energy resources—principally coal in the south, hydro-power in the centre and oils and gas in the south—are considerable. All these point to bright prospects of economic development of the continent.

Africa is one of the most trade-dependent areas of the world. With an annual output of \$21,000 million, its exports were valued at \$4,800 million and imports at \$6,400 million, amounting to 23 and 30 per cent respectively of national income. A major weakness of the African economy in the past has been the dependence of certain countries on a single commodity or on a few commodities. Thus, more than two-thirds of the total export earnings of the UAR and Sudan are from exports of long-staple cotton, over two-thirds of Ghana's export earnings are from cocoa; iron ore and rubber account for 80 per cent of Liberia's export earnings, Tanganyika's economy is harnessed largely on sisal. This dependence makes the economies of these countries dependent on the fluctuations of prices of raw materials.

The African countries have realised that without widening the base of their economies through industrialisation, it is impossible to reduce the vulnerability of their economies to the sharp fluctuations in their primary exports. They are conscious of the fact that the per capita income in industry is higher than in agriculture and that an expansion in industrial employment tends to raise output. It is also clear to them that industrialisation provides the basis for a rapid increase in productivity and income. African leaders have accepted rapid industrial expansion as the most important means of economic growth. Thus industrial activity is expected to expand at a fast rate and account for an increasing share of the national product. Broadly speaking, industrial development in Africa is likely to proceed along three lines : (i) raw materials and foodstuffs now being exported in crude form will be processed in varying degrees before they are sold; (ii) home manufacture will increasingly tend to replace

imported goods; and (iii) some heavy industries are likely to develop with foreign capital, skill and enterprise, to begin with.

Some basic characteristics of the African economy tend to retard the rapid development of industry. First, there is dearth of indigenous capital. Although governments have provided substantial incentives, the response of private investors has not so far been very satisfactory. This is due to a low rate of savings and lack of enterprise and will and capacity to explore and exploit opportunities for profitable investment. The lag in private investment tends to slow down the pace of industrial transformation. Second, in Africa there has so far been little or no indigenous supply of managerial and financial skills. Technical know-how is lacking and the growth of the entrepreneurial class slow. In some countries, the slow build-up of the infra-structural facilities constitutes a handicap. There is also the need to train a large number of men to handle plant and equipment.

In view of these handicaps, the vast majority of African countries have realised the importance of foreign capital and technical know-how. They are convinced that foreign private capital and technical skill can play a significant role in their schemes of industrial development. There is a widespread feeling that it will be difficult to carry out plans for economic development without the participation of foreign private enterprise.

Like other newly independent countries, African nations need private investment on terms acceptable to them. Three important considerations are :

- (1) Recognition on the part of investors of the need for the ultimate Africanisation of enterprises. African leaders are keen on African participation in industrial enterprises and creation of jobs for their own people. They also want foreign collaboration to train African managers and technicians who will ultimately hold positions of responsibility in collaboration projects;
- (2) Recognition of the need for local industries. Africans are no longer satisfied with the old approach that meant large investments in extractive industries because these industries usually involved no processing and had little impact on the local economy. They are now far more inclined to welcome collaboration in activities which involve a high degree of local processing of raw materials and in setting up import-competing manufacturing industries based largely on locally available raw materials;
- (3) Adequate African control of industrial enterprises. Although liberal concessions and incentives are offered, the newly independent African nations would naturally like to retain control of joint ventures.

India, which not long ago was as backward industrially as most African countries are today and which in the short period of three Five-Year Plans has built a fairly sound industrial base, has a bright image in Africa.

African leaders and people have confidence in India's capacity and willingness to help them in the many complex tasks of socio-economic development. India has developed close relations—political, economic, social and cultural—with the emerging African nations. A favourable climate has been created by Indians sent to African countries to work in different fields of activity. Indian teachers in Africa are quite popular. The visits of various delegations have created a fund of goodwill for India among African governments, business men and other people. The Indo-African joint ventures already started have proved useful in creating a favourable climate for Indian investment and collaboration in Africa.

III

It is quite clear that there is vast scope for the establishment of Indo-African joint ventures. But to enable the prospective Indian entrepreneur to come forward with his plans of collaboration, it is important that he should know in broad detail the economic climate in the more important countries of Africa. In this section we therefore propose to deal with a few countries and study their development plans, industrial policies, incentives and concessions offered to foreign entrepreneurs and specific industries offering possibilities of collaboration. We shall make an assessment of the prospects of setting up Indo-African joint ventures.

Case Studies

Nigeria : The largest country in Africa, Nigeria has a population of over 55 million. The six-year (1962-67) Development Plan, with an investment of £N 1,366 million, recognises the vital role which foreign capital and skill can play in the development process. Emphasis is laid on diversification of the economy through industrialisation and presently industrial activity is mainly confined to import substitution. Nigeria has a very favourable investment climate. Private investment is considered responsible for the "preponderant part of economic activities" while public capital expenditure is also expected to generate private economic activity. Government has no plans for nationalisation of industry beyond the extent to which public utilities are already nationalised and should this occur, fair compensation assessed through independent arbitration is assured. Provision has been made for a tax-holiday for new companies for a period up to five years. Relief is also given from import duty on materials or spare parts. In addition, import of machinery and/or components is allowed on a duty-free basis for industries of special benefit to the country. The tariff schedule provides for protection of many products as also protection against dumping. There is complete freedom to convert and transfer funds from Nigeria to other sterling bloc countries.

The rich natural resources of Nigeria make it one of the most promising countries in Africa. The prospects for rapid development of industry are good, considering the availability of a large market, a variety of raw materials, a plentiful and adaptable labour force and abundant power resources. There is good scope for collaboration in various industries, particularly those based on local raw materials, such as cotton textiles, oilseeds, tanning of hides and skins, leather, footwear, sugar and sugar by-products, cement, including asbestos cement, jute bags, paper and pulp, starch, ceramics, food processing and a variety of building

materials. There is also scope for setting up certain industries based on imported raw materials, such as fertilizers, metalware, plastics, etc.

Kenya : Kenya has a population of about nine million which is increasing at the rate of 3 per cent per annum. The six-year (1964-70) Development Plan envisages an annual growth rate of 5.7 per cent, requiring a capital formation of £317 million. The industrial priorities indicated in the Plan envisage a significant export increase or import substitution, maximum possible processing of primary products as well as production of investment goods. The Plan recognises that a vigorous and healthy private sector can play a major role in promoting industrial growth. Kenya welcomes foreign investment and assures all modern facilities to the investor provided (a) the proposed project will lead to the earning or saving of foreign currency, or (b) the proposed project will result in a gain of technical knowledge, etc., that will help in the economic development of the country. The Government provides security of investment while repatriation of both profits and capital is guaranteed on investments in approved projects. An investment allowance of 20 per cent of the cost of new industrial buildings and new machinery installed in such buildings is allowed. Government's basic tariff policy provides for protection of local industries. It also allows duty-free import of certain industrial machinery, while in certain cases refund of customs duty is allowed for approved projects. An Industrial Development Corporation has been set up with government funds to encourage medium and large-scale industries. A new institution, the Development Finance Company of Kenya, was started in 1963 to provide finance for large-scale industries.

This signifies considerable scope for Indian collaboration. There is good scope, particularly in textiles, processing of foodstuffs, packaging industries, pulp and paper, hardboards, assembly plants including motor vehicles, agricultural implements, plastics, building materials, electric lamps and tubes, electric motors, knitting wool, paints and varnishes, power alcohol, concrete pipes, etc.

Ethiopia : With a population of about 25 million, Ethiopia is undergoing rapid and vast changes in its economic structure. The second Economic Development Plan, with a total investment of Eth. \$1.696 million, is aimed at : (1) accelerating the rate of economic growth through better utilisation of available resources thereby increasing the productive capacity of the economy ; (2) introducing modern equipment and technology, thereby raising the skill and productivity of labour ; and (3) raising the savings and investment potential of the country. Ethiopia has a mixed economy in which the private and public sectors have equal rights, obligations and facilities. Realising the need for increased investment of private capital, both foreign and domestic, and for encouraging the flow of capital investment, an investment decree was promulgated in 1963. It provides guarantees for private investment. There is no discrimination against foreign capital. Remittance of profits and repatriation of net proceeds is allowed. Exemption from income-tax is guaranteed to all new enterprises investing Eth. \$,200,000 and above in industrial, mining and transport activities. In addition, all agricultural and industrial machines and implements are exempt from customs duty, municipal taxes and other duties levied on imports. The Development Bank (established

1951) has been assisting in promoting new projects while the Investment Bank, set up in 1963, is meant to promote and participate even in equity investment and can give long-term loans for 7-10 years.

Thus the outlook for Indian collaboration in Ethiopia is quite favourable. Considerable potential exists for cotton textiles, edible oil processing, agricultural machinery and implements, a wide variety of light engineering products, chemical industries, essential oils, power alcohol, plastic materials, glass sheets, etc.

Uganda : The economy of Uganda has been primarily dependent on agriculture which accounted (in 1960) for 62 per cent of the gross domestic product and 82 per cent of exports. Vulnerability to fluctuations in world prices of its primary exports and consequent deterioration in the terms of trade in recent years has strengthened the country's determination to diversify its output and broaden the base of its economy. The First Plan (1961-66) providing for a capital investment of £90 million aims at a balanced development of the various sectors. Uganda has the basic pre-requisites for industrialisation, e.g., political stability, large mineral resources, including iron ore. Its communications system is reputed to be among the best in Africa. The country is rich in hydro-electric resources; supply of semi-skilled and unskilled labour is quite abundant. Given the capital and skill that can be assumed to flow in with foreign investment, the picture that emerges is encouraging. Uganda welcomes foreign capital; Government is anxious to provide whatever assistance is possible to productive enterprises. Most capital goods are free of duty, refund on imports of goods used in manufacture is allowed, while protection is given to local industries in a number of cases. Government has set up the Uganda Development Corporation to assist those who wish to take advantage of the country's potential for investment.

Uganda thus offers very good scope for industrial collaboration. According to the business men's delegation conditions for investment by India are "definitely more favourable". Considerable goodwill has been created by the Indian Government's project for sugar factories. The keen interest taken by local Indians in productive enterprises provides a solid background for future Indian collaboration. Good possibilities exist for cotton textiles, cement, power alcohol, ceramics, paper, chip boards, agricultural tools and implements, metal boxes, steel furniture, bicycles, electric cables, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics.

Ghana : Ghana has perhaps the highest standard of living in developing Africa today. It has an ambitious 7-year (1963-70) Plan for National Reconstruction and Development with a planned investment of £G 1,016.5 million and a target of national income growth of 5.5 per cent and per capita rise of 3 per cent. The Plan provides for the development of a wide variety of industries. The main aim of the country's industrial policy is to evolve a socialist pattern of society. It emphasises, however, that there are different paths to socialism and that each country must have its own way. Although initially there was some ambiguity about the attitude towards foreign capital, the Plan says that foreign private capital has "quite a special place" in it. The Capital Investment Act (1963) and National Investment Bank Act (1963) clearly

stipulate that "no investment shall be subject to expropriation by Government ; fair compensation is assured in case this is done. There is no restriction on the remittance abroad of capital and profits (after tax). Government provides important incentives for foreign entrepreneurs : (a) an approved enterprise is entitled to exemption from income-tax for five years ; (a) a capital allowance is granted for buildings, plant, machinery, structures, etc., used for an approved project ; (c) exemption is given from imports and customs duties as well as from purchase tax on material and equipment required for an approved project ; and (d) exemption from income-tax is allowed for scientific research for the development of an approved project.

Considering the policy of encouraging foreign capital, there appears to be good scope for Indian collaboration. A striking possibility which should be explored is the setting up of projects in collaboration with Government on a turn-key basis, particularly through supply of equipment on deferred payment terms. A big industrial complex is likely to emerge in the Volta Region and there should be good scope for India to participate not only in industrial projects but also in the construction of civil engineering works and the like.

Zambia : The economy of Zambia is based primarily on copper. Minerals account for more than 90 per cent of exports and the mining industry is a major source of employment. With a population of 35 million, Zambia is much better off than most African countries. Although no plan of economic development has so far been prepared, Government is making all efforts to diversify the economy and is keen to have a wide range of industries. It has set up INDECO (Northern Rhodesian Industrial Development Corporation) with the aim of encouraging the development of industries which will utilise indigenous raw material resources and are labour-intensive. A significant feature of Government policy is that it prefers to have collaboration with developing countries like India rather than with the advanced countries. The climate for Indian collaboration, according to the FICCI delegation, is "very favourable indeed". Relations between Africans and Indians are much more cordial than in some other parts of the country. It should be possible to secure local participation in industrial ventures, though it will be necessary to obtain the cooperation of INDECO. Given Zambia's basic policy of increasing employment potential, medium and small-scale industries offer the best prospects. Indian entrepreneurs can fulfil an important task in this direction provided they act without any delay.

Sudan : With a population of 14 million, Sudan, which attained independence in January 1956, has a vast potential for economic development. The ten-year (1961-62 to 1970-71) Plan seeks to bring about an appreciable increase in real income and broaden the economic structure. It lays considerable emphasis on import substitution. Government policy envisages promotion of industry through private initiative and private capital investment. In pursuance of this policy, Government is following a fairly liberal policy in encouraging local and foreign entrepreneurs. The Approved Enterprises (Concessions) Act of 1956 provides that no discrimination will be made against foreign enterprises. It provides a number of incentives, such as a depreciation allowance at double the

nominal rate, reduction in import duties on raw materials and preferential railway tariff rates. Remittance of profits to the country of origin is allowed, while fair compensation is guaranteed in case of compulsory acquisition by the State. Although the foreign entrepreneur has to face some difficulties due to shortage of local capital, there is considerable long-term potential for development and good scope for collaboration in different fields of industry, particularly in medium and small-scale industries. A good opportunity exists for Indian collaboration, particularly in the manufacture of cotton yarn and knitwear, electric motors, fans, cables pumping sets, steel re-rolling mills based on local scrap, hardware, dry batteries, aluminium sheet rolling, solvent extraction, insecticides, etc.

Tanzania : The economy of Tanzania has up to now been based predominantly on agriculture. Although mineral resources are reported to be rich, these have not been developed. The five-year (1964-69) plan, with an outlay of £ 246 million, aims at building a solid industrial base. Industrialisation here implies the processing of local raw materials. Tanzania is eager to secure foreign investments but prefers that they should be in partnership with the country's public development institutions so that it could itself invest 20-75 per cent in equity capital. Repatriation of capital as well as profits (after tax) is permitted. Most industrial equipment, raw materials, implements and tools are exempt from duty. At the same time, tariff protection is provided for a wide range of industries. An investment deduction of 20 per cent is granted on industrial buildings, purchases and installation of machinery. Tax refund is allowed on scientific research. Government however prefers joint ventures in collaboration with one of the development corporations. Although it is necessary to be careful in selecting projects of interest to India, it is very important that we decide on our area of collaboration without delay, otherwise we may have to choose from less worthwhile investments. Good scope exists for cotton textiles, motor tyres and tubes, power alcohol, electric cables, metal manufacture, pharmaceuticals, ceramics, agricultural tools and equipment, oil processing, soap, etc.

Malawi : Although Malawi has only 4 million people, it is, by African standards, densely populated. The First Five-Year (1964-69) Plan lays emphasis on stimulation of the private sector of the economy and in particular encouragement of industrial development. The principal manufacturing industries are processing industries although there are some industries based on imported raw materials. Malawi's industrial policy seeks to encourage the growth of industries and for this purpose Government welcomes the inflow of productive foreign capital. The Malawi Development Corporation is regarded as the main instrument of industrial development. It has been providing capital for collaboration projects on an equal basis (one-third each) among the foreign investor, the local collaborator, and the corporation itself. To encourage the establishment of large and medium-scale industries, a system of exclusive licensing for periods up to five years has been introduced. Government provides tax concessions to investors; a 100 per cent investment allowance on new industrial buildings, plant and machinery is admissible. Repatriation of dividend, interest and savings is allowed. Scope for Indian collaboration at the present stage is however somewhat limited due to the small size of the population.

Democratic Republic of Congo (Leopoldville) : With a population of 15.3 million, Congo (Leopoldville) has a fairly good potential for investment. It produces agricultural products like groundnuts, palm oil and kernels, coffee and rubber. It has good resources of minerals such as copper, manganese ore, zinc, coal, etc. The country also produces some industrial products—sugar, cotton textiles, cement, refined copper, zinc ingots, footwear and beer. Its major exports constitute agricultural products, natural rubber and tin ores and concentrates. The draft plan for the period 1965-68, prepared by the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, includes the Inga hydroelectric project which will help develop an industrial complex around Leopoldville and Maladi. The code of investment of Congo, finalised in 1965, lays emphasis on the role of private investment, both indigenous and foreign, in the economic development of the country. It requires that projects should be in conformity with the priorities and objectives of the national development plans. Government assures a favourable climate for investment. The nature and extent of concessions proposed for projects are determined by their contribution to the general economic development, balance of payments position, degree of value added to production, participation of local capital and prospects of training and employment of local personnel. Although a definite pattern of economic development is still to emerge, the Republic of Congo (Leopoldville) may have good scope for Indian collaboration in respect of certain industries.

The data furnished in Sections II and III should be sufficient to indicate that there is tremendous scope for Indian collaboration in Africa. Most countries of Africa have definite plans for economic development. Most of them envisage diversification of their economies with special emphasis on industrial growth. Generally speaking, there is lack of private capital, local entrepreneurs and technical skill—the pre-requisites for any scheme of industrialisation. Realizing this deficiency, almost all countries welcome the inflow of foreign private capital. Incentives are given to foreign entrepreneurs by way of tax exemptions, rebate on import and customs duty, provision of depreciation allowance, permission to repatriate capital and profits, and guarantees against nationalisation. At the same time, in most countries protection from foreign competition is given to local industry. The African countries are determined to raise their standards of living and with this the demand for manufactured products is bound to increase.

Since, to start with, most African countries are keen to develop small-scale and medium industries, India, with its rich experience in these fields, is in an advantageous position. There is considerable scope for Indian collaboration. But Indian entrepreneurs have to keep in mind three basic considerations : (1) The newly-independent African nations would like to have foreign capital within the framework of their development plans and policies. Fortunately, the terms offered are favourable and flexible. (2) Non-availability of local capital and private entrepreneurs may pose some problems at the initial stage. We should be prepared to enter into collaboration with financial and other institutions established by the various governments and at the same time endeavour to develop a fairly reliable entrepreneurial class, willing to accept risks and responsibilities. (3) It is essential that our collaboration schemes should provide for training of Africans in technical skills and management. (4) It is of vital importance that we should explore Africa's vast potential without undue delay.

Mechanisation of Agriculture in West Africa

YAIR ROTH AND Y. S. BRENNER

THIS paper is based on an experiment conducted in 1963 and 1964 on a State Farm in the Volta Region of Ghana. The object of the experiment was to examine the advantages and disadvantages of mechanised farming in West Africa today. An attempt is made here to study the results of this experiment from three aspects: (1) from the point of view of the agronomist, whether the work itself is improved through mechanisation as appears to be the case when, for example, in bush clearing bulldozing and rooting take the place of burning; (2) from the farmers' point of view, whether the use of machines is more profitable than that of manual labour which is still relatively cheap in West Africa; and (3) from the point of view of the economist who concerns himself with the long-term aims of economic growth and development in this part of the world.

From the agronomist's point of view there are at least some tasks where the use of machines has an obvious advantage. The construction of dams and the draining and levelling of large areas of land are hardly worthwhile or even possible without the use of some mechanical equipment. Similarly, there is a clear improvement in the use of mechanical equipment in bush-clearing. Traditionally the West African farmer in the bush regions clears the land he intends cultivating in a given season by burning the vegetation with which it is overgrown. This apparently cheap and simple method then permits him to grow one or two consecutive crops with a good yield. In the following seasons he is forced to move to new land because by burning he has destroyed the natural 'green fertilizer' with which he might have restored to the soil with the aid of mechanical equipment. Soon the abandoned land reverts to bush and it will then take between five and ten years, according to the area, for the land to regain the degree of fertility which will make it worthwhile to repeat burning and cultivation. The resulting system of shifting cultivation thus reduces land use to a fraction of between one-fifth and one-tenth of the exploitable area.¹ In addition to this mechanisation has advantages where the work itself can be done by hand but is greatly improved by the use of mechanical equipment; for example, when ploughing replaces hoeing, or machine shelling of maize takes the place of manual shelling which is, as a rule, rather damaging to the crop.

From the farmer's point of view mechanisation is mainly a problem of capital and opportunity cost. Assuming that capital for the introduction of mechanical equipment is readily available and the farm large enough to permit its full employment, the question is still to be asked if at the prevailing capital-labour cost ratios it may not be more profitable to cultivate land by the traditional manual methods. The following four Tables permit a comparison of the profitability for the farmer of fully mechanised and partially mechanised production on a large farm in Ghana.²

Table I

Not Fully Mechanised Production, Maize, Minor Season 1963, 23 Acres

Kind of work	Man-days		Hours with wheel tractor		Hours with chain tractor	
	Total	Per acre	Total	Per acre	Total	Per acre
Harrowing					31	1.3
Spiking			17			
Lining			21			
Hand sowing	36	1.5				
Filling vacancies.	24	1				
Weeding and hoeing	302	13				
Cultivating			31	1.3		
Hand picking	115	5.6	88	3.8		
Shelling	98	4.2	48	2		
Drying and bagging.	94	4.1				
Total :	669	29.0	205	9.0	31	1.3

Table II

Cost of Production. Not Fully Mechanised as per Table I

Expenditure	Total	Per acre	Price per unit	Cost per acre
Man-days	669	29.0	6s. 6d	£ 9. 8s. 6d
Hours of wheel tractor	205	9.0	16s. 0d	£ 7. 4s. 0d
Hours of chain tractor	31	1.3	£ 2.0s. 0d	£ 2. 12s. 0d
Hours of implements	236	10.2	5s. 0d	£ 2. 11s. 0d
Seeds	282 lbs.	12.3 lbs	4d	4s. 2d
Total :				£ 21. 19s. 8d

The average maize yield was 1540 lb per acre, i.e. 7 bags. Hence, partially mechanised cost of production of one ton of maize was £ 31.10s. 0d. which is £3.3s. 0d. per bag. The average cost of production per acre was, as shown in Table II, £ 21.19s. 8d.

Table III

Fully Mechanised Production. Maize. Major Season 1964. 85 Acres

Kind of work	Man - days		Hours with wheel tractor		Hours with chain tractor		Hours with combine harvester
	Total	Per acre	Total	Per acre	Total	Per acre	
Ploughing	39		101	1.2	89	1.0	
Harrowing			109	1.3			
Fertilizing	12		81	1.0			
Cultivating			129	1.5			
Thinning out	43	0.5					
Weeding and hoeing	407	5.0					
Harvesting	129	1.5					87
Carting maize	16	0.5	96	1.0			
Bagging and weighing	161	2.0					
Total :	807	9.5	516	6.0	89	1.0	87

Table IV

Cost of Production. Fully Mechanised as per Table III

Expenditure	Total	Per acre	Price per unit	Cost per acre
Man-days	807	9.5	6s.6d	£ 3. 1s.9d
Hours of wheel tractor	516	6.0	16s.0d	£ 5.16s.0d
Hours of chain tractor	89	1.0	£ 2. 0s.0d	£ 2. 0s.0d
Hours of combine-harvester	87	1.0	£ 2.10s.0d	£ 2.10s.0d
Implements	605	7.1	5s.0d	£ 1.15s.6d
Seeds	1020 lbs.	12.0	4d	4s.0d
Super phosphate	170 cwt.	2.0	15s.0d	£ 1.10s.0d
Sulphate of amonia	170 cwt.	2.0	10s.0d	£ 2. 0s.0d
Total :				£ 17.17s.3d

The cost assessments for the mechanical equipment were made with due regard to the specifically West African conditions. It was found that both the degree and efficiency of its exploitation, even on the

best run farms, are considerably below normal expectations and the purchasing price and depreciation above the general norm. The following is a detailed account based on the experiment :

Wheel Tractor :

(Depreciation over *five* years. Working hours 1000 per year)

Average cost.	£ 1000
Interest—6 per cent per annum with half the amount to be repaid within five years	£ 150
Spare parts and repairs—100 per cent (experience)	£ 1000
	<hr/>
	Fixed costs. Total : £. 2150
	<hr/>
Total of fixed costs per year	£ 430
Cost of fuel, lubrication oils etc. p. a.	£ 180
Operators' wages etc. p. a.	£ 200
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Total cost p. a.	£ 810

Cost per hour : $(810/1000) = 16s.$

(The cost per hour which is usual in Europe is approximately 8s. 9d.)

Chain Tractor :

(Depreciation over *six* years. Working hours 1300 per year)

Average cost.	£ 5000
Interest—6 per cent per annum with half the amount to be repaid within six years.	£ 900
Spare parts and repairs—100 per cent (experience)	£ 5000
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	Fixed costs. Total : £ 10900
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Total of fixed costs per year	£ 1800
Cost of fuel, lubrication oils etc. p. a.	£ 450
Operators' wages etc. p. a.	£ 250
	<hr/>
Total cost p. a.	£ 2500

Cost per hour : $(2500/1300) = \text{App. } £ 2$

Combine-harvester (self-propelled) :

(Depreciation over *six* years. Working hours 800 per year)

Average cost.	£ 4500
Interest—6 per cent per annum with half the amount to be repaid within six years.	£ 800
Spare parts and repairs—100 per cent (experience)	£ 4500
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	Fixed costs. Total : £ 9800
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Total of fixed costs per year	£ 1630
Cost of fuel, lubrication oils etc. p. a.	£ 240
Operators' wages etc. (five months only)	£ 150
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Total cost p. a.	£ 2020
Cost per hour : (2020/800) = £ 2. 10s.	
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Comparing the inputs in mechanised and partially mechanised farming, i.e., Tables I, II, and III, IV, we get the following results:³

Table V
Inputs per acre

	Fully mechanised	Not fully mechanised
Man-days	9.5	29.0
Hours of wheel tractor	6.0	9.0
Hours of chain tractor	1.0	1.3
Hours of implements	7.1	8.2
Hours of combine-harvester	1.0	
Hours of sheller		2.0

Table VI
Inputs per acre by kinds of work

	Fully mechanised	Not fully mechanised
<i>Planting :</i>		
Tractor hours	1.0	1.0
Man-days	0.15	1.5
<i>Weeding :</i>		
Man-days	5.0	13.0
<i>Harvesting :</i>		
Man-days	1.7	9.8
Tractor hours	1.0	5.8
Combine-harvester hours	1.0	
Sheller hours		22.0

To summarise, on a large farm it is even today more profitable to have full mechanisation than partial mechanisation. As a comparison of Tables II and IV shows⁴ it cost £21.19s. 8d. to grow one acre of maize by partial mechanisation whereas the cost of growing one acre of maize by full mechanisation was only £14.7s.3d. and with the addition of fertilizers only £17.17s.3d. It is also noteworthy that the yield per acre without the application of fertilizers was 1540 lb., i.e., 7 bags, whereas the yield per acre from land to which fertilizers were applied was 1850 lb., i.e., 8.4 bags.

In the fully mechanised experiment production of one ton of maize cost £21.5s.0d. whereas in the partially mechanised experiment it cost £31.10s.0d. This means that the cost per bag with full mechanisation was £2.2s.6d. and with partial mechanisation £3.3s.0d.

The wages actually paid in these experiments were the normal current rates in Ghana of 6s.6d. per man-day for ordinary labourers and 7s.7d. for senior labourers in charge of 5 to 14 men. Clerks and storemen were paid 13s.3d. These wage-rates are those prescribed by the government as minimum wages in accordance with Article 10 of the collective agreement of 20 October 1960 which has so far not been revised though prices have gone up considerably.

It is rather difficult to assess the opportunity cost of these 6s. 6d. wages. It is however a fact that workers from the northern territories come down to do seasonal work in the cocoa-belt on not more than 4s. 6d. a day.⁵ It is also a fact that the supply of labour at 6s. 6d. per day is by far greater than the demand. This however need not be evidence of higher transfer costs. The average income from traditional farming is, as far as we were able to assess, about £80 per annum. This is about 5s. a day under present conditions. To this it must be added that the farmer who hires himself out for daily rated work seldom totally abandons his farm. He usually reduces its size and continues to cultivate it after working hours or leaves it to be cultivated by the generally under-employed members of his household. The main attraction of wage-work appears to be the greater degree of security. The workers seem to value, above all, the fact that the money is received in cash and regularly and that there is no risk involved. In fact there is no opportunity cost in the accepted sense of the term in West Africa. The extended family and its concomitant under-employment usually reduces the productivity of self-employed labour from between 40 and 90 per cent of its productivity under wage-work conditions.⁶ This means that wage-work rather increases the overall product.

From the above it seems obvious that provided the physical and financial resources are adequate, mechanisation and employment of wage workers are desirable and profitable in West Africa. However this statement must be qualified. Firstly, much still depends on the thorny problem of management. Secondly, the mechanisation of agriculture for production of some crops still requires foreign experts. Thirdly, full mechanisation appears at the present stage profitable only with crops like maize, groundnuts, millet, dry legumes and rice, while others, like cotton, yarn and some other legumes, are more cheaply produced with only partial mechanisation.

From the long-term point of view of economic development the merits of mechanisation are self-evident. One can hardly conceive of large-scale irrigation projects, construction of dams, or draining of swamps, etc., today without the use of machines though in fact such work can be done and has been done in the past without them. In this article, however, we are not concerned with publically initiated schemes of such magnitude. We are merely discussing the direct utilisation of mechanical equipment by farmers themselves. Yet, even in this limited sense it seems fairly clear that in a great number of cases, particularly of bush clearing, mechanisation is not merely desirable but necessary. Faced with the rapidly increasing population it may indeed be worthwhile for governments in West Africa to consider the setting up of State-owned tractor stations and to put their services at the disposal of farmers free of cost so that bulldozing may replace burning as a farming practice. Earlier in this article it was suggested that land use in the best cultivated areas in West Africa is restricted to between ten and twenty per cent of the potentially available land. This, it is claimed, is primarily due to the system of shifting cultivation. Without mechanical equipment, however, this is the only practicable method of agriculture. Therefore, it is necessary to compare the high cost involved in the use of mechanical equipment in Africa not only with the apparent low cost of labour but also to take into consideration the actual price and public value of arable land. Unlike in developed countries mechanisation in Africa usually not only replaces labour but also increases land.

The necessity for mechanisation becomes even more obvious when regarded from a wider aspect. Taking again Ghana as an example, it is estimated that about 60 per cent of the working population are employed in agriculture. Part of this labour-force produces crops for export. Cocoa, among other things, is the main source of government finance for the country's development projects. With a population increasing by no less than two per cent per year food production by the traditional methods cannot keep pace with the rising demand. In fact, food imports have risen, at current prices, from about £10m in 1951 to over £26 m in 1961. The productivity of labour is however only 1:1.5, compared with that of 1:12.0 in the United States. This means that one man employed in agriculture in Ghana produces food for one and a half additional persons whereas one man employed in agriculture in the US produces enough food to feed 12 extra people. Yet, Ghana is also committed to a policy of urban industrialisation which causes a continual shift of population away from agricultural to non-agricultural employment. To some degree this may in due course lead to higher per capita productivity on the farm as more under-employed labour is caught up in the productive processes but more than this is required to feed the country. In fact, a considerable rise in farm production will be necessary during the next five years merely to maintain the present standard of living in this country. A number of experiments designed to examine the degree of improvement which can be brought about without the use of expensive mechanical equipment have shown that production can be raised by up to 10 per cent through better organisation and by up to 14 per cent by better husbandry and use of fertilizers. Taken together this means that without the use of machines the Ghana farmer can at best raise production by 24 per cent. This would still be six per cent short of the country's requirements over the next five years. There-

of cement from Swedon to Jibouti to Addis Ababa than for the same item from Swedon to Jibouti"¹⁵. Railway authorities have been compelled by road transport competition to reduce the freight charges but they are still quite high. In spite of this, the railway is still the main artery of internal

TABLE I
Operation of the Franco-Ethiopian Railway

	1961-62	1962-63	1963-64
Length of track	781	781	781
Freight carried (000 tons)			
Imports	116.4	127.7	149.4
Exports	122.2	110.7	122.3
Internal traffic	100.5	98.9	125.9
Passengers: km. (million)	53.2	62.3	67.0
Employees: Ethiopians	1,717	2,136	2,429
Foreigners	169	151	82
Total	1,886	2,287	2,511
Annual wages and salaries (Ethio. \$000)	7,238	7,810	8,376

Source : Ethiopia-Statistical-Abstract, 1965, p. 86.

and external trade. This is due to two reasons. First, for imports of machinery and other goods requiring careful handling, railways are considered safer than road transport by truck. Second, the cost of transport by truck varies over the same route during the different seasons of the years. The rates by road from Addis Ababa to Assab in November and January are Eth. \$ 17.50 and \$ 45.00 respectively¹⁶. But the rates of rail transport remain unchanged for the whole year. Thus Jibouti, due to the rail line, is still the port through which most of Ethiopian ommerce passes¹⁷.

Railway construction is a very expensive proposition and as such railways can only link important ports and cities situated at great distances. Moreover there is little justification for railway authorities to build stations around villages which are far from the nearest railway line. In these circumstances, roads linking small and large cities can produce good results by helping farmers to market their products more easily and encouraging inter-regional trade.¹⁸ This would also help the farmers to increase exports of agricultural products.

The roads in Ethiopia are not sufficient to meet the country's requirements. They do not reach many areas with large agricultural potentials. Further the roads are in a poor condition. "The worse the road, the higher the cost of transport".¹⁹ The standard rate in Central America, Puerto Rico, Turkey, Guatemala is US \$1.00 a ton per mile. The freight rate from Jimma to Maji by truck is US \$ 1.60 a ton per mile. As such "nobody benefits by these increasing freight rates.....The consumer pays materially more than would be necessary with a reasonably improved road system, and the producer also gets a lower price for his crops. The cost over and above US 3.4 cents per ton per mile serves no useful purpose whatever. It is wealth destroyed with benefit to no one."²⁰ So there is an immediate need for an improved system covering about 18,000 km. of highways which should be built at the earliest possible time.²¹

Fortunately the role of transport in economic development is fully appreciated in Ethiopia. In 1950 the Imperial Ethiopian Government

secured a loan of US \$5 million from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for the rehabilitation, repair and maintenance of its road system. By the Proclamation 115 of 26 January 1951, an Imperial Highway Authority was established. This agency was given the general function of developing and maintaining the country's highways by utilising the funds provided by the Government. In 1952, the Imperial Highway Authority also assumed responsibility for 894 km of roads in the new federal territory of Eritrea. The Imperial Government, in addition to the loan, provided Eth. \$ 23,00,000 for the reconstruction, repair and maintenance of roads. As a result of the first phase of the development programme, highway traffic increased by 50 per cent and freight rates dropped sharply. During the last two decades when prices of world coffee were depressed the improved road conditions made it possible for Ethiopia's coffee to capture world markets at reasonable prices. Without lower transport costs, much of the coffee would have remained on the trees²².

A new three-year highway construction programme was launched in the beginning of 1957 for connecting the coffee and grain growing regions with the main centres. For this the Ethiopian Government signed a second agreement with the International Bank for US \$15 million. Road construction opened up new areas with large potentials for commercial agriculture. It was estimated that the new roads would make it possible to increase production of cash crop by an estimated \$25 million a year.²³

The need for adequate provision for transport facilities for the effective implementation of Ethiopia's development plan was realised fully when the plan was formulated. The demand for greater transport facilities makes it necessary during the Second Five-Year Plan to pay due attention to this subject.²⁴ Transport and communications have been allocated 18.7 per cent of the total outlay (16.8 per cent for transport and 1.9 per cent for communications). The plan aims to expand transport and communication facilities by 28 per cent. The First Plan had allocated nearly 45 per cent of the outlay for transport.

TABLE II
Transport and Communications Investment in First and Second Plans
Thousands of Eth. \$

	First Plan		Second Plan	
	Amount	Percentage	Amount	Percentage
Railways	7,000	3.1	10,000	3.1
Road transport	127,800	56.2	155,600	49.2
Water transport	26,900	11.8	24,163	7.6
Air transport	47,600	21.0	89,153	28.2
City traffic	8,000	3.5	6,000	1.9
Total	217,300	95.6	284,916	80.0
Communications	10,000	4.4	26,500	10.0
Grand Total	227,300	100.0	311,416	100.0

About 50 per cent of the outlay on transport and communications was set apart for roads. "In addition to the completion of about 490 km of roads under construction, the construction of about 1300 km of all-

weather roads and about 1,000 km of feeder roads have been planned.²⁵ Harar is to be connected to an all-weather road network. These road facilities will improve not only government administration but also local trade. But roads, even if very well organised, cannot cope with the ever-growing volume of goods which have to be transported from one place to another. To relieve the growing pressure on roads, the Second Plan provided 3.1 per cent of the outlay for railway building. It was planned to construct railway lines between Awash and Assab, Nazareth and Dilla (Sidamo) and Agordat and Tesseney. Ethiopia has now signed an agreement with France for Fr. 80 million to finance a 300-km line from Nazareth to Dilla.²⁶

Considering the present contribution and future requirements of transport facilities in the country, the amount allocated for railways during the Second Plan is not sufficient. - According to Lord Lugard, the material development of Africa may be summed up in one word, "transport". He added that "the development of African countries is impossible without railway facilities"²⁷ and that any railway built reasonably cheap is bound to be remunerative.²⁸ Since many fertile areas in Ethiopia are far from important markets, a railway network will contribute much to the economic and trade development of the country.²⁹ Further, with the development of agriculture, industry and commerce, the pressure on rail transport will increase at a faster rate. So railways are the king-pin of the national economy and they must be expanded at a faster rate in order to meet the increasing transport requirements of the country.

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National Integration

K. SANTHANAM

THE expression 'national integration' is delightfully simple. But, even a little reflection reveals enormous complexities and delight tends to change into despair. It is, therefore, necessary to avoid easy optimism as well as paralysing pessimism. The problem has to be objectively and completely analysed and the reality faced with courage and imagination. The objectives should be formulated with precision and coherence and suitable policies, procedures and measures have to be devised, both short-term and long term, which will be mutually consistent and take the country steadily, even if slowly, towards the full realisation of the objectives.

Let us now define the problem in its essential aspects. India is not a new country which can write on a clean slate. It has inherited many tendencies, traditions, beliefs, habits, taboos and other emotional complexes and psychological twists from the remote times, from mediaeval ages and the recent past. To deal with all of them in a comprehensive manner would require a large-size volume. For the purposes of this article, it is enough to concentrate on those factors which have still a powerful pull on the lives of large sections of the people and which have to be taken into account, encouraged, tolerated, subordinated or superseded, as may be necessary for national integration. They are (i) religion, (ii) caste, (iii) race and colour, (iv) language and literature and (v) cultural traditions. It will be found that each of these influences both unites and divides. This union and division may be vertical, horizontal or both. In the case of none of these factors, wholesale preservation or total rejection is possible. There are elements in each of them which should be eliminated, some immediately and others progressively and slowly. Some others may have to be changed, refined and assimilated.

Religion has been the greatest single force in the evolution of India for thousands of years. This does not mean that Indian civilisation has been lacking in the development of social, economic, literary, artistic and other cultural aspects of life. But, generally, they have often been overshadowed by and always closely linked to the religious life of the people. The greatest leaders of India have been her saints, religious teachers and heads of religious orders, temples, mutts and other religious organisations. Even today, the place occupied by religion in the lives of the people is far greater than what the politicians and the intellectuals are willing to concede.

Throughout the ages, religion has been a factor of unity and division in almost equal measure. One cannot but feel inspired and thrilled by the fact that in times when there were practically no means of transport or conveyance other than human or animal labour, millions of people all over India were on the move visiting sacred shrines, bathing in the sacred rivers and visiting sites and monuments hallowed by ancient traditions.

Though the emergence of politics and economics has, to a certain extent, reduced the influence of religion in recent times, the development of modern means of transport and communication have also enabled religious teachers and organisations to extend their activities over larger areas and populations. The numbers of people visiting the remote shrines of Amarnath, Badrinath and Kedarnath have, undoubtedly, increased owing to the facilities of railway and motor transport. Pilgrimage to the more accessible centres like Haridwar, Banaras, Tirupathi or Rameswaram has become a regular feature in the lives of many sections of Hindus who could not have undertaken it in the past. Thus Hinduism continues to be a strong pervasive force among the vast Hindu population. At the same time, it must be confessed that its ability to unite the Hindus is greatly diminished by its division into sects and its association with the institution of caste. As a combined result of all these, the Hindus are divided and disunited but have learnt to cultivate toleration as an essential virtue.

It is natural for Indian thinkers to be reluctant to face frankly the impact of Islam on India. During many centuries, it played an aggressive role and converted millions of Hindus, often by force and during the entire period of Muslim rule by continuous exercise of political pressure. Though, in many places, goodwill and friendly relations had been established between the Hindus and Muslims, there has been an under-current of hostility which tends to burst out suddenly on trifling provocation. The division of India and the creation of Pakistan has had conflicting effects in respect of this hostility. On the one hand, the Muslim community in divided India has come to realise that its future depends upon the goodwill of the Hindus, while the latter have got rid of the fear of Muslims which had been the result of centuries of Muslim domination. On the other hand, the continuing conflict between India and Pakistan and the latter's insistence on its being a Muslim power tends to strengthen the small but aggressive and fanatical sections of both communities and prevents the growth of mutual trust and goodwill.

The Christians in India do not present difficult problems for national integration. Their numbers, though not insignificant, are small in proportion to those of Hindus and Muslims. Though it is true that Christian missionaries often used material inducements for conversion and were helped directly or indirectly by the British Government in India, there was never any use of force and hardly any direct political pressure. It should, however, be noted that Indian Christians are generally intensely religious.

Among the Muslims, there is the conflict between Shiyas and Sunnies and generally there is not more harmony and co-operation between the various Christian denominations than among Hindu sects.

It cannot be disputed that these inter-religious and intra-religious differences constitute a major obstacle in the way of national integration. The Communist solution of the elimination of religion through an active anti-God movement backed by all the resources of the State is impossible for India. The very existence of so many religions and sects will present a far greater resistance to anti-religious activity of even a communist dictatorship in India. But it is altogether inconsistent with any system of democracy. Therefore, we have to contemplate the indefinite persistence of religious spirit and influence over the vast majority of the Indian people. At the same time, measures have to be devised to eliminate open conflicts and subconscious antagonisms, promote toleration and bring about the subordination of religious considerations in political, economic and cultural spheres where the individual should be motivated primarily by human and national interests.

The means to reconcile religion and national integration as envisaged by the national political leadership is secularism. Strictly interpreted, it means elimination of religion in all affairs outside its strictly spiritual sphere but religion does not consist of mere religious beliefs. It has powerful social pulls among its followers and religious institutions have economic, educational and psychological impacts which necessarily affect every aspect of national life.

In the Constitution, strict neutrality and impartiality have been imposed upon the State and public authorities in relation to religion. Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru who were both ardent advocates of full national integration and who were the joint makers of modern India had radically different approaches towards the problem of religious harmony. Gandhiji believed that true religious spirit was of incalculable value and every effort should be made to preserve and intensify it, while seeking to eliminate the objectionable features of fanaticism, intolerance and narrow-mindedness. Jawaharlal was, on the other hand, a rationalist and agnostic and preferred to ignore religion and strive for its strict exclusion from all fields of national endeavour. I am personally convinced that, though difficult, it is Gandhiji's approach that will conduce to national integration in the long run. Nehru's approach has, in my view, tended to create a gulf between the leaders and the people and undermine the moral and spiritual basis of our national life. This has resulted in a deplorable deterioration of standards of private and public conduct and increase of corruption and nepotism. While the State and public authorities have to observe strict neutrality and impartiality as provided for in the Constitution, a warm and live interest in the movements for reformation and purification of the existing religious practices is indispensable for the growth of a healthy and tolerant multi-religious nationalism. I do not also see any objection to active state financial assistance on a pro-rata population basis for restoration and renovation of temples, mosques and churches and publication of religious literature free from fanaticism and sectarianism. As a matter of fact, the States have to regulate the administration of properties and endowments belonging to religious institutions. In Madras, for instance, all the Hindu temples are practically under Government control. To the extent this control is informed by a truly religious spirit and is free from political exploitation, it will help national integration.

Logically, the problem of caste is much simpler. Caste distinctions, prejudices and taboos are altogether irrational and have little place in the present and none in the future. The objective of a casteless society deserves to be supported without reservations. At the same time, many traditions and customs which deserve to be supported and encouraged have come to be associated with caste. For instance, women of almost all castes except some of the lowest have been enjoined to abstain from intoxicating drinks from time immemorial and this is equally true of men of many of the castes. The enforcement of total prohibition will help to preserve this valuable tradition. On the other hand, if it is sought to eliminate caste without prohibition, the drink habit may spread among men and women who are now free from it and the net result may be a grave deterioration in national sobriety. Vegetarianism, sexual restraint and family affection are some of the other traditions which deserve to be preserved. The problem of eliminating caste without undermining these traditions requires imagination and prudence of the highest order.

Fortunately, race and colour do not play much part in the social life of the people. But the segregation of untouchables in rural areas and of tribals in the hills tend to make them feel that they are unwanted citizens of India. I do not think that excessive solicitude for the preservation of tribal customs is desirable. While no coercion of any sort should be resorted to, assimilation and absorption of all untouchable and tribal people through education and economic development are, in my view, essential steps towards national integration.

Language is at present the most difficult and controversial subject in connection with national integration. In the recent past, the forcible imposition of English as the sole medium of instruction in the secondary schools and colleges and its use as the official language of administration brought about some degree of national integration at the top levels of Indian society. Mahatma Gandhi was emphatic that this was a wholly artificial and unhealthy state of affairs and real national integration involving the masses was possible only through the development of regional languages and the substitution of English by Hindi as the national lingua franca. These views were accepted by almost all nationalists during the struggle for freedom. For the first time, some differences arose in the Constituent Assembly where many representatives from non-Hindi areas felt that Hindi was not in a position to take the place of English for purposes of higher education, scientific research and administration at the national level. The real issue was postponed for 15 years during which English continued to play the same role as it did during the British regime. Now the problem has become more complicated. It is natural that the regional languages should seek to replace English in the state administrations and the universities. But it is obvious that, without a common language for common purposes, this will result in national disintegration. On the other hand, Hindi is not more developed than any other regional language and it is not possible to contemplate its becoming the main medium of instruction in the universities, technological and research institutions or the language of the Supreme and High Courts. The only solution seems to be that, for a long time to come, the regional languages and English should continue to be the joint media of higher education and English should continue to be the main means of communication for national purposes with Hindi as a joint language.

There is psychological resistance on the part of Hindi States to accept this solution. But it is difficult to see any other method of resolving the linguistic conflict. When all the principal regional languages have become fully developed and established themselves as efficient vehicles for modern science, administration, industry and commerce, it may be possible for Hindi which has similarly developed to take the place of English in national affairs but this is bound to be a very slow process and may require many decades for full substitution. The transition is bound to be difficult and will require great patience and statesmanship.

I do not want to discuss in detail the effect of innumerable differences, in customs, habits and cultural traditions existing among the various parts of the country. Thus food habits vary widely not only among the various regions but even among the people of the same region. To the foreign visitor, any large gathering of Indians in a metropolitan city appears as a chaotic collection of people, chiefly on account of lack of any similarity in dress. Traditions relating to music and dancing differ widely though the patterns are comparatively few. Music may be divided into Karnatak and Hindusthani styles and dancing into Bharathnatya, Kathak and Manipuri. The folk dancing styles are of greater variety. Some people feel that all this variety adds to the richness of Indian social life and no attempt should be made to remould them into fewer patterns. On the other hand, there are others who believe that a certain minimum uniformity in food, dress and other matters will be a powerful factor in national integration. There is some truth in either view and while existing differences should be tolerated and no coercion used, a steady attempt should be made to evolve a national menu, vegetarian or non-vegetarian, and a national dress at least for legislatures, schools, colleges and other public institutions. A judicious support of a few of the best styles of music and dancing will also certainly conduce to the growth of national emotional integration.

I have so far dealt with our national inheritance from the past. Here the measures suggested are largely of a negative character—toleration, elimination of useless and burdensome rituals and formalities and suppression of positively anti-social customs and beliefs like untouchability, astrology and all kinds of quackery. But no real integration can be achieved by mere negation. The major effort should be concentrated on positive measures. They are mainly political, economic and educational. In all these three fields, India has practically to abandon her past and follow the paths indicated by modern thought, science and invention. Though she has to suffer from the handicap of being behind other nations by nearly a century and a half, she has the great advantage of skipping over the cruelties, injustices and ugliness which Europe and America had to put up with during their transition from medieval to modern civilisation.

The great movement for national freedom has been the most significant factor of national unity in recent times. Fortunately for India, this was consolidated by the peaceful withdrawal of British power and the framing and implementation of a comprehensive democratic constitution by the Constituent Assembly. 26th January 1950 deserves to be considered as the greatest date in the political life of India in all her history. It is true that the partition of 1947 and the separation of

Pakistan was a violent shock to those who dreamed of a united India including Pakistan but even after partition India is a great country in respect of her area, population, natural resources and the intellectual and cultural level of her people. The organisation of our political life on a stable democratic basis was a momentous achievement. The Indian Constitution has wisely provided for a strong Central Government which can maintain the unity and integrity of India but it has also prudently left large powers to autonomous states for dealing with the day-to-day affairs of the people. If the Constitution had been worked in the proper spirit, I am convinced that there would have been a greater degree of national integration. But unfortunately, the Union Government has tended to behave autocratically in relation to the States and this has provoked the opposite reaction of the States trying to interfere in the legitimate spheres of the Central Government. The Constitution has been amended too frequently, and, in my view, this has reduced its sanctity in the minds of the people. I have no doubt that it is the fixity and stability of the Constitution of the U.S.A. that has been the greatest factor in the development of the political and economic power of the U. S. A. A similar faithful adherence to her traditional Constitution has enabled the U. K. to survive as a great power in spite of the practical liquidation of the empire.

It is, therefore, essential that if Indian political evolution and national integration are to march in step that the constitution should have stability and sanctity. The States should feel secure of their areas, rights and status and the use of special powers given to the Centre to supersede the States or over-rule them in their own spheres should be used only in grave emergencies and ultimately fall into disuse.

It was the dream of Jawaharlal Nehru that economic development was the most patent instrument for national integration. He defined the national economic objectives as socialism and planned economy through which poverty will be eliminated and the entire population assured of social justice and material conditions which will allow the fullest development of all the potential capacities inherent in our vast population. It must be admitted that the Five-Year Plans have been formulated with a broad national outlook. But unfortunately they have not been able to inspire the masses because they were implemented almost exclusively through bureaucratic control and regulation. The result has been incommensurate with the tremendous amount of thought, labour and money invested in these plans. Slowly but steadily the conviction has been spreading that planning and development, especially in agriculture and social services, should be from below.

For this purpose, community development and in recent years Panchayati Raj have received greater attention and emphasis. But this has raised a new problem. Local and regional disparities are bound to grow with the decentralisation of economic activity. Far-reaching measures will have to be taken by the Central Government to promote national integration in spite of such disparities. For this purpose, a national minimum standard of social services and social security will have to be enforced with Central assistance which should be proportionate to the needs of the States.

It will be generally agreed that ultimately it is through education that national integration can be fully achieved and maintained. Recently, the Education Commission has submitted a comprehensive report for a national education plan comprising all stages and aspects. It has suggested a common national pattern with sufficient flexibility for regional and local needs and differences. It is not going to be easy to implement the recommendations of the Commission. It will be difficult to find the necessary funds. The complicated problem of language has already been dealt with. In other matters also, vested interests and longstanding prejudices are bound to impede efforts to promote national integration. But means have to be found to overcome these difficulties.

Thus the problem of national integration requires persistent and concentrated effort over many decades to come. It requires the mobilisation of all the enlightened and patriotic elements throughout the country. Political unity, basic uniformity in economic and educational development, sympathetic understanding and encouragement of religious and cultural traditions which are not inconsistent with national integration and a stern and relentless struggle against injustices, inequalities and superstitions which cause division, dislike and hatred between sections of the people are the major tasks which have to be fulfilled before India can stand before the world as a strong and integrated nation.

Quarterly Chronicle

INDIA AND AFRICA

INDIA'S relations with one of its oldest allies in Africa, Kenya, were severely strained in July and August. India was the first country in the world to establish a diplomatic mission in Nairobi in 1948 at a time when the independence movement in Kenya and the rest of the continent was in its infancy. The Mau Mau movement which eventually led to the prolonged incarceration of Jomo Kenyatta was still four years away. The part played by the Indian mission in Nairobi in expediting Kenyan freedom is now a matter of history but India had come to believe that by its record in Kenya it had acquired a unique place in the hearts of the Kenyan political leaders. But New Delhi was rudely shaken out of this complacency when the Government of Kenya deported eight people of Indian origin. Without consulting or informing the Indian High Commission in Nairobi the Kenyans booked the Asians, most of whom held British passports and none being an Indian national, on a Bombay-bound plane. Plainly this was in gross contravention of international practice or etiquette, a circumstance which Prem Bhatia, the Indian envoy, was quick in bringing to the notice of his host government. After prolonged protestations the Indian point of view prevailed but not without leaving a bad taste in the mouths of all parties concerned. So serious was the breach between New Delhi and Nairobi that Prem Bhatia had to rush to New Delhi to explain the situation. This episode may lead to fundamental changes in certain aspects of India's policy towards Africa, in particular countries where Indians are settled in appreciable numbers.

The deportees were the victims of the inter-tribal rivalry within the country, based largely around two personalities, Oginga Odinga, the Luo chieftain and Opposition leader, and the President, Jomo Kenyatta, the Kikuyu leader. The Asians were suspected of sympathising with the Odinga group. What shocked the world more than anything else was the summary expulsion of two of the "Asian" residents, Mr. Pranlal Sheth and Mr. Bhadressa, who had acquired Kenyan nationality, on vague grounds of showing themselves "to be disaffected towards the Kenya government".

India played a significant role in the period under review in trying to influence the course of events in Rhodesia and Southwest Africa. It has been suggested that it was India which saved the Commonwealth from disintegration. The Indian delegation, led by Swaran Singh, External Affairs Minister, was responsible for the meeting of minds which was made possible in spite of the divergences in the Afro-British positions. The compromise communique issued at the end of what

turned out to be a "Rhodesia summit" bore the hallmark of Indian diplomatic skill.

At the same time, Swaran Singh was the first to admit that the desired results had not been achieved in London. He told Parliament in New Delhi that India would give "all possible help" to freedom-fighters in Rhodesia to end the minority regime. One form which this aid is taking is the constant pressure India is exerting on Britain to bring about majority rule in Salisbury. India is also in close touch with Zambia on this issue and the two governments had another opportunity to exchange views on the subject when the Zambian Vice-President and Foreign Minister, Reuben Kamanga and Simon Kapwepwe, visited Delhi in August.

On Southwest Africa also India was among the first to voice its condemnation of the World Court's judgment which, without dealing with the merits of the case, threw out the Ethiopian-Liberian plaint against South Africa's administration of the mandated territory. The judgment was also the subject of several critical editorials in the Indian Press.

The image of India in Africa generally came in for close scrutiny when India's Information Minister, Raj Bahadur, led a two-man team to Malawi to take part in the celebrations held in that country to mark its becoming a republic. On his way back to India he visited Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania and met most of the leading personalities. He attacked foreign news and television agencies based in India for spreading a "malicious and distorted" image of India abroad, including Africa. The Minister was shocked to learn that news of poverty and squalor in India was carried across the seas while the tremendous development that had taken place in the country since independence was not publicised adequately. It is to be hoped that the Indian Government will take steps, in association with African news media, to improve the two-way dissemination of news between India and Africa, breaking the monopoly of biased Western news agencies in this field.

FOCUS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

Events took a curious turn in the hitherto immutable southern Africa. Nothing had ever shaken the complacency of Africa and the world more violently than the perverted judgment of the International Court of Justice at The Hague. No other act had caused deeper forebodings than the assassination of Hendrick Verwoerd, South Africa's Prime Minister and the maker of apartheid in its present form. No African nation aroused lesser interest in its independence than Botswana which was the British protectorate of Bechuanaland until Sept. 30, while, at the same time, no other independence has been so meaningful in the context of a possible transformation of a whole compact region. Botswana is the first foot of the camel in the tent of the smug Arab.

The ding-dong battle over Rhodesia continued to be fought in Whitehall and Salisbury, with the climax being reached in early September when the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference took place in London. What did not happen in London was more important than the decisions and deliberations of the august assembly: the Commonwealth

failed to break up, despite the deliberate abstention of such stalwarts of the club as Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. The final communique gave out nothing except yet another proof of superior British diplomacy, provoking Kaunda to remark that "Wilson is trying to be too clever".

With the slow process of disengagement from the Commonwealth which Mr. Kaunda had initiated the world had come to believe that the final links would be snapped with the end of the London meeting. In order to demonstrate that he really meant business this time Kaunda had ejected from Zambia the squadron of Javelin jet fighters which Britain had stationed there to counter any Rhodesian threat to Zambia's independence. Along with the squadron the 700 RAF personnel manning radar and anti-aircraft units were withdrawn at Kaunda's behest. But Zambia stayed in the Commonwealth.

One factor which must have impressed considerably some of the Commonwealth partners was the brinkmanship of Harold Wilson over Rhodesia. The British Prime Minister, who is quite adept at this kind of diplomacy, withdrew his two special emissaries, Oliver Wright and Duncan Watson from Salisbury only ten days before the Commonwealth talks started. No sooner were the talks concluded in London than Wilson despatched his peacemakers to Ian Smith again to discover areas of agreement between the two sides. The impression of British firmness towards Salisbury had meantime prevailed in the minds of the Commonwealth delegates. Even men like Milton Obote of Uganda, once the strongest African critic of British policy in Rhodesia, went back home highly pleased with Wilson's antics. Rhodesia's African exile organisations have however continued to frown on these insincere parleys, suspecting Britain of being in league with the White settlers. There are persistent reports that Britain may conclude an agreement with Ian Smith on the constitutional future of Rhodesia.

Constitutionalism and the faith of the world in juridical processes suffered a severe setback with the World Court judgment on Southwest Africa, now administered as part of South Africa. After six years' protracted legal wrangling the Court threw away the case taken to it so hopefully by Ethiopia and Liberia, acting on behalf of the Organisation of African Unity, the Afro-Asian bloc at the UN and the conscience of the world. These countries wanted South Africa to surrender its old League of Nations mandate to the UN, as successor to the League. They accused the Republic of trampling human rights by applying apartheid to the mandated territory and of violating the mandate by militarising Southwest Africa. The 14 World Court members voted 7-7, so it was the casting vote of the Court President, Sir Percy Spender of Australia, which decided the case. Sir Percy rejected the complaint because, he said, Ethiopia and Liberia had failed to establish any legal right or interest in the subject matter of their complaint. The judgment did not deal with the merits of South Africa's administration of the mandated territory and the application of apartheid to it.

Among the first to react to this judgment was Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie who suspected the motives of the ruling to be political rather than legal. India's External Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh, condemned the ruling as a judgment "not likely to inspire confidence in the

Court or in the establishment of the rule of law in international affairs". India, he said, had viewed the judgment "with deep disappointment". K. Krishna Rao, legal adviser to the Ministry of External Affairs, termed the ruling "shockingly unfair" and pointed out how extraordinary it was that the Court had taken 4 years and 9 months to pronounce on the preliminary question about the interest of Ethiopia and Liberia, a matter which was not even raised by South Africa. Rao summed up the prevailing Afro-Asian sentiment when he remarked that The Hague ruling had given a great blow to the prestige of the Court. Within Southwest Africa, the judgment caused unmitigated joy among its White inhabitants, just as it steeled the resolve of the Southwest African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO), claiming a membership of 50,000, to rise in arms against Pretorian tyranny. SWAPO, like most southern African freedom movements, is operating from its exile headquarters in the Tanzanian capital of Dar-es-Salaam.

It is not given to all to live to see the fruition of their ambitions, least of all to statesmen and politicians. But destiny was kind to the architect of apartheid, Verwoerd, who, before he was knifed to death in early September, had had ample time to rejoice over the World Court's ruling. More than anybody else in the Republic he was convinced that the ruling was a *carte-blanche* to his government to implement its schemes and popularise its writ in Southwest Africa. This interpretation suited his grandiose dreams perfectly. In his later years Verwoerd lived in gnawing fear of some kind of UN intervention in southern Africa, precipitated by the developments in Rhodesia and, later, in Southwest Africa itself. This was the main reason why he did not go out of his way to lend support to the Ian Smith regime and confined himself to giving aid stealthily in the shape of petrol and essential consumer goods.

Had the assassin's knife not felled him in Pretoria, Verwoerd would have given a new orientation to the application of apartheid in territories beyond his world-sanctified control, such as Southwest Africa and the three High Commission territories. He had remarked after The Hague ruling that he had nothing to fear from the world organisation any more. Verwoerd's successor, who is also a "V", could not have inherited a better legacy; armed with The Hague ruling he can flaunt the victory sign more arrogantly in the face of world opinion.

The question which commentators everywhere posed after Vorster's accession to power in Pretoria was whether the doctrine of apartheid would henceforth be modified or taken to a new high water-mark. Although we do not know all that is worth knowing about Vorster his main claim to fame rests on the work he did at the Native Affairs Ministry, allotting a firmer base to Bantustans and uprooting the non-White natives from their ancient homes and environs. The victims of his policies include several Indians in the Republic who have been rendered homeless and "refugees" overnight by a stroke of the South African government's pen.

So sure are the South African racialists of the correctness of their policies and soundness of their perspectives that only days before Bechuana-land became the independent republic of Botswana they renewed their offer to administer the three High Commission territories as independent Bantustans, promising them freedom and economic prosperity. Whatever the nature of their independence and despite their membership of the

UN there is little doubt that the three territories of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (the last will be free in 1970) can at best function as hostages of South Africa, thanks to their closely interlinked economies.

Both Chief Jonathan, Prime Minister of Lesotho, and President Seretse Khama of Botswana have been at pains to assure Pretoria that they would live at peace with the big neighbour and not embarrass it by harbouring and inciting pan-Africanist freedom movements from within their borders. But it has been a time-honoured privilege of Botswana to fulfil precisely this function and act both as the gateway and haven for political refugees from the Republic. The story of Abraham Fischer, the fugitive lawyer, has already become a legend. It is in South Africa's interest to keep both Khama and Jonathan firmly in the saddle until such time as men more amenable to the will of Pretoria are discovered and the wherewithal found to instal them in Gaberones and Maseru. Pretoria would naturally prefer to deal with the devils it knows.

But opposition to Khama and Jonathan within Botswana and Lesotho is by no means non-existent. In Lesotho both the opposition parties, the Congress Party and Marematlou Freedom Party, are to the left of the ruling National Party. They are both firmly opposed to the terms under which the country was granted independence. Jonathan in particular fears the Congress Party (it captured 25 out of 60 assembly seats in the March 1966 general election) which has powerful pan-Africanist affiliations extending up to Ghana and Algeria and has close links with Peking. Hence the frequent assertions by Jonathan, repeated on Oct. 5, that Lesotho will not seek ties with Communist countries. He charged un-named Red countries of trying to infiltrate into Lesotho, apparently through the leftist local parties as well as the Communist Party, the only one of its kind in southern Africa.

Jonathan who was making the customary major pronouncement on foreign affairs on the day of Lesotho's independence on Oct. 4 pledged to follow a "neutral line" even on such controversial issues as the South-west Africa question which has acquired a new dimension in the wake of The Hague ruling. In fact Lesotho's vote at the UN on matters concerning South Africa would be "neutral", designed not to embarrass its powerful neighbour. These motives can only be appreciated by a realisation of the fact that Lesotho is the Hyderabad of Africa, completely surrounded by the Republic. Apart from its geographical monstrosity perpetrated by the British towards the end of the last century, Lesotho is almost totally dependent on its neighbour for its very survival. For instance, out of its total revenue of £ 2.1 million in 1963-64, half was derived from its share of customs and excise agreement with South Africa concluded over 50 years ago. At any given time at least 150,000 of Lesotho's male population (out of a total population of 650,000) is employed on South African farms and mines, remitting £ 800,000 a year back home to keep its economy in gear. These are formidable considerations which Chief Jonathan has to bear in mind before venturing a bold plunge into the rough seas of international politics.

Botswana is more fortunately situated to follow a freer policy in its dealings with the outside world though Khama has promised Vorster to

pursue a good-neighbour policy towards the Republic. Khama, widely known and admired in India, won a more impressive victory at the general election in March 1965, bagging 28 out of 31 seats—the remaining three went to Philip Matante's People's Party. Even so, rather oddly, his position in both national and pan-Africanist politics is more insecure than that of Jonathan. Pressures on Khama to allow Botswana to be used as a springboard for attacks on South Africa and Rhodesia have always been there but these are bound to increase in intensity with the passage of time. Botswana, as pointed out earlier, has been the traditional refuge of fleeing politicians. Moreover, there is no other African territory which, due to proximity and other strategic reasons, could provide a more ideal base for offensive activity directed at the overthrow of the racist minority regimes in neighbouring Rhodesia, South Africa and Mozambique. The OAU, once its affairs become more ordered, cannot be expected to miss such a Godsend opportunity.

Despite their defeat at the ballot box, the Opposition People's Party and the Botswana Independent Party, which was eclipsed, are not forces which can be easily subdued or written off. Like the Congress Party in Lesotho, both the opposition groups in Botswana have wide overseas affiliations, the PP leaning towards Peking and the IP being pro-Moscow, apart from being on the friendliest terms with the multi-racial African National Congress of South Africa.

MALAWI AS A REPUBLIC

From the jigsaw puzzle of southern African politics let us move northwards to comparatively less complex political climes. Malawi, Africa's "odd man out", became a republic within the Commonwealth in early July, the second anniversary of its freedom and break with the Central African Federation. The trend in Malawi, which is among Africa's poorest nations, has been one of gradual disengagement from its Black neighbours and greater solidarity with South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. Hastings Banda wants Malawi to develop in peace, away from the crossfire of pan-Africanist politics even if it means a compromise with the devil himself. Malawi gets 75 per cent of its financial aid from Britain, including £ 5 million a year to balance its budget. The British run its civil service as well as control all its security forces, including the army command. More than 100,000 Malawians work on Rhodesian farms and plantations; about an equal number are employed in South Africa and Mozambique. Without the funds repatriated by them the Malawian economy would be in more dire straits than it is now. But the dominant question in Malawi today is political; the vacuum under Banda remains unfilled. He is nearing 65 and his main fear is that a revolt, inspired from outside Malawi, might topple his regime overnight. His greatest enemies are without, the men whom he sacked in 1964 months after the country became free. Some of them, notably Kanyama Chiume and Yatuta Chisiza with strong pan-Africanist ties, are functioning from Tanzania. Willie Chokani, the soft-spoken, India-educated ex-Labour Minister of Malawi, is organising his team from Zambia. But the man Banda fears most is Henry Chipembere who, by his daring assault in Fort Johnston area about two years ago, nearly succeeded in toppling Banda's rule. He is now living in the United States and little is known or heard of his current plans or activities.

MURUMBI'S RESIGNATION

The Kenyan governmental boat was rocked by the sudden resignation of Joseph Murumbi as vice-president. Murumbi had barely served a term of less than six months. The first incumbent of this high office, Oginga Odinga, lost no time in claiming that Murumbi had quit to express his solidarity with the Kenya People's Union. Murumbi denied this. It has been known that Murumbi, who had been External Affairs Minister, was brought under strong pressure from President Kenyatta personally to accept the office of vice-president. He had wanted to quit politics altogether to join a private industrial organisation but Kenyatta had used the bait of Murumbi's past loyalty to him and the cause of liberation. Murumbi, who is soft and compromising by temperament, yielded after throwing hints to his close friends that he would in any case quit the office after some months. The most likely date mentioned was July though the resignation actually materialised in September. A desperate search is on for a successor to Murumbi, by no means an easy task. Speculation on the causes which led to Murumbi's resignation has not yet died down but to those who have followed the course of Murumbi's career it is clear that he was dissatisfied with the manner in which Kenyatta, his old friend, was conducting the nation's affairs, culminating in his open breach with Odinga. Murumbi was also critical of the Kenyan handling of the Rhodesian question, implying at times that the British were shaping the Kenyan approach. It was due to his "extremist" views, unpalatable to the British, that Murumbi was not chosen to represent Kenya at the Lagos Commonwealth conference early this year.

COUNTER-REVOLT IN NIGERIA

In Western Africa, the counter-revolution in Nigeria shocked those who had believed that Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi had buried tribalism and welded Africa's most populous country into one single unit. Following another army mutiny and the kidnapping of the Major-General, an Ibo by tribe, the 31-year-old Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, a Hausa, became the supreme ruler of Nigeria. Aguiyi-Ironsi's miscalculation lay in his over-enthusiasm to weed out tribalism from Nigeria and instal a unitary system instead. His sweeping reforms sowed suspicion among the Hausas of the north that the Ibos and Yorubas of the south wanted to dominate the whole country. The new Nigerian ruler stands for gradualism in these matters though he has denied persistent reports that he plans to divide Nigeria along tribal lines.

Activities of the Council

The following is an account of the activities of the Council during the quarter :

The Council gave a reception at Parliament House on August 16 to a Zambian delegation led by Mr. Reuben C. Kamanga, Vice-President, and including Mr. S. M. Kapwepwe, Foreign Minister, Mr. H. Shambaane, Resident Minister of the Central Province, Mr. R. T. Sikasula, Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and Dr. J. Zulu, Secretary to the Planning Office. Among the distinguished gathering in the Parliamentary Committee Room, which was full to capacity, were heads of all African missions in New Delhi, Mr. Dinesh Singh, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Vice-President of the Council, members of Parliament belonging to all parties, including Mrs. Violet Alva, Vice-Chairman of the Rajya Sabha (Upper House), Mr. Surendranath Divedi, leader of the Praja-Socialist Party, Mr. Hiren Mukherjee, leader of the Communist Party, and Dr. Humayun Kabir. Mr. Gopala Reddi, leader of the Congress Party in the Upper House, was in the chair.

Replying to the welcome address by Mr. K. C. Pant, General Secretary of the Council, and speeches by members of Parliament, the Zambian leaders expressed their appreciation for the assistance India had given to their country in the wake of the UDI in Rhodesia. They recalled the glorious role India had played in the nationalist struggles all over the world and appealed to it to continue to support the fight for freedom in Africa which would be incomplete without the independence of Angola, Mozambique, parts of French Africa and Southern Africa. The colonialists were taking a last-ditch stand in Southern Africa where they had vast economic interests. This explained why Zambia did not expect Britain to withdraw from Rhodesia. Such a course of action would jeopardise its vast investments in and trade with South Africa.

In Rhodesia, the visiting dignitaries said, the problem was Britain and not the illegal regime of Mr. Ian Smith. It was Britain that was refusing to discharge its responsibilities towards the African majority by ending the rebel regime and ensuring independence on the basis of one-man-one-vote. India should therefore put pressure on Britain at the forthcoming Commonwealth conference to solve the problem in the only way it should be solved, that is, by handing over power to the African majority.

Rhodesia, Mr. Kamanga said, was a burning issue concerning not only Zambia, which was of course immediately affected, but the whole of Africa and the world. The situation was getting worse every day. The only way to resolve it was to use force but this Britain had refused to do.

Zambia had offered itself as a military base against Rhodesia because it was convinced that the policy of economic sanctions adopted by Britain was bound to fail. He reviewed the working of the economic sanctions to show that they had had little impact on Rhodesia and caused greater strain to the Zambian economy. It was quite obvious that any embargo on trade with Rhodesia could not succeed so long as Portugal and South Africa were not covered by it. Yet, Zambia had cooperated with Britain in this matter only to prove the ineffectiveness of the policy of economic sanctions. It did not believe that economic sanctions could solve the problem so long as they were not made mandatory.

Mr. Kamanga declared lack of confidence in Britain. Mr. Wilson, he said, was a man of so many ways. He had started a process of "talks about talks" with Mr. Smith, not with a view to solve the problem but to find a means of recognizing the illegal Smith regime. He was ready to give up Rhodesia. If "successful", the talks about talks would lead to Mr. Smith agreeing to resign and forming a "legal" government without terminating the illegal seizure of independence. This was totally unacceptable to the Africans who wanted one vote for one man before independence was granted to Rhodesia. The Zambian leaders rejected the "six principles" on the basis of which Britain was negotiating with Rhodesia.

Thus, Mr. Kamanga said, Africans were left with no alternative but to wage a fight for freedom. In this the nationalist organisations would have to play a major role. They would need all kinds of help. Afro-Asian Governments would also have to discharge their responsibilities. Zambia would do its best although the whites in the country were a security problem. The struggle when it came would be carried beyond the borders of Rhodesia. This was the grim prospect before Africa and the world.

Mr. Pant, extending a warm welcome to the Zambian leaders, said: "It is hardly necessary for me to dwell on the very cordial relations which exist between India and Zambia. I can only say that Your Excellencies are here among friends who regard you as their own, who look upon your visit as a token of the rare mutual understanding and confidence that bind the two countries together. We had the pleasure of welcoming your distinguished President in our midst in 1961 when the Council organised a seminar on Portuguese Colonialism. He has left a deep and lasting impression and we hold him in the highest esteem.

"While extending a hearty welcome to all our guests I would like to recall that H. E. Mr. Kamanga is not only a distinguished leader but an author of note. As for H. E. Mr. Kapwepwe, he is no stranger to this country. Bombay University has reason to be proud of counting him among its distinguished ex-students. I might add that I had the pleasure of meeting him at the U. N. last year and it gives me particular pleasure to renew our acquaintance.

"We in this country have been deeply disturbed and concerned by the chain of crises set in motion by the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the illegal Smith regime, and in particular the difficulties faced by Zambia. It is our earnest hope that all friendly countries will treat

these difficulties as their own and assist in overcoming them. India retaliated against this outrageous act by severing all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia. We are proud to recall that even earlier India had been among the first to break off diplomatic relations with Southern Rhodesia when it became apparent that the Smith regime would go ahead with its illegal plan. Recognising this development as a serious threat to international peace and security, India readily extended all support and cooperation to the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Organisation of African Unity in whatever steps they proposed to deal with this situation. Throughout this period the leaders of Africa, and in particular Zambia, have acted with dignity, tolerance and patience, but recent developments have shown that the racist regime is in no mood to heed their warnings and is bent on driving African States to extreme steps.

"The demand of the African States with regard to Rhodesia has been simple, forthright and reasonable—a rapid transition to independence on the basis of majority rule. It is unfortunate that the British Government have not only failed to take vigorous action to prevent the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the rebel regime, but through their half-hearted measures they have given the illegal Smith regime the benefit of time to consolidate itself.

"In this context we naturally share the apprehensions of the African leaders with regard to Mr. Wilson's formula which concedes the right of independence to the white minority without at the same time enforcing the principles of majority rule. Here I may state that our Government has called upon Britain 'to use force if necessary to nullify and checkmate the illegal seizure of power by the white minority'. We agree with the leaders of Africa that at no cost must the history of South Africa be repeated.

"We have seen that economic sanctions, whether applied to South Africa or Rhodesia, have been ineffectively and haltingly applied. No effort has been made to plug the innumerable loopholes and we are not convinced that, selective as they have been in the case of Rhodesia, any grave impact has been made on her economy. We know and the whole world knows that the oil embargo against Rhodesia has been a complete failure. There is irrefutable evidence to prove that oil has been pouring in by road and rail from South Africa; storage tanks have been constructed in the town of Beira in Portuguese Mozambique and Rhodesia is receiving well over its public ration in 80,000 gallons a day. In fact we are told it is coming in such a steady stream that the only problems are those of distribution and storage of the overflow.

"As for the sanctions against Rhodesian tobacco, which if effectively applied could literally break the Smith regime, we hear that secret auctions have been going on with Portuguese and South African middle men playing the leading role.

"It is thus clear that the British Government must revise its policies and make them more effective if it wishes to drive any conviction home to the members of the Commonwealth. Otherwise Mr. Wilson must be prepared to preside over the disintegration of an already divided Commonwealth.

"Another matter which has caused us concern is the recent judgment of the World Court, an agency of the UN, concerning South-West Africa. You will recall that India was the first to raise this issue in the UN in 1946 and we are confident that our Government will continue to fight against the annexation of S.W. Africa by the South African Government. There has been a demand for mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia through the UN, but this demand becomes meaningful only if the UN is more responsive to the legitimate aspirations of Afro-Asian peoples to freedom and dignity than is reflected in the World Court judgment.

"Before I conclude I would like to convey through Your Excellencies to your President that we strongly condemn the unwarranted Portuguese military activity on the border between Zambia and Angola and the naked aggression on Zambian soil last month.

"We have the honour of presenting you with some literature and we hope you will find the time to go through it. It includes the resolution passed by our Council on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence and conveyed to your President through H. E. Mr. Mutemba, Resident Minister, Western Zambia, who was our honoured guest. You will see that the Indian Council for Africa has been making steady progress and apart from our other activities, we have been able to give to the *FRELIMO* and the ZAPU some material assistance, modest though it may appear, of bales of cloth, money, sewing machines, medicines, books and a jeep. Last year, as our contribution to the celebration of the International Cooperation Year we presented to Lusaka University 47 books on India. We are now expecting a lady student from Zambia to whom we have awarded a scholarship in Home Science. As a voluntary organisation we face innumerable difficulties, but with encouragement and support from distinguished African leaders like yourselves we are confident we can achieve our cherished goal of further promoting goodwill and understanding between India and friendly African countries."

Mr. Gopala Reddi, Mr. Hiren Mukherjee and Dr. Humayun Kabir recalled the friendly relations that have existed between India and Zambia, the goodwill visits exchanged between them and the facilities for study and training offered to Zambian nationals in this country and India's prompt assistance to Zambia after the UDI. They assured the visitors of India's support to and solidarity with Zambia on the question of Rhodesia.

Office Secretary's visit abroad

The Office Secretary of the Council, who has been redesignated as Executive Secretary, visited Paris for three weeks to establish contacts with institutions working on French Africa. The French Ministry of External Affairs presented to the Council through her a set of books on all countries which have attained independence in French Africa. Later she spent a week in London where the Commonwealth Relations Office extended its co-operation to her. She then visited Rome and had discussions with FAO officials working on Africa.

Book exhibition

The Library of the Council took part in a book exhibition held as part of the international youth conference organised by the Young Women's Christian Association of India at the India

International Centre from August 30 to September 10.

Bombay Regional Office

The regional office of the Council at Bombay was reconstituted with the following office-bearers :

Mr. Harish Mahindra	President
Mr. H.H. Ismail	Vice-President
Mr. Ahmed Zakaria and	
Mr. Mahendar Dave	General Secretaries
and Mr. Adam Adil	Treasurer

New Members

The Council has enrolled as ordinary members Dr. Anirudha Gupta, Special Fellow on Commonwealth Africa at the Indian School of International Studies, Mr. Ajit Gopal, a Special Correspondent of the Hindustan Times, and Mr. Bihari Lal Khachi.

Donations

The Council expresses its thanks to the following for the donations of cash, materials or books they have made to the Council :

Ahmedabad Textiles Mills Foundation, Mahindra and Mahindra, Indian National Trade Union Congress, Kamani Engineering Corporation, Planning Commission, Gandhi Smarak Nidhi, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, and the Embassies of Nigeria, Uganda, Ethiopia, UAR and Ghana.

Publications Received

From the French Ministry of External Affairs :

- (a) 1. Madagascar.
2. Niger.
3. Upper Volta.
4. Ivory Coast.
5. Dahomey.
6. Central Africa.
7. Mauritania.
8. Senegal.
9. Congo (Brazzaville).
10. Chad.
11. Gabon.
- (b) La Documentation Photographique Sur 66L' Afrique Noire Francophone, 66 Arts d' Afrique'', "L' Afrique,
- (c) Le Mois en Afrique.

Yugoslav Survey.

China Report.

Wayward Servants by Colin M. Turnbull.

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Nigeria Weekly News Review.

New Journal

The historical Society of Nigeria has begun publication of a new journal, *TARIKH*, devoted to African history especially written for schools. The journal will supplement text-books and publish the results of latest research. It is published twice a year in November and May and costs 24/- for a two-year subscription.

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Corrections

Ulli Beier, author of the article "Saving a Language" published in *Africa Quarterly*, Vol. V. No. 4, is a member of the staff of the Ibadan University. He is a German national and not a Nigerian.

Read Mazrui, Ali A. for Ali, A. M. in Reference No. 2 on page 322 of *Africa Quarterly*, Vol. V. No. 4.

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Nehru and Africa. (English, French, Arabic)

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India and Africa : Perspectives of Co-operation

Price Rs. 2.00. 7sh. 6 d. or \$1.

Rhodesia : The Case for Majority Rule.

Price Rs. 1.50. 6 sh. or 50 cents.

Pakistan's New Aggression in Kashmir.

Price Rs. 3.25. 12 sh. or \$2.00

Bandung to Algiers : A Decade of India's Foreign Policy.

Price Rs. 1.00. 4 sh. or 50 cents.

Textile Industries in India and Africa (an Africa Quarterly Supplement).

Price Rs. 3. 9 sh. or \$1.50.

Report of Seminar on Problems of Socialist Transformation in Developing Countries.

Price Rs. 3.00. 9 sh. or \$1.50

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Price Re. 1.00. 4 sh. or \$1.00

Algeria by Dinesh Singh.

Price Re. 1.00. 4 sh. or \$1.00

Multi-racial Society by Dr. S. N. Varma.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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



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AFRICA QUARTERLY

A Journal Of African Affairs



Vol. VI

October—December 1966

No. 3

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Note to Contributors

The Indian Council for Africa welcomes articles and contributions from all interested in African affairs, especially from those making particular studies of African problems and people. Remuneration may be paid for articles and contributions accepted for publication in the journal.

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AFRICA QUARTERLY

(A Journal of African Affairs)

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AFRICA QUARTERLY is published in January, April, July and October every year.

AFRICA QUARTERLY is devoted to a study and objective understanding of African affairs. It publishes contributions from outstanding writers, experts and specialists on various political, economic, social, cultural and literary subjects of interest to the people of Africa. Apart from these, it carries documentation on different specialised African subjects.

Contents Copyright

Subscription (*in India*): Rs. 10 per annum

Subscription (*Foreign*): £ 1. 10sh. or \$5

Single Copy : Rs. 3

Single Copy : 9sh. or \$1.50

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Rhodesian Rebellion and African Response

DONALD ROTHCHILD

“WE are trying desperately to negotiate,” Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Douglas Smith declared in an interview on August 1, 1965, “but, if we cannot negotiate, then, as I see it, there is only one other way to obtain independence and that is to take matters into our own hands, by whatever name you wish to call.”¹ By November 1965 he had taken the plunge. Why did Ian Smith see no other way but a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), and how have the new nations of Africa attempted to counteract his desperate act of rebellion?

Neither Ian Smith nor any of his Rhodesian Front colleagues has made anything but very fragmentary references to explain their extreme haste in this matter, but the reasons are not hard to find. In one form or another, UDI has been evident in Rhodesian thinking since early in this century when European power began to force political and constitutional concessions from British authorities. The crucial landmark in this struggle for autonomous powers was Britain's decision to grant internal self-government to the Rhodesians in 1923. From that point forward, the settlers made continuous probing efforts to extend the sphere of their own autonomy as well as the physical area over which they could exercise hegemony. In this sense, the decision to set up a Central African Federation represented a placing of emphasis on the second priority rather than the first, for it meant a geographical expansion of influence as the price of a significant delay in Southern Rhodesia's own full independence. Thus paradoxically, the imposition of Federation, which Africans hated so much, contributed directly to a situation in which Africans gained valuable time to press for majority rule.

During the debates over Federation and the years immediately following its consummation, white Rhodesian leaders in the north and south continued to cast about for a new formula which would free their territory from what they viewed as its two primary threats—the growing power of African nationalism and the surviving ties with the United Kingdom. Federation itself was a hurried attempt to stabilize a region highly sensitive to the changing moods of the African continent.² Growing African militancy, inelegantly described as “Gold Coastism,” combined with the possibility of an unsympathetic Labour government in power in the United Kingdom, caused white Rhodesians to consider a wide variety of propositions, all aimed at the same primary objective—the security of

the European population in Central Africa. These Rhodesian leaders pressed successive British administrations to make further political concessions to the Federation and grant additional powers to Southern Rhodesia. At times Southern Rhodesians threatened the continuance of the inter-unit institutions which bound them to the predominantly African northern territories; at other times, European spokesmen even concocted such harebrained schemes as a plan to amalgamate the Europeanised areas in the south-central part of Northern Rhodesia with Southern Rhodesia, leaving the so-called "black" areas of the north under Colonial Office supervision. These sentiments indicate that Ian Smith's fitful desperation of 1965 is far from an entirely new phenomenon; in fact, his attitude has deep roots in the Rhodesian tradition and in the Rhodesian attitude toward the outside world.

If the white Rhodesian response to African nationalism and external pressure bears a striking resemblance to past attitudes, surely some generalizations are possible as to the underlying reasons for the response. At heart, three major reasons would seem to account for the European's sense of urgency in the face of widespread domestic and international opposition: his recognition of the determination of the forces ranged against him, his vulnerability and his fear of the consequences of minority status. Each of these factors will be treated in turn.

In many respects it is the white Rhodesian who has been the consistent realist with regard to the long-term implications of African nationalism. In part the irritations resulting from a situation of white minority government in an era of African rule elsewhere on the continent account for the very African militancy that the Rhodesians seek to quarantine; nevertheless, it is an excellent example of a self-fulfilling prophesy in action. Having abetted the rise of militancy in the first place, the white Rhodesians are quite right in pointing out African nationalism's resolute determination to end all traces of white minority rule in Africa.

Evidences of African militancy are readily at hand. Within Rhodesia, the nationalist parties—Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the Rev. Ndabamingi Sithole's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)—are fundamentally in agreement as to the need for majority rule. Both parties have relied upon a combination of internal and external pressures to bring about political democratization, hoping through political and constitutional means to stave off a racial crisis of ugly dimensions. These African nationalists are however quite clear about the implication of UDI. As a senior officer of ZANU, Nathan Shamuyarira, commented prior to the fact:

ZANU faces a crucial decision as the Rhodesian episode moves to the final crisis. The policy of confrontation was intended to influence Britain on the one hand, and the Rhodesian settlers on the other, to agree to convene a constitutional conference at which white and black aspirations could be reconciled. However, if the Rhodesian Front takes independence unilaterally, the position will be completely changed. The question then

will simply be how the African can take over the government from the settlers. The point of constitutional accommodation will have been passed.³

Outside Rhodesia, African nationalists have displayed unusual solidarity on the Rhodesian issue. In a typical statement of African attitude on the Rhodesian question, the Kenya government asserted in May 1965 that,

We cannot consider ourselves fully free until the whole of Africa is free from colonialism and foreign minority and racist imperialism and domination. We cannot compromise on the question of democratic equality based on universal adult suffrage.

The Kenya Government has already declared that it would not recognize any Government in Rhodesia unilaterally declared by Mr. Smith. But this stand is not enough. We further declare that we would not recognize any independent Government in Rhodesia whether as a result of unilateral declaration or negotiation between Mr. Smith and the British Government, if such Government is not based on democratic one-man one-vote majority rule.⁴

These sentiments were reaffirmed in October 1965 at both the pan-African and world levels. The annual summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity in Accra passed a resolution urging British authorities to assume the administration of Rhodesia by force in order to prevent a proclamation of UDI. The United Nations General Assembly, by a massive majority of 107 to 2, adopted a resolution calling upon the United Kingdom to "take all steps necessary" to prevent or end a unilateral move to independence in Rhodesia.

These multifarious pressures were not without their effects. British leaders, compelled to do more than issuing vague strictures or warnings, searched for a formula to reconcile black Rhodesian demands and white Rhodesian anxieties. The British authorities erringly rejected the use of force at the outset and sought instead to play the role of broker between the disputant interests. At each stage Britain's acute embarrassment has been painfully evident. On the one hand, primarily for internal political and economic reasons, she seemed reluctant to intervene directly against her "kith and kin" in Rhodesia; on the other, she tried to avoid a threatened collapse of the Commonwealth, a possible outcome of outraged African nationalist feelings. Faced with this dilemma, British leaders played for time, hoping to escape thereby from the cruel alternatives that seemed to bode only ill for British interests in the years to come. Thus at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in June 1965, British spokesmen assured the various delegations of their dedication to the "one-man, one-vote" principle and asserted that Her Majesty's Government would recommend independence for Rhodesia only if it "were satisfied that this was on a basis acceptable to the people of the country taken as a whole." The formula was anything but clear. In ensuing months, British leaders ruled out the use of force to prevent

UDI, thereby throwing away their "trump cards" in advance of a possible rebellion. They did promise to invoke economic sanctions, however, in the event that the Smith government "took the plunge". Britain's Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, roused to action by the dangerous drift toward an illegal seizure of power, flew to Salisbury late that month to negotiate directly with Ian Smith. His efforts to find a compromise demonstrated clearly what many textbook writers tend to depreciate rather cavalierly, namely, that world public opinion is capable of flexing powerful muscles on issues of inter-state politics. White Rhodesian leaders did not fail to recognize these pressures for what they were, and, sensing that time was not on their side, decided to gamble upon a unilateral declaration of independence while the opportunity still availed. Unwilling to accept the validity of the African nationalist case, white Rhodesians saw no alternative to using the ultimate weapon.

Because white Rhodesians harbour no illusions over African nationalism's commitment to majority rule throughout the continent, they feel terribly vulnerable under present circumstances. Their feeling of apprehensiveness was evident in their negotiations with British officials from the time the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland began to show signs of serious strains, and this has tended to increase with Malawi's and Zambia's attainment of independence under African governments.

Rhodesia's sense of vulnerability can be seen both in the negotiations on the 1961 constitution as well as in the interpretation of its provisions. In the negotiations on the constitution, the white Rhodesians made limited concessions to African interests in order to induce the British government to give up some of the reserve powers still under their control. Again white Rhodesians acted in a manner calculated to reduce external influences over their own affairs. The 1961 constitution provided for dual voters' rolls with the predominantly African "B" roll electing 15 out of 60 parliamentary representatives. It also provided for a Declaration of Rights and a Constitutional Council to prevent the passage of discriminatory legislation. The British government, satisfied with these concessions to African interests, accepted new arrangements permitting the Legislative Assembly of Southern Rhodesia to amend the constitution in certain specified fields without the approval of the government of the United Kingdom and eliminated certain reserve powers then held but not utilized by the authorities in London. Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys explained the government's position with respect to this surrender of reserve powers as follows :

The new Constitution will have the effect of giving to the Africans, for the first time, substantial representation in the Legislative Assembly and will provide new constitutional safeguards which will enable the British Government to dispense with the reserve powers which we at present possess. These reserve powers have in the past proved to be a somewhat blunt instrument which, in practice, it was difficult to use.⁵

As far as such Rhodesian leaders as Prime Ministers Sir Roy Welensky and Sir Edgar Whitehead were concerned, the arrangements

were final and would effectively seal Southern Rhodesia off from the possibility of British governmental interference for all time. "Irrespective of political ballyhoo and double talk," declared D. V. Muller, a leading Southern Rhodesian trade unionist, in a referendum broadcast on July 7, 1961,

the question facing Southern Rhodesia at the polls is basically whether or not to allow Africans a means of expression through their own representatives in the Parliament of our land, with adequate safeguards for all concerned, in exchange for our independence within the framework of the Federation. One negotiates for the best possible deal under the circumstances, and I believe the best deal has been negotiated.⁶

The Opposition was less sanguine about these assurances. The leader of the Opposition in the Federal Parliament, W. J. Field, argued in a broadcast on July 10, 1961, that Southern Rhodesians were "conceding a great deal for almost nothing," since the British government had abrogated the reserve powers by disuse. In addition, Field challenged the Welensky-Whitehead contention that the new provisions would give Southern Rhodesia its independence, as under the new constitution "we will not be free from the United Kingdom." In support of this contention, he noted that the United Kingdom would, under certain circumstances, still give its assent to changes in the Southern Rhodesian basic law.⁷

Time has proved the Opposition to be the greater realists. This is not only to imply that the British were in any way insincere about the constitutional arrangements, but that circumstances forced a re-evaluation of the meaning of the 1961 agreements. For example, in the United Nations debate of June 1962 over adding the question of Southern Rhodesia to the agenda of the General Assembly, British spokesmen contended that the General Assembly would be exceeding its powers under the Charter if it debated the Southern Rhodesian constitution. Since Britain had no authority in Southern Rhodesia's internal affairs, constitutional questions in that country were solely the concern of Rhodesian authorities. Nevertheless African nationalists were little put off by the force of this argument. African leaders refused to be bound by what Dr. Julius Nyerere described as a "manipulated constitution" and argued persuasively that the British Guiana and Aden interventions could act as precedents in the present situation. Meanwhile Zambia's Foreign Minister, Simon M. Kapwepwe, told delegates at the United Nations General Assembly that the outcome of the constitutional crisis in Rhodesia was of more than domestic interest to his country, since Zambia is dependent upon her southern neighbour for access to the sea as well as for such industrial requisites as electricity and coal.⁸ For the African spokesmen, then, Britain's failure to act was evidence of sheer constitutional "legalism", occasioned more by feelings of ethnic kinship with the settler overseas than by legal and constitutional considerations.

British leaders clearly felt the whiplash of these arguments. Disclaiming any intent to retreat from the constitutional arrangements already settled upon, Prime Minister Wilson's last-minute mission to Rhodesia

gave every indication of a desire to secure new concessions for African interests from the reluctant authorities in Salisbury. In his encounter with Ian Smith and members of the Rhodesian cabinet, Wilson pressed for amendments to the 1961 constitution aimed at strengthening and protecting the African's position in an independent Rhodesia. On his return from Rhodesia, Wilson maintained that there were several ways in which the 1961 constitution could be amended without any special procedures being utilized,⁹ but he clearly intended to effect major changes in the existing situation by way of the constitutional proposals to be laid before the Royal Commission appointed to deal with the question of Rhodesia's independence. What would have happened had the Rhodesian and British governments been unable to agree on these constitutional provisions? The *London Times'* comments on this eventuality were illuminating :

Presumably Mr. Wilson would then like to revert to his original proposal : that the Commission itself should be charged with recommending the amendments to the 1961 constitution which would be necessary for Rhodesia to proceed to independence. This was a thoroughly sensible proposition.¹⁰

Although it may have seemed a thoroughly sensible proposition to the *Times*, there is no getting around the fact that it also amounted to a move—and a thoroughly justified one—to modify the existing constitutional arrangement. What was painfully clear to the white Rhodesians was now evident to all dispassionate observers : they remained in an exposed and vulnerable position so long as they continued to rely upon British government approval for their actions. Wilson was as conciliatory as he seemed to be in Salisbury only because of the weakness of his position in the event the Smith government invoked its ultimate weapon. But such a situation was by its very nature temporary, making the time factor crucial from the white Rhodesian's point of view. Thus Smith, in a radio broadcast on November 2, 1965, pressed Britain to reply by the following day regarding the terms of reference to be placed before the Royal Commission. He observed that the Rhodesian government was ever conscious—"and that is putting it mildly"—of the danger of allowing matters to drift. Nothing, he continued, has been more impressed on British authorities than the importance of the time factor because of the long delays and procrastination of the last three years.¹¹ For Smith, then, UDI was the only escape from the European community's continuing vulnerability.

If the whites of Rhodesia sought political power free from external control in order to reduce their vulnerability to external interference, they also exhibited fear of minority status in an African-dominated state. The two are opposite sides of the same coin. For as long as the white Rhodesians could continue to hold power they would not be exposed to the vicissitudes of the majoritarian will. As long as they remained the most powerful element on the Rhodesian scene, they would not be exposed in the sense that true minorities are.

Rhodesian fears of genuine minority status were not hard to find. Over and over again, Rhodesian whites expressed their fears of being

"swamped" by an alien, hostile and homogeneous African force. The evidence of considerable racial harmony in independent Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, and elsewhere were morbidly twisted into an inaccurate story of black vindictiveness and misrule. Thus when asked by reporters what it would mean if an African government came to power in Rhodesia, Smith replied, *inter-alia*, that "wherever the African has taken over there has been trouble, there has been bloodshed."¹² "I have always made it clear," Smith noted on another occasion, "that if UDI is the only means of obtaining independence and of saving our civilisation, then I am in favour of such action."¹³ White "civilization" thus became tied to the continuance of white power and justified, in Smith's eyes, the most extreme measures in its defence. But as the Nairobi-based *East African Standard* commented in an editorial,

The Rhodesian crisis is based on minority fears which were experienced, though on a smaller scale, in Kenya a few years ago and proved grossly exaggerated. However hard the case of the settlers there may be, and however valid their complaint of betrayal by Britain, this cannot stand in the way of the rights of the majority, and impede the final stages of Africa's transformation.¹⁴

In sum, the logic of UDI was the logic of despair. How then to account for the behaviour of Smith's supporters? On the whole it seems safe to conclude that their behaviour could be accounted for by their reaction to the situation they found themselves confronted with in Central Africa. Being white, prosperous, and numerically outnumbered (some 18 to 1), they felt exposed and terribly vulnerable. "Europe's abdication," writes Margery Perham, "left the settled minorities in Algeria, Kenya, Central Africa, and elsewhere face to face with a new Africa resolved to bring the whole continent under native rule. In this situation the Rhodesian colonists are naturally interested less in historical and sociological assessments than in self-preservation."¹⁵ But this disinterest "in historical and sociological assessments" is irrational and compounds the very grounds for anxiety which the white Rhodesians are trying to control. Their refusal to learn dispassionately from the Kenya experience with decolonization as it actually occurred meant that the white Rhodesians rejected the hazards of adjustment in the real world—and these are substantial—for a policy of illusion. Their reaction to events about them was logical, but it was a myopic and self-defeating logic.

But can this rebellion of "small and frightened men"¹⁶ succeed in the face of widespread African nationalist hostility? Supported by South African and Portuguese authorities, the Rhodesians have survived the oil blockade, the financial restrictions and the export controls. Rhodesian Finance Minister John Wrathall's statement that his country would "win through" no matter what measures the British Government might apply epitomizes the defiant mood which prevails in white ruling circles in that land.¹⁷ The Smith government is playing for time, hoping that other countries of the world will become preoccupied with other concerns and concede the present regime a kind of *de facto* recognition.

African nationalist intransigence nevertheless remains as strong as ever. If anything, the failure of Wilson's policies has sharpened suspicions and antagonisms. African nationalists smart under the frequent Rhodesian assertions that their rule is ineffective and tyrannical. Although frustrated over their inability to raise commodity export prices to accelerate the inflow of economic assistance, or to grapple effectively with the unemployment crisis, African leaders feel that Rhodesia's racism is one wrong which they can do something about. Rhodesia is a direct blow to Africa's dignity; if all of Africa combined lacks the strength to resolve this situation, then, in African eyes, the independence which much of the continent has secured is specious and unsatisfactory. The mood of African nationalism is *also* one of defiance. Thus the *Nationalist* of Tanzania expresses the sentiments of many when it asserts in an editorial:

The Rhodesian situation is a test case for the African States. A bunch of rabid white racists, with the connivance of the most accomplished colonial power, have flexed their muscles, defied Africa's pledge to fight to free the whole of Africa, and made a mockery of Africa's claim to independence.....The challenge is to the African States to demonstrate their strength.¹⁸

Indeed, what muscles can Africa flex, and how likely is its display of strength to prove triumphant? In the present situation of economic and governmental fragility, direct African military intervention seems an unreliable course of action. Consequently, a simple arithmetical evaluation of available forces is likely to prove unrewarding; the Rhodesian army and air force are quite respectable and the African states are in a poor position to raise a large international force to overwhelm the rebellious regime. Moreover, the attempts made by freedom fighters to pierce the white-controlled redoubt have thus far had minimal impact. Guerrilla attacks may well increase in intensity without an Algerian-type situation developing. Therefore unless the British government reverses its stand on military intervention—an improbable eventuality¹⁹—the Smith government would seem to have little reason to fear a successful military assault for the time being upon its citadel.

African nationalists, fully aware of the military realities involved in this conflict, rely primarily upon diplomatic and psychological pressures to achieve their end. Thus various diplomatic means—both public and private—are employed to mobilize the opinion of the world's community of states in support of Rhodesia's African majority. This choice of weapons shows considerable prudence. Military force, after all, is only one type of power available to rulers; diplomatic pressure can also be a powerful tool and one which is particularly well suited to the present African circumstances. "Individually," admits Mwalimu Julius Nyerere of Tanzania,

African States are weak. Collectively we are not weak. It is only failure to work together which now makes us weak.²⁰

This appeal, made at the November 1966 summit conference of

the Organization for African Unity in Addis Ababa, is essentially an appeal for collective diplomatic, not military, force.

An examination of the use African leaders have made of diplomatic pressures reveals the strengths and weaknesses of such an approach. As the efforts to secure the general support of the nations of the world, gain acceptance of majority rule prior to Rhodesia's independence, and invoke effective sanctions show, diplomatic pressure has been effective, but only within certain very definite limits.

In terms of gaining majority support, the African states have been overwhelmingly successful—at the OAU, the 1966 Commonwealth meetings, and the United Nations. The November 1966 U. N. General Assembly's vote, by 89 to 2 with 17 abstentions, approving a resolution calling on Britain to take all necessary measures, including the use of force, to overthrow the Smith regime indicates the general support the Africans have gained throughout the world. On the international scene, however, the winning of numerical majorities is no guarantee of success. To understand the reasons for this, it is necessary to delve deeper into the nature of the majority support and distinguish between those nations which subscribe to a particular action as a general sentiment and those which view the vote as a commitment to action. When such a distinction is applied, the significance of the majority's sentiment may prove more apparent than real, reducing the possibilities for effective action. Thus, in the case at hand, it is crucial to note that the open opponents of the resolution are the two countries controlling Rhodesia's access to the sea and a number of the countries which abstained are the ones with substantial investments in southern Africa. The United States' position is ambiguous since it combines a highly effective application of sanctions with an apparent unwillingness to go further and offend a valued ally during the present Southeast Asian crisis. Until diplomatic pressure can compel these wavering states to assume a more active role, it will be difficult to translate principle into policy commitments on the Rhodesian question.

The impact of diplomatic pressure has also been evident in the bargaining that has taken place over the future Rhodesian constitution. From the outset, the African nationalist leaders sought to make Britain's Labour government more specific about the meaning of "unimpeded progress to majority rule." At the 1965 Commonwealth Conference, the African states forced a thorough discussion of white minority rule in Rhodesia, insisting that no independence be given to that country except on the basis of a majoritarian democracy. This difference of viewpoint over the timing of independence became the crux of the dispute between the Wilson government and African militants in Tanzania and elsewhere. When President Nyerere failed to gain what he considered adequate assurance that majority rule would precede independence, he refused to sign the communique at the end of the 1965 Commonwealth Conference. Then, following the declaration of UDI, he joined eight other states by implementing a December 1965 resolution of the OAU foreign ministers meeting by breaking relations with the United Kingdom after the ultimatum to Britain to crush the rebellion expired.

While the African radicals terminated their relations with Britain, the remaining African nationalists used their continuing contacts to keep up steady pressure upon British officials. The total effect of this dual approach was telling indeed. The Commonwealth Sanctions Committee, set up following the Lagos Commonwealth Conference in January 1966, may have had some effect in influencing Britain to request Security Council authorization of the right to prevent tankers from transporting crude oil to Beira for further shipment to Rhodesia.²¹ The September 1966 Commonwealth Conference was the scene of a bitter battle between Harold Wilson and an aroused and embittered group of Commonwealth leaders, mostly African. Most of the Commonwealth prime ministers dismissed Wilson's appeals for more time for voluntary sanctions to take effect and demanded an unequivocal statement ruling out independence before majority rule. Wilson resisted such an undertaking, hoping to leave the door ajar for future negotiations with white Rhodesian moderates.²² In the end, however, he was compelled to make a half bow to Commonwealth sentiment; in the final communique, the British government stated that it would not agree to independence before majority rule "unless the people of Rhodesia as a whole are shown to be in favour of it." Moreover, the British government declared that if the regime in Rhodesia refused to negotiate an ending of the rebellion by the end of the year, Britain would withdraw all its previous proposals for a negotiated settlement of the dispute and would sponsor a resolution at the United Nations Security Council providing for "effective and selective mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia." Diplomatic pressure had achieved its most resounding success thus far on the question at hand. Even so, there was considerable truth in Nyerere's charge that the conference communique still did not guarantee majority rule before independence.²³ This was underlined by the conciliatory line Commonwealth Secretary Herbert Bowden took in his negotiations with Ian Smith during the following month. Nora Beloff reports that Bowden took great pains to stress,

that a return to legality does *not* mean a period of direct rule, either by the Governor or from Whitehall and, still less, the imminent imposition of African rule. Mr. Bowden would be quite willing to wait for two, three or four elections—almost a generation—before the automatic process of a gradual enlargement of the franchise did in fact tip the balance in favour of the African majority.²⁴

Africa's diplomatic victory was by no means a total one!

Another important area where diplomatic pressures have had a substantial impact is that of sanctions. Economic sanctions, an earnest of Britain's good intentions, have hurt but not toppled the Smith government. At the 1966 Commonwealth Conference, Prime Minister Wilson estimated that Rhodesia had been denied access to markets which took about £72,000,000 of its exports outside southern Africa.²⁵ Unquestionably export restrictions have hampered the crucial tobacco industry as well as the production of pig iron and sugar, causing some 3,000 Europeans to emigrate from the country since UDI. Economic investment is down, foreign exchange difficulties are creating complications, and the

cost of consumer imports is high. In addition, the OAU decision to close certain air routes has caused inconvenience.

Nevertheless sanctions cannot be said to have had a decisive effect thus far on the Rhodesian economy. As the report of the Commonwealth Sanctions Committee concluded:

There has been disappointment that there is yet no convincing evidence that the overthrow of the illegal regime in Rhodesia is in sight. The Committee is agreed that sanctions at the present level of their application have not produced the desired political results and that there is therefore need to take further action.²⁶

Asbestos firms had initial difficulties finding export markets after "independence", but soon found new outlets and returned to full production. Similarly nickel and chrome, in short supply throughout the world, have found ready customers to make up for other businessmen overcome by scruples. Japan accepted Rhodesian iron ore in exchange for a £1,500,000 contract for railway wagon bogies. France is reported to be negotiating an arms deal and West Germany, a major purchaser of Rhodesian tobacco, is interested in cutting in on Britain's traditional engineering equipment market.²⁷ Meanwhile the oil sanctions are being made meaningless by non-cooperation on the part of authorities in Mozambique and South Africa; and Zambia, despite her genuine hostility to the Smith regime, is compelled by circumstances to go on trading with her neighbour to the south. Perhaps Julius Nyerere was overstating his case a bit when he described the sanctions as "totally ineffective,"²⁸ but certainly they have not shaken the confidence of white Rhodesians regarding the viability of their country after UDI.

The inadequacy of sanctions as presently applied has led to widespread African demands for machinery to increase their effectiveness, namely, mandatory economic sanctions. Anyone breaking such sanctions made mandatory by vote in the Security Council of the United Nations acts illegally against the world community. In principle, this amounts to a formidable threat to would-be violators.

Here one must recognize the existence of strongly differing views on what type of mandatory sanctions to apply. In the event of the Rhodesian rebellion not ending by the year-end, the British government has pledged to sponsor a resolution in the Security Council providing for "effective and selective mandatory economic sanctions." Such key exports as chrome, asbestos, iron ore, and tobacco would probably be restricted immediately, with oil imports following at a later stage. Such an arrangement was satisfactory for Uganda's Milton Obote, who declared at a London press conference that he did not feel Britain or anyone else should call for complete mandatory sanctions because it might have an adverse effect on the British economy.²⁹ Other African nationalists firmly demanded comprehensive mandatory sanctions, a viewpoint that gained overwhelming support at the OAU meetings in Addis Ababa in November 1966.

But the big question remains: will mandatory economic sanctions bring down the Smith regime? Certainly the Portuguese and South Africans have been very cautious in coming to the assistance of their Rhodesian friends. Authorities in Mozambique did not openly flaunt the oil blockade at the time Wilson secured UN authorization to prevent tankers from bringing supplies to Beira for transfer to Rhodesia. Verwoerd acted very cautiously when the rebellion began, moving to direct and open support only after it became clear that only minimal risks were involved. It is possible that the retaliatory implications implicit in mandatory sanctions would again cause these two southern African powers to hesitate, but there is little evidence to suggest that they are intimidated by the prospects of international coercive action. In plain fact, by the time mandatory sanctions are invoked, they may be "too little and too late"³⁰ to be a decisive factor. The Smith regime has had sufficient time to replace lost markets, the consolidation of white minority interests throughout southern Africa has proceeded rapidly, and the international community is not firmly united and committed on the imperative need for majority rule in Rhodesia to assure success for any experiment with mandatory sanctions.

Diplomatic and military power are ranged against each other in a conflict of increasing dimensions. Race is pitted against race, minority against majority, and despair against despair. Initially the advantage would seem to be on the side of those with military force. Certainly the past affords few concrete instances of a world public opinion as a general sentiment overwhelming a powerful citadel, particularly one made desperate by the attitude it has adopted. Yet theorists of international relations are probably at fault in underestimating the significance of diplomatic pressure in wearing down the moral resolve of anyone against whom it is directed. This is an agonizing racial clash in which memories of past affronts cannot and will not be forgotten. Thus, provided the African states remain united and militant on the Rhodesian question, neither they nor the rest of the world need underestimate the extent of power they have at their disposal. If African nationalism can ultimately topple the Smith regime, it will demonstrate that UDI, proclaimed in the name of minority security, was itself a cause of great insecurity and dislocation for the men who proclaimed it. Thus white Rhodesians may come to find that they have a tiger by the tail.

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Algeria : Revolution or Change ?

K. R. SINGH

ALGERIAN independence ushered in an era of expectations. The people considered independence a panacea for the country's ills and thought it would bring them peace and prosperity and get Algeria a place in the sun, especially in the newly emerging developing countries. In the first flush of excitement they however overlooked two basic factors which were to have a decisive influence on the future of Algeria: the continuing colonial legacy of the country and the stresses and strains generated within the ranks of the Algerian leadership during the independence struggle.

The Evian Agreement which led to Algerian independence did not give the country total independence. There were several factors, mostly economic and strategic, which tied it to France. These related to the predominant French influence in Algeria and the ultimate concessions the French and the Algerians could make during the long and bitter negotiations which culminated in the signing of the agreement. Apart from the binding ties of the Evian Agreement, independent Algeria suffered from two severe handicaps : lack of an infrastructure and trained manpower and continued dependence, for some time at least, on foreign sources, mostly French, not only for its development but also for its very existence as an independent nation.

On the political front, the FLN (National Liberation Front) was more of a 'movement' than a well-knit political party with a strong cadre and rigid party programme. Moreover, the violent armed struggle had introduced a new element, the ALN (National Liberation Army), which competed with the politicians in wielding political influence in an independent Algeria. The often-overlapping spheres of influence of the FLN and the ALN complicated the matter still further. Thus in the post-independence struggle for power among the Algerian leaders we come across serious ideological clashes based mainly on three themes : democracy, socialism and the role of the army in an independent Algeria. The task was further complicated by a clash of personalities.

In 1961 Ben Khedda and his supporters, often described as 'centralists', were in power in the GPRA (Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic). Other leaders like Ben Bella, Ait Ahmad and Rabah Bitat were under arrest and personalities like Farhat Abbas were under

temporary eclipse. In 1962, Ben Bella and others were released by the French. The re-entry of this group into Algerian politics started the first phase of the struggle for power in Algeria. The FLN, the guerrilla forces within Algeria and the ALN were divided between the Ben Khedda and Ben Bella groups. The split dealt a mortal blow to the concept of collective leadership which had been repeatedly emphasised during the period of the revolutionary struggle.

There were several causes which led to this split, the clash of personalities being one of them. But the ideological reason, which to me appears to be the most important one, centred around the role of the army in an independent Algeria. The Ben Khedda group believed that after independence the ALN should assume the role of a normal army subordinate to a civilian government, whereas the other faction, led by Ben Bella and supported by Colonel Boumedienne, opposed it. It insisted that the ALN should retain its political and revolutionary role and play a leading part in bringing about a social and economic revolution in the country.

The first overt clash between the two groups came at the famous Congress of the CNRA (National Council of the Algerian Revolution) held in Tripoli in May 1962. The Ben Bella group launched a propaganda campaign against the 'factional dictatorship' of the 'centralists'. No settlement was reached despite the slight majority of the Ben Bella group. The Ben Khedda group left Tripoli on 7 June 1962.

An argument used to discredit the Ben Khedda group was the truce agreement signed by it with the OAS (*Organisation de l'armee secrete*) on 17 June 1962. The signing of the agreement, as seen in retrospect, was a bold move on the part of the GPRA because it saved many lives on both sides, the French colons and the Algerians, and prevented Franco-Algerian relations from deteriorating further. This was important because Algeria had to depend to a large extent on French aid for its very existence as a new independent state. The political capital made by the Ben Bella group out of the GPRA-OAS agreement was ethically wrong because when it came to power the group went out of its way to please the French and reassure them of their continuing interests in Algeria.

As mentioned earlier, Ben Khedda did not trust the ALN, especially under the leadership of Col. Boumedienne. On 26 June the GPRA voted for disciplinary action against Col. Boumedienne and his supporters in the ALN. He was accused of undermining the authority of the GPRA and of trying to establish a dictatorship. On 30 June he was dismissed and deprived of his rank. Ben Bella came out openly in support of Col. Boumedienne and said on 6 July 1962 that the only reason for his differences with Ben Khedda was the step taken against Col. Boumedienne.

Ben Khedda did not have the authority to enforce the decision of the GPRA. In the first week of July 1962 Col. Boumedienne's troops crossed into Algeria from their camps in Tunisia and Morocco. By the

end of July they had occupied Bone and Phillipeville. These army manoeuvres had forced the hands of Ben Bella and effectively ruled out all chances of a political settlement between the Ben Bella and Ben Khedda groups. Soon the Ben Khedda group, sensing its weakness, withdrew from the contest and the Ben Bella and Boumedienne group assumed power.

Some of the commanders of the army districts (*wilayas*) in Algeria, especially of the *Wilayas* 3 and 4, opposed Boumedienne. But they were also brushed aside. Here again the game was not fair. Despite the promise of making Algiers a demilitarized zone Col. Boumedienne moved his troops there and occupied it on 9 September 1962. It will thus be noted that Boumedienne had never hesitated to use the army to further his political ends or sometimes even thwart a political settlement which might result in close collaboration among the politicians and the consequent side-tracking of the army. By his judicious pinpricks he had kept alive mutual suspicions among the politicians, isolated one group from another and continued to support Ben Bella with the result that the latter became the captive of the army.

Soon after coming into power the Ben Bella group began to consolidate its position. It had control over the FLN. No other political party or group was allowed to function openly. The principle of a single party system accepted at Tripoli was rigorously followed. In view of this ideological proposition the activities of three other Algerian parties were suppressed in 1962. They were the Algerian Communist Party, the People's Party and the Party of Socialist Revolution. Successful attempts were also made to control the Algerian Labour Union (UGTA) and the Students' Union (UGEA).

Ben Bella however could not retain all his former supporters. One by one they too fell out. Mohammad Khider resigned on 17 April 1963 from his post as Secretary-General of the FLN. Ben Bella assumed that post. Ferhat Abbas, who had been made President of the Constituent Assembly, also resigned from his post because of undue interference on the part of the FLN in the constitution-making procedure. On his resignation he issued a lengthy statement criticising the proposed constitution as being a dictatorial one. Ferhat Abbas thus became a rebel in independent Algeria.

On the one hand Ben Bella was losing his political supporters. On the other Col. Boumedienne was becoming more and more powerful. By 18 May 1963 he had been nominated First Deputy Premier. He also retained his Defence portfolio. By 26 November 1963 he had obtained permission to abolish the old *wilaya* system and had reorganised the armed forces. The old units were disbanded and a new army was organised, based primarily on those units which were trained by him in Tunisia and Morocco.

By this time Ben Bella had lost almost all his supporters among the old politicians and had become dependent on Boumedienne and a victim of his own intrigues against his former political colleagues. He was

allowed to continue in this position but the moment he showed signs of trying to regain what he had lost he was swiftly eliminated from the game.

The clash between Ben Bella and Boumedienne was inevitable. Few people doubted it. But the timing of the *coup d'etat* of 19 June 1965 caught everyone by surprise. Several possible reasons can be given for the *coup*. Two of them deserve special notice: the change in Ben Bella's policy towards his political opponents and the timing of the Afro-Asian conference in Algiers. He had probably realised the mistakes he had made in 1962-63 by isolating himself from the politicians and was trying to come to an understanding with the Front of Socialist Forces (FFS) of Ait Ahmad. He was also thinking of releasing Ferhat Abbas from prison. The change in Ben Bella's policy was a danger signal for the army because if the politicians could sink their differences Ben Bella's dependence on the army would diminish. This would give Ben Bella an alternative base for power which would be to Boumedienne's disadvantage. The matter was gaining urgency because hardly four days before the *coup* Ben Bella was reported to have reached an understanding with Ait Ahmad and his FFS. It would also have been dangerous for Boumedienne to allow Ben Bella to play host to the Afro-Asian Conference. Ben Bella's enhanced international prestige, especially in Afro-Asian countries, would have created complications for the army leaders in Algeria.

The reasons for Ben Bella's removal can also be gauged from the way the Algerians received the news. It is surprising that there was little pro-Ben Bella reaction when the news of the *coup d'etat* was made known to them. No doubt the student community did demonstrate in support of Ben Bella but they were silenced by the police. Why did the people receive the news silently? Were they disillusioned with him? Had he failed to deliver the goods?

As mentioned in the beginning, the Algerians were facing several problems following the declaration of independence. These were mostly economic. The country had lost its infrastructure, capital and technical knowhow. There was widespread unemployment and the treasury was empty. The economic regeneration of Algeria was the most important task facing the new government.

The Algerians had decided to accept socialism as an ideology to evolve their economic policies. The objective conditions then prevailing in Algeria were conducive for it. The French *colons* had left Algeria in a hurry leaving their property behind. The 'capitalist' Algerian class, if any, was discredited as being the 'yes-men' (*Beni Oui-oui*) of the French. The anti-*colon* and, by implication, anti-capitalist turn of the independence movement had also prepared the people for such a change. Thus, there was an ideological orientation of the nationalist leaders as well as the people towards socialism. The practical manifestations of this change were seen in various socialist experiments undertaken after independence—*autogestion* (self-management), agrarian reforms and nationlisation being the most important of them.

The ideological and political foundations of Algerian socialism

were laid at the Hamamet meeting (in Tunisia) in May 1962. The meeting was held under the presidentship of Ben Bella and the report prepared there was accepted with minor changes at the Tripoli Congress of the CNRA. The report stressed that leadership should be vested in the peasants, workers and young and revolutionary intellectuals. It rejected the classical method of western liberalism and free enterprise on the ground that it would gradually lead to dependence on western capitalism. Instead, it called for state planning, nationalisation of banks, industries and foreign trade and agrarian reforms. These principles were elaborated further in the Algerian Charter of 1964.

But before the Algerian leadership could formulate the details of its socialist programme and create an administrative structure to implement it the Algerian people had stepped in with their pragmatic approach. When the French *colons* left Algeria they had left behind their farms and industrial enterprises. The workers on their own took over the management of these farms and factories and formed committees for this purpose. These efforts at self-management (*auto-gestion*) were successful. The workers in the fields gathered the harvest and those in the cities continued, within their limitations, to run the factories. This spontaneous reaction of the Algerian population saved the country from anarchy.

When the Algerian Government was established it passed several decrees legalising these acts of 'self-management'. On 23 October 1962 a decree was issued prohibiting purchase, sale or lease of properties left by the *colons*. The March 1963 decrees made land abandoned by the *colons* national property. They also legalised and institutionalised self-management. The Government appointed representatives on workers' committees and gradually established its influence over them. Soon these self-management units lost their spontaneous character and became government-run or directed units.

Algerian self-management needs a deeper study not only as a socialist experiment in Algeria but also as the most important ideological contribution made by Algerians to the Afro-Asian world. In its pure form self-management would have meant a totally autonomous economic unit managed by workers without outside interference. In Algeria the experiment did not succeed because of two factors. The first was lack of technical knowhow to manage these units and the second was interference and later control from the top. Workers who assumed responsibilities in the beginning thought themselves as the initiators of and participants in this new experiment. It was something which they had created. But later with the increasing government control they started equating themselves with salaried employees. This subtle but crucial change in their outlook spelled the doom of self-management. Another factor which led to a lot of dissatisfaction among workers, especially agricultural workers, of the self-management units was the question of distribution of profits. They demanded that net profits be divided among them. The question was discussed at the self-management congress for agricultural workers in October 1963 where the delegates agreed that without profit distribution there could be no true self-

management. The government and the UGTA were however of the opinion that all profits should be ploughed back as investment. This caused much dissatisfaction and led to opposition to the Ben Bella regime.

Another manifestation of Algerian socialism was the agrarian reform movement. The question of reforms was discussed at the Tripoli Congress of 1962 which advocated liquidation of the economic bases of agrarian colonisation and limitation of landed property in general. The problem of the land owned by the *colons* was simplified by their mass exodus and management of the *colons'* landed property by Algerian workers, first on their own initiative and later on government's directive. But the imbalance in regard to the land holdings of Algerians themselves has not been corrected so far. Many Algerians continue to hold disproportionately large landed properties while the majority of peasants hardly manage to eke out a bare subsistence. This did not speak highly of the socialist regime under Ben Bella. Some service cooperatives were formed but there was no compulsion on the part of Algerian leaders to force socialism upon the non-self-management agrarian sector of the country.

Nationalisation of the means of production and distribution was undertaken after independence. But there too the majority of the *colons'* industrial and business enterprises were brought under self-management after their owners had fled the country in 1962. Some other enterprises like foreign-owned hotels and restaurants, banks and insurance companies were also nationalised. There were rumours about nationalisation of the oil industry but these were emphatically denied.

The result of these socialist experiments proved rather harmful to the economic stability of the country. The experiment in self-management, which had a good start, was later hampered by state interference; the agrarian reforms failed to bridge the gulf between the rich and the poor and the nationalisation policy shied away foreign and even local capital with the result that there was no significant progress in the industrial field. Only the oil industry, unhampered by any socialist threats, continued to flourish. All this made the masses think that the failure of socialist experiments was the failure of Ben Bella's socialist policies. Some of the disillusionment among the masses was unavoidable but this led to general apathy when Ben Bella was ousted from power by Boumedienne.

The failure of Algerian policies was attributed by Col. Boumedienne, after the *coup d'etat*, to foreign ideological influences over the national policies of the country. Addressing the *gendarmerie* on 30 April 1965, he said: "Our fatherland has been infested by adventurers who wanted to be counsels, who had fumbled revolutions everywhere, and who wanted to use Algeria as a testing ground". He discarded these foreign ideological interferences and wanted to uphold the ideological independence of Algeria. The 1965 coup saw the departure of the foreign ideological motivators of Ben Bella's socialism. Most of these ideological interpreters were leftist and their departure gave rise to the theory that the new regime was

reactionary. This also led to a confrontation between the forces of Boumedienne and the generally marxist-oriented students of Algeria who got some encouragement from the pronouncements of these discarded ideological supporters of Ben Bella. But China's absolute and total support to 'Brother' Boumedienne, whatever its motive at the time, stole the thunder from their ideological propaganda. How could Col. Boumedienne, who had been exalted by the Chinese, be a 'fascist' and an 'assassin'!

The new regime of Col. Boumedienne is pragmatic in its approach to Algerian problems. This means demolition of the ideological basis of the previous regime. Ben Bella's policy of socialism thus came under severe criticism. On 1 November 1965, on the occasion of the anniversary of the Algerian Revolution, Boumedienne criticised the old policies which, he said, had been confined to taking brash but fragmentary measures, expropriating and nationalising small establishments of little economic importance to the state. But in consequence the wellsprings of real activity were broken, confidence and security destroyed, and individual initiative for investment and creativity diminished.

Boumedienne, recognising the semantic and ideological utility of socialism for Algeria, did not criticise it in theory but confined himself to criticising its implementation in the country. He continued to give formal approval to socialist experiments like self-management and nationalisation conducted by the previous regime. But socialism was not to be the sole guiding force in the formulation of new policies. On 12 July 1965 he declared that he intended to reconstruct the economy of the country on a solid basis in accordance with the real potentialities of the country.

The new pragmatic orientation might lead to the participation of private capital, both domestic and foreign, in the Algerian economy; especially in industry. President Boumedienne emphasized industrial development in his 1 July 1965 speech. The new code of investment framed recently gives ample encouragement to foreign and domestic capital for participation in the economic development of Algeria. Naturally, the question of nationalisation has been shelved for the time being. This is an example of pragmatism overruling ideological conformation, a basic change from the attitude of the previous regime. The new regime has re-emphasized the role of Islam in the country. The correlation between Islam and socialism has been a hotly debated issue in Algeria. The leadership in Algeria, though progressive, could not openly dissociate itself from Islam and therefore pleaded that there was no incompatibility between Islam and socialism. But there was some dissatisfaction over the 'non-conformist' view of Islam taken by the intelligentsia and 'foreign ideological influences' were blamed for it. To counteract this charge Ben Bella and others made several statements to the effect that they wanted to institute a revolutionary socialism which would take into account the Arab-Islamic traditions of Algeria. Ben Bella even went to the extent of stating in the Central Committee of the FLN on 22 April 1964 that they were Arabs, their ideological base was Islam and that their socialist revolution had Islam as its basis.

Islam will thus get an added impetus under the new regime not only because Boumedienne is oriented towards Islam as a religion but also because it will probably endear him to the masses who are profoundly religious.

The *coup d'etat* which replaced Ben Bella with Boumedienne was not welcomed by all sections of the country. Some people, specially students, and a section of workers, opposed it. But these sporadic outbursts of pro-Ben Bella sympathy did not evoke a more vocal and positive response from the masses at that time. It was easy for the new regime to deal firmly with such demonstrations. Thus, on the one hand there was general apathy probably because of the unrealisation of dreams of an utopia and on the other hand there was opposition, though nascent, from a substantial minority of the intelligentsia to the new regime.

Boumedienne has not done anything spectacular to put himself in the limelight. Probably he does not intend doing so. Maybe, he feels that promises which cannot be fulfilled are more harmful than judicious silence. He also realises that it will need a lot of hard work to produce results, especially in the economic field, which would justify the new regime. He is probably taking steps in that direction. The liberalisation of investment facilities is an indication of this change.

The change, probably motivated by the desire for rapid industrialisation of the country, was not welcomed by a section of the Algerian intelligentsia who saw in it a negation of socialist principles to which they were ideologically committed. They raised their voices against it. Leaders of the Algerian Communist Party, which had been banned as early as 29 November 1962 but whose activities were not curbed, were arrested in mid-September 1965. This led to a violent reaction in the *Pravda* of 27 September 1965¹. But the arrest of Algerian communists did not break the backbone of dissension. By the end of January 1966 there was a three-day student agitation. The excuse for holding the demonstration was to protest against the kidnapping of the Moroccan leftist leader, Ben Barka, but later the agitation took an anti-Boumedienne turn. The students were protesting against the dissolution of the students union and the arrest of some of their leaders. They thought they had an important role to play in Algerian politics but they were more or less disfranchised by the new regime, which they did not like. Continuing opposition to the present regime by the Algerian students cannot therefore be ruled out.

On a more mature political level also the forces of opposition are regrouping. One of them is described as the Clandestine Organisation of the Algerian Revolution (OCRA). It is attracting some well-known Algerian personalities like Bachir Boumaza, a known leftist theoretician and an old associate of Ben Bella who was Minister of Information in the Boumedienne Cabinet and had gone into exile from Algeria in October

1. The Soviet Communist Party had invited representatives of the banned Algerian Communist Party to its 23rd Congress in 1966 which resulted in a walkout by the official delegation sent by the Algerian Government to attend the Congress.

1966. Another known Algerian personality who can create trouble for the present regime and who escaped from prison in May 1966 is Hoccein Ait Ahmed.

In spite of this opposition Col. Boumedienne has more or less consolidated his hold on Algeria. No organised opposition is permitted to function within the country. The FLN and the labour union (UGTA) have been more or less brought under control and the students' union banned. The army, which had raised him to power, is still under his command and is being treated very well. The cabinet is composed of either army men or others supporting the regime. The regime is not taking any ambitious or flamboyant attitude in regard to foreign policy. In internal affairs, especially in the economic field, the regime hopes to create conditions which will promote rapid industrialisation of the country, raise its per capita income and help solve the unemployment problem.

Col. Boumedienne used the army and police to come to power. He will continue to be in power till he does not have to use them to remain in power. During the long years of the war of liberation the Algerians learnt to resist ceaseless pressures, propaganda, blandishments and even terrorism. The same things continued, on a somewhat lesser scale, even after independence. As a result of these experiences they have to think for themselves and judge things on their merits. This inherent ability of the Algerian masses to formulate independent views and work for their implementation will determine the success or failure of the new regime.

The South African Scene

VANITA SABIKHI

CONTRARY to popular belief, the nationalist movement in South Africa is essentially a struggle for liberation. It is not merely an agitation to secure equality with the white minority community in power. Though not a unique phenomenon, the nationalist struggle tends to be relegated to the background in view of the greater significance of the need to eliminate apartheid and the consequent politics of an exclusively white dominated State. Indicative of the sorry state of affairs in South Africa is the fact that a struggle for equality of the indigenous majority with the privileged white minority is continuing in the country at a time when the right of self-determination has been universally accepted. The greater part of the white-dominated world press concentrates on the subsidiary issue of apartheid so as to divert popular attention from the main movement for self-determination of the people. Despite the imposition of restrictions by the government, the movement has gathered considerable momentum and is assured of political and military support from independent and newly liberated African countries.

A white minority government exercising exclusive control over Africans by denying them fundamental human rights and dignity, economic and political opportunities in a predominantly African country is an illogical situation. Yet, the Nationalist Government in South Africa continues to rigidly enforce the philosophy and economics of apartheid. The policy of apartheid or separate development is the Nationalist Party's answer to the peaceful existence of a heterogeneous population of Africans and whites. Though pursued on the plea that the existence of vast cultural differences between the two groups requires development along separate lines, it is a ruthless policy designed to perpetuate white domination in the country. To implement apartheid, the Nationalist Government has evolved a policy of group areas—areas where only whites can live and those 'reserved' for Africans. It is interesting to note that in the 'European' territory live 6,000,000 Africans, 1,500,000 coloureds (those of mixed descent), 500,000 Indians and 3,000,000 whites. The total area of South Africa is 472,359 square miles, of which the 'European territory' comprises 416,130 square miles. The remainder, some 56,000 square miles or less than 12 per cent of the total, is the land reserved for Africans comprising Bantu homelands. In these 'reserved' areas live 5,000,000 Africans. Within their respective areas the

two communities are expected to live separately without any intermingling between them.

The inequality obvious in this geographical division of territory was extended further so that the white state came to be contiguous with the area that was rich in natural resources and advanced economically with the help of South African labour. This territory also included all large cities, seaports, harbours, airfields, areas served by road and rail, power lines and major irrigation schemes. The major gold, diamond and coal mines were also in this industrially advanced area. Most of the industries as well as extensive farm lands however were manned by African labour. This is indeed a paradox in the context of the watertight divisions the Nationalist Party intended to finally have throughout the country. Against this, the African or Bantu homelands, as they were called, consisted of 260 small and separate areas scattered throughout the country without any possibility of their coming together. These are the South African backwaters, the primitive, rural slum region without any industries, few resources or developed communication systems. They are congested, distress areas where people live on the edge of starvation with almost no means of employment. There being no irrigation facilities, farming is in a bad way and famine a common occurrence. The 'homelands' being mere reserves of labour—men working on farm lands and industrial projects in the white regions—more often than not they are drained of their menfolk, women depending mainly on primitive agriculture which does not provide them with even subsistence living.

The philosophy of apartheid, though claimed as the only way for Africans to develop their own way of life, has in fact undermined it. Its implementation has resulted in the exploitation of African labour who, even though officially confined to the reserves have to depend on the whites for their livelihood. Thus, in the Bantu homelands no industry can be developed. In the Transkei, the Bantustan showpiece of the Republic, the Government says there are 44 secondary industries with an annual gross output of £795,000. But in reality these are merely essential services, like dry-cleaners, bakeries, smithies, etc. In agriculture too, the picture is dreary; crop yields, according to official figures, provide the equivalent of a gross annual income of £4.5 per head while the annual income per head from livestock is less than 2s.6d. The Transkei's largest source of income is migrant labour; 150,000 Africans are recruited annually by Government bureaux to work in mines and industries. The Tomlinson Report which investigated Bantustan planning and actual implementation stressed that the development of the reserves in the primary sector alone—forestry, agriculture and mining—would not meet the needs of the Transkei, for the reserve would then support only 1/5th of the total population in a backward subsistence and peasant economy. For the remaining 4/5th there would be no livelihood unless secondary industries were established. However, Government, fearing that the setting up of such industries would stop the flow of labour to industries in the white area, has decided not to allow any private investment in the Bantustans and has restricted its own investment to agriculture. The Bantu homelands would thus have to rely entirely on income from migrant labour and be condemned to a destitute existence. The policy of separate

development would ultimately lead to tribalisation of South Africa. The whole scheme seems an attempt by the Afrikaner Nationalists to fight the forces of African nationalism and weaken them through divisions and tribal conflicts.

South African opposition to Afrikaner nationalism has been considerably influenced by the overwhelming legislative superiority of the ruling Nationalist Party. It has moved gradually from the Bantu political liberalism of the 1880's when Africans were eligible for election to the Cape Parliament to an extra-parliamentary position when Africans voted for whites in Parliament during the half century of Union and since 1960 to underground activity.

The three major African national organisations in the country today are the African National Congress, and its associate, 'Umkonto-we-Sizwe'; the Pan-African Congress to which the 'Poqo' is linked; and the Communist Party. The African National Congress, founded in 1912 when General Hertzog began the break from General Botha's group which led to the formation of the Nationalist Party, is the pioneer South African national movement. Believing in a multi-racial society it has given expression to the liberal aspirations of the Africans. Over the years it has reacted to white official policy with changing attitudes. The ANC has followed a liberal policy, become militant, attempted passive resistance, joined a multi-racial popular front and was overtaken by impatient black nationalism and went underground.

From the time of its inception to 1936, the leadership of the ANC was in the hands of professional men and church leaders who combined nationalism with respect for tribal authority. They hoped that cooperation with liberally inclined whites would lead to a reduction of racial discrimination and give them a share in political power. African aspirations had been encouraged by the liberal traditions of the Cape Colony administration. Then came a period of militant nationalism when a desire to eliminate the whites and a call for the abandonment of discrimination of every kind against Africans gained ground. The leadership called for non-cooperation with government institutions, boycott, strikes and civil disobedience. White, Indian and African radicals organised multi-racial demonstrations. As the Nationalist Government expanded its field of racial legislation affecting all non-whites and as opposition from Africans coloureds and Indians grew the ANC moved towards multi-racial co-operation and organised passive resistance. The Suppression of Communism Act in 1950 came as threat to all non-whites of the Union so that the more militant ANC members moved closer to the communist group. A multi-racial opposition front had been formed by June 1955, consisting of the ANC, the South African Indian Congress, the newly organised Congress Democrats and the Coloured People's Organisation. They jointly held a People's Congress in Johannesburg and demanded equal opportunities for all. Though the communists played a major role in organising the People's Congress, it had a limited ideological impact on the ANC. Increased repression and suppression had by 1957 resulted in the younger ANC members becoming more militant and identifying themselves with pan-Africanism. Boycotts were organised, but the treason trials of ANC

members immobilised the leadership so that large-scale, effective protest campaigns could not be staged. The Sharpeville killings of March 21, 1960, intended to curb the 'defiant' African protest against the carrying of passes and later disturbances arising out of attempts to crush the nationalist campaign, marked the beginning of the present phase in the life of the ANC. The movement was forced to operate underground as Government legislation outlawed both the nationalist organisations—the ANC and the PAC. A large number of Africans were arrested, detained indefinitely or tried for incitement against Government. Harsh penalties were imposed on them. The ANC, though underground, has today consolidated its position and enjoys wide support among the Africans. The various obstacles put in its way by the ruling authorities—threats, suppression, victimisation and bans (1961, 1962 and 1963)—have left the organisation undaunted.

The Pan-African Congress, formed in 1959, is more militant than the ANC. Led by Robert Sobukwe, a university lecturer, it was founded to give expression to the ardent zeal of the younger section of the ANC which was determined to secure liberation which it regarded as essential for the success of pan-Africanism. A dispute arose between the two wings of the ANC on the issue of the role of Europeans in South Africa and the party's relations with the communists. Sobukwe and his "Africanists" claimed that the ANC, in spite of its 40 years leadership of the Africans, had failed too often in its ambitious protests and strikes, that it was dominated by communists and whites and that it paid too little attention to the African personality, advocating only assimilation of the African into the European way of life. The Pan-African Congress is committed to the establishment of an 'African-Socialist Democratic Republic'. 'Poqo' is in fact the same body as the Pan-African Congress banned in 1960. Working underground, it has effectively and successfully organised two campaigns against Government at Sharpeville in March 1960 and at Pearl in the Transkei region. Both the Pan-African Congress and the ANC were banned after the Sharpeville demonstration and heavy sentences imposed on their leaders. Now underground, the Pan-African Congress has built up a vast underground movement.

The Communist Party, revived in 1960, is the third major nationalist political organisation in South Africa. Founded in 1910, it disbanded itself in 1950. The Suppression of Communism Act 1950 dealt a heavy blow to its activities. The communists have, as before, strong links with the banned ANC. Since the ANC also advocates close cooperation with the communists, a large number of nationalists to have become members of both the organisations.

The re-emergence of the Communist Party incidentally coincided with the beginning of a new phase in the nationalist politics of the country. The philosophy of non-violence advocated and followed by all opponents of the Nationalist Party was now abandoned. Legal means having been prohibited, the only way left was to adopt 'illegal' means. With a view to crush the labour struggle, Government had enacted ruthless legislation. Under cover of progressively introducing apartheid measures were initiated which while giving wide definitions of such

terms as subversion and court procedure and granting discretionary powers to ministers eliminated the privileges of the majority of the indigenous population.

The chief milestones in the South African Legislative Security Code since 1940 are : the Magistrates Court Act 1944, a pre-Nationalist measure, which has through repeated amendments extended the powers of magistrates from imposing a six-month sentence for theft to a compulsory seven-year sentence for a second housebreaking conviction. The Suppression of Communism Act 1950, which forms the basis of a series of later legislation, defines crimes against the State. It empowers Government to declare any organisation unlawful and name any person a communist if in its opinion the organisation or person concerned promotes communism. Such suspects could not attend meetings and make speeches and had to be confined to particular areas. The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1953, Public Safety Act 1953, Criminal Procedure Act 1955, Riotous Assemblies Act 1956 and Natives (Prohibition of Interdicts) Act 1956, curtailed individual liberties of political protest, and provided the police force with special powers of search, arrest, detention and banishment on suspicion of endangering State security. No appeal was allowed and all measures were vigorously imposed. The ratification of the Unlawful Organisations Bill in 1960 enabled Government to proscribe the ANC and the PAC along with their subsidiary wings. A liquidator soon confiscated all their assets. Further arbitrary legislation—the Sabotage Act 1962—created a new offence called sabotage and made it punishable with death. This was given a wide definition ranging from trespass and arson to impeding the police. Burden of proof to the contrary was placed on the accused who was denied jury trial and appeal and was liable, even if a juvenile, to a minimum penalty of five to ten years imprisonment which the court was not entitled to suspend.

The latest in despotic legislation intended to terrorise the coloured population is the General Law Amendment Act of 1963. Giving vast powers to representatives of Government, it put an end to all individual rights and privileges. The provisions of the Act—indefinite imprisonment without trial of persons who had completed prison sentences for crimes under the preceding Acts, summary trials without preparatory examination, 90 days detention without appeal, imprisonment for five years or death penalty for receiving training outside South Africa in violence or for achieving the objects of a banned organisation or for advising interference by an 'international organisation' with the onus of proving innocence on the accused—converted South Africa into a police State.

Preventive detention, the most significant feature of the General Law Amendment Act, resulted in widespread repression. The Union Government, through the African Police and the Defence Force, armed with extensive powers of detention of suspects without trial, could confine large numbers of persons to solitary imprisonment for extended periods on grounds of active opposition to apartheid or even suspicion. No legal advice could be secured by the detainee without prior consent of the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development. Further, the

Act provided that persons serving a term of imprisonment may be detained indefinitely on completion of their sentences.¹ The 90-day detention clause of the Act covered charges ranging from sabotage, conspiracy to commit sabotage, being a member of and attempting to further the activities of a banned organisation to leaving the Republic without necessary documents. Large numbers of people were arrested on the slightest suspicion and detained without trial. To exercise complete control over suspects engaged in nationalist activities, Government also provided that, if necessary, a detainee could at the end of a 90-day detention term be rearrested. On October 9, 1963, the Cape Supreme Court ruled that Government had the right to rearrest and detain people as the law did not provide any immunity from indefinite detention.² This clause of preventive detention enabled the authorities to crush all nationalist activity in the country.

On the whole, this legislation—as others in the past—aims to muzzle any kind of opposition. To supplement the General Law Amendment Act Government passed the Bantu Laws Amendment Act 1964 authorising the Minister of Bantu Administration to control all Africans in towns and white rural areas. In order to remove ‘surplus’ Africans from white areas by altering their status to that of migratory labour, the administration tightened its control over the drift to the towns. By a system of controlled labour employment of Africans, the Minister of Labour and Economic Affairs was empowered to restrict African labour and prescribe the kind of work they were required to do. The measure complemented Government’s policy of creating autonomous or semi-autonomous ‘homelands’ for Africans by forcing them—even when urbanised—to regard the traditional Bantu areas as their homes.

The true concept of Bantustan, as endorsed by the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1964, is that the African reserves should remain reservoirs of cheap labour for industry and that the black man should be admitted to the white areas of South Africa only to the extent necessary for the economy. In essence, the Act destroyed the right of any African to a permanent home in 87 per cent of his country. Even in ‘his own areas’ no African has the right to freehold land ownership or security of person, land tenure or movement.

Instead of subduing the 13 million indigenous and coloured population of the country, this intensified repression aroused their nationalistic zeal and determination to free their country. They now resorted to violence. With all channels of legal opposition closed to them, they were forced to resort to methods of struggle which were ‘unconstitutional’, ‘illegal’ and violent. Verwoerd had created a classical revolutionary situation which shocked observers of the South African political scene. This change in policy coincided with the re-emergence of the communists though they cannot be held responsible for it. African whites and those supporting their philosophy should realise that this development has been forced by circumstances. Outbreak of violence is not necessarily a positive proof that the communists are behind it. Algerians and Cypriots fighting for their liberation, for instance, were not terrorists. They were only aggrieved nationalists.

It was in this context of Government suppression and repression that a new organisation emerged in South Africa in 1961—the 'Umkonto-we-Sizwe'. Nationalist fighters, having exhausted every possible non-violent means to press their demands, launched forth as an independent organisation. The Umkonto complemented the activities of the recognised political movements for national liberation and acted as their 'frontline fighting arm'. In 'Umkonto-we-Sizwe' the people have created the nucleus of an army for national liberation, an organisation which will help them to obtain arms and train themselves in their use.

Repressive legislation apart, the violent, cruel methods used by Verwoerd's police force to implement the policy of apartheid have bred violence. There has been a massive and unprecedented build-up of police and armed forces with a view to suppressing the people's movement for liberation. With the mobilisation of part-time white civilians, Government seems well prepared for a civil war. Expenditure on the country's armed forces has increased from £ 40 million to £ 104 million since 1960. The all-white Permanent Force has also been increased from 9,000 to 15,000 in the short period since 1960. In addition, a Citizen Force of 40,000 and a commando network in which every white man is required to serve have been created. The South African armed forces have also acquired superior arms and ammunition as aid from the Western countries of Europe, America and Britain. A domestic armaments industry has made the country virtually self-sufficient in small arms and ammunition. Though claimed to have been set up for external defence, this powerful force has usually been used to put down non-violent internal demonstrations.

The continuing policy of apartheid has resulted in widespread protest and a worldwide movement for sanctions against South Africa. The movement enjoys the support of Afro-Asian and Socialist countries. Several meetings of African States, from 1958 onwards, have openly condemned South African policies, recommending trade and other embargoes and assuring active assistance—political and military—to the freedom fighters. In December 1958, the first All-African Peoples' Conference, meeting in Accra, issued the first call for a worldwide trade and diplomatic boycott of South Africa. Fifteen months later, in April 1960, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference at Conakry, attended by delegates from 50 African and Asian countries—including the Soviet Union and China—renewed the call and demanded that Afro-Asian countries take immediate steps to sever trade relations with South Africa. Several African States soon after their independence pledged solidarity and support to South African freedom fighters. In June 1960, an Addis Ababa meeting, attended by ten independent African States, recommended a complete boycott of South Africa, followed by closure of ports to that country, its expulsion from the Commonwealth, stoppage of Arab oil sales to it and intensification of the struggle for United Nations action. In April 1963, again at Addis Ababa, heads of independent African States recommended far-reaching and decisive measures against Africa. They called for the immediate enforcement by African States of trade and diplomatic sanctions which, though widely accepted, had not been universally implemented. Further, it was decided to

launch a concerted campaign to boycott and ultimately dislodge the Republic from all international organisations, including those concerned with sports and cultural exchanges and to request an early meeting of the Security Council to consider the explosive situation in South Africa with a view to imposing all-round sanctions, including an immediate embargo on the flow of arms and strategic materials to the Republic. African attempts to expel South Africa from various inter-governmental associations have been consistently pursued.

The United Nations, since its inception in 1946, has been concerned with the apartheid issue, raised that year by the Indian delegation as the Question of Peoples of Indian Origin in South Africa. Since 1952, it has come up before every General Assembly session. The Security Council for the first time in March 1960 was apprised of the South African political situation following the large-scale killing of unarmed demonstrators at Sharpeville. Its conclusion was that the situation in South Africa had 'led to international friction and if continued might endanger international peace and security'. The General Assembly and the Security Council had by 1962 adopted in vain no less than 27 resolutions condemning South Africa's racial policies and urging the South African Government to revise them, initiating measures to effect 'racial harmony based on equality'. Ignoring all recommendations of the UN, South Africa has ruthlessly implemented the policy of apartheid. The situation has been aggravated by the continuous flow of arms from the NATO bloc countries and the intensive military build-up within the country. In November 1962, the General Assembly was compelled to take its first decisive step, advising imposition of collective sanctions by way of severance of diplomatic relations, closure of ports to South African vessels and prohibition of ships calling at South African ports, boycott of all South African goods and exports, including arms and ammunition and refusal of landing and passage facilities to South African aircraft. The unanimous acceptance of the proposal by a majority of member States—67 to 16 with 23 abstentions—indicated their sense of urgency to take up the cause of South Africans. The North American member States of the General Assembly along with the Western European countries and Spain opposed the proposal for fear of trade losses. They supplied 63.7 per cent of South African imports and bought 79.8 per cent of South African export products.

The continuance of apartheid resulted in a gradual deterioration of the relations between South Africa and other African States creating racial friction which endangered international peace and solidarity. The active moral and material support assured to the South Africans by the newly independent African States brought to the fore the possibilities of a violent struggle between the coloured community and the western powers who stood by the South African Government. The Security Council was summoned twice in 1963. At its first meeting, it recommended an arms embargo against South Africa. A demand for a complete trade boycott by Afro-Asian members was defeated by the United States, Britain, France, Formosa, Brazil and Norway. The December meeting extended the ban on arms sales by restricting exports of materials necessary for the manufacture of arms and ammunition in South

Africa itself. The Security Council also called for the release of political prisoners and abandonment of the anti-apartheid trials. The General Assembly followed up these sanctions by a call for an embargo on oil supply. The resolution was adopted by 84 votes to 6 (including the United States, Britain and France, the only suppliers of oil to South Africa). The Special Committee on Apartheid, reporting the same year, endorsed the recommendations of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Going a step further, it advised the World Assembly to 'consider, without further delay, possible new measures in accordance with the Charter, which provide for stronger political, diplomatic and economic sanctions, suspension of rights and privileges of the Republic of South Africa as a member state and expulsion from the United Nations and its Specialised Agencies.'

The consensus of opinion on the need to end apartheid is obvious from the various resolutions of the United Nations and the newly-liberated African States. The United Nations call for sanctions—diplomatic and trade—has been widely implemented by African and Asian countries. However, South Africa's major trading partners have ignored the call much to the consternation of other countries. Sanctions, if consistently imposed, would certainly be an invaluable aid to the freedom fighters.

Mozambique, the Rhodesias and Leopoldville Congo, which take 90 per cent of South Africa's exports, ignored the call for a trade boycott. Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique could hardly have been expected to stand up against the Verwoerd regime. Among Asian countries, many of South Africa's important trading partners, including Russia, China and India—the last mentioned cut off its last links in July 1963 by refusing landing and passage facilities to South African aircraft—and Kuwait, have joined the sanctions campaign and implemented the November 1962 General Assembly resolution. Others like Japan, Ceylon, Pakistan and West Asian countries motivated by self-interest have not so far implemented the resolution. Japan continues to maintain a flourishing two-way trade, taking 7 per cent of South Africa's exports; Ceylon's exports of tea and rubber have increased since 1962-63; and the oil producing countries of West Asia have carried on an open trade with South Africa. Even though oil distribution is controlled by international agencies, it cannot justify disregard of the UN.

The South African economy over the last four years has experienced an unprecedented boom, made possible by the indigenous resources potential, active assistance from the western countries and failure of some of the Asian States to implement the trade embargo accepted by them in principle. The gross national income has risen at an annual rate of 10 per cent since 1962; new private investment in plant and equipment as well as in construction went up by 12 per cent in 1963 and manufacturing production in 1963 rose by 12 per cent. Domestic expansion has been accompanied by a considerable measure of price stability with little or no pressure on the country's balance of payments or on its foreign exchange and gold reserves. The fact that the African economy is apartheid-oriented is obvious from the many laws that control the movement and employment of African labour. Since 1880 when gold was discovered in the country the Government has through Pass Laws

regulated the movement of labour from reservoirs of the unemployed and Africans have been confined to their 'reserves'. These discriminatory regulations created nationalist feelings among the working class who started taking a leading part in the movement for liberation. The Government imposed further regimentation and control through the Bantu Laws Amendment Act 1964. The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development determined areas from which Africans should be recruited, the number of Africans to be employed in any defined area, the location of industries in which they could be employed and the employers for whom they could work. Armed with these powers, the Minister tried to control African labour. The Verwoerd regime resorted to legislative action to safeguard its own economic interests. Available statistics show how poverty was thrust upon Africans through these measures. While the national income and profits and earnings of the privileged white community have increased at a steady pace, those of the non-whites have shown little change. For instance, in the manufacturing industry, which is of great importance to the South African economy and has steadily grown over the years, one sees that there has been no change whatsoever in the disparate wage patterns. There are today some 441,000 Africans employed in private industry—more than double the number of European industrial workers. According to one estimate,³ African earnings in industry (calculated at 1959 prices) rose from an annual level of £158 in 1950 to £180 in 1962 or by about 17 per cent. In this period the value of manufactured goods and the national income were more than doubled. On the other hand, the rise in European earnings in the manufacturing industry was more than one-third during this period. In 1959-1961 the wage disparities became more marked. Compared to the 17 per cent increase in real African earnings over the 13 years between 1950 and 1962, the increase over the three years from 1959 amounted to less than 11 per cent. Over the latter period European earnings maintained a 30 per cent rate of increase. Today, the ratio of African to European earnings in private industry is well below what it was in 1925. In this, as in every other sphere—political and social—the Republican Government attempted to consolidate apartheid. The Africans, instead of enjoying higher living standards with the increased national income, have been condemned to poverty.

Table I
White and Non-white Earnings in Private Industry
Annually in £

	Whites (1)	Non-whites (2)	(2) As a per cent of (1)
1925-26	205	50	24.6
1938-39	232	56	23.9
1944-45	364	107	29.3
1959-60	957	202	21.1
1960-61	1000	212	21.1

Source: The Economics of Colour Bar—W. H. Hutt.

Another factor responsible for the unprecedented economic boom in South Africa is the intensification of the policy of foreign private state monopoly co-operation over a large field of trade and industry. In this way Government plans to secure national economic self-sufficiency for the country. The western countries have joined hands with South Africa to speed up its industrial development not only by trade but also by investing capital in major industrial projects. It is they—especially Britain and the United States — who hold the major share of trade sustaining and providing the necessary props to the apartheid regime. Extended trade, capital investment and a regular supply of arms and equipment give the Republic all the support it needs. During the years 1962-63, the countries of North America and Western Europe stepped up their exports to South Africa by more than a quarter and increased their share of South African imports from 65.8 per cent to 70 per cent. They continued to purchase 60 per cent of South African goods. Britain alone has since 1959 extended at a lively pace its trade with South Africa, supplying 30 per cent of the country's imports and buying 34 per cent of its exports. Further, Britain's tariff preferences for South African goods and South Africa's allegiance to the sterling currency system, despite its withdrawal from the Commonwealth, provides it with a variety of foreign exchange facilities and privileges. Britain is today South Africa's most important trading partner, followed closely by the United States, whose total exports in 1960 amounted to \$200 million. Of the other western countries, West Germany has since 1960 doubled its trade with South Africa, supplying nearly 11 per cent of South Africa's import requirements. The Bonn Government also continues to supply arms and military equipment to South Africa. Expansion of the two-way trade between South Africa and these western countries has nullified the Asian-African boycott of the Republic.

Table II
South African Trade with certain Western Countries

In £ millions

	Imports to South Africa January-August			Exports from South Africa January-August		
	1961	1962	1963	1961	1962	1963
Britain	155.2	99.1	118.2	145.2	99.4	111.3
U.S.A.	134.5	57.4	65.3	42.9	27.1	27.2
France	13.9	7.3	12.1	15.7	8.4	8.7
W. Germany	51.3	34.3	43.1	21.3	13.6	15.6
Belgium	7.2	4.0	4.6	19.2	12.3	13.5
Holland	12.5	8.1	8.7	13.0	12.4	8.2
Italy	14.5	10.1	11.8	22.1	16.0	15.3
Canada	12.8	8.2	15.2	4.9	2.8	3.9
Total	401.9	228.5	279.0	284.3	192.0	203.7
Per cent of total trade	65.8	68.2	70.0	55.6	60.0	61.5

The large capital investments of South Africa's western allies have sabotaged the UN call for sanctions. Britain and the United States today have a substantial capital stake in South Africa's mining industry and its financial corporations. In the giant consortiums controlling the gold and diamond mining industry Britain and America have a 25 per cent interest, the balance being in the hands of South African, French, Belgian and West German monopoly interests. Britain and America have also a firm foothold in other strategic industries. According to the 1960 figures, 70 per cent of the estimated total foreign capital investment in the country was made by them. It is surprising as well as interesting to note that during the period 1960-63, when criticism of South Africa's apartheid policies was most vehement, these investments increased at a very rapid pace. Thus, even though they condemned apartheid in public, their trade interests and capital investments forced them to stand by South Africa.

There has been an increased flow of arms and military equipment into South Africa from western countries. By providing South Africa with technical know-how, they have helped develop an armament industry in the country. So far, only 43 out of 111 UN members have pledged to respect the arms embargo. The result is a steady increase in the military strength of South Africa. This highlights the pressing need for imposition of complete sanctions.

All these factors have helped create a situation reminiscent of that which obtained in Algeria just before the beginning of the war of liberation. As a result of Government's refusal to allow any peaceful agitation against the illogical politics of apartheid, the country's nationalist liberation fighters have yielded place to those believing in armed struggle. In Algeria too, the leadership of the freedom movement had passed into the hands of militant revolutionaries long before an organised rebellion was launched.

The Republican Government, however, continues to deny Africans their social, economic and political rights. This presents a challenge to the world's conscience. The UN's repeated warnings have been ignored, creating, as the latest report of the Special United Nations Committee has put it, 'a provocation of people everywhere.' Total sanctions, political and economic, strictly imposed, seem to be the only means of destroying this bastion of reaction.

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2. Mr. Elijah Loza, a trade union leader of Cape Town who was not released at the end of the 90-day detention term.
3. *South African Economy* by Houghton.

Africa Today

V. KUDRYAVTSEV

AFRICA is being shaken by a multiplicity of events. This multiplicity arises out of the fact that on the African continent there has been a collision of practically all the social and economic eras that the human race has lived through; but such collisions most frequently assume a form which applies only to an individual country. Considerable sections of the African population seem to emerge suddenly out of long-past centuries and dive immediately into our twentieth century with its developed science and techniques and its complicated social-economic relations. It is obvious that such a process cannot occur painlessly. It is accompanied by social upheavals, calls for victims, proceeds in such complicated circumstances that it is not always possible to sort things out into tidy heaps. All the more so because the relations between the various sections of this multiple process change almost from day to day.

Therefore it is practically impossible at the present stage to find out the causes of events in Africa exclusively in any one particular feature. It would not be right, for instance, to ascribe all events harmful to African progress exclusively to neo-colonialism, ignoring the conditions which have developed objectively in this or that country, or the battle which goes on inside that country between individual social groups. It is also illogical to lump everything onto economic backwardness, since it is wrong to overlook the political superstructure, which by no means plays a small part in determining the lines of economic development. Modern history shows that the undervaluation or overvaluation of any one of these factors inevitably leads to failures.

At the same time it must be stressed that what is happening on the African continent, however tragic it may occasionally be, must not induce a feeling of depression. There is proceeding the complicated process of formation of the new independent Africa. At the present moment the transition from the first stage of the national liberation revolution to the second stage is taking place. Whilst the first stage had the task of gaining complete political independence, the second stage must solve the problems of the economic emancipation of the former colonies and dependent countries. But there is no impassable stonewall between the two stages. The tasks of one stage often interlink with those of another stage. Particularly as the first stage has been completed only in general outline. In many of the countries even political independence is a formality, since it brought into power pro-colonist elements, educated and

ideologically trained in the former colonial empires. Hence it is clear that it is not in all countries that national independence must be finalised in the second stage.

One of the important features of the second stage of the national liberation revolution, in my view, is the formation of a new statehood in the former colonies. Many of the African countries, as far as their state structure is concerned, cannot be described as new. In some places the colonisers, granting independence to their colonies, imposed on them a form and character of rule which was to the advantage of their neo-colonialist policy. That is what British politicians did in Nigeria, for example, where an exact copy of the British governmental structure was installed, which did not correspond in any way to the local conditions which had formed historically. In Kenya the courts and prosecuting organs are also copies of British models. African judges even appear in public in white wigs and black robes, which look quite absurd. The same applies to university education and university traditions, transplanted from Western Europe onto African soil, which is unsuitable for them. As is well known, in that same Nigeria, the British colonisers installed their own bourgeois democratic multi-party system, which only served to consolidate tribal differences and helped to intensify the inter-tribal struggle, which has acquired modern political organisation.

The unsuitability for many of the African countries of the form and character of the system of government in respect of the tasks of the new stage in the national democratic revolution manifests itself even more clearly in the events which are happening in Africa. (Incidentally, the constitutions of many, if not most of the new African states, were worked out in the inner circles of the ruling machinery of the colonial powers long before they secured political independence). This has become particularly obvious in the case of Nigeria. Naturally, events in Nigeria were influenced both by its economic backwardness and by the absence of its own heavy industry. But these features were not the decisive ones. If Nigeria is to emerge from its economic backwardness, while preserving and strengthening its independence, it is necessary to decide in what direction and in whose interests the Nigerian economy is to develop. And that will depend on who holds ruling power, and how far the state structure corresponds to the interests of the further development of the national democratic revolution. It appears to me that it is around this basic question that events in Nigeria are proceeding. A battle is going on about the nature of government it should have and about who is to decide the direction of economic development.

The federal system imposed by British colonisers weakened the country internally, encouraged centralising tendencies, and placed it in the hands of the northern feudalists. This put a brake on the progress of the whole country. The January upheaval was directed principally against the domination of the feudal reactionaries and against the federal structure of the government. But the young officers who organised the upheaval could not carry it through to completion. General Ironsi stopped half way, subjecting the "too radical" young officers to persecu-

tion. In this way the General prepared the ground beforehand for revenge on the part of the northern feudal reactionaries and thereby lopped off the branch on which he himself proposed to sit.

The new coup d'état in Nigeria is directed against the idea of a unitary state. It aims at preserving federalism. There have been threats even of separating the North from the rest of Nigeria. Although Colonel Govan, who now holds the central power, has stated that the unitary system has not justified itself, nevertheless the question of the state structure has not been settled and the fight around this question is becoming more acute.

Under African conditions the question of the state structure cannot be settled without taking into account such specific conditions as the existence of tribes and the absence of a fully developed nation. It is not surprising that the sharp change from a federal to a unitary system aroused fierce reaction among the tribal chiefs and the feudal high-ups, which developed finally into another overthrow, this time directed against the unitary state.

General Ironsi's government took no steps to deprive the feudal and tribal top layer of their economic privileges. It did nothing to let the broad popular masses feel the favourable results of the change to a unitary state. As a result, the reactionaries were able to carry a considerable section of the masses with them in opposition to General Ironsi's progressive line.

The events in Nigeria have raised in a very acute form the question of the tribal division of African countries and intertribal quarrels. The neo-colonialists use these disagreements as a lever against the internal unity of African countries. But this does not mean that everything can be ascribed to neo-colonialism. Tribes and disputes between them existed in Africa before the appearance of the colonisers. The latter helped to increase this enmity. At the same time, the existence of tribes and disputes between them (which express themselves in the most diverse forms, right up to the tribal principle in the formation of governments in modern countries which regard themselves as being democratic and even based on the principles of "African Socialism") is an objective factor which cannot be disregarded.

Together with the creation of unitary states it will presumably be necessary to take into account certain peculiarities in the structure of local organs covering administrative units in which the population consists of some particular tribe. In the selection and training of administrative and other cadres, the tribal factor must not be overlooked, particularly when it is a question of the lower administrative organs. This naturally assumes that the leaders of a country are capable of rising above the interests of their own tribe. In the process of creating new industrial centres and co-operatives, members of different tribes should establish closer contacts and the identity of their social interests will assist in the gradual elimination of inter-tribal strife. A considerable part in this will be played by all-national public organi-

sations and the army, with the essential condition of the abandonment of the system of mercenary soldiers and a switchover to universal or even selective conscription, under which military service ceases to be a source of income and becomes the honourable duty of every citizen.

The gradual elimination of inter-tribal strife is naturally impossible without a determined attack on the positions of the feudal and tribal top layer, which at the present stage of the national democratic revolution is linked with neo-colonialism, being anxious not to forfeit its privileges. Attempts to compromise on these most important problems merely result in the defeat of the progressive forces. An example is provided by Ghana where the institution of tribal chiefs was preserved although in a somewhat modified form. The active part it played in the military overthrow left no doubt about the reactionary character of its attitude. At the same time Guinea, which had abolished the institution of chiefs even before the official proclamation of independence, made it considerably easier to carry out radical social-economic transformations. It will be recalled that the racist regime of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia secured the agreement of the tribal chiefs (by means of bribery and retention of privileges) to the proclamation of "independence" with a white minority in power. Inter-tribal strife, cleverly used by the neo-colonialists and their local agents, also played a considerable part in the Congo tragedy.

All this leads to the conclusion that the successful elimination of the backwardness of the African countries can be ensured only if it is carried through by a government which corresponds to the basic interests of the majority of the population. The present stage of developments in Africa is characterised by a fierce fight for the establishment of a new statehood. The fight goes on in the midst of the existence of tribes and continuing strife between them. It strives for a statehood which would meet the tasks of the second stage of the national democratic revolution, the stage of economic emancipation of the formally independent countries of the African continent.

Socialised Capitalism in East Africa

ALI A. MAZRUI

IS an African country which gives profit guarantees to foreign investors being socialistic? Is a Government which encourages Africans to become shareholders in business firms being socialistic? Is a country in which the bulk of the economy is under free enterprise being socialistic? Possibly not.

And yet, if socialism means full-scale public enterprise and discouragement of private investors, then no developing country can really afford to be socialistic. Rapid economic development requires a climate of commercial confidence and economic predictability. It requires the importation of a good deal of capital, much of which must necessarily be private capital. It also requires full economic vigour—and this calls for a policy of creating an African entrepreneurial class.

It is perhaps about time that East Africa was honest with itself. What we have in East Africa now is a compromise. It is neither classical capitalism nor full-blooded socialism. What we have is what might be called SOCIALISED CAPITALISM — an encouragement of private enterprise and the creation of an African commercial class, but controlled by Government and regulated by a national ethos of fairness and equity. Socialised capitalism is perhaps a transitional stage in East Africa. But while it lasts we should perhaps be clearer about its ultimate justification.

Poor countries are faced with the problem of having to choose between an ethic of distribution and ideology of development. An ethic of distribution believes in preventing disparities between the earnings of different people. It seeks to establish a society of economic equality — so that no one is much richer or much poorer than anyone else. An ideology of development, on the other hand, believes that the first priority is rapid economic development. And if, in the course of development, some people get richer than others, this should not for the time being worry us too much. In fact, it might be necessary to exploit the psychological power of the profit motive—encouraging private investors and speculators to invest in the country, make a profit for themselves, and help to lead the country towards greater affluence. The fight against poverty in a very poor country might involve creating a small indigenous wealthy class for the time being as well as the acceptance of some degree of economic exploitation by outsiders. This is what is already happening in East Africa anyhow. We must be careful lest it becomes full-blooded capitalism. We must make sure that what we have for the time being is indeed SOCIALISED CAPITALISM—tamed and controlled for the public good.

For the sake of public relations, we may call it "African Socialism" if we like. But the danger of calling it "socialism" is that we might become complacent—and think we have already arrived at a just society. True socialism should perhaps remain our ultimate goal—but for the moment we should recognise that we have only arrived at the intermediate stage of socialised capitalism. In order to avert complacency we should perhaps call that stage by the name of what it really is — *a compromise between socialist ethic and a capitalist method*. That is what socialised capitalism is all about.

In order to grasp the full implications of this compromise, we should now remind ourselves of the ultimate values of African nationalism during the colonial period. There is no doubt that the ultimate basis of African nationalism was indeed a belief in *equality*—whereas the ultimate value of Western liberalism was, in fact, individual freedom.

It is not always remembered that equality is a less self-centered principle than freedom. Western individualism, by being libertarian, was more self-centered than the egalitarian individualism which inspired African assertiveness. Africans aspired to bring about a world in which no African individual counted for less than an individual from another race. And while they were struggling for that world African nationalists before independence tried to make sure that no individual African counted for more than another *African* either.

But what has happened since independence? The ideal of maintaining equality between Africans themselves in a given country has sometimes come into conflict with the ideal of creating equality between Africans and others. The former ideal of equality between Africans should presumably dictate a policy of trying to prevent the emergence of an African bourgeoisie. But in East African conditions such a policy could mean leaving the profits of the private sector of the economy to be acquired exclusively by non-indigenous entrepreneurs. Africans in Kenya might then remain equal in poverty between themselves—while the inequalities of income between them on one side and the Asians and Europeans on the other are allowed to persist.

The Government of Kenya seems to have rejected, for the time being, this solution. In April 1965 the Minister for Commerce and Industry urged the non-African businessmen to identify themselves with African aspirations by inviting Africans to buy shares in their enterprises. Minister Kiano said at the time: "While we do not discriminate against non-Africans in Kenya, the spirit of give-and-take should prevail".

The Kenya Government Sessional Paper on African Socialism also included a bias for such a policy. It appeared that what was being urged by the Kenya Government was not so much African socialism as the Africanisation of capitalism. And yet for many Kenyans—as indeed many Africans elsewhere as well—African socialism should include the Africanisation of the rudimentary capitalism which has already emerged. There is certainly a great keenness in East Africa that there should be greater African

participation in commerce. But is this "equality"? Kenya's Minister for Commerce and Industry has described it as a process of narrowing "the wide gap between Africans and non-Africans in commerce and trade". In Uganda, Dr. Milton Obote has made similar appeals to non-African businessmen—that they should try and get more and more African shareholders. But while the gap between black East Africans and non-indigenous East Africans is being narrowed, new gaps between black East Africans themselves might be created.

The Marxist purists might argue that this is not socialism. That might be so. But it does not prevent it from being good Marxism. It was Engels who once said:

A bourgeoisie is...as necessary a precondition of the socialist revolution as the proletariat itself.

By extension one might argue that an *African bourgeoisie* is as necessary a precondition of an African socialist revolution as an African proletariat. In urging the Africanisation of Kenya's nascent capitalism, Kenya's Minister for Commerce and Industry might indeed have been a bad socialist—but he might still have been a good Marxist.

But the significant thing about political thought in East Africa is not its relationship to Marxism. It is not even what it expounds in a document. It is what it seems to take for granted. In an ethnically pluralistic society, the first task of socialism, according to this school, is not to abolish class distinctions altogether but to prevent class distinctions from coinciding with racial differences. The problems of class distinctions can be mitigated by social mobility. A person can move from one class to another. The very creation of an African bourgeoisie would be proof that social mobility can be engineered or manipulated by government policy. But while it is possible for an individual to change his class, it is not very easy for any one generation to change its race. "Racial mobility" is not entirely impossible but it usually involves generations of mixed marriages.

If, then, racial differences are more rigid than class differences, the first pre-condition of social harmony in a plural society is a racial diversification of the middle class. The most decisive internal revolutions which have taken place in Africa south of the Sahara in the last few years have been the overthrow of the Tutsi in Rwanda and the overthrow of the Sultan's regime in Zanzibar. In neither case was the revolution initially directed against the idea of class distinctions as such. Both Rwanda and Zanzibar had revolutions primarily because their middle and upper classes had not been ethnically diversified to a sufficient degree.

But would it have been more "socialistic" to have thwarted those revolutions? Perhaps not. But both in Rwanda and in Zanzibar ethnic minorities held *political* power out of proportion to their numbers. In Kenya and Uganda, however, political control has already passed to Africans. With that control is the responsibility to prevent, among other things, the victimisation of non-African minorities. But why not take over the Asian shops? Partly because opportunities for Asians in other

sectors of national life had already been narrowing. The Africanisation of the Civil Service especially has inevitably been at the cost of the immigrant races. To prevent the Asians from engaging in commerce as well might reduce them to a painful redundancy in the life of the country of their adoption.

But why not nationalise Asian businesses and still use Asians as Government employees in those enterprises? Partly because once a business becomes a Government enterprise recruitment for it might become subject to all the usual pressures of political patronage. An Asian competing for a job in a Government enterprise might well be at a greater handicap than if he had been allowed to compete with Africans in *private* enterprise. There is therefore a sense of "social justice" in plural African societies which could be best served by attempting to Africanise capitalism through the competitive methods of capitalism itself. Since the Government is engineering the whole competition, this is not laissez faire capitalism. Yet it is not state capitalism either. It is the paradox of *state-induced free competition* between races. The fact that the new African entrepreneur gets special government encouragement does not negate the fairness of the competition. The immigrant communities have had a head start in business enterprise. Only special Government assistance to Africans could counter-balance that start—and help to equalise business opportunities between the races.

But will the Governments of East and Central Africa limit themselves to this? Kenya's Tom Mboya has asserted that any move to buy up all Asian shops and install Africans "would hardly be a progressive action." The ambition for the time being remains that of racially *diversifying* the bourgeoisie—rather than keeping out the Asians from the class altogether in the days ahead. Given that the ultimate equality which matters to African nationalists is equality between races rather than between classes, the diversification of the bourgeoisie can, to many Africans, be defended in intelligible socialistic terms. What should be remembered is that this is a question of marrying the socialist ethic to the capitalist method once again.

There are dangers in the situation. There is, first, the temptation which might make African Governments more overtly racialistic against Asians and other immigrants in the days ahead. If African Governments did that, they would be betraying their own brand of equalitarianism and vision of a just society.

There are other dangers too in socialised capitalism. Prominent among these other ones is the danger of drifting into full-blooded, unmitigated capitalism—the danger of having the capitalist method divorced from the socialist ethic. What must constantly be borne in mind is that a truly socialised capitalistic system needs certain safeguards to prevent it from degeneration.

One vital safeguard is the freedom of the trade union movement. When true socialism is achieved, trade unionism as so far conceived will have to wither away. It will perhaps have served its purpose. But for as long as there are private employers around, and a new class of indigenous

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bourgeoisie, the case for collective bargaining in the traditional style remains strong. Some Government mediation is justified, since the Government already controls the employers. But on the whole, while Western-style trade unionism is inconsistent with full-blooded socialism, it is far from being inconsistent with socialised capitalism. On the contrary, one method of taming capitalism, and ensuring that it is socialised and somewhat accountable to the workers, is to retain the vigour of a free union movement

Another safeguard against a deterioration of socialised capitalism is a national ethos which puts a premium on hard work. In this connection Tanzania so far is ahead of the other East African countries. Tanzania is wrong in reducing too much the vigour of trade unionism, but it is right in its general ethos of frugality and hard work. I do not agree with every aspect of its National Service as recently announced for graduates. But the general principle of encouraging service and sacrifice has a lot to commend it in a poor country.

In *Ujamaa : The Basis of African Socialism* Nyerere claims that in traditional Africa everyone was a worker—a “worker” not merely as distinct from employer but also as distinct from “loiterer” or “idler”.

It is not certain that this is a justified interpretation of life in traditional Africa. What is certain is that Tanzania has tried from the outset to utilize the concept of WORK as a slogan for national mobilization.

There was first the neat motto of “Uhuru na Kazi” or “Freedom and Work”. And then, on independence, came the programme of self-help. Apparently self-help was first considered during discussions on the Three-Year Plan envisaged for 1961-64. Some of the external aid expected had not materialised and it appeared more important than ever that a scheme of self-help should be devised. When the Regional Commissioners took office in March 1962 Mr. Rashidi Kawawa, then Prime Minister, explained to them the Government’s desire to get the people to participate in projects which the people could undertake without Government finance such as roads and houses. How useful self-help schemes have been economically is not clear. But the idea had other functions apart from economic ones. As Dr. Joseph Nye, Jr., once put it in an article in *Transition*, “Self-help also allowed the Tanganyika Government to release the energies of those who had participated in the struggle for independence, and later to increase the number involved in the political process.....While no figures are available it is a generally accepted impression that a greater part of the population has been involved in self-help, and it might be called their first contact with ‘the Tanganyika Nation’.”

A later manifestation of the ideology of hard work in Tanzania was in regard to farms. If again we go back to Nyerere’s formulation of his socialism in *Ujamaa* we see the following argument:

"Those of us who talk about the African way of life and, quite rightly, take pride in maintaining the tradition of hospitality which is so great a part of it, might do well to remember the Swahili saying: *Mgeni siku mbili; siku ya tatu mpe jembe*—or in English, 'Treat your guest as a guest for two days; on the third day give him a hoe'."

By not developing their Arusha farms fully, some Europeans there were later to have their farms taken away from them. They were "wageni siku ya tatu" or guests by the third day—and they had failed to accept the challenge of the JEMBE or hoe. Indeed, the challenge of "toil" as an ideological concept confronted the native as well the foreigner. And the concept of toil has now become part of the ambition of maximum utilization of the nation's resources. On February 15, 1965, the Government of Tanzania once again reiterated the following policy:

"Because of the significant part which the agricultural economy has played in the past, and because of the increased role which it is to continue to play, the Government attached great importance to land and its use. It was the greatest single asset at the disposal of the country, and the Government was therefore determined to see that those who had been given land, both indigenous and non-indigenous people, should develop it fully and properly, in the interest of the nation".

In some ways, this preoccupation with hard and rational work is one of the more attractive aspects of the national ethic of Tanzania. In the struggle for independence the compelling slogan was "Uhuru"—but Nyerere soon turned it into "Uhuru na Kazi". Now the call is for "socialism"—and the new motto has perhaps become "Socialism and Sweat".

Yet here again the public sector in the Tanzanian economy, both now and in their plan, is modest. Once again it is a question of a compromise between a socialist ethic and a capitalist method in the task of development. None of the East African countries can as yet afford the rigours of a fully socialised economy. But there is always need for some frugality, and for alertness against the dangers of the capitalist method and its inhumanity. There is also a need for an energetic union movement in the transitional stage, but with some imposed procedures for settling disputes. If the capitalists are controlled by the Government, so should the workers to some extent. But the control of the workers should be more modest. Otherwise the nation will run the risk of drifting from socialised capitalism to a cruel *desocialised* version. For the time being, it is probably better to err on giving too much freedom to the unions than on giving too little. Ultimately that is one of the best ways of reconciling the need for development with the need for distributive justice in the process of production.—*An open talk given to students of the 15th course at the ICFTU, African Labour College, Kampala, Nov. 21, 1966.*

Role of Internal Resources in Economic Development

PAVEL PRAZAK

THE constant and rapid progress of the developing countries depends, apart from other factors, on the solution of the contradiction between needs on the one hand and disposable resources on the other. In theory this contradiction can be solved in three ways: (a) development based on internal resources alone; (b) development based on external resources alone; and (c) development based on the best possible exploitation of internal and external resources together.

Development based essentially on internal resources alone is not typical of the present period. Although such development has been attempted voluntarily or forced upon countries in the past, it is only possible in countries with large internal resources. Even in such cases autarchy or economic isolation would be a great disadvantage; it would mean refusing the advantages accruing from the international division of labour. In the present situation which tends towards greater integration in the world, an orientation towards the exploitation of internal resources alone could hardly guarantee in the long run the required rate of economic growth in the developing countries.

The other extreme is economic development based mainly upon external resources. This alternative also does not seem acceptable from the point of view of rapid and independent economic development. It delays economic independence. In fact it keeps countries in their present position within the international division of labour and does not help them to attain a position corresponding to their economic potential. Economic development would thus largely depend upon external factors.

In the present period, both kinds of resources have to be utilised. The developing countries are faced with the problem of finding the correct proportion between internal and external resources. This is the only way to solve the contradictions between the needs of development and the resources at their disposal. The degree to which internal and external resources should be utilised will be determined not only by the way in which a country participates in the international division of labour, but also by the internal and international political situation.

The relationship between internal and external resources has to be looked upon as a relationship of quantity and quality. In this sense the

first task consists in the mobilisation of internal resources as the decisive precondition for the effective utilisation of external resources which by their very nature are supplementary (although quantitatively they can exceed internal resources).

It is important that each country should attempt to utilise its internal means of development to the maximum. It should pursue a social and economic policy that does not hinder the fulfilment of this task. For, the mobilisation of resources for development and their level of social implementation is primarily a problem of organisation. The state through its economic policy should play a very important role in it.

Introduction of social and economic relations conducive to the full utilisation of internal resources for a country's development is the basic precondition for an independent economic growth. Without the mobilisation and exploitation of internal resources effective utilisation of external resources cannot be ensured.

External resources then remain a foreign element which cannot be organically absorbed. Although they can act as a stimulus for a certain length of time, they cannot be used effectively from the point of view of a country's internal economic needs. Therefore the central problem is how a developing country can best use external resources to strengthen and speed up the process of mobilising its internal resources. The main accent in the process of economic development is upon internal resources.

The accent on an orientation towards the maximum exploitation of internal resources does not mean a rejection of external resources. The effective utilisation of external resources in the interest of strengthening internal resources is of considerable importance, especially during the first phase of the process of economic development. This is because resources from abroad can accelerate and even give it the necessary initial impulse. External resources are an indispensable addition to internal resources until structural changes can guarantee full mobilisation and use of internal resources. Even then the advantages of using external resources to satisfy demands for economic development need not be lost.

From the qualitative point of view, however, internal resources are of fundamental and decisive importance. The quantitative proportions can then remain more or less arbitrary (consideration, though, has to be given to the fact that even if internal resources play a decisive part, a high percentage of external resources always introduces certain negative influences, such as foreign indebtedness, etc).

Even if all preconditions for the optimal exploitation of external resources are fulfilled, it is still not very likely that they would accelerate the process of economic development in a decisive way. Experience gained so far shows that external resources can only function as an addition to internal resources although their role in total accumulation has been growing over the last 15 years. The following table shows the trends in accumulation from 1950 to 1960.

Table I
Developing countries : Development of gross accumulation 1950-1960 at 1960 prices/billions of U. S. \$

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Gross accumulation, Total	16,0	18,9	18,9	18,8	21,6	22,6	24,4	25,2	26,4	26,9	28,4
Accumulation from external resources	1,1	3,4	3,1	1,6	2,6	3,0	4,1	5,7	4,2	3,4	4,3
Accumulation from internal resources	14,9	15,4	15,8	17,2	19,0	19,6	20,3	19,5	22,2	23,4	24,1

Source : *Studies of Long-term Economic Projections for World Economy, United Nations, New York, 1964, p. 59*

After 1960 more funds were invested from abroad and during the period 1960-1962 the annual average reached \$6 billion. Considering the actual state of affairs, no further substantially* large flow of funds into the developing countries can be expected although it can be assumed that the demand for investment funds will grow quite rapidly. That means, however, that for long-term development the quantity of external resources can hardly be considered the decisive factor in financing economic development. Therefore the quality of internal resources must be strengthened during the entire process of economic development. They must also play the decisive part in terms of quantity too. Past developments show that in the developing countries internal resources have not been mobilised to a sufficient extent. The limited possibilities, in quantity and quality, of utilising external resources mean that the most important task of the developing countries consists in the effective mobilisation of internal resources. This is necessary to achieve a rate of accumulation from internal resources that can create the conditions for the required pace of development.

The situation in the last few years has shown that one of the main factors slowing down economic development in these countries was the low rate of accumulation from internal resources and from resources in general. It was estimated that on an average the rate of accumulation from internal resources in the developing countries amounted to only between one-half and two-thirds of that in the highly developed countries. A contradiction typical of the present state of the underdeveloped economies is the relationship between the enormous funds needed for economies is development on the one hand and the low rate of accumulation, especially from internal resources, on the other.

Table II contains data illustrating the difference between the rates of accumulation from internal resources in the highly developed and in the developing countries.

Table II

Accumulation from Internal Resources in Selected Highly Developed and Developing Countries 1950-1960.

Rate of accumulation from internal resources in % of gross national product.	Economically Developed Countries.	Developing Countries.
20-22	Finland, Japan, Australia	
14-16	Holland, New Zealand	Venezuela, Congo Leop. Rhodesia, Nyasaland.
11-13	Austria, Denmark	Burma, Iraq.
8-10	Italy, USA, France, Belgium	Trinidad, Tobago, Brazil, Columbia, Ceylon, Ecuador, Honduras, Costa Rica.
5-7	Great Britain	India, Jamaica, Taiwan
2-4		Philippines
0-1		Chile

Source : *World Economic Survey 1960, United Nations, New York 1961.*

The high rate of accumulation from internal resources in Venezuela, Congo, Rhodesia and Nyasaland is not typical. To a certain extent this was due to reinvestment of profits by foreign extractive companies. In the developing countries with the lowest incomes the rate of accumulation is even lower. This in fact reflects a closeness to the subsistence level of living standards in those countries. This is of course the well known vicious circle of low incomes leading towards low incomes.

Table II shows that the developing countries with the highest rates of accumulation are in this respect more or less on the same level as the developed capitalist countries with the lowest rates of accumulation. For the time being it is true to say that without a considerable rise in the rate of accumulation the contradiction between the amount of disposable resources and those needed for economic development cannot be overcome.

The progress of economic reconstruction in the developing countries also depends upon the growth and utilisation of the national income. Distribution of the national income, and therefore the rate of accumulation, is fundamentally determined by the social and economic structure of a society. The social and economic structure in the developing countries is considered by numerous Marxist and non-Marxist economists to be a major obstacle in their way to economic development.

According to the Argentine economist, Dr. Raul Presbisch, this fact is felt in the following ways :

- (a) "this structure paralyses to a considerable extent the social development, i. e. the growth and creation of the dynamic

elements in society, or initiative and energetic people, able to take risks and responsibility in the technical and economic fields as well as in the other branches of social life;

- (b) this social structure is characterised mainly by the privilege in the distribution of wealth and the distribution of incomes resulting from it. This privilege weakens or suppresses the initiative in economic activity, it is an obstacle in the way of the effective use of human labour, land and equipment;
- (c) the privilege in distribution does not find its expression in a mighty pace of capital accumulation but in the exaggerated demands for consumption in the higher social sphere; while the situation of the masses of the people remains extremely desperate".¹

The problem of a higher rate of accumulation is therefore, in the first place, a problem of changing social relations and the distribution of incomes corresponding to them. However such changes in the present social and economic structure imply a new policy of redistribution of the national income.

It is quite obvious that the social differences in the developing countries are enormous. According to various sources of the United Nations it is estimated that in Latin America, for example, 45—55 per cent of the population earns not more than 15—20 per cent of the national income, while 5 per cent of the population get 30 per cent of it. A policy of redistribution which would lead to a higher rate of accumulation and to a quickening of the pace of its growth, should, therefore, consist of an effort to limit the high level of consumption of a small part of the population. It should be turned into investment contributing to the acceleration and achievement of the required pace of growth. This redistribution policy, however, does not mean a simple reduction in the high incomes of a minority of society and an increase in the income of the mass of the population. The results of such a redistribution would not contribute to a rise in accumulation and a higher rate of industrial growth.

The limitation of consumption in the highest income group must also be reflected in accumulation and a quicker pace of development. It will then create conditions for a rising economic standard of the country.

The change in the social and economic structure may take the form of capitalistic relations or non-capitalist construction.

The differences in social and economic structures obviously provide some of the reasons for the considerable differences between the rates

¹Dr. Raul Prebisch : *For a Dynamic Development of Latin America*, (in Czech) VSE, Praha, 1964. (Translated from the original mimeograph by Economic Commission for Latin America in 1963).

of accumulation in the various developing countries, as illustrated in the following table.

Table III

Relation between the per capita income levels and the rate of accumulation from internal resources in selected developing countries, 1950-1960.

National income per capita in U. S. \$	Net accumulation from internal resources in % of gross national product.				
	0-5	5-7	8-10	11-13	14-16
0-99	Taiwan Indonesia	India			Burma Congo
100-199	South Korea	Guatemala	Brazil Ceylon Ecuador Honduras Columbia	Iraq	Rhodesia- Nyasaland
200-299	Panama		Turkey Costa Rica		
300-399	Chile		Jamaica		S. Africa
400	Puerto Rico		Argentina Trinidad Tobago		Venezuela

Source : *World Economic Survey 1960*, United Nations, New York 1961.

Apparently in certain countries the low per capita incomes do not represent any obstacle to reaching a high rate of accumulation from internal resources. At the same time, there are countries in which comparatively high per capita incomes are not proportional to the rate of accumulation. One of the main reasons for these differences is the diversity of social and economic structures.

The tendencies prevailing in this field between 1950 and 1960 were not very favourable for economic construction. The rate of accumulation remained unchanged or fell slightly in 60 per cent of the developing countries. In the remaining 40 per cent the total rate of accumulation increased by only 2 per cent of the gross national product. A growing dependence on external accumulation became obvious and this also influenced changes in the rates of total accumulation. In more than one-third of the developing countries, the rate of accumulation from external resources rose by 2-3 per cent of the gross national product; in a quarter it increased even more. In the countries in which the total rate of accumulation rose, the growth was usually the result of an increasing ratio of accumulation from external resources. In the countries in which the rate of total accumulation decreased, the fall was usually the result of a lower rate of accumulation from internal resources which was not compensated by an increase in the rate of accumulation from external resources.

Table IV

*Accumulation from Internal and External Resources; average level 1950-1959
and changes in 1950-52 and 1957-59 in % of gross national product.*

Country (S. C.)	Total accum.		Accum. from external resources		Accum. from internal resources	
	Rate of accum.		Rate of accum.		Rate of accum.	
Rhodesia-Nyasaland	23	3	9	7	14	-4
Venezuela	19	-1	3	4	16	-5
Congo Leo.	18	-10	2	9	16	-19
Trinidad-Tobago	16	0	6	0	10	0
Jamaica	15	10	9	2	5	8
S. Africa	15	-4	1	-3	14	0
Costa Rica	15	0	4	1	11	-1
Puerto Rico	14	1	18	8	-4	-7
Burma	13	7	-1	10	14	-3
Taiwan	12	0	7	0	5	0
Brazil	10	0	-1	1	10	0
Morocco	10	-14	-1	-9	11	-5
Honduras	10	-2	2	2	8	-3
Argentina	10	0	-2	0	8	0
Turkey	10	3	2	-1	8	3
Ecuador	9	4	1	2	8	2
Columbia	9	-1	0	-1	9	0
Ceylon	9	-2	0	5	9	-7
S. Korea	8	1	9	2	-1	-2
India	8	5	1	3	7	2
Panama	6	4	6	2	-1	2
Philippines	4	2	2	1	2	1
Indonesia	3	-5	1	-1	2	-3
Chile	3	4	2	2	1	2

Source : *World Economic Survey* 1960, United Nations, New York, 1961

Another major factor in this field was the inability of the developing countries to raise the rate of accumulation from internal resources. In more than three-quarters of all developing countries the rate of accumulation from internal resources either decreased or remained more or less constant. The decrease was usually considerable.

These data show that until now the developing countries have not succeeded in solving successfully the contradiction between the disposable resources and the needs for economic development. As it may prove

very difficult to considerably increase funds from abroad, the only solution of the problem of underdevelopment remains the mobilisation of their internal resources in the widest sense. That means the creation of conditions for the effective utilisation of internal resources to stimulate economic progress.

Only in this way can they hope to achieve the desired pace of development. The mobilisation of internal resources at the same time represents one of the conditions for an independent economic development in the sense of acquiring equal rights for the developing countries in the international division of labour.

DOCUMENTATION

S. W. Africa Cases: Ethiopia v. S. Africa; Liberia v. S. Africa

P. SREENIVASA RAO

IMMEDIATELY after World War I, impelled by a wave of idealistic aspirations, members of the international community were engaged in the first ever organised attempts to secure permanent peace based on lasting justice. This was sought to be achieved by recognising the interests of all States in matters happening in any quarter of the globe. The recognition of community interest was manifested chiefly in four ways: (1) in the League Covenant which emphasised that peace was indivisible; (2) in the institution of protection for minorities, embodied in several minority treaties; (3) in the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, which recognised the interest of all the States in the "humane conditions of labour" in all other States; and (4) in the mandates system as consecrated in Article 22 of the League Covenant.

Essential Features of the Mandates System

Though the delineation of the mandates system and the subsequent allotment of the mandate territories (formerly belonging to Germany and renounced by it in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers) to different mandatories was made by the Allied and Associated Powers, the system drew its philosophy and basis from Article 22 of the League Covenant which recognised the well-being and development of peoples, who were "not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world", as a "sacred trust of civilisation". This "sacred trust" was to be entrusted to the advanced nations, who were willing to undertake the responsibility of discharging it as mandatories "on behalf of the League". The mandated territories were categorised into three classes—A, B and C, according to the stage of development of the people who inhabited them. South-West Africa and South Pacific Islands were grouped under C mandate. South Africa was chosen as mandatory for South-West Africa. According to Article 22, Paragraph 6, "owing to the sparseness of their population or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the mandatory, and other circumstances" of the people of the South-West Africa territory, the mandatory was allowed to

administer the territory¹ "as an integral portion of its territory". The mandatory was under an obligation to submit annual reports with reference to the territory committed to its charge (Article 2, Paragraph 6). The right of supervision was accorded to the League Council. The League Council was to act upon the advice of the Permanent Mandates Commission which would receive and examine the annual reports from the mandatories (Article 2, Paragraph 9).

The mandate for South-West-Africa was adopted by the League Council by its resolution of 17 December 1920. While embodying the above mentioned principles, the mandate agreement specifically provided that the mandatory must prohibit slave trade, forced labour without adequate remuneration, traffic in arms and ammunition, supply of intoxicating spirits and beverages to the natives, establishment of military or naval bases or raising any fortifications and giving military training to the natives except as training for purposes of internal policing and local self-defence. The mandatory was asked to safeguard the freedom of conscience and the full exercise of all forms of worship. It was further under the obligation to freely allow all missionaries and nationals of any member state of the League of Nations to pursue their callings in the territory (Articles 3, 4 and 5). Article 6 of the mandate agreement required the mandatory to submit annual reports regarding the discharge of its obligations under Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5. Article 7, Paragraph 1, provided that the mandatory could not unilaterally, without the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, modify the terms of the mandate. Under Article 7, Paragraph 2, provision was made for a compulsory "compromissary clause" if any dispute whatever were to arise which could not be settled by negotiation, between the mandatory and any other member of the League of Nations, over the interpretation and application of the mandate agreement. The mandate agreement was deposited in the archives of the League of Nations.

Dissolution of the League and the Mandates System

The mandates system proved to be one of the most successful and useful ventures of the League of Nations. Iraq, which was A mandate territory, for example, acquired independent statehood on 3 October 1932. Several other territories like Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan were well on their way to achieving independence during the League period and indeed acquired it soon after the dissolution of the League. How World War II put an end to the activities of the League of Nations is now a matter of history. At the time of the dissolution of the League of Nations, however, the necessity to continue the mandates system for the benefit of the native population was clearly recognised. The League fondly hoped in its resolution of 18 April 1946 that the mandatories would administer the mandated territories within the structure of the United Nations Charter whose Chapters XI, XII and XIII embodied principles corresponding to those enshrined in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League².

The Union of South Africa itself specifically acknowledged that its obligations as mandatory continued to exist even after the dissolution of the League.³ In a declaration made on 9 April 1946 in the Assembly

of the League of Nations, the representative of the Union Government, after having expressed his Government's intention to seek international recognition for the territory of South-West Africa as an integral part of the Union, stated:

"In the meantime, the Union will continue to administer the Territory scrupulously in accordance with the obligations of the Mandate for the advancement and promotion of the interests of the inhabitants as she has done during the past six years when meetings of the Mandates Commission could not be held".

Though the representative felt that the disappearance of the League Council and the Mandates Commission would 'necessarily preclude complete compliance with the letter of the Mandate', he was sure that

"The Union Government will nevertheless regard the dissolution of the League as in no way diminishing its obligations under the Mandate, which it will continue to discharge with the full and proper appreciation of its responsibilities until such time as other arrangements are agreed upon concerning the future status of the Territory".

In a memorandum submitted on 17 December 1946 to the U.N. Secretary General, the South African Legation in Washington declared that the "responsibility of the Union Government as Mandatory is necessarily inalienable". On 4 November 1946, before the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa re-emphasised his Government's obligation under the mandates system. Further, in a letter of 23 July 1947, to the UN Secretary-General the Legation of the Union of South Africa in Washington communicated a resolution passed by the Union Parliament in which it was laid down

"that the Government should continue to render reports to the United Nations Organization as it has done heretofore under the Mandate".

1950 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice

Contrary to the legitimate expectations raised by these pronouncements, the Union of South Africa refused to subscribe to the trusteeship system of the UN and showed scorn for international supervision in violation of its obligations.⁴ The Union of South Africa, in so far as it approached the UN General Assembly in regard to the mandate, did so only to get the approval of the General Assembly to its long-expressed wish to annex the mandated territory, which the UN, as the Permanent Mandates Commission earlier, resented.⁵ This denial of the obligations which South Africa owed to the international community raised pertinent issues about the status of the territory of South-West Africa, the nature of obligations assumed by South Africa as mandatory and the applicability of the UN Charter provisions in Chapter XII to the South-West Africa mandate. On a reference made by the UN General Assembly by its

Resolution 338 (IV) of 6 December 1949, the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the *International Status of South-West Africa*, addressing itself to these issues, concluded :

“On the General Question :

unanimously,

that South-West Africa is a territory under the international Mandate assumed by the Union of South Africa on December 17th, 1920;

On Question (a) :

by 12 votes to two,

that the Union of South Africa continues to have the international obligations stated in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the Mandate for South-West Africa as well as the obligation to transmit petitions from the inhabitants of that Territory, the supervisory functions to be exercised by the United Nations, to which annual reports and the petitions are to be submitted, and the reference to the Permanent Court of International Justice to be replaced by a reference to the International Court of Justice, in accordance with Article 7 of the Mandate and Article 37 of the statute of the Court;

On Question (b) :

unanimously,

that the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter are applicable to the Territory of South-West Africa in the sense that they provide a means by which the Territory may be brought under the Trusteeship system;

and by eight votes to six,

that the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter do not impose on the Union of South Africa a legal obligation to place the Territory under the Trusteeship system;

On Question (c) :

unanimously,

that the Union of South Africa acting alone has not the competence to modify the international status of the Territory of South-West Africa, and that the competence to determine and modify the international status of the Territory rests with the Union of South Africa acting with the consent of the United Nations.”⁶

The U. N. General Assembly, by its Resolution 449A (V) of 13 December 1950, accepted the opinion of the Court. The conclusions reached in the 1950 Opinion were reiterated by the Court in its later pronouncements on the *Voting Procedure on Questions relating to Reports*

and Petitions concerning the Territory of South-West Africa (7 June 1955) and the Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South-West Africa (1 June 1956).

U. N. Efforts to Control the Mandate

Repeated efforts by U. N. members urging South Africa to place the mandated territory under the trusteeship system were rendered futile by the intransigent attitude of the latter. Moreover, the South African Government, whose policies of racial segregation have been a constant source of threat to international peace, embarked on extending its policy of apartheid to the mandated territory. The U. N. General Assembly, by passing a score of resolutions and appointing Special Committees, tried to persuade the South African Government to desist from violating the terms of the mandate and cease forthwith the application of the policy of apartheid to the mandated territory.⁷ The South African Government with its callous indifference to the voice of the international community continued to frustrate hopes of an amicable peaceful settlement of the whole problem.

South-West Africa Cases (Preliminary Objections): First Phase

In this connection arises the question: how far is the introduction of the policy of apartheid into the mandated territory by the mandatory a proper discharge of the "sacred trust" entrusted to it? Ethiopia and Liberia, as former members of the League of Nations, invoking Article 7(2) of the mandate agreement⁸, Article 37 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice⁹ and Article 80(1) of the U. N. Charter by their applications of 4 November 1960, instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice relating to the "continued existence of the Mandate for South-West Africa and the duties and performance of the Union, as Mandatory thereunder."¹⁰ As the two applicant Governments were acting in the same interest, the Court by an order of 20 May 1961 joined the proceedings in the two cases. On 30 November 1961 within the time-limit fixed for the presentation of its first pleadings, the South African Government filed four preliminary objections to the Court's jurisdiction. Accordingly, an order of 5 December 1961 of the Court recorded that by virtue of the provisions of Article 62, Paragraph 3 of the Rules of the Court, proceedings on the merits of the cases were suspended.

The four objections raised by South Africa were :

1. The mandate agreement was not, at any rate after the dissolution of the League of Nations, a "treaty or convention in force" within the meaning of Article 37 of the Statute of the Court.
2. The applicants did not have any *locus standi* as required by Article 7, Paragraph 2, of the mandate agreement, as they could not be regarded as "another member of the League of Nations".
3. There existed no "dispute" between the Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia on the one hand and the Government of

having the character of a treaty of convention. The Preamble of the Mandate itself shows the character".¹²

With respect to the second preliminary objection, the Respondent contended that as the obligations relating to the administrative supervision by the League and submission to the Permanent Court of International Justice were of a contractual character, they had become extinct with the dissolution of the League, leaving, however, its rights under the mandate intact, being of an objective character. Article 7 of the mandate, it was suggested, also ceased to have any operation since the demise of the League of Nations as after that event "another Member of the League of Nations" could not exist.

When similar arguments were advanced in 1950, in its Advisory Opinion the Court ruled :

"The authority which the Union Government exercises over the Territory is based on the Mandate. If the Mandate lapsed, as the Union Government contends, the latter's authority would equally have lapsed. To retain the rights derived from the Mandate and to deny the obligations thereunder could not be justified."¹³

Recalling this and other observations in its 1950 Advisory Opinion, the Court declared :

"The unanimous holding of the Court in 1950 on the survival and continuing effect of Article 7 of the Mandate continues to reflect the Court's opinion today. Nothing has since occurred which would warrant the Court reconsidering it".¹⁴

In support of its view that Article 7 of the mandate continued to have validity despite the dissolution of the League of Nations, the Court advanced three grounds:

- (1) Judicial protection of the "sacred trust" was an essential feature of the mandate system. The Court elaborated this theory of judicial protection in the following terms :

"Under the unanimity rule (Articles 4 and 5 of the Covenant), the Council could not impose its own view on the Mandatory. It could of course ask for an advisory opinion of the Permanent Court but that opinion would not have binding force, and the Mandatory could continue to turn a deaf ear to the Council's admonitions. In such an event the only course left to defend the interests of the inhabitants in order to protect the sacred trust would be to obtain an adjudication by the Court on the matter connected with the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate. But neither the Council nor the League was entitled to appear before the Court. The only effective recourse for protection of the sacred trust would be for a Member or Members of the League to invoke Article 7 and bring the dispute as also one between them and the Mandatory

South Africa on the other, as required by the terms of Article 7 of the mandate. This was particularly so because no material interests of the Applicants or of their nationals were involved therein or affected thereby.

4. Even if any "dispute" existed, it was not a dispute that could not be settled by mutual negotiation.

Inasmuch as the dispute was related to the interpretation and application of the South-West Africa mandate agreement, the Court briefly recalled the nature and chief characteristics of the mandates system. The Court observed :

"The essential principles of the Mandates System consist chiefly in the recognition of certain rights of the peoples of the under-developed territories; the establishment of a regime of tutelage for each of such peoples to be exercised by an advanced nation as a 'Mandatory' 'on behalf of the League of Nations'; and the recognition of 'a sacred trust of civilisation' laid upon the League as an organized international community and upon its Member States. This system is dedicated to the avowed object of promoting the well-being and development of the peoples concerned as is fortified by setting up safe-guards for the protection of their rights.

The rights of the Mandatory in relation to the mandated territory and the inhabitants have their foundation in the obligations of the Mandatory and they are, so to speak, mere tools given to enable it to fulfil its obligations".¹¹

The Court then proceeded to examine each of the objections raised by the Respondent. The Respondent argued that the resolution in which the mandate agreement was set forth was not a treaty but was only an executive action taken by the Council of the League of Nations in pursuance of the Covenant. Even if it was a treaty, it was further contended, it was not binding on the Respondent as it had not been registered in accordance with Article 18 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which provided that "no such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered".

The Court found that the mandate was a special type of instrument instituting a novel regime and embodying international engagements for the mandatory as defined by the Council and accepted by the mandatory. The Court did not accept that the mandate was *ab initio* null and void due to its non-registration, as logically it would have also meant the invalidation of the mandatory's right of administration over the mandated territory. Therefore, the Court pointed out, it would be impossible for the mandatory to maintain that it had such title until the time of discovery of the ground of nullity. Rejecting the first objection, the Court held that

"The Mandate, in fact and in law, is an international agreement

to the Permanent Court for adjudication. It was for this all-important purpose that the provision was couched in broad terms embracing 'any dispute whatever...between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate...if it cannot be settled by negotiation.' It is thus seen what an essential part Article 7 was intended to play as one of the securities in the Mandates system for the observance of the obligations by the Mandatory."¹⁵

- (2) Judicial protection was the most reliable procedure ensuring protection by the Court whatever might happen to or arise from the machinery of administrative supervision.
- (3) At the time of the dissolution of the League, an agreement was reached among the members of the League during the Assembly session in 1946 to continue the different mandates and the mandatories specifically agreed that they would continue to administer the mandates subject to the terms of the original Mandate Agreements.

The Court pointed out, therefore, that

"Those States who were Members of the League at the time of its dissolution continue to have the right to invoke the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, as they had the right to do before the dissolution of the League. That right continues to exist for as long as the Respondent holds on to the right to administer the territory under the Mandate".¹⁶

Relying on its third preliminary objection that there existed no "dispute", as the Applicants lacked any legal interest in the subject-matter (i.e. the discharge of the sacred trust) before the Court, the Respondent attempted a classification of its obligations under the mandate : (i) its obligations towards the inhabitants of the mandated territory and (ii) its obligations towards the members of the League of Nations, or their nationals. The Respondent argued that with respect to the first category of obligations, the mandatory was accountable only to the League of Nations as an organisation but to nobody else.

The Court refused to be led away by any such distinction and pointed out that the broad terms of Article 7 did not admit of any such classification resulting in the exclusion of the legal interest of the members of the League of Nations in the proper discharge of the mandatory's obligations towards the inhabitants of the mandated territory. In a vital observation regarding the nature and scope of Article 7 the Court, rejecting the third objection, held that

"The language used is broad, clear and precise: it gives rise to no ambiguity and it permits of no exception. It refers to any dispute whatever relating not to any one particular provision or provisions but to the 'provisions' of the Mandate, obviously meaning all or any provisions, whether they relate

to substantive obligations of the Mandatory toward the inhabitants of the Territory or toward the other Members of the League or to its obligation to submit to supervision by the League under Article 6 or to protection under Article 7 itself. For the manifest scope and purpose of the provision of this Article indicate that the Members of the League were understood to have a legal right or interest in the observance by the Mandatory of its obligations, both toward the inhabitants of the Mandated Territory and toward the League of Nations and its Members.¹⁷

As to the fourth objection, that even if a dispute existed it was not one which could not be settled by negotiation, the Court found that a deadlock had been reached in collective negotiations in the past and that the written pleadings and oral arguments of the parties before the Court clearly confirmed the continuance of the deadlock. This fact led to the conclusion that no reasonable probability existed that further negotiations would lead to a settlement. The Court also made it clear that what mattered was not so much the form of negotiations as the attitude and views of the parties on the substantive issues involved.

On these grounds, rejecting all the four objections to its jurisdiction, the Court concluded, by eight votes to seven, that

Article 7 of the Mandate is a treaty or convention still in force within the meaning of Article 37 of the Statute of the Court and that the dispute is one which is envisaged in the said Article 7 and cannot be settled by negotiation. Consequently the Court is competent to hear the dispute on the merits.¹⁸

Separate opinions were appended by Judges Bustamante Y. Rivero, Jessup and the Judge *ad hoc*, Sir Louis Mbanefo, who voted with the majority of the Bench.

Dissenting Opinions

President Winiarski, Judges Basdevant, Morelli and Judge *ad hoc* Van Wyk appended their dissenting opinions. Judges Percy Spender and Fitzmaurice appended their joint dissenting opinion. Judge Spiropoulos in a declaration expressed his dissent from the judgement.

- (i) President Winiarski's difficulty was mainly to believe that the concept of judicial accountability formed an essential part of the mandates system. He observed :

"This hypothesis is quite improbable; it is not and cannot be supported by any evidence. Article 22, Paragraph 1, of the Covenant provided *in fine* 'that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant. These securities are set out in the following paragraphs of Article 22. The Mandates System was perfectly well able to do without that 'security' now recognized by the

Court and, for which the Council probably felt no need, just as it felt no need for any enforcement action, the provision of the Covenant and of the Mandate Agreement being considered sufficient by the authors of those instruments.”¹⁹

- (ii) In their joint dissent, Judges Percy Spender and Fitzmaurice objected to the very approach of the Court to the issues before them. According to the learned Judges, the Court assumed jurisdiction only by adopting premises which “largely assume beforehand the correctness of the conclusions arrived at.” The cases consisted of issues of a non-judicial character, which were, according to the joint dissent, matters for the political rather than for the legal arena. The joint dissent observed :

The proper forum for the appreciation and application of a provision of this kind is unquestionably a technical or political one, such as (formerly) the Permanent Mandates Commission, or the Council of the League of Nations—or today (as regards Trusteeships) the Trusteeship Council and the Assembly of the United Nations. But the fact that in present circumstances, such technical or political control cannot in practice be exercised in respect of the Mandate for South-West Africa is not a ground for asking a court of law to discharge a task which, in the final analysis, hardly appears to be a judicial one.²⁰

South-West Africa Cases (Merits): Second Phase

The Court having pronounced that it was “competent to hear on the merits”, the Applicants, Ethiopia and Liberia, repeated their charges and wanted the Court to declare that (i) South-West Africa was a territory under the mandate ; (ii) the Union of South Africa continued to have obligations under the mandate of 17 December 1920 ; (iii) with regard to the administration of the territory that the Union of South Africa was under an obligation to submit to the supervision and control of the UN General Assembly ; (iv) the Union of South Africa, in violation of the terms of Article 7 of the mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and without the consent of the UN substantially modified the terms of the mandate ; by practising apartheid, adopting arbitrary and unjust regulations and suppressing the rights and liberties of the inhabitants in the mandated territory and obstructing their orderly evolution toward self-government and applying acts of administration and legislation which were inconsistent with the international status of the territory, South Africa had violated Article 2 of the Mandate Agreement and Article 22 of the League Covenant ; (v) the Union of South Africa had failed in its duty to render annual reports to the satisfaction of the UN General Assembly and transmit petitions from the inhabitants of the territory addressed to the UN General Assembly.

In opposition, the Respondent prayed the Court to dismiss all the charges made against it and wanted it to declare that with the dissolution of the League the mandate agreement had lapsed, leaving no obligations for it thereunder. In the alternative, the Respondent prayed the Court

to declare that even if the mandate as such survived the dissolution of the League, its obligations to furnish reports and submit to international supervision had not been replaced by any similar obligations relative to supervision by any organ of the UN or any other organisation or body.

The court, before considering the various charges put forward by the Applicants with regard to the proper discharge of the mandate agreement, felt obliged to decide a fundamental question relating to the legal interest of the Applicants in the subject matter of the dispute before it. The Court said :

“In this connection, there was one matter that appertained to the merits of the case but which had an antecedent character, namely, the question of the Applicants’ standing in the present phase of the proceedings,—not, that is to say, of their standing before the Court itself, which was the subject of the Court’s decision in 1962, but the question, as a matter of the merits of the case, of their legal right or interest regarding the subject matter of their claim, as set out in their final submissions”.²¹

To decide this fundamental question, the Court first examined the nature of obligations contemplated under the mandates system and categorised them into “conduct” provisions and “special interests” provisions. “Conduct” provisions were those relating to the mandatory’s obligations towards the inhabitants of the mandated territory and towards the League and its organs. “Special interests” provisions were those conferring certain rights relative to the mandated territory directly upon the members of the League as individual States, or in favour of their nationals. The Court found that the dispute in the present case related exclusively to the “conduct” provisions. Thus viewed, the essential question before the Court was “whether the various mandatories had any direct obligation towards the other members of the League individually, as regard the carrying out of the ‘conduct’ provisions of the mandates”.²² If the answer to this question was in the negative, the obvious conclusion on the part of the Court would be to refuse to pronounce upon any one of the submissions made by the Applicants.

To find an answer to the above question, the Court referred to Article 22 of the League Covenant which laid down that the mandates should be administered “on behalf of the League of Nations”, that the mandatories should furnish annual reports to the satisfaction of the Council of the League of Nations and that the terms of the mandate could not be modified without the consent of the League of Nations. The Court construed these provisions to the effect that

“...even in the time of the League, even as members of the League. When the organisation still existed, the Applicants did not, in their individual capacity as States, possess any separate self-contained right which they could assert, independently of, or additionally to, the right of the League, in the pursuit of its collective, institutional activity to require the due performance of the Mandate in discharge of the ‘sacred trust’. This right was vested exclusively in the League, and was exercised through its organs. Each member of the League

could share in its collective, institutional exercise by the League, through its participation in the work of its organs, and to the extent that these organs themselves were empowered under the mandates system to act. By their right to activate these organs (of which they made full use), they could procure consideration of the mandates question, as of other matters within the sphere of action of the League. But no right was reserved to them, individually as States, and independently of their participation in the institutional activities of the League, as component parts of it, to claim in their own name,—still less as agents authorised to represent the League,—the right to invigilate the sacred trust,—to set themselves up as separate custodians of the various mandates. This was the role of the League organs".²³

The Court then went on to reject several arguments advanced on behalf of the Applicants to rebut the conclusion so reached by it. In this connection it was pointed out by the Court that the member states, under the mandates system, did not have any parallel rights with the League Council's power of supervision in the discharge of the "sacred trust" by the mandatory; that they could not seek mere "opinions" from the Court without being able to establish any legal interest; mere humanitarian considerations were not sufficient to generate legal rights and obligations and the unilateral declarations made by the Respondent at the time of the dissolution of the League did not invest in the member States of the League of Nations any special rights that were not originally contemplated under the mandates system. The Court also pointed out that if on a correct legal reading of a situation some lacuna was perceived (in this case it was the Court's view that after the dissolution of the League of Nations there was nobody to ensure a proper discharge of the mandatory's obligations relating to the 'conduct' provisions) it was not for it to remedy the situation. Such an attempt, the Court observed, would amount to an "essentially legislative task in the service of political ends the promotion of which, however desirable in itself, lies outside the function of a Court-of-law".²⁴

Against the conclusion of the Court that they did not have any legal interest in the subject-matter of the dispute, it was strongly urged by the Applicants that the Court was precluded in the later phase to reopen an issue which had been settled by its judgement in the earlier phase and that if they had any legal right to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court they had sufficient interest in the subject-matter of the claim. The Court refused to accept this contention, holding that

"a decision on a preliminary objection can never be preclusive of a matter appertaining to the merits, whether or not it has in fact been dealt with in connection with the preliminary objection".²⁵

The Applicants then sought to prove that the phrase "any dispute whatever" in Article 7, Paragraph 2, of the mandate was wide enough to include their legal interest in the 'conduct' provisions.

Disagreeing with the Applicants and in direct opposition to its ruling in the earlier phase of the case, the Court declared that it

“does not however consider that the word ‘whatever’ in Article 7, Paragraph 2, does anything more than lend emphasis to a phrase that would have meant exactly the same without it ; or that the phrase ‘any dispute’ (whatever) means anything intrinsically different from ‘a dispute ; or that the reference to the ‘provisions’ of the Mandate, in the plural, has any different effect from what would have resulted from saying ‘a provision’. Thus reduced to its basic meaning, it can be seen that the clause is not capable of carrying the load the Applicants seek to put upon it, and which would result in giving such clauses an effect that States accepting the Court’s jurisdiction by reason of them could never suppose them to have”.²⁶

On these grounds, the Court, by the President’s casting vote, the Bench being equally divided (7—7), decided

“that the Applicants cannot be considered to have established any legal right or interest appertaining to them in the subject-matter of the present claims, and that, accordingly, the Court must decline to give effect to them.”²⁷

Judge Morelli and Judge *ad hoc* Van Wyk* appended separate opinions to the judgement of the Court.

Dissenting Opinions

Vice-President Wellington Koo, Judges Korstsky, Tanaka, Jessup, Padilla Nervo, Forster, and Judge *ad hoc* Sir Louis Mbanefo appended dissenting opinions to the judgement of the Court.

(i) Vice-President Wellington Koo expressed his disagreement with the judgement of the Court as it was clearly contradictory to the finding of the Court in its judgement of 1962. Dealing with the merits of the dispute, the learned Vice-President of the Court pointed out that two fundamental principles characterised the mandates system, *viz.* (1) whatever powers and authority were given to the mandatory were designed not to serve its interests but for the sole purpose of enabling it to fulfil its obligations ; (2) the principle of international accountability.

On the basis of the first principle, Vice-President Wellington Koo held that

“the policy of apartheid or separate development as pursued in South-West Africa, as far as the non-White groups are concerned, has not been and is not compatible with the basic principle of the ‘sacred trust of civilization’ or with the Respondent’s obligation under Article 2 of the Mandate”.²⁸

The Vice-President of the Court held the South African Government also guilty of violating the second principle. Referring to the various official pronouncements which the South African Government

made at the time of the dissolution of the League and later as members of the UN and to its decision not to supply annual reports to the UN General Assembly, Vice-President Wellington Koo observed that the actions of the Union of South Africa were

“incompatible not only with its basic obligation under Article 6 of the Mandate and with its undertaking toward the League Assembly at its final session but also with its obligations under the United Nations Charter and its undertaking towards the General Assembly”.²⁹

(ii) Judge Koretsky observed that he

“can in no way concur in the present judgement mainly because the Court reverts in essence to its judgement of 21 December 1962 on the same cases and in fact revises it even without observing Article 61 of the Statute and without the procedure envisaged in Article 78 of the Rules of the Court”.³⁰

(iii) Judge Tanaka did not accept the classification adopted by the Court distinguishing between “conduct” provisions and “special interests” provisions. According to him, the provisions of Article 7, Paragraph 2, could not be narrowly interpreted to exclude the Applicants’ legal interest in the mandatory’s duty to discharge the “sacred trust” in a proper way. Proceeding to examine the merits of the dispute, Judge Tanaka held that

1. The mandate survived as an international institution, a conclusion which the Respondent itself did not contest.

2. The Respondent continued to have obligations stated in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the supervisory functions to be exercised by the UN, to which annual reports were to be submitted.

3. The norm of non-discrimination or non-separation on the basis of race had become a rule of customary international law as was contended by the Applicants. In this connection the learned Judge held that

“The Applicants’ norm of non-discrimination or non-separation being conceived as of *per se* nature would appear not to permit any exception. The policy of apartheid or separate development which allots status, rights, duties, privileges or burdens on the basis of membership in a group, class or race rather than on the basis of individual merit, capacity or potential is illegal whether the motive be *bona fide* or *mala fide*, oppressive or benevolent; whether its effect or result be good or bad to the inhabitants.”³¹

4. Certain administrative measures taken by the Union of South Africa conferring Union citizenship on the inhabitants of the mandated territory and providing representation in the Union parliament from the mandated territory were inconsistent with the international status of the mandated territory.

(iv) Judge Jessup, in his dissenting opinion, recalled that it was the fifth time the Court was called upon to consider the legal issues arising out of the administration by the Republic of South Africa of the mandated territory and that on four occasions the Court never deviated from its conclusion that the mandate survived the dissolution of the League of Nations and the Union of South Africa as mandatory continued to have obligations. But by its judgement of 1966 the Court, Judge Jessup regretted, in effect swept away this record of sixteen years on a ground not advanced by the Respondent in its final submission of 5 November 1965. Describing as a procedure of utter futility the Court's ruling that the Applicants had *locus standi* to institute the proceedings before the Court but did not have the legal interest which would entitle them for a decision on the merits of the dispute, Judge Jessup asked :

“...Why would the Court tolerate a situation in which the parties would be put to great trouble and expenses to explore all the details of the merits, and only thereafter to be told that the Court would pay no heed to all their arguments and evidence because the case was dismissed on a preliminary ground which precludes any investigation of the merits?”³²

After an examination of the merits of the dispute Judge Jessup held that the practice of apartheid by South Africa in the mandated territory was in violation of its obligations as mandatory under Article 2 of the mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.³³

Reflections on the 1966 Judgement

The 1966 Judgement, as could be seen from the very valid objections raised by the dissenting opinions, based its conclusions on highly controversial reasoning. It is all the more unconvincing from the way in which it was adopted, that is, by the casting vote of the President. As events turned out, the non-participation of Judge Zafrullah Khan in the proceedings of the Court, on informal advice from the President of the Court, crucially affected the outcome of the case. One cannot help wondering what convinced the learned Judge to abide by the informal advice of the President of the Court. His abstention becomes particularly conspicuous when one considers that the Mexican Judge, who was given similar advice, appealed to the Full Bench of the Court, won his point and participated in the proceedings.

The reaction of the world to the Court's conclusions is one of disappointment and disbelief. Earnest A. Gross, advocate for the Applicants in the present dispute before the Court, described the 1966 judgement as an “abortion of the judicial process” which will have “unpredictable political consequences about which nobody can possibly rejoice”.³⁴ Representatives of 61 Asian and African nations in a statement on 11 August 1966 expressed the fear that the judgement “would damage international confidence in the practice and efficiency of international law.”³⁵ Mr. Swaran Singh, India's Foreign Minister, said in the Lok Sabha on 2 August 1966 that “the judgement is not likely to inspire

confidence in the International Court or in the establishment of the rule of law in international affairs."³⁶ Dr. Krishna Rao, legal adviser to the Government of India, while participating in the deliberations of the International Law Association, characterised the judgement as "shockingly irresponsible" and wanted a thorough re-examination of the procedural rules of the International Court of Justice.³⁷

The fact that the Court could arrive at its final conclusion only by adopting so narrow an interpretation would give one the impression that "dialectics have usurped the place of judicial reasoning". The frustration expressed by large sections of the international community is very natural and demands of the highest international tribunal to uphold the cause of international justice. It is apt to conclude this analysis of the judgement on a note of caution uttered by that great jurist and scholar, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, who said :

"The problem of judicial impartiality, however exaggerated it may be on occasions, is an ever-present problem in relation to international tribunals—in particular those of an institutional character as distinguished from *ad hoc* tribunals. It is bound to arise...not only in cases involving directly the state of which a Judge is a national, but also states to which his State is related by political or ideological affinity. It is a problem which cannot be solved by mere devices of machinery. But it can be considerably alleviated by the fullest possible completeness of judicial reasoning which renders it practicable for everyone to know and to assess the value of the grounds of the decisions given by an international tribunal".³⁸

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1. See in this connection the observation: "Though the mandates system was an innovation in the fields of international law and of colonial policy and though it owed its creation mainly to the need for disposing of a pressing political problem, it is also the fact that, underlying this institution, are ideas which had for a long time been taking shape in the minds of idealists, statesmen and experts in colonial matters and in international law and which had been disseminated by philanthropic and progressive circles in different countries". *The Mandates System (Origin-Principles-Application)* (League of Nations, Geneva, 1945), 7.

Judge Jessup emphasised this aspect in his separate opinion appended to the *South-West Africa Cases* (Preliminary Objections), *Judgement of 21 December 1962*: I.C.J. Reports 319 (1962), 429; and in his Dissenting Opinion to the *South-West Africa Cases (Second Phase)*, *Judgement of 18 July 1966*: (special edition), 398. Almost all the judges dissenting from the judgement of 18 July 1966 stressed this point.
2. For the text of the resolution of 18 April 1946, see Marjorie M. Whiteman, "Digest of International Law" (Dept. of State Publication, June 1963) Vol. 1, 697.
3. See the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *International Status of South-West Africa*, I.C.J. Reports 128 (1950) 134 and 135, where a reference to the various pronouncements accepting international obligations was made.
4. See the letter of 11 July 1949 from the Government of the Union of South Africa to the Secretary-General stating that no further reports regarding the administration of the mandated territory would be forwarded, *Official Records of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, Annex to the Fourth Committee, Document A/929*.
5. During the League period, in its annual report for 1936 at page 4, the Government of the Union of South Africa expressed the opinion that "to administer the mandated territory as the fifth province of the Union, subject to the terms of the mandate, would not be in conflict with the terms of the mandate itself". However, it added that it felt "sufficient grounds have not been adduced for taking such a step". In view of this fact, the permanent Mandates Commission regarded the question of incorporating the mandated territory by the mandatory in the territory as still hypothetical. The Commission, however, hastened to make legal reservations concerning the opinion expressed by the mandatory in its annual report. See *Minutes of the Thirty-first Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission* (League of Nations, Geneva, 1937), 113, 114, 116, 175 and 192. For a further discussion on this question see *Minutes of the Thirty-fourth Session of the Commission*. (League of Nations, Geneva, 1938), 74.

The United Nations General Assembly by its Resolution 65 (I) of 14 December 1946 refused to accede to the request of South Africa to incorporate South-West Africa in its territory.
6. I.C.J. Reports 128 (1950), 143-144
7. For an exhaustive collection of all the resolutions of the General Assembly of the UN relating to the status of the South-West Africa territory and a very useful documentation on the issue, see *The Question of South Africa (Documents and Comments)*, published under the auspices of the Indian Society of International Law (New Delhi-1, 1966).
8. Article 7, Paragraph 2, reads: "The Mandatory agrees that if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation,

shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations."

9. Article 37 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice says : "Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of a matter to a tribunal to have been instituted by the League of Nations, or to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the matter shall, as between the parties to the present Statute, be referred to the International Court of Justice."
10. Article 80, Paragraph 1 provides : "Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties."
11. See "*The South-West Africa Cases (Ethiopia V. South Africa; Liberia V. South Africa)*, Preliminary Objections, Judgement of 21 December 1962 : I.C.J. Reports 319 (1962), 329.
12. *Ibid.*, 330.
13. I. C. J. Reports 128 (1950), at 133.
14. Op. cit, note 10, 334.
15. *Ibid.*, 337.
16. *Ibid.*, 338.
17. *Ibid.*, 343.
18. *Ibid.*, 347.
19. *Ibid.*, 458.
20. *Ibid.*, 467.
21. See "*South-West Africa Cases (Ethiopia V. South Africa; Liberia V. South Africa)* Second Phase; Judgement of 18 July 1966 (Special Edition), 18.
22. *Ibid.*, 22.
23. *Ibid.*, 30-31.
24. *Ibid.*, 39.
25. *Ibid.*, 40.
26. *Ibid.*, 45.
27. *Ibid.*, 56.
28. *Ibid.*, 248.
29. *Ibid.* 251.
30. *Ibid.* , 252.
31. *Ibid.*, 326.
32. *Ibid.*, 407.
33. *Ibid.*, 472-73.
34. Quoted in, Earl W. Foell : "World Court decision fans African embers", *Christian Science Monitor*, Boston, 20 July 1966.
35. *The Hindustan Times*, Delhi, 13 August 1966.
36. *The Hindustan Times*, Delhi, 3 August 1966.
37. *The Times of India*, Delhi, 26 August 1966.
38. Lauterpacht : *The Development of International Law by the International Court*, Stevens and Sons, London, 1958, 40.

The Copperbelt Personality : An Outsider's View

ANIRUDHA GUPTA

A visitor to the Copperbelt in Zambia is at once struck by its unique character. This hub of industrial life with the copper mines doing day and night shifts and African and European miners working in close proximity provides a strange contrast to the rather dull tenor of life in other parts of Zambia. Though, after independence, the flow of rural African population to industrial centres has become alarmingly large, the Copperbelt still retains its individuality. It has a life of its own and, within it, one can sense signs of restlessness and conflict of various interests. The existence of a vast body of African workers, totalling some 45,000, side by side with European expatriate workers further bifurcates this little world. It is on the adjustment of racial relations between these two groups that the realisation of Zambia's vision of building up a "non-racial society" will finally depend.

In this article I propose to deal with some aspects of race relations I investigated during my short visit to the Copperbelt. I interviewed many Africans and Europeans, representatives of the mining companies, talked to African trainees selected for advanced studies and officials of the various workers' unions. One thing became clear to me at once : the living conditions of African miners have changed vastly due to the sincere efforts made by the mining companies. The African townships are clean and well-planned. Hospitals and schools have been constructed to look after their immediate needs. The average African wage has much improved¹ and today an increasingly large number of Africans are selected for training for higher posts in the mining industry.

The conditions of European mine workers, on the other hand, have in no way been adversely affected. They are enjoying a far better standard of living. Their average annual earning, under the general expatriate wage system, increased from £ 2,120 in 1954 to £ 2,689 in 1965,² their beautifully decorated houses have all modern amenities that one could desire in Africa, including radio, television, electricity, water supply, etc.

Seeing all this, one should have thought that a general improvement in economic life would *inter alia* supply solutions to problems of racial adjustment. Indeed, on the surface, one sees great improvement in race relations. I have seen Africans and Europeans working in the mines in cordial co-operation; in restaurants and bars Africans

holding high posts easily mix with Europeans. This, in itself, is no small progress. I was told by the editor of a paper that even as late as 1959, when a distinguished African visitor was invited to a dinner given by a European club, there was so much fuss that when the dinner was over, club members decided to break all crockery. Reason? "No white man could use cups and plates that have been touched by a black man!"

Considering the past, one is impressed by the genuine efforts made by the companies to improve the racial situation. For, on their success depends to a large extent the success of Dr. Kaunda's Government to build what he considers a non-racial society. Yet, in spite of the progress made, there are certain disturbing signs that might cause an explosion some day. There is obviously a lot of misunderstanding still persisting between the Europeans and Africans. While some of these misunderstandings have a concrete basis, most of them are products of a total lack of inter-communication between the two communities. As a result, many grievances and irritations which have only a subjective basis are adversely affecting the experiment now being made on the Copperbelt. Before we take up cases of imagined grievances, let us point out those which have a concrete basis.

The present double wage structure under which the expatriates are paid higher wages than the local staff, mainly Zambian, is certainly the worst thing that could happen to defeat the official policy of building a non-racial society. There is much logic why an expatriate coming from a far-off land should be given a higher wage as an inducement to work in the country but in practice this double wage system has divided the Copperbelt society into two broad racial groups—the Africans and the Europeans. The dilemma of the companies can be well understood, but the double wage system, by acting as a dividing line, has created misunderstandings in the minds of a newly rising and more educated group of Africans. I interviewed many Africans who had been recently appointed to higher posts or were being trained for higher places in the mining industry. I was told that a Zambia-born European having the same training as an African got a higher salary simply because his parents happened to be born in a foreign country! This is certainly a cause for personal resentment. If this is true, one would certainly feel disturbed. The argument that the African, in any case, does not need as much money as the European because his living standard is lower than that of the average European is nothing but blind prejudice. Maybe the African does not spend as much money on expensive items as the European but he has to look after a large family of relatives whose number has been increasing alarmingly in all urban centres.³ Besides, is it not human psychology to do what our better and more prosperous neighbours do? The African's social life and family budget are unfortunately modelled on the European way of life and when he finds it difficult to maintain such standards he is frustrated.⁴ I was also told that there had been cases where European employees who, for all practical purposes had settled in Zambia for generations, were hired on the wage scale laid down for the expatriates. If true even in a single case, the mining companies should investigate the matter thoroughly. For, a single case

of injustice can make the African bitterly resentful. This is the prevalent psychology among the upper level of African workers on the Copperbelt and it was best expressed by an African trainee who said: "Some day, the situation will explode."

The Expatriate Argument

It seems that there are two kinds of arguments over this question. The first may as well be ascribed to the expatriate mine workers and officials. It runs as follows:

(1) Those who have left their homelands to serve in a foreign country braving many difficulties have already made some sacrifice. Unfortunately, the Africans do not look at it that way. "They even do not appreciate the difficult process of racial readjustment", as many European mine workers put it.

(2) The expatriates have to put up with discomforts in regard to the education of their children, radio, television, and bad postal services, etc.

(3) Many expressed anxiety about the future of their children. They pointed out that the standard of education in the country had fallen since independence and that the policy of Africanization would harm the careers of their children in Zambia. Apart from this, they also expressed general uncertainty about the course politics might take in the country. Very few Europeans seemed to have *genuine* sympathy for an African government. "Today there is Mr. Arthur Wina as Minister of Finance, tomorrow he may not be there". This statement more or less sums up the European attitude towards African governments in general.

(4) Finally, the Europeans often point out that the Africans are hyper-sensitive even on very minor matters concerning day-to-day social behaviour. There seems to be much resentment on this score and perhaps the few instances cited by Europeans might be true. One such case was that of the unruly behaviour of some African girl trainees in a local nursing school. Complaints were being voiced about their rather noisy evening parties and the local party leader of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) wrote a curt letter to the Public Relations Officer (PRO) of one of the companies demanding immediate action against the girl trainees. The choice before the PRO was indeed difficult. If he were to ignore the letter, certainly the local party boys would create enough trouble for him; if he decided to take disciplinary action, he could not hope to remain popular among the Africans!

Before we consider the set of arguments advanced by the Africans, let us briefly examine the above arguments.

(1) It is true that some Europeans came to the Copperbelt mainly to settle down; but in most cases, the expatriate worker is mainly, perhaps exclusively, interested in making money. As such his complaints

about physical discomforts and personal sacrifice hold little water. Discussing this aspect, a highly placed official at the Staff Training College in Kitwe told me: "It is a psychology that buttresses itself on flimsy or imagined grounds". His description seemed to be most appropriate.

(2) As regards uncertainty about the future, there is no doubt that this is a factor which disturbs the minds of most Europeans on the Copperbelt. It would be an ideal thing if the African Government could dispel this fear; at the same time, it is very necessary for Europeans to remember that the discomforts they are experiencing, mostly in small matters, are not unique. Would not a mine worker shudder to think what life would be in a one-room flat in a London suburb? The trouble is that very little objective thinking is done on these matters; most Europeans are ready to hit back at an African administration without understanding its problems and limitations.

(3) The anxiety about the future of European children is genuine and the expatriates should know where they stand on this matter. But, again, this is a problem which does not necessarily involve politics. The process of African development appears to this writer to be one in which Africa would need all kinds of experts and skilled men for the next two or three generations, not as expatriates but as active and intelligent members of an integrated society.

(4) Finally, despite developments in several material aspects of life on the Copperbelt, there still does not seem to be any inter-communication between Africans and Europeans. So long as this is not established, it is futile to hope for a common understanding that would benefit both the communities.

The African Argument

Let us now examine the African argument.

(1) In the first place, Africans complain that a hidden form of racialism is practised by Europeans. On questioning them, I found that most of them were unable to explain this phenomenon of "hidden racialism," though they pointed out several minor cases of friction.

(2) A much more serious grievance is that the process of Africanization of the mining staff is very slow. Ridiculing the various crash programmes for the training of Africans undertaken by the companies, an African told me: "This is an unending process of training and there seems to be nothing else". On rechecking the various instances cited, I found that definite efforts had been made by the companies to quicken the pace of Africanization in various departments. Yet, why do so many misunderstandings prevail on this score?

(3) Finally, nearly all members of African salaried staff whom I interviewed complained bitterly about the double wage structure which, as pointed out earlier, has most unfortunately divided Africans and Europeans into two separate groups. This racial factor has in fact been accentuated by a wholly economic issue.

On attaining political independence, it is perhaps a natural tendency for Africans to show off their independence and especially their newly achieved status of social equality, sometimes in an aggressive manner. When some Europeans tactlessly object to this process of self-assertion by the Africans, they simply fail to accept this very common human weakness. As a result, the African tries to find out, sometimes even deliberately, such cases as could prove his point that racialism exists on the Copperbelt though in a hidden form. The present programme of training Africans in the mining industry may well be re-investigated to find out whether the method and object—*training* and *pace* of Africanization—are going hand in hand. If not, changes are called for both in policies and in the manner in which they are being implemented. About the double wage structure, there seems to be a consensus among both Europeans and Africans that it is morally wrong and unjustified. If so, one wonders why something cannot be done about it. As a short-term measure, the present wage structure should be reformed, though, one must note, in the long run nothing but abolition of the system itself would satisfy the Africans.

General Observations

The Copperbelt today overflows with wealth. The soaring price of copper in the world market, the discovery of new mining sites and, what is most important, the liberal policy of the Zambian Government on taxation, have given every incentive to the mining companies to improve the material conditions of their employees. Yet, political independence and increasing wealth have brought in their wake new aspirations, new tensions and new conflicts which it would not be wise to ignore. Despite the swiftness of change, each group—the management, the expatriates or the Africans—seems to be living in its narrow groove and such channels of inter-communication as exist are not adequate for a drastic readjustment of social relations which has become imperative.

This compartmentalisation of social life must be broken if a harmonious multi-racial society is to be built on the Copperbelt. It is rather naive to think that a few integrated schools could do this job. It is equally foolish to think that mere social mixing between Africans and Europeans at parties and clubs would bring them together. Schools or clubs certainly contribute to the creation of better relations, but that is merely secondary. The class-room perhaps helps an African boy or girl to learn a few English words or the names of his or her European class-mates. Again, at clubs or parties, Africans may learn table manners and perhaps strike up friendship with a few Europeans. Yet the process remains one-sided and promotes individual relations rather than group relations.

Again, the present practice of African ministers and politicians visiting the Copperbelt to hold out assurances to both African and expatriate workers does not seem to have contributed much to the process of racial harmonisation. Mere exhortations are not enough. In fact, this practice seems to have encouraged certain unhealthy tendencies, *viz*: (i) the psychology of representing to men in authority every minor complaint for redress; and (ii) an impatience, mainly on the part of

Africans, that their Government is not keen enough to understand and protect their interests. This habit of dependence on administration may create various complications, including greater bureaucratic interference in industrial relations.

For a proper readjustment of the racial situation and understanding between Africans and Europeans, new institutions and forums will have to be established where members of both the races could talk freely about their problems and devise ways and means of solving them. Instead of avoiding the issues, it is necessary to face them boldly. Here the company managements and the various unions representing Africans and expatriate workers could do a useful thing; instead of meeting occasionally to discuss their trade union or economic interests, they could join hands to arrange such forums, group meetings, informal exchanges of ideas as would bring the diverse groups together. Perhaps, the ruling UNIP could also help in the process. So far its local party bosses have spent too much energy on interfering in trade union affairs or in minor matters which only aggravate problems of racial adjustment. It would be most desirable if the top leadership of the UNIP could lay down a broad line of policy on this question for its local workers to follow.

Much has been done on the Copperbelt to improve the living conditions of Africans and provide all possible comforts for expatriate workers. Yet material wealth is not everything; it is the spiritual, emotional and social aspects of life that need immediate reform on the Copperbelt.

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1. Between 1964 and 1965, the total average African earning in mining and quarrying increased from £132 to £413. For industry as a whole the average African earning increased by 20 per cent during 1964-65. See *Economic Report*, Ministry of Finance, Lusaka, 1966, p. 29.
2. Op. cit., p. 29.
3. From a casual survey of African families in one mining township, I found that at least seven were supporting unemployed relatives and their children.
4. Noting this trend, the Morrison Report points out: "The African naturally tends to make direct comparisons between himself and the European with whom he works. He, therefore, compares his own wages and conditions of employment with those of Europeans, rather than with those of fellow Africans employed outside the mining industry". *Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Mining Industry in Northern Rhodesia*, Lusaka, 1962, p. 9.

Quarterly Chronicle

THE world has got used to living with Rhodesia. So has India. But no country which has the interest of democracy at heart can cease to protest against the atrocity that is personified by the so-called white man's burden over the four million inhabitants of Rhodesia. India has lost no opportunity to make its views known on the subject. Mr. M. C. Chagla, India's External Affairs Minister, reiterated the Government's well-known views on Rhodesia and said the sanctions proposed to be applied by Britain were unlikely to be effective. He welcomed Britain's move to approach the United Nations for the imposition of selective mandatory sanctions against the rebel Ian Smith regime in Salisbury but added the rider that the illegal rule could be brought down only if mandatory sanctions of a general and comprehensive character were applied under Chapter VII, Articles 41 and 42, of the UN Charter, covering both imports and exports. It was India's view, he pointed out, that apart from an embargo on Rhodesian exports, at least some of the major imports like oil, petroleum products, textile fabrics, machinery and spares and fertilisers should also be banned mandatorily from reaching that country.

A week later the Security Council, for the first time in the history of the UN, invoked mandatory economic sanctions, including an oil embargo, in an attempt to crush the white minority government in the heart of Africa. But the Council failed to vote for the use of force to compel obedience to the oil embargo, thus raising doubts about its effectiveness. The Council rejected African demands for a strict oil embargo by Britain aimed at South Africa and Portugal, Rhodesia's chief suppliers of oil. The British contended that such a step would require a naval blockade of *all* Southern Africa and involve a confrontation with the Republic whose trade is vital for the British economy. The resolution, for which India voted, nevertheless represented a historic step by the Security Council which acted under the provisions of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter dealing with threats to world peace.

In the economic field, the most interesting development concerning India was the fruitful visit paid by a five-member all-Indian delegation from Kenya representing the Africindo Industrial Development Corporation. Members of this team, whose work had the blessings of the Kenyan authorities, held discussions with Indian Ministers on matters relating to the expansion of trade and economic cooperation between the two countries. Their main purpose was to enlist India's financial and technical support for the promotion of joint ventures in Kenya, especially in the field of small-scale industries. The delegation pleaded

for easier export of Indian machinery and tools to Kenya and training facilities for Kenyan students in India. It also suggested that Indian financial institutions should invest in the Corporation's share capital either in equities or in preference shares and provide loans for joint ventures.

Before the delegation left India at the end of a successful trip the terms of a mutual assistance agreement providing, among other things, for the establishment of joint industrial ventures, were finalised between the Kenyan body and the National Industrial Development Corporation of India. Under the agreement, which is to be signed between the two organisations, the NIDC will conduct a feasibility survey for industry in Kenya, providing all the technical help necessary for the purpose. It would then assist in the establishment of any factory recommended by the survey report. Moreover, the NIDC will undertake to train Indian and African students in technical lines at Indian educational institutions but, above all, it would help the Africindo Corporation to develop into an organisation that could itself conduct the basic programmes in such matters as training locally.

The long-term objective of the Corporation is to seek the integration of the Indian community numbering about 150,000 in the economic life of Kenya, thus fortifying the foundations of a multi-racial society. The Corporation has realised that with the entry of Africans into commerce and industry and the consequent large-scale displacement of Kenyan Indians valuable skills and experience could be lost to the country unless they could be used to help Africans switch over to commerce in a planned and scientific way and establish cooperative industrial projects where Indian skills could be exploited. With an initial authorised capital of Sh. 5 million the Corporation is well equipped to attain its preliminary goals. Two members of the Kenyan delegation stressed that there was ample scope for all in Kenya if the immigrant races were prepared to play their part in its economic development. Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister whom the delegation met, spoke well of the ventures for co-operation and promised Indian support for them. She was anxious to see relations between the African majority and the Indian minority in Kenya develop harmoniously and this, in her view, could be achieved if the Indians helped in the economic development of their adopted homeland, thus removing one of the major causes of racial friction.

On their way back the delegation visited Ahmedabad with the sole purpose of meeting the Gujarat Chief Minister and asked him to take interest in the rehabilitation of Indians returning from Kenya due to the changing politico-economic climate there. Though they spoke of their own efforts to narrow the area of differences with Africans, they wanted the Gujarat authorities to take a realistic view of the whole situation and sought timely help where it would alleviate misery and distress. The response to their suggestions is believed to have been favourable. It has been estimated that only 60,000 of the Indians have so far become Kenya citizens, the figure including children who were born in the country. But the number of those who have become citizens through *choice*, as distinct from the mere operation of law, is less than 9,000. It is possible that if the Kenyan government implements its economic policies the Indian commu-

nity will be hard hit, being eventually driven out of commerce and industry which it has traditionally controlled. Although this particular scheme may not be favoured by the government, a person of the position and standing of Mr. F.R.S. de Souza, the "Indian" Deputy Speaker of the Kenyan lower house of Parliament, has spoken of a plan for a governmental buyout of Indian-owned shops in Nairobi, Mombasa and other urban centres in the country.

As if taking a timely cue from his suggestion the Nairobi City Council decided in December to give three months notice to stall-holders, mainly Indian, to quit the municipal markets under its control. The Nairobi move was followed by the civic body in Mombasa, the second largest city. The two councils based their decision on their desire to "Africanise" trade. It touched off a bitter controversy and at least one major English language newspaper wrote an editorial criticising the move in so far as it equally affected Asians who had become nationals of the country. But there has been no indication that the two civic bodies, whose example will certainly be followed elsewhere in Kenya and East Africa, will revise their decisions so as to exempt Asians who have acquired Kenya citizenship.

One African country which has offered to rehabilitate Indians forced to leave Kenya is Zambia. A Zambian team visited Kenya in November to recruit people who could take over jobs in Zambia in the event of a mass exodus of skilled Europeans if the Zambian-Rhodesian common railway system was broken up. Several Indians who were dismissed from railways, post offices and other services applied for jobs in Zambia and got them. Earlier in the year, a recruiting mission from Malawi railways had also toured Kenya and some other parts of East Africa and recruited several Indians who had lost their jobs due to Africanisation.

These rather sad developments may be ended on a happier note: in the middle of November, Nigeria opened a direct communications link with India for the first time. A radio telegraph circuit between Lagos and Bombay was inaugurated in the Nigerian capital. India is the seventeenth country to open a radio communications link with Nigeria.

Zambia-India Friendship Association

A Zambia-India Friendship Association has been set up in Lusaka to promote better understanding and greater friendship between the peoples of Zambia and India through mutual appreciation of the arts and culture of the two countries. To achieve this objective, the Association, formally inaugurated on Nov. 14, will hold meetings and social gatherings and arrange film shows, exhibitions and lectures of educational and cultural interests and assist students from either country during their visits to Zambia or India. A non-political organization, the Association has Mr. D.M. Lisulo as its Chairman, Mr. C. Kamalondo as Secretary and Mr. K.V.R. Sastry as Treasurer. Both Mr. Lisulo and Mr. Ramalondo have studied in India.

Zambia's Troubles

Zambia continued to struggle for survival in the face of Rhodesian outrages and British prevarication. Its leaders, notably President Kenneth Kaunda, condemned wholeheartedly the Wilson-Smith meeting in a boat and wondered why Britain continued to negotiate with a traitor. Early in the year, Mr. Harold Wilson promised at the Commonwealth conference in Lagos that the collapse of the Ian Smith regime was a matter of weeks rather than months. But in the meantime Zambia alone has lost \$240 million as a result of the Rhodesian rebellion. Perhaps more than the economic problems, Kaunda is concerned about the possibilities of a major racial explosion in Central Africa. This tragedy, Kaunda told journalists in Ottawa in November, could have been averted by Britain using force against Smith but "today there has to be bloodshed". Before he went on his "economic and diplomatic" mission to America, Canada and a few other western countries, Kaunda faced what he termed a desperate situation at home. This arose from racial mistrust, suspicion and doubt between the Africans and the 65,000-strong white community of Zambia. He referred to the mass resignations of Europeans from the copper mines following race riots in the Copperbelt town of Kitwe in early November resulting in the stoning to death of a white woman and the deportation of 23 Europeans from the country. One casualty of these events was Anglo-Zambian relations which reached their "lowest ebb", according to some press reports. A goodwill visit by 10 British MPs to Zambia was cancelled at the last moment. Simultaneously, the Royal Air Force airlift of oil to Zambia was ended. Kaunda refused to accept a package aid offer of £13 million from Britain since it was not only inadequate but also derisory, a great part of it being meant to cover the cost of the oil airlift and other activities connected with the anti-Rhodesian sanctions.

South Africa watched the situation with unconcealed glee. It acted as a self-appointed champion of all Rhodesian causes. A senior South African Cabinet Minister, Mr. Ben Schoeman, told a meeting near Johannesburg that Wilson must realise that he would have to destroy the Rhodesian whites before they would surrender. Warning Wilson that Rhodesia would never go under, this confidant of Prime Minister Vorster advised the British leader to swallow his pride. He made it clear that South Africa would never participate in sanctions against Rhodesia if called upon to do so as a member of the UN. Another Minister, Jacobus Fouche, warned the UN that if it ever tried to fight South Africa "we will finish them off before breakfast". Fouche, largely responsible for building up his country's defence forces during his six years as Defence Minister before being transferred to the Agriculture Ministry, suggested that nations which might boycott South Africa could not do without its gold and raw materials. He boasted: "If the western countries do not buy our gold while they boycott us, the price of our gold will quadruple and when these countries stop boycotting us they will find South Africa richer than ever before".

Battle Cry in Pretoria

While South African Ministers talked this language, the Vorster

government quietly carried on a two-pronged offensive. On the diplomatic front, its ambassador in London, Dr. Carel de Wet, initiated moves towards a Rhodesian settlement. On the security front, the South African police took special precautions to safeguard its northern border. Police chief Lt.-Gen. Johannes Keesj said the border would be patrolled by a special armed unit of unspecified strength, trained in guerrilla warfare and equipped with helicopters. The countries to the north of the Republic are, significantly, Rhodesia, newly-freed Botswana and South-West Africa. About the same time, Defence Minister Botha disclosed with deliberate vagueness that South Africa would soon have a "powerful and unique" weapon which, according to scientific speculation, might be either a new type of guided missile or some kind of automatic rocket. Mr. Botha said the weapon was designed by South African scientists in conjunction with certain other scientists whose nationality or identity he declined to give.

On the economic front it was reported that South Africa was taking no chances of being caught in an oil embargo and was pushing ahead with preparations to ensure supplies. The latest measure, reported from Johannesburg in the middle of December, was the government's intention to enlarge its oil tanker fleet by buying 650,000-ton tankers. Reports said the government was building its own refinery and had made arrangements with some oil-producing countries in the Middle East for the purchase of crude oil. Simultaneously there were indications from Rhodesia that if the UN imposed oil sanctions the illegal regime would have enough fuel stocks to last two years, even if South Africa refused further supplies. But it was not equally stressed that Rhodesia had been getting 200,000 gallons of oil products daily from South Africa and Mozambique since the British oil embargo was imposed a year ago.

While these battle cries were being raised in Pretoria and Johannesburg, UN members were proposing mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa as the only peaceful means of ending its apartheid policies. A resolution passed on December 13 by 87 votes in the 122-nation Special Political Committee demanded that Britain, America, France and other major trading partners of South Africa take urgent steps to stop their trade with it. Indian ambassador Parthasarathi said his country was deeply concerned with the situation and regretted the assistance being given to South Africa. Portugal also came in for strong condemnation from another UN agency, the Trusteeship Committee. The General Assembly, taking up the committee's resolution, recommended that the Security Council make it obligatory for all States to break diplomatic relations with Portugal and impose an economic boycott against Lisbon. Portugal's military NATO allies were specially requested to desist from giving any assistance to Lisbon which would enable it to continue its repression of the African people under its domination.

Termination of Mandate

Six weeks earlier, towards the end of October, the UN General Assembly took another historic step by proclaiming the termination of South Africa's mandate over South-West Africa, declaring that hence-

forth the former German colony was a direct UN responsibility. The General Assembly, after a long and bitter debate, approved, by 114 votes to two with three abstentions (Britain, France and Malawi), a resolution setting out action to compel South Africa to give up its stranglehold over the territory. In addition the resolution set up a 14-nation special committee to recommend practical means for UN administration of the territory so that it could be put on the road to independence. It set April 1967 as the deadline for receiving the committee's report, to be considered at a special Assembly session. South African foreign minister Hilgard Muller lost no time in dubbing the Assembly resolution illegal.

Another UN body, the Committee on Colonialism, has accused Spain of suppressing freedom movements in its colony of Equatorial Guinea. The 7-nation mission to West Africa found that most people in the territory wanted independence not later than July 1968 and recommended that the Spanish government convene a conference at once of all political leaders in Guinea to arrange for the transfer of power.

Ghana Issue at OAU

Guineans from Conakry nearly wrecked the fourth summit meeting in Addis Ababa of the Organisation of African Unity. Ghana arrested Guinea's foreign minister and his 18 aides while they were on their way to the summit, threatening to hold them captive until such time as the Ghanaians held in Guinea against their will were not allowed to return home. The incident dominated the OAU deliberations for some days. While President Nyerere of Tanzania openly condemned the Ghanaian action on the ground that it jeopardised the success of the conference, Emperor Haile Selassie sent his Justice Minister to Accra to talk with its military leader, General Ankrah. The OAU later despatched a peace mission of Kenyan, Congolese and Sierra Leonean ministers which secured the release of the 19 captives, thus saving the summit. The meeting, regarded as the least successful of the OAU summits, achieved little apart from urging mandatory and comprehensive sanctions against Rhodesia and calling on all African nations to contribute to a special fund to help Rhodesian nationalists "intensify their fight". The summit did nothing to resolve the differences between Rhodesia's two rival parties, ZAPU and ZANU, led respectively by Joshua Nkomo and Rev. N. Sithole, both in detention.

China exploited the OAU conference to repeat its accusation that the Ghanaian regime was a "pawn of US and British imperialism". The Peking *People's Daily* warned Ghana that "all those who are engaged in opposing China are merely raising a rock only to have their own toes crushed and will end up in complete disgrace". Reports from Accra said the military regime was contemplating a complete rupture of relations with Peking on account of continued Chinese aid to ex-President Nkrumah. Nkrumah was reported to have received £750,000 in American and British currency from China and Russia to plan the overthrow of the Ankrah regime. Taking seriously the threat of infiltration by Nkru-

mah agents, the Ghana government warned all police and army units to be vigilant on and off duty. The Ghanaian authorities continued with their economy measures, some resulting in considerable unemployment, culminating in the closure of 20 embassies and missions abroad, saving £1 million a year.

Coup in Burundi

The tiny Central African kingdom of Burundi flashed into headlines towards the end of November. Army captain Michel Micombero seized power from recently-crowned King Ntare, 19, and proclaimed Burundi a Republic. The king was in neighbouring Congo attending the celebrations of the first anniversary of General Mobutu's seizure of power when the 24-year-old Captain struck. One of Micombero's first acts was to resume diplomatic relations with China, giving rise to fears that the tiny country of 2.5 million people could once again become a Chinese base in Africa. The Chinese embassy was closed down in January 1965 after its active role in fomenting rebellion in the Congo. Under the circumstances, the temptation for Mobutu to condemn the coup was great but he confined himself to merely remarking that Micombero's move was an "act of discourtesy" towards the Congolese people because it took place while Ntare V was in Kinshasa.

Mobutu himself took further steps to consolidate his rule over the country. In early November he assumed powers to curtail the authority of the Congo's 12 provincial governors and local assemblies in order to "put an end to arbitrary acts which have been and continue to be committed in the provinces". Two days later he suspended these governors and replaced them by army officers. The provinces included North and South Katanga, to which belonged former Premier Moise Tshombe, now in self-imposed exile in Spain, and the Upper Congo, the scene of a mutiny six months ago. Only a few days ago Mobutu dismissed eight Ministers in a sweeping Cabinet reshuffle. He also introduced changes in the Congolese army command.

Whether President Nyerere of Tanzania was referring to these developments or the coup in Togo that failed on November 21-22 or the "failure" of the fourth African summit is not clear, but he seemed pretty depressed on his return from Addis Ababa. Passing through Nairobi on his way back home, he remarked that "there is a devil somewhere causing all the confusion on the continent". He soon made it clear whom he was referring to when he accused Britain and France of dominating OAU affairs. He wanted African nations to make up their minds whether they preferred Africa to association with their former colonial masters. The OAU summit from which he had returned had demonstrated, he lamented, that Britain and France had more power over the organisation's affairs than all its member-States put together. No other African leader has talked so plainly about the continent's ills.

Nyerere Acts

Nyerere's stock in East Africa rose when in early December he asserted his authority over Zanzibar by suspending the decree setting up

a special court in the island to try political offenders. The court had been set up a month earlier by the Zanzibari leader and Tanzanian vice-president, Abeid Karume, to try those held under preventive detention and those accused of stealing or damaging government property. No existing laws in Tanzania were to limit the jurisdiction of the 14-member court which was to formulate its own procedures. Its proceedings were to be secret, denying the right of representation or appeal to the accused.

Tanzania's relations with its neighbours deteriorated sharply. The disclosure that Portuguese soldiers in Mozambique had crossed the Rivuma river into Tanzania and laid mines which killed four Tanzanians shocked the country and made its leaders step up the campaign against the Portuguese. Mr. Rashidi Kawawa, Tanzania's second vice-president, toured the southern region and called for the people's cooperation with the armed forces to repel the Portuguese. Mozambican nationalist forces have been conducting a guerilla campaign against the Portuguese from Tanzanian soil under the aegis of the OAU's Liberation Committee. Tanzania's relations with Kenya were none too happy either. In early December about 60 Kenyans living in Tanzania's Lake Victoria region were herded into a boat and sent off to Kisumu summarily. Though Tanzanians claimed the action was taken against those who had entered the country without valid entry permits, the Kenyans described it as a reprisal against their charges of child slavery in Tanzania. Some months ago it was alleged that Tanzania was recruiting Kenyan children for forced labour in forests. Tanzania had reacted by repatriating as many Kenyan children as it could lay its hands on.

Kenya-Uganda Conflict

Kenyan-Ugandan relations were also strained. Kenya's Home Minister, Mr. Daniel Moi, announced before a startled Parliament that the Opposition leader, Mr. Oginga Odinga, had gone to Uganda to contact foreign missions for funds. On his way back Odinga, known for his leftist leanings, was humiliated by Kenya police and stripped naked for a thorough search. Mr. Moi denied that his predecessor and former vice-president had been ill-treated, explaining that Odinga had consumed "too much whiskey" and was so gay that he stripped himself voluntarily to impress upon the police officers that he had nothing to hide. Odinga, however, is known to be a teetotaler.

Uganda's President, Mr. Obote, however had no time to concern himself with his neighbours' affairs though his sympathies are quite obviously with Odinga. He was preoccupied with setting in order his own house whose peace had been shattered by the events of February 1966 leading to the mass arrest of his Cabinet colleagues, suspension of the federal constitution, flight of the Kabaka of Buganda and his own assumption of supreme powers. Mr. Obote straightened the remaining "mess" in the army by arresting the chief of the defence staff. Brig. Shaban Opolot, whom he had always suspected of siding with the Kabaka. No details were given about Opolot's disgrace except the official spokesman's stock announcement that he had been dismissed "for activities and

behaviour prejudicial to the good behaviour and control of the armed forces". Four weeks later Obote announced a further extension by six months of the state of emergency in the key province of Buganda after his Internal Affairs Minister Basil Bataringaya had told Parliament that the Kabaka was planning to stage a comeback with the aid of foreign troops. Obote silenced any lingering hopes about a return to democratic, constitutional rule by informing the country a few days later that there would be no elections in Uganda for five years.

Activities of the Council

The following is an account of the activities of the Council during the quarter :

Uganda Women's Delegation

The Executive Secretary of the Council remained in touch with the Uganda Women's Delegation which visited India in December to attend the 17th International Conference on Family Planning. She arranged a meeting of the delegation with the Prime Minister. The delegation comprised Mrs. Kamanyi, Vice-President, Mrs. Rebecca Mulira, Member, and Mrs. Dastur, Treasurer, of the Uganda Council of Women.

Books for Zambia

The Council presented a set of books on India to the library of the National Archives of the Republic of Zambia. It is compiling another list of books which will be sent to the Archives shortly.

Book Exhibition

The Council participated in an exhibition of books on Nigeria organised in November by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations.

Annual General Meeting

At the Council's annual general meeting on Nov. 25, the following were elected members of the Executive Committee : Mr. Asoka Mehta, Mr. Dinesh Singh, Mr. S. Mulgaokar, Mr. C.R. Pattabhi Raman, Mr. S.L. Poplai, Col. B. H. Zaidi, Mr. S. A. Mehdi, Dr. Gopal Singh, Mr. K. C. Pant, Mr. Ravindra Varma, Mr. L. C. Jain, Mr. I.K. Gujral, Mr. Sisir Gupta and Dr. P.D. Gaitonde.

The Council constituted a sub-committee to raise funds for its building. It comprises Mr. B. P. Jain (convener), Mr. G. L. Bansal, Mr. L.C. Jain, Col. B.H. Zaidi, Dr. Gopal Singh and Mr. I.K. Gujral.

Seminar on African Developments

Under its programme for 1967, the Council will organise, among other activities, a seminar on Recent Developments in Africa and a study tour of Himachal Pradesh for African students in summer.

New Members

The Council has enrolled as an ordinary member Mr. K.R. Singh, Lecturer, Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi.

Publications

A book on the United Arab Republic, the second in a series on independent African countries, has been sent to the Press. The first book was on Nigeria.

Book Reviews

South Africa, A Study in Conflict

Pierre L. van den Berghe, Wesleyan University Press.

A *bona fide* professional in any field is a pleasure to behold, and there can be no doubt that Professor Pierre L. van den Berghe, the author of *South Africa, A Study in Conflict*, is a true professional both as a sociologist and as an Africanist. In an area in which the amateur who has read a few books on Africa and has taken a whirlwind three-week tour of 21 countries considers himself qualified to analyse and condemn in print, particularly in the case of South Africa, it is refreshing to spend a few hours with a trained observer who has the background, talent, and objectivity to tackle an assessment of the tangled South African skein. And to tackle it without attempting to offer a panacea for the country's ills off the top of his hat, too!

Dr. van den Berghe begins by pointing out to the reader that his book does not purport to add any new facts to the South African jigsaw puzzle. He also makes it a point in his introduction to lay out for public inspection as many of his prejudices and preconceptions as he can possibly pin down and label, certainly a tribute to his training in sociology. This clearing of the intellectual and emotional decks for action would undoubtedly have been an easy-to-rationalize-away chore in a study of an area which lends itself so beautifully to the old adage about Africa in general: Visit for a day and you can write an article, a week and you can write a book, a month and you can't write a word.

Dr. van den Berghe has obviously not only read all the books during his seven-year study of the South African scene, but he has also taken the trouble to live there for two years and has produced one of the recent classics in sociology, *Caneville, the Social Structure of a South African Town*. And although it may seem superfluous since anyone can easily tell that the Afrikaner government is always wrong merely by glancing through the newspapers, living in South Africa is a vital factor in the production of meaningful scholarship concerning that bedevilled country. There is something about the immovable object and the unstoppable force situation existing there which has its own unique taste and texture which cannot be vicariously experienced; it has to be lived to be known.

Even the majority of those living amidst the subterranean turmoil bubbling just beneath the superficial quiet of the crust of white complacency, however, have little meaningful impression of their future role in history unless they happen to be trained sociologists or active politicians. The average white South African businessman, although he prides himself

on "knowing the African", actually has extremely little knowledge of who and what the non-white politicians and issues involved are. Given the most simple high school type matching test of 100 events, dates, names and places in African politics in South Africa, it is almost certain that the great majority of white South Africans, businessmen or otherwise, would fail to score 50 per cent marks.

Here is an example of this myopia toward "black politics". During the middle of the dire national emergency of March 1960 in South Africa, I attended a dinner at a Pretoria hotel with a group of 15 Polish immigrants who had been resident in the country since World War II. After the usual liberal libation of real Polish vodka and an excellent dinner of Cape lobster, the talk turned to politics, as it invariably does in that country, more often sooner than later. Naturally, every man present took it upon himself to inform the only "foreigner" in the assemblage, namely me, about the looming racial armageddon inherent in that week's particular crisis, the Sharpeville shooting. With the vodka and the bonhomie flowing in ever increasingly stronger freshets, I decided that it would not be too far amiss to conduct a little Gallup type poll on an informal level to determine the authenticity and authority for the dogmatic statements on African politics in South Africa being poured into my assumed *tabula rasa* of a South African political mind. A man-by-man survey showed beyond any doubt that not one of these ostensibly well informed political pundits knew a single African, let alone an African politician, on any level outside of a master-servant relationship! And this situation could be multiplied by multiples of scores of thousands of cases among born white South Africans. Even the material published on African politics by the non-white organizations in South Africa is read only by the non-white masses, active politicians, and the Special Branch of the South African police!

For this reason, the background and preparation which Dr. van den Berghe brings to his subject is a vital ingredient of his book and makes his study well worth careful reading by any serious student of the keg of racial and political dynamite called South Africa. In fact, it would behove the white population of that country to make it an under-the-counter best-seller in their own country even though it will undoubtedly be banned by the powers that be. It is a clear mirror which will reflect for them from a distance what they evidently cannot see from their own close point of vantage and may in the long run shed the necessary light which might serve to disclose the cancer which is devouring the very soul of that beautiful but tragic land.

On the debit side of the ledger, there are the lapses into sociological jargon which Dr. van den Berghe allows himself and his occasionally distressing linguistic quirks such as "the police was fired upon" and others of a similar kind. These are a result of the author's particular background and experience, however, and are to be blamed on his editors rather than on him. Even the comma in place of a colon in the title can be laid at the foot of the editors and need not detract from the intrinsic worth of the book as a whole. This chaff can be easily glossed over because the wheat of Dr van den Berghe's offering is so much worth the effort of brush-

ing aside the slight irritation of some of his more annoying linguistic aberrations.

The author gives us a sketch of the historical background needed for perspective in any consideration of the South African problem, and his light touch makes a pleasure of reading what has lately become a bit repetitious in that so many books on the country's malaise are beginning to appear, each giving a thumbnail sketch of South African history for the general orientation of the reader. At this rate, it should not be long before many interested readers become more immediately familiar with South African history than that of their own country. In addition, Dr. van den Berghe appends a close chronology of South African events which should be of value to many readers and researchers plus numerous statistical tables which are also extremely useful. His best contribution in the background line, however, is an excellent detailed bibliography which is one of the best published in any book not primarily concerned with South African bibliography which I have seen in some years.

The heart of Dr. van den Berghe's book is made up of astute, incisive chapters on the culture and status, polity and economy of the country's social structure, an objective analysis of the new diminishing conflict between the Afrikaner and the English-speaking South African, "Native Policy", and the non-white opposition and internal power balance. He closes his study with perspicuous chapters on the country's economic system and its "dysfunctions", a most interesting survey of the value conflicts involved in this many peopled land, the external pressures which they breed, and some theoretical considerations resulting from his survey of South Africa from the sociological point of view. Although this book, as the author so honestly points out in his introduction, does not bring to light any new facts or offer any panaceas for the solution of South African problems, it does offer one of the best general overviews published in recent years from an angle of observation which is rare because South Africa has generally been the domain of study primarily of political scientists. All in all, despite the few minor shortcomings noted previously, the book can be considered one of the most useful general studies in recent years of a steadily deteriorating situation and a book which can be highly recommended for reading by anyone concerned with or interested in the past, present and future development of that unhappiest of lands, the Republic of South Africa.

EDMUND A. BOJARSKI

Nigeria : The Army and the People's Cause.

Obargogie Ohonbamu, Ibadan, 1966, pp. 52

This pamphlet is a revised version of Dr. O. Ohonbamu's lecture on the "Role of Army in Nigerian Politics" which he delivered at the University of Lagos on 29 January 1966. The basic theme of the book is the role the Nigerian Army could play in the reconstruction of a Nigerian society.

The pamphlet is divided into two parts. Part I deals with the general functions of an army and the "democratic coup" of 1966. Apart

from the traditional role of the army in maintaining the security of a nation from both within and without Ohonbamu assigns two important tasks to the army of a developing country: (a) to act as an instrument of nation-building, (b) to change and clean society (p. 20). It is in this context that he fully supports the "democratic coup" of January 1966 which removed "corrupt politicians".

The second part of the pamphlet is devoted to a discussion of the task of national reconstruction by the army. He refers to a number of tasks which the Nigerian army must tackle. They are: recovery of all ill-gotten gains and goods from politicians and their associates; (2) adoption of a new constitution with provisions for a unitary form of government and with an elected President at the head of the executive; (3) fixation of a national minimum wage; and (4) nationalisation of land.

It is obvious that the author has been over-enthusiastic and over-optimistic about the role which the army could play in maintaining national unity and carrying out the task of national reconstruction. The events that have taken place in Nigeria after the military coup of January 1966 go a long way to prove that the army itself suffers from certain limitations. It is doubtful whether the Nigerian army will succeed where politicians have failed. For, after all, politicians are always more responsive to public opinion than an army. The pamphlet does not present a very serious study of the role of the Nigerian army in the political life of the country.

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
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
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
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
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


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


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



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Subscription (*in India*): Rs. 10 per annum

Subscription (*Foreign*): £ 1. 10sh. or \$5

Single Copy : Rs. 3

Single Copy : 9sh. or \$1.50

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Military Coups and Inter-African Diplomacy

YASH TANDON

BOUMEDIENNE'S Algerian coup of 19 June, 1965, touched off, by example or simply by accident, a number of similar military coups all over Africa. On 25 November, 1965, General Mobutu deposed President Kassavubu in a bloodless coup in Congo (Kinshasa). Four days later, General Christophe Soglo deposed President Souvou Migan Apithy in a similar coup in Dahomey. On 1 January, 1966, Colonel Bakassa deposed President David Dacko in the Central African Republic. Three days later, on 3 January, President Maurice Yameogo in Upper Volta met a similar fate at the hands of Lieutenant-Colonel Sangoule Lamizana. A fortnight later, on 15 January, came the most dramatic coup of all—Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi's, military take-over of Nigeria, to be followed, on 24 February, 1966, by yet another dramatic coup leading to the deposition of Nkrumah in Ghana. In July, 1966, King Mwambutsa IV of Burundi was deposed by his son, who crowned himself as King Ntare V in September, only to be deposed by his Prime Minister Michel Micombero on 29 November, 1966.

For every successful coup there might have been some unsuccessful ones and several plots still unhatched or prematurely discovered. Thus, in February 1966, the Uganda Government uncovered an alleged plot by some cabinet ministers to overthrow the Government and in turn staged a "Government coup". On 21 November President Grunitzky of Togo, who had himself come to power after one of the first army coups in independent Africa in 1963, foiled an attempt to overthrow him. On 27 November, the Ethiopian Government arrested the Deputy Chief of the Ethiopian Territorial Army, Brigadier-General Tade Sse Birru, for allegedly attempting to overthrow the Government.

The military coups in Africa therefore are a natural subject of interest for political scientists. Most writings on military coups have concentrated primarily on their domestic, as against international, causes and implications. They form a significant area for research, for one needs to know the nature of the coups and why they occur in order to understand the workings of the political systems in Africa.

Is there some value, for instance, in distinguishing between purely military take-overs and take-overs that have only used the military as a tool but that have really put into power not the military itself but some politicians previously in opposition? Is it possible to predict the nature of political systems in Africa? One of the first African countries to achieve its independence was Sudan. Within two years, in 1958, it had a military coup. It has now emerged out of its military period after

the October 1964 revolution. Is there a pattern in this for the rest of Africa? Most military governments that came into power in 1965-1966 also promised to return to civilian constitutional rule. Military governments, or at least strong governments, may be a necessary phase of political development for Africa, as for many other new states in the world. Why this should be so, if it is so, is an interesting area for thought. Military regimes, on the other hand, may be not a passing phase but a recurrent phenomena *a la* Latin America. Is Africa then likely to follow the Latin American way?

Perhaps a less thought out, but equally interesting, area of research is the international aspects of the military coups. It is this that we are concerned with in this paper. But here, too, one must identify two fairly distinct areas of thought. The first is the impact of the military coups on the international relations of Africa. What does the fall of Nkrumah mean for Africa? "The enemies of Africa are now jubilant," President Nyerere of Tanzania is reported to have lamented after Nkrumah's downfall.¹ "There is jubilation in Salisbury and Johannesburg..... What was Kwame trying to do? He stood for the liberation of Africa. There is not a single leader in Africa more committed to this than Kwame. Whom did he anger? Certainly not Africa, and not even friends of Africa." By implication, then, Africa, according to Nyerere, was heading for worse days in its international relations after the fall of Nkrumah.

If these are some of the possible consequences of Nkrumah's overthrow, what then of the impact of the changes in regime in Upper Volta, Dahomey, Chad, Nigeria, the C. A. R., Congo and Burundi? It is argued in some circles that the net effect of these changes has been to make Africa less radical than before. Military leaders are known to be generally conservative. They are also known to feel more secure than their doddling civilian counterparts. Could a sense of security among the new African governments foster a new attitude towards their international problems? So far the military leaders have curiously behaved like politicians. There is no talk, for instance, of giving the "right kind of military orders" to settle the Rhodesian problem. The military leaders insist on a political settlement or on the use of force by Britain alone. Thus it seems that the military takeovers have not brought about any change in the political style of African states in their external or international dealings. We may have to wait a little longer to give a more satisfactory answer backed by more substantial evidence.

But there are yet other kinds of issues raised by the military coups that need examining. Whatever the short-term implications of these military coups for African international relations, they have also raised issues of a more general character, but which are of more fundamental and long-term consequences for inter-African relations. These are issues of principle. They relate to the principles of diplomatic behaviour between African states.

II

How should an African State react to a military coup in its neighbouring country? Should it not assist, in the name of law and

constitutionality, a legitimate regime that is threatened with a military takeover? If African unity is to mean anything, then should not each African state be its brother's keeper?

It could be argued, of course, that what happens in the domestic affairs of one African country should be of no legitimate concern to other African states. They all have signed the Charter of the O. A. U. which, in the first three of the seven principles enunciated in Article III, forbids them to interfere in the internal affairs of other states, and which expects of them to scrupulously respect the sovereign equality of all Member States.

But is an attitude of non-concern on the part of an African State justified in a situation where the constitutional government in a neighbouring state is threatened by a foreign power which proposes to use the army of the state to overthrow the regime? The members who signed the Charter of the O. A. U. and accepted the principle of non-interference had also pledged to carry out one of the purposes of the Organisation, namely, "to eradicate all forms of colonialism in Africa". This should include, one would expect, attempts to reinstate colonialism or neo-colonialism in any part of Africa. It was for this reason that the Congo under Tshombe's regime became a matter of concern for all African states. For this reason also, one could argue, military coups should become the legitimate concern of all responsible African states if there is suspicion of foreign involvement.

If the doctrine of non-interference is to have any meaning in the African context, its application should not create a situation where all the big powers of the world begin interfering in a small African state, while other African states stand on the sidelines watching the panorama in pious adherence to the doctrine, one might say, of non-concern.

The question of how a state is to prove foreign involvement in a military takeover in a neighbouring state in order to justify its own intervention is, no doubt, a difficult one. A state that seeks to influence events in a neighbouring country for its own political motives can surely find a foreign hand where none exists. But at this stage we are concerned only with the principle of non-interference.

The problem of intervention is thus one of the problems arising from military takeovers. Another is the problem of recognition. Should regimes established through military coups be recognised? To ask a still more general question: what manner of changes in government should be recognised among African states? Should the O. A. U. not formulate some basic principles governing the recognition of changes in regime?

The problem is a real one. Immediately after the assassination of President Olympio of Togo in January 1963, the Foreign Ministers of the Monrovia group of African states met, at the initiative of Nigeria, at an emergency session in Lagos. At this meeting, the Nigerian representative, Jaja Wachuku, asked for the enunciation of some principles which would help solve the issue of whether or not to recognise the new regime put into power by the military.

"Should automatic recognition be accorded to the provisional Government of Monsieur Grunitzky, without taking into account the suspension of the Constitution, or the dissolution of the Assembly and of the abrogation of the electoral laws of the Republic of Togo?" Wachuku asked. "Can recognition be decided without taking account of the external influence and of the military constraint which contributed to bring to power and reinforce the new regime?"²

At this conference, members were divided on the question of recognition. Nigeria and Sierra Leone took the legalistic approach that the Togolese Constitution provided for cases of vacancy in office, and therefore a government installed by force ought not to be recognised at once without recourse to the regular legal channels. Ivory Coast also refused to recognise the Grunitzky Government because of alleged foreign interference (meaning, presumably, Ghana's) in the assassination of Olympio. Senegal and Cameroun took the position that although the assassination should be condemned, it was basically an internal Togolese issue, and therefore the new Government should be recognised if members felt that it had the support of representatives of all political elements in the country.

What was important about the Lagos Conference was that some African governments should have actually convened a conference to discuss the principles of recognition, even if there was no agreement at the end of it, and no conventions were signed. Conferences to decide on the recognition of Governments are not now-a-days a common feature of international diplomacy. There is a consensus among states that recognition is basically a political right each state reserves to itself, and that such objective criteria as exist—such as that the government recognised should have *de facto* control over the country, and, for *de jure* recognition, expressed support of the masses of the population—are no more than a minimum guide for the governments according recognition. These criteria have no mandatory force. It is also generally understood that where a government refuses to recognise a regime on some seemingly objective grounds—like the refusal of the United States to recognize Communist China on the ground, among others, that the regime had been forced upon the people and not democratically elected—the reasons for non-recognition are really political.

The importance of the Lagos Conference of January 1963 lies in the fact that, against the background of a generally accepted practice in regard to recognition, African states should have thought of laying down some principles of recognition applicable to Africa alone. It is interesting, and somewhat paradoxical, that Ghana, which had most eloquently preached the values of African unity and joint action, should have been the first to recognise the Grunitzky Government without consulting other African states. When Ghana's "premature" recognition of Grunitzky came under attack from other members of the African community, Ghana's High Commissioner in Nigeria, Mr. Doe, explained that until a common foreign policy in the framework of African unity was formulated, Ghana had the sovereign right to recognise whichever government it pleased.

In making recognition the sovereign right of each individual state, to be exercised on political considerations rather than on the basis of commonly agreed principles, Nkrumah's regime had perhaps inadvertently sealed its own fate. It was ironically Nkrumah, after he was overthrown in February 1966, who faced the political implications of what he, and some other African states, regarded as too "premature" a recognition of the military government that had overthrown him. At the O.A.U. Foreign Ministers' Conference in February-March, 1966, Congo (Brazzaville), Mali and Tanzania led a fight to prevent the delegation sent by the new regime in Ghana from taking its seat at the Conference on the ground that it was too premature to judge the outcome of the political conflict in Ghana. By then, of course, it was too late to formulate principles. The detractors of Nkrumah could argue that they were only doing what he had done himself exactly three years ago.

The Togo military coup of January 1963 and the Ghana coup of February 1966 were the two main events which caused the greatest controversy over the question of recognition of governments installed by military coups. The only other major incident which raised the question of recognition took place in 1961 when, in the midst of a crisis in the Congo, President Kassavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba dismissed each other from office, and sent rival delegations to the United Nations. But this problem arose from the peculiar circumstances prevailing in the Congo at the time, and not as the result of a military coup.

In any case, the final outcome of both the Congo situation and the crises in Togo and Ghana shows that African states seem to be falling in line with the rest of the international community in their practice regarding recognition. Recognition becomes the sovereign privilege of each state according to it, and it may do so solely on grounds of political expediency.

It is a moot point whether African failure to work out common principles of recognition will necessarily vitiate African attempts to forge unity. In allowing each state to determine for itself whether or not it wishes to recognise a particular regime, African states may be taking the wise step of not burdening the O.A.U. with the task of working out common principles of recognition where no such principles exist, and where attempts to work them out may themselves introduce a discordant element in the already hard-strained unity of African states.

On the other hand, problems like Togo and Ghana are likely to arise again. It may be worthwhile for African states to work out certain basic principles of recognition now rather than let themselves be split over a particular issue in future. Such principles could not be enunciated during the Togo and Ghana crises because of the obvious impossibility of taking a detached view when faced with a concrete and controversial situation. Failure to agree on common principles of recognition may, it could be argued, raise a "China question" for Africa. A revolutionary government could overthrow a ruling regime but succeed in retaining control over only part of the territory. If recognition were to remain the sovereign privilege of each state, Africa might face a situation where half the members of the O.A.U. recognise the new regime as represent-

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ing the true interests of the country, and therefore eligible for representation in the O.A.U., and the other half recognise the old regime. The cause of African unity demands some agreement on what legitimate methods changes in government might be brought about in the African context.

Much of the heat generated at the Lagos Conference that met after Olympio's fall and at the O.A.U. Conference that debated the credentials of the delegation of the new regime in Ghana was, it may be argued, a result not of the difference of opinion on the principles of recognition, but of the emotional feelings of those who sympathised with the fallen regimes, and the manner in which they were overthrown. The violent assassination of President Olympio was more shocking than a new regime taking over the reins of government. At the May 1963 Addis Ababa Conference, where the O.A.U. was formally created, the Charter of the Organisation therefore included as one of its principles the "unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other State."

Yet condemnation of political assassination as a method of assuming power does not necessarily imply non-recognition of a government that comes into power through this method. Recognition must depend on criteria other than the manner in which a regime assumes power. Similarly, members of the O. A. U. may condemn the subversive activities of a member state to overthrow the government of a neighbouring state. But once subversion succeeds and a government comes into power, other members of the O. A. U. cannot withhold recognition from the new regime on the ground that it assumed power using subversive methods in league with a neighbouring state. The need to maintain diplomatic relations among African governments, whatever their complexion, is so strong that the issue of how these governments came into power becomes academic as far as recognition is concerned.

Addressing the Fifth Carnegie Endowment Institute in Diplomacy at Makerere in Uganda, the former Tanzanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Oscar Kambona, had this to say: "We bear a responsibility to future generations of Africans. Our inter-state relations must be regulated by correct norms. Tanzania, for example, does not and cannot approve of changes of government by acts of force. We could not welcome the recent coups d'état in a number of African states. This was not because we sympathized with the policies of this or that government, but because recourse to violence negates the fundamental principles of constitutional government which we believe Africa needs if it is to develop and to impose itself as a positive force in the world." Tanzania may disapprove of the manner in which the present regimes in Algeria or in Ghana assumed power; yet it can hardly afford to cut off diplomatic relations with these states.

III

We have said more about the implications of military coups in regard to the principle of recognition than about their implications in

regard to the principle of intervention not because the problems of intervention are less significant than those of recognition. On the contrary, intervention in the affairs of another state can have more serious consequences than withholding of recognition. In fact, it is precisely because interventions are so much more serious affairs than withholding of recognition that the question of intervention in post-coup situations has seldom figured in African international conferences. Thus, both the January 1963 conference at Lagos and the February 1966 O. A. U. Conference were able to discuss the question of whether the new regimes in the two countries should be recognised or not. Nobody suggested at these conferences that African states should collectively intervene in order to restore the old regimes because they were overthrown by unconstitutional means.

There is at least one more reason why the question of intervention in post-coup situations has not arisen. Most cases of international intervention have occurred in situations of prolonged, and often bloody, battle between opposing forces within a country contending for power. The Spanish civil war of 1936 is a classic case, but Congo is a good example for Africa. Military coups in Africa in the more recent times have been quick affairs. In many cases, as in the Congo when Mobutu assumed power in November 1965, or more recently in Burundi, the coups have been bloodless. Bloodshed and protracted armed struggle attract attention and often intervention also.

In conclusion, one may reiterate that the impact of military coups on the norms of inter-African diplomacy—which include the principle of recognition and the doctrine of non-intervention—can be of greater fundamental importance than their impact on the more short-term foreign policy orientations of African states toward such problems as Rhodesia or South Africa. These norms define the workings of the African sub-system; foreign policy orientations, on the other hand, keep on changing with changes of regime. It is possible that very soon African states will get used to the idea of recurrent military coups and relations between them will continue as before regardless of the coups. On the other hand, further military coups could produce more serious problems of recognition and intervention. Only time will reveal the trends in African diplomatic practice.

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The Rhodesian Crisis and the Use of Force

P. CHANDRASEKHARA RAO

THE historical roots of the concern of the international community with the problem of Southern Rhodesia which continues to threaten the peace and security of Africa and the world are universally known.¹ There are two dominant issues involved in this question: the goals to be achieved and the tools to be employed to realise them. As regards the first, there is unanimity among the members of the United Nations, with the exception of a few racist states like South Africa and Portugal, over the need to bring the illegal Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia to an immediate end. However, Southern Rhodesia might have gained independence before majority rule had the Tiger Agreement of December 1965 between Mr. Wilson, the British Prime Minister, and Mr. Smith, the so-called Rhodesian Prime Minister, come through.² But following the refusal of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia to accept the Tiger Agreement, the British Government made it clear that there would be no independence for Southern Rhodesia before majority rule³—a commitment which the British Government had failed to make until then notwithstanding the pressure of the Afro-Asian countries. This is undoubtedly a significant development in the history of the problem.

Opinions however differ as to how best the desired goals could be effectively realised. Typical of the united standpoint of the African States, and also of the Asian States to a great extent, is the following statement made by Mr. Keita, the representative of Mali in the Security Council, during its deliberations in December 1966: "We shall always insist that the use of force is the only means to overcome the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia".⁴ The United Kingdom, which bears the heaviest and most direct responsibility in this matter, and other Powers like the United States do not subscribe to this view though they no longer advocate peaceful means of settlement like negotiations, enquiry and conciliation, which have been tested in the past and found ineffective in the face of Mr. Smith's intransigence.

It is significant that according to both these views there is now a threat to international peace and security in the Rhodesian situation—a stand endorsed by the Security Council in its latest resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966—and that compulsive measures contemplated in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter should be employed to settle the problem. However, while the first view urges comprehensive mandatory sanctions backed by the use of armed force, the second prefers selective mandatory sanctions not involving the use of armed force. The preference expressed in the second view is now being

tested by the Security Council. Recent reports indicate that the existing sanctions have not been potent enough to mend Mr. Smith and he is even predicting the likelihood of Southern Rhodesia becoming a republic soon.⁵

What then are the alternatives open to the international community to save the situation? Can it be said that the existing sanctions have conclusively failed? Is there any other alternative to the use of force? If not, who should employ it: the United Kingdom or the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity or any member of the United Nations? These are some of the questions that may be probed here from the standpoint of the accepted principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

Sanctions in Perspective

The African States maintain, from what happened at the time of its establishment and from what is happening now, that the Southern Rhodesian regime continues to exist because the United Kingdom Government is not carrying out its commitments in accordance with its constitutional obligations and in accordance with the United Nations Charter. To see things in the historical perspective, the developments in this connection may be broadly analysed in three phases: the 'no sanctions' period, the 'voluntary sanctions' period and the 'selective mandatory sanctions' period.

The 'No sanctions' Period

From resolution 1747 (XVI) of 28 June 1962, which affirmed for the first time that the territory of Southern Rhodesia is a non-self-governing territory within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations to resolution 2022 (XX) of 5 November 1965, the General Assembly had continuously called upon the administering power, namely, the United Kingdom Government, to take "all possible measures to prevent a unilateral declaration (by the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia) and, in the event of such a declaration, to take all steps necessary to put an immediate end to the rebellion with a view to transferring power to a representative government in keeping with the aspirations of the majority of the people." This was approved by the Security Council, beginning with resolution 202 (1965) of 6 May 1965, when it requested the United Kingdom "to take all necessary action to prevent a unilateral declaration of independence" and "to promote the country's attainment of independence by a democratic system of government in accordance with the aspirations of the majority of the population."

The British Government not only refused to take the recommended action but also raised a preliminary objection to the question of Southern Rhodesia being discussed in and considered by the United Nations on the ground that it lacked competence to entertain the question since, in its opinion, Southern Rhodesia had been for more than three decades a self-governing territory and as such it fell outside the scope of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter dealing with non-self-governing territories. It also maintained that the 1961 constitution of Southern Rhodesia was a step which must lead to African majority participation

in the government in due course. Hence it would not be prudent on the part of the United Nations to intervene in the affairs of Southern Rhodesia and mar the orderly transformation of the territory into a more democratic country.⁶

Meanwhile, the minority regime in Southern Rhodesia kept on pressing the United Kingdom to grant it independence on the basis of the 1961 constitution which was declared unacceptable by the Africans in Southern Rhodesia on the ground that it would "entrench the settler minority rule in the country".⁷ The United Kingdom, on the other hand, declared that independence would not be granted unless its well-known six principles were satisfied.⁸

In the face of reports that Mr. Smith might make a unilateral declaration of independence, the United Kingdom remained content with a mere warning that any such declaration would have "grave consequences" for the territory and that economic sanctions would be instituted should such a step be taken. It did not consider the use of force appropriate despite General Assembly and Security Council appeals to take "all necessary measures" to prevent such a unilateral move by the Southern Rhodesian Government. The African response to this approach was vividly brought out by Mr. Adebo, the Nigerian representative in the Security Council, when he stated that "to tell Southern Rhodesia that they (the British) would never apply force" "is like telling the burglar that he is welcome to your house because, while you do not like burglars or burglaries, and while you are prepared to do everything to keep them out, you are not prepared to use force at all".⁹ Encouraged by this equivocal stand of the administering power, the minority regime in Southern Rhodesia, on 11 November 1965, unilaterally declared its independence from the United Kingdom.

The 'Voluntary Sanctions' period

Even after the unilateral declaration, the British Government expressed its opposition to the employment of mandatory economic sanctions. With its concurrence, the Security Council, in its resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, was only prepared to determine that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was "extremely grave" and that "its continuance in time constitutes a threat to international peace and security". The resolution called on all states to "desist" from providing the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia with arms, equipment and military material and "to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products". The course of voluntary sanctions thus began under the auspices of the United Nations. The African States however maintained that these sanctions, whose effectiveness depended largely on the willingness of member states to comply with them, could result only "in skimming the problem, not solving it".

A considerable degree of compliance with this resolution was reported by the members of the United Nations with the exception of a few like Portugal and South Africa, which have continued to maintain normal friendly relations with the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia.¹⁰

At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meet in Lagos in January 1966, the British Prime Minister had stated that "the cumulative effect of the economic and financial sanctions might well bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks rather than months".¹¹ The communique issued at the end of the conference however reported that "some Prime Ministers had misgivings in this regard".¹² These misgivings came true as with the passage of time the situation in Southern Rhodesia took a turn for the worse.

Despite the Council's resolution and the oil embargo instituted by a number of states, including the United Kingdom, oil continued to flow into Southern Rhodesia from South Africa and Portugal.¹³ Mr. Ian Smith declared that his country would beat the United Kingdom embargo.¹⁴ On 9 April 1966 the Security Council considered a letter dated 7 April 1966 from the representative of the United Kingdom requesting the President of the Council to convene an emergency meeting to consider the situation arising from the arrival in Beira of an oil tanker which might result in substantial supplies of oil reaching Southern Rhodesia in contravention of the oil embargo imposed by his Government.¹⁵ In its resolution 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966 the Security Council, "gravely concerned at reports that substantial supplies of oil may reach Rhodesia as the result of an oil tanker having arrived at Beira and the approach of a further tanker which may lead to the resumption of pumping through the CPMR pipeline with the acquiescence of the Portuguese authorities" and "considered that supplies will afford great assistance and encouragement to the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia, thereby enabling it to remain longer in being," determined that "the resulting situation constitutes a threat to the peace". It therefore called upon the Portuguese Government not to permit oil to be pumped through the pipeline from Beira to Rhodesia and also not to receive at Beira oil destined for Rhodesia. It also called upon the Government of the United Kingdom "to prevent by the use of force, if necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia....."

Thus, it is significant to note that the Security Council, on the initiative of the United Kingdom, took a decision on the Rhodesian question for the first time under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. But it could immediately be seen that it was not a decision of any major consequence. The Security Council merely determined that the situation arising out of substantial supplies of oil to Rhodesia "constitutes a threat to the peace", thus facilitating it to call upon the United Kingdom under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to use force, if necessary. This is essentially different from saying that the situation arising out of the usurpation of power by a racist settler minority in Southern Rhodesia itself constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Such a finding would have made it obligatory for the Security Council to act under Chapter VII to abolish the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia.

Acting under the authority of the Security Council the United Kingdom was able to prevent tankers from carrying oil to Southern Rhodesia through Mozambique. But this did not prevent oil from

reaching Southern Rhodesia via South Africa. The tobacco and sugar crops of Rhodesia found their way to outside markets through South Africa. It was also reported that South Africa "could provide Southern Rhodesia with virtually everything it had been importing from the United Kingdom."¹⁶ As the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom himself conceded in the Security Council, "early forecasts were not borne out by events. Quite frankly, we expected a greater economic and political impact."¹⁷ Notwithstanding the declaration that they would not negotiate with the illegal regime, the British held informal talks with Mr. Smith between May and December 1966 to find out "whether a basis for negotiations genuinely exists."

The 'Selective Mandatory Sanctions' period

Following the failure of the talks between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith on board a British warship off Gibraltar, a meeting of the Security Council was convened on 8 December 1966 at the request of the United Kingdom. Mr. George Brown, the British Foreign Secretary, said in the Security Council:

"My Government accordingly believe that this Council cannot permit the situation to deteriorate further. They consider that the combination of circumstances flowing from the initial actions of the Smith regime, in purporting illegally and unconstitutionally to declare their independence, affects not only the stability and progress of Rhodesia's immediate neighbours, but also the maintenance of international peace and security. The situation thus created is such that the Council should now invoke certain measures under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter".¹⁸

In its resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966, the Security Council acknowledged, for the first time in the history of the problem, that "the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security." This finding made it obligatory on the part of the Security Council to act under Chapter VII of the Charter, which deals with "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression". However, the United Kingdom was willing to employ only selective mandatory sanctions on certain commodities and not comprehensive sanctions. It contended that the contemplated measures should not only be certain of success and capable of proper control but also injure Rhodesia's economy as much as possible without causing any unnecessary damage to the economy of other countries.¹⁹ Doubts have been expressed by several representatives as to whether such selective mandatory sanctions will be sufficient to force the Smith regime to return to legality. Speaking for the Organization of African Unity, Mr. Thiam of Senegal said the African States did not at all believe in the effectiveness of the measures proposed by the United Kingdom for two reasons: first, the selective character of those measures weakens them, makes them inoperative and, secondly, their mandatory character is an illusion.²⁰ It was also made clear that it was unrealistic to make an approach to the Rhodesian crisis which ignored the cardinal fact that the protectors of the illegal regime exist among the

colonial or racist regimes in the neighbourhood of Rhodesia, especially South Africa and Portugal. Economic sanctions designed to leave these elements untouched will not have any corrective effect on the Rhodesian situation. Taking the view that the only effective method is the use of force, Mr. Parthasarathi, the representative of India said: "Ian Smith and his henchmen will not come to their senses so long as they are treated with kid gloves."²¹

The Security Council finally endorsed the stand taken by the United Kingdom and decided, among other things, that all states members of the United Nations shall prevent:

"the import into their territories of asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products and hides, skins and leather originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution."

The object is to strike directly at the earning power of Rhodesia by action against exports which are most vital to it in international trade. Member states were also required not to participate in the supply of oil or oil products or promote the sale or shipment of arms, etc., to Southern Rhodesia. The resolution called upon members and non-members of the United Nations to carry out this decision of the Security Council in accordance with Articles 25 and 2 of the Charter. It also requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of the resolution, the first report to be submitted not later than 1 March 1967, perhaps on the presumption that the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia would by then feel the pinch of the situation. In his report of 21 February 1967,^{21a} the Secretary-General noted that "certain States which have significant trade with Southern Rhodesia" have not yet reported the measures they had taken. South Africa is one of them. What is more, the South African Prime Minister reiterated recently that his country would not participate in the economic sanctions. Portugal also did not report any measures taken or contemplated by it but raised a number of irrelevant points. It even contended that the United Nations was liable to pay damages to the extent of £10 million on the ground that the economy of Mozambique had suffered severe economic and financial losses as a result of the carrying out of a number of measures envisaged in the resolutions of the Security Council.^{21b}

It is thus clear that all the developments in the Rhodesian situation until now have, beyond any doubt, shown that the main assumptions of the United Kingdom have all proved wrong. The economic collapse of Ian Smith's regime, which was declared imminent, has not materialised. The fair chance which was supposed to exist for the problem to be solved by peaceful means has completely disappeared. These facts cannot but lead one to the conclusion that the estimates of the African states are sounder and more realistic than those of the United Kingdom and like-minded states.

Comprehensive Economic Sanctions and the Use of Force

Now that selective economic sanctions appear to have become only a time-killing process, there seem to be only two courses left open: comprehensive economic sanctions applying to the whole of the Rhodesian economy and to all imports and exports, and the use of force.

The primary responsibility for action, including the use of force, is in the hands of the United Kingdom. As pointed out by Mr. Adebo, the Nigerian representative in the Security Council, "We did not give Great Britain that primary responsibility which flows directly from that nation's historical connection with Southern Rhodesia"²²—a fact recognised by the General Assembly and the Security Council. The legal position has been neatly summed up in the Commonwealth communique which stated that the United Kingdom has the "constitutional authority and responsibility for guiding Rhodesia to independence." Notwithstanding its legal competence, it is unlikely that the United Kingdom will hereafter undertake any unilateral action without involving the United Nations. The obtaining by the United Kingdom of the approval of the Security Council, first, in November 1965, for the adoption of voluntary sanctions, then in April 1966 in connection with the use of force to prevent oil reaching Southern Rhodesia, and again in December 1966 in connection with the imposition of selective mandatory sanctions are pointers in this direction.

Besides, the United Nations itself is under a legal obligation to act not only because Southern Rhodesia is a non-self-governing territory but also because of the finding of the Security Council that the Rhodesian situation constitutes a threat to international peace. The removal of this threat to peace is therefore a primary responsibility of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. Certain questions arise in this context. Is it a condition that comprehensive economic measures should have proved inadequate if force is to be employed? Are these two exclusive processes? Conflicting views have been expressed on these questions. Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter deal with these issues. While Article 41 entitles the Security Council to decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, Article 42 permits measures involving the use of armed force for the same purpose. The arrangement of these articles may lead one to believe that Article 42 could be put into operation only after action contemplated under Article 41 has been found ineffective. This view is unwarranted. The words "should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be ineffective" in Article 42 can only mean that actual proof of the inadequacy of economic measures is not a condition precedent to the taking of such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to restore international peace and security. Again, there is no basis for the argument that action under Chapter VII means either economic sanctions or military operations. The Charter does not preclude a combination of the two,²³ though they could be independently tried and tested.

In the Rhodesian crisis, the Security Council is perfectly entitled to try comprehensive economic sanctions before agreeing to permit the use of armed force. Besides the impracticability of giving such sanctions a mandatory character, the experience of the League of Nations, especially during the Italo-Ethiopian war, makes it clear that economic sanctions will be ineffective unless supported by military force.²⁴ Speaking in the context of the Rhodesian situation, Sir Roy Welensky, former Prime Minister of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, has stated: "I have all along held the view that, if mandatory sanctions are applied, and if they are to be effective, force has got to be used".^{24a} If Southern Rhodesia were an island, economic sanctions could no doubt be made effective. Southern Rhodesia is, however, geographically and economically linked to South Africa and Portugal and without the latter's support economic sanctions against the former must fail. As pointed out by Julius K. Nyerere:

- "South Africa and Portugal must want the Smith rebellion to succeed. Their interest is one of ideological sympathy; but it is also one of geography. The map of Africa shows their reasons for wanting white domination safely entrenched in Southern Rhodesia—just as it indicates the special interest of countries like Zambia and Bechuanaland that it shall not succeed."²⁵

The United Kingdom has made it clear that it does not want any confrontation with South Africa and Portugal with whom it has strong economic ties. South Africa is the third largest customer of the United Kingdom. The volume of trade between the two countries is of the order of \$730 million. Twenty per cent of the gold holdings of the Bank of England is owned by South Africa. The anxiety of Britain to avoid any irritation in its relations with South Africa has been clearly spelt out by its Foreign Secretary, who said:

"Not only must we proceed step by step in dealing with this situation, but it must not be allowed to develop into a confrontation—economic or military—involving the whole of southern Africa. I have no doubt the Council realizes that such action could have incalculable consequences to the whole of central and southern Africa, going far beyond the issues raised by the Rhodesian problem—and indeed none of us could predict the consequences. Indeed, they could very rapidly dwarf the Rhodesian problem and defeat the very purposes which we pursue."²⁶

And if the necessary cooperation from South Africa and Portugal to make sanctions work is not forthcoming, and if a confrontation with them is to be avoided, then the United Kingdom leaves itself and the Security Council only one way to bring down the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia and that is by force.

Actually, a situation in which the Security Council may have to call upon member states to apply military sanctions in the form provided for in the United Nations Charter cannot easily arise.²⁷ The Military Staff Committee, created under Article 47, which is supposed to advise

and assist the Security Council on questions relating to enforcement, has been moribund from the start. Similarly, the special agreements on armed forces, assistance and facilities which each of the member states is to make available to the Security Council under Article 43 are still to be negotiated. The Charter however makes provision for transitional security arrangements in Article 106. Under this Article, the five permanent members of the Security Council shall consult each other and, as occasion requires, other members of the United Nations on joint action on behalf of the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. This provision has not yet been put to test.

Besides, it would appear that the Security Council may establish a UN Force under Article 42 itself. While action under this article "may include" operations by forces of member states, its language does not preclude the use of any other forces available to the Security Council.²⁸ In fact, in April 1966, the Security Council had called upon the United Kingdom to prevent, by the use of force if necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia. There are therefore no legal impediments involved if the Security Council decides to issue a similar directive to the United Kingdom to use force or constitute a UN Force. It would constitute a grave violation of constitutional and Charter obligations if the United Kingdom, even after economic sanctions have proved ineffective, were to thwart, by exercising its veto, any such course of action by the Security Council.

Assuming that the Security Council fails to act because of the veto of the United Kingdom, it may be asked whether there is any other organ of the United Nations that could authorise the use of armed force. Though the Charter confers on the Security Council the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security," it does not confer on it exclusive jurisdiction in respect thereof. It is open to the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution to make appropriate recommendations to members for "collective measures".²⁹ But it is not clear whether a two-thirds majority of the member states present and voting could be secured in the present case to make the General Assembly act under the said resolution. The United Kingdom, the United States, France and their allies would in all probability oppose any such action by the General Assembly. The Soviet Union and its allies, although they supported in the Security Council the invocation of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, might for known reasons follow suit. Although the Soviet Union, in the Middle East crisis of 1956, appeared to have acquiesced in the use by the General Assembly of its powers under the Uniting for Peace Resolution,³⁰ it was made clear at that time itself that it considers the resolution "inconsistent with the Charter."³¹ It is therefore doubtful whether in the face of such discouraging signs, any attempt by the Afro-Asian countries to bring the matter before the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution would serve any useful purpose. This is perhaps the reason why no attempt has been made so far to bring the matter before the General Assembly.

As for action by the Organization of African Unity, it does not appear that it could legally authorise the use of force by African states without the prior approval of the Security Council. Article 53 of the United Nations Charter provides, *inter alia*, that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council". There are of course exceptions to this principle but they are not relevant in the present context. Besides, the African states do not appear to possess the ability to mount a concerted military action against Southern Rhodesia, which is backed by a well-trained army equipped with modern weaponry.³² The individual member states of the United Nations do not appear to be legally competent under the Charter to undertake any military action save in self-defence against an armed attack or when authorized by the United Nations.

Conclusions

In retrospect, it may be seen that the real question in the Rhodesian crisis is not whether force should be used. Of that all are convinced, including the United Kingdom though it would not openly say so. The United Nations is not in a position to compel the United Kingdom to use force. Mandatory action from that institution could flow only with the agreement of its five Great Powers. The United States and Nationalist China toe the line of Great Britain on this question. France still considers the question of Rhodesia as an internal affair of Great Britain. The Soviet Union is the only power which supports the African plea for the use of force. The Organization of African Unity, another organ vitally interested in the matter, has proved itself ineffective to undertake any action barring the adoption of condemnatory resolutions. There is not even a remote possibility of the Soviet Union³³ or any other state rendering any direct military assistance. Guerilla attacks from within or outside Southern Rhodesia might not yield much result. Therefore, the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia would seem to have little reason to fear military intervention unless the British Government reverses its present stand not to use force. As pointed out by the *New Statesman* the British "had either to concede that we can no longer determine the events in Africa and leave Smith to the Africans, or restore constitutional law by force . . . In short, Britain should either wash her hands off Rhodesia or enforce the law. Wilson lacks the courage to do either". The alternatives in this regard appear to be quite clear to the United Kingdom but the circumstances do not seem compelling enough to make it follow the right course of action. In view of the apprehensions of the British Government that "what is at stake is the future of the multi-racial Commonwealth,"³⁴ the Commonwealth seems to be the most effective instrument which could exert pressure on the United Kingdom to take meaningful steps to solve the Rhodesian question.

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Nigeria and the Commonwealth

G. O. OLUSANYA

THAT Nigeria would become a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations after her independence was never in doubt; it was the normal thing in the early years of this century for British colonies to look forward to achieving Dominion status. What gave Dominion status its particular attraction was that the white colonies had themselves enthusiastically accepted this status. The Nigerian nationalists believed that what was good for the Irish and the Afrikaners—two uncompromising champions of complete national autonomy—must certainly be good for them. They therefore made Dominion status the goal to which their efforts were directed. The Nigerian National Democratic Party, the most radical of the early political parties in the country, maintained that its aim was “to secure the safety or welfare of the people of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria as an integral part of the British Imperial Commonwealth”.¹ The Nigerian Youth Movement, the first nationwide political organization, set forth its goal as “complete autonomy within the British Empire ... a position of partnership with the other member-states of the British Commonwealth of Nations”,² while the *West African Pilot*, the organ of the ultra-nationalists, envisaged the time “when the imperial master becomes a powerful Mother supported by her brood, each a full-grown man and full-fledged in his own authority”.³

Political wisdom also played an important part in determining Nigeria's keenness on Dominion status. The Nigerian nationalists were quite aware that to ask for independence outside the Commonwealth was to delay the attainment of that objective. They realized that Britain was anxious to retain links with her former colonies so as to ensure protection of her economic interests in the future when she would no longer be in a position to keep watch over them herself.

Moreover, most early Nigerian leaders were trained in Britain and were steeped in the British liberal tradition. They came to have a somewhat exaggerated respect for the British way of life—the passion for justice and fair play, the freedom of thought and expression, respect for human dignity, dignified restraint and the wide measure of tolerance peculiar to the British. “We should,” declared Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, “value our British connection as a pearl of great price because it has enabled us to pass through an apprenticeship in the art and science of constitutional government...”⁴ Thus, Nigerians while naturally aspiring to independence were never interested in severing their ties with the Commonwealth after the attainment of that objective.

So great was the faith reposed in the British nation that the nationalists were ready to excuse the evils of colonial rule as being

the work of officials rather than of the British people and held the mistaken belief that these evils would be removed if they were brought to the attention of the British people. This view was expressed by the *West African Pilot* when it urged representation for Africans in Westminster so as "to undo the wrongs which official versions and views are capable of doing" and to "make the Britishers at home more conversant with the problems of the colonies so as to humanise their methods of administration and so hasten the Africans' march towards Dominion status."⁵ Even in the heyday of the nationalist movement, even at those moments when the British seemed to have been traitors to their tradition, their ideals and their way of life, Nigerians were never in doubt that this was a temporary phase, born of necessity, which would disappear once the needs of the moment were over. Thus throughout the war years when the nationalist movement reached its most active phase even though there were incessant demands for constitutional progress which received little or no sympathy from the British and consequently created bitterness, there never was at any time a demand that Nigeria, if and when she achieved her independence, should break away from the Commonwealth. For instance, during the controversy over the Atlantic Charter—a controversy which caused a great deal of bitterness in Nigeria the *West African Pilot* asserted that "nobody expected the Prime Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire, or to liquidate the Empire for that matter. The Empire has all the facilities to remain intact for ever if those who steer her will descend to human fundamentals in their application to statecraft."⁶ In fact, membership of the Commonwealth was regarded as the normal end of the fight for self-rule.

This desire for association with the Commonwealth was almost an article of faith with all political parties in Nigeria. This was underlined by Chief Obafemi Awolowo in his vote of thanks to the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, on his visit to Nigeria in 1959, a year before independence. After emphasizing that there was in Nigeria a tremendous goodwill for Britain, he declared: "As has been stated *ad nauseam* for our own part the place to which we belong in the world's contest is the British Commonwealth of Nations."⁷

Before 1959 little or no attention was paid to Nigeria's role in foreign affairs by the Nigerian political parties. This is quite understandable because the fight until then was for self-government and all efforts were concentrated on it. By 1959, it was quite clear that independence was just round the corner and consequently in the federal elections that year full attention was paid for the first time to foreign affairs. It is instructive to note that at this late stage all parties were still unanimous that Nigeria should be a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations after attaining independence. The Action Group in its statement on foreign policy stated that "Nigeria should take its place in the Commonwealth of Nations, and should not hesitate to make her attitude towards the ideals for which the Western democracies stand clear beyond any shadow of doubt".⁸ The party went on to emphasize that Nigeria's association with other nations should be determined not only by her national interests but by the extent to which such relations were compatible with her legitimate obligations as a loyal member of the Commonwealth. Dr. Azikiwe, speaking

for the NCNC (National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, now known as National Convention of Nigerian Citizens), condemned the Action Group's demand for alignment with the Western democracies partly because such an alliance would "entangle Nigeria in military alliances which are not in our national interest and which could endanger our corporate existence" and partly because the Western democracies included many states with the exception of Britain that had ruled Africans with force and cruelty. He was however careful to point out that "we would bind ourselves closer to the United Kingdom and the USA".⁹

In short, association with Britain and consequently with the Commonwealth was considered desirable. In a statement issued a month later Dr. Azikiwe's party, NCNC, categorically stated that "we shall remain as a full-fledged member of the British Commonwealth of Nations".¹⁰ The Northern Peoples' Congress too in its manifesto stated that Nigeria must join with countries whose policies were motivated by the same beliefs as her own, and, therefore, she must maintain the closest relationship with the United Kingdom and join and support the United Nations and aim at retaining and expanding her existing ties of friendship with the United States. It then went on to sum up its policy on foreign affairs which included, specifically, membership of the Commonwealth of Nations.¹¹

There was no change in the attitude of the political parties on this question and in the Independence Resolution moved by the Prime Minister, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, it was specifically requested that Nigeria should become a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. The motion read :

"That this House authorises the Government of the Federation of Nigeria to request Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as soon as practicable to introduce legislation in the Parliament of the UK providing for the establishment of the Federation of Nigeria on 1 October 1960 as an independent sovereign state and to request Her Majesty's Government in the UK at the appropriate time to support with the other Member Governments of the Commonwealth Nigeria's desire to become a member of the Commonwealth."¹²

This attitude is not surprising when one considers the background of the various political leaders. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the Action Group leader, received his post-secondary school education in Britain. As a lawyer, he had great admiration for the British passion for justice and was a great admirer of the democratic ideals of which Britain is the fountain-head. Naturally, Chief Awolowo was keen to retain the link with Britain after independence so as to continue to share or enjoy fellowship with those who held the same ideals. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the leader of the NCNC, was trained in the United States and Britain. He too was a passionate believer in parliamentary democracy and has dedicated himself to ensuring that this system of government flourishes in Nigeria. His training in the United States has provided him with an abiding respect for the rule of law and for democratic processes.

It is therefore not surprising that he was keen that Nigeria's association with Britain should continue after independence because that country is the *fons et origo* of democracy. The leader of the Northern Peoples' Congress, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, was also to some extent a believer in parliamentary democracy. His own belief however was that the task of ruling should be left in the hands of the aristocratic class and enlightened commoners. Moreover, he and the other NPC leaders had every reason to be friendly with Britain. In the colonial period, the Imperial Government did everything possible to win and cultivate the friendship of the Northern Emirs partly because of the respect they had for them and their institutions and partly to identify their cause with that of the Emirs and thereby secure allies for their regime, and consequently ensure permanence of their rule. Every effort was made to preserve for them their indigenous system of government through the system of indirect rule. Pains were also taken to preserve their religion. For this reason, the missionaries were banned from the Moslem area of the North. Another reason was that the Government wanted to avoid political complications. As the Colonial Office put it: "Whatever threatened the Moslem religion threatened the authority of the Emirs and so endangered the system of indirect rule".¹³

Moreover, the children of the rulers were given education so as to identify the interests of the ruling class with those of the Colonial Administration. It is instructive to note that the first school established by the Administration of the Moslem area of Northern Nigeria was founded in Sokoto by Major Bourdon for the children of the chiefs.¹⁴ As a result of the policy pursued by the British Colonial Administration, the aristocratic leaders of Northern Nigeria became particularly friendly with Britain and this determined their attitude towards Nigeria's association with the Commonwealth. As these leaders shaped Nigeria's political policies in the absence of an enlightened public opinion in the country owing to mass illiteracy, there was a very favourable climate of opinion for Nigeria's association with the Commonwealth.

Another very important reason why Nigerians were wedded to the idea of membership of the Commonwealth and association with the Western nations as a whole was the fact that they had been conditioned by their education to believe that the Western world possessed the best political and social systems and that the welfare and prosperity of their country in the post-colonial period could only be assured by associating with the Western world. On the other hand, Soviet Russia was painted for them in the worst colours possible. They were not allowed to find out for themselves what communism really was. They were prevented from travelling to communist countries and communist literature was banned from the territory. The result was that they possessed little or no information about the non-Western world except the meagre and distorted information handed out to them by their colonial masters. Their image of the USSR was that of a country in the grip of a dictatorship, scornful of human freedoms and opposed to any form of religion. Nigerians were also made to believe that the USSR would seek to establish itself in Nigeria after independence to the detriment of their national interest and that the only way to avoid this was to draw close to the West and

scorn any approach from the Soviet Union. This has produced a fear of and suspicion against Soviet Russia in Nigeria, particularly among the traditionalists and religious conservatives of the North who have been in power since Britain's departure from Nigeria. This suspicion and fear have not yet died down altogether and explain the unwillingness of Nigeria to establish diplomatic relations with Russia in the immediate post-colonial period.

Moreover, Nigeria did not have to struggle to any great extent for attaining independence. This fact was emphasized by the Prime Minister, Albaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, in his speech on the independence motion. The struggle was not marred by any bloodshed. "We and the British have got on very well together and the road to independence has not seen any bloodshed or ill-feeling between us and the British".¹⁵ Nigeria did not have to fight any pitched battle with the forces of imperialism because of many factors arising from the war—the loss of a sense of mission on the part of Britain, her military and economic weakness resulting from the war, the fear of the spread of communist activities to the colonies if independence was withheld for too long, the United States' attitude resulting from this fear and the anti-colonialism typical of the post-war period. It only needed to make its appearance strongly felt to scare them away. Consequently, there existed no bitterness between Britain and Nigeria when it came to the parting of ways in 1960 with the result that there existed no barrier, no inhibition against a cordial relationship with Britain.

In addition, Nigeria realized that independence carried with it a great responsibility. It demanded improvement in the material welfare of the people and assurance of their security. The leaders were aware that this could be achieved not by national efforts alone but by co-operation with other countries of the world, particularly the well-developed nations. They thought it would be better to start with those nations with whom the country already had ties of friendship. This was expressed by the Nigerian Minister of Finance, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh :

"We know that in this world of today, no country, however great, can stand alone. 'Interdependence' is a popular word these days...We shall continue to strive to ensure that the goal of self-government will be accompanied by the growth of an independent economy capable of sustaining the development of our resources, the welfare of our people and the defence of our country as a full member of the British Commonwealth and the comity of nations."¹⁶

They fully understood that they would need economic and technical aid and would have to attract investments from foreign countries to speed up the economic development of the country. They were conscious of the fact that with independence there would be many countries offering help and advice but were not blind to the fact that among them there would be those who were sincere and those who were only seeking their own ends. They therefore wanted to come closer to the friends they already had rather than put their trust in friends who

might be coming forward to help them. This was emphasized by the Prime Minister, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, in his speech on the independence motion. He stated :

"The reason why I personally want to see Nigeria taken into the Commonwealth is this. I know very well the immense opportunities and the great need for development in our country and I want to ensure so far as is possible that the development is on sound lines. At present we are an under-developed country. In order to expand our economy we must seek investments from richer and more developed countries, investments both of money and technical skill. It is going to be difficult sometimes to sift the genuine from the self-interested and that is one reason why I should warn that Nigeria must be careful in recognising her real genuine friends."¹⁷

Alhaji Yusuf Maitama Sule specifically mentioned these friends in his speech :

- "If Western democracies, particularly Great Britain and the USA, will continue to prove that they are our friends in need, and very good friends indeed, we will not have any fear of being 'courted', so to speak, by countries whose investments in Nigeria may defeat the whole purpose of our economic development because of the strings they may attach to such investments. So long as this continues, Nigeria should not and would not welcome foreign investment from any country whose ideology may ruin our social, political, educational, and traditional set-up....."¹⁸

This confidence reposed in their erstwhile friend—Britain—has not been betrayed. For instance, in 1962 out of a total estimated £235 million of private investment in Nigeria, £165 million, that is over two-thirds, was British investment.¹⁹ This investment covered the whole field of trade and industry.

Efforts to train foreign service personnel did not start until 1959 when a handful of graduates, mainly from Ibadan University, were selected to go to Oxford University. Consequently, Nigeria did not have enough trained people to man her foreign service posts when she attained independence in 1960. Moreover, she fully realised that the foreign service was a costly business which a poor country could ill-afford. She therefore looked up to Britain and other Commonwealth countries to help her look after her interests in those countries where she could not be directly represented.

Furthermore, Nigeria believed that the Commonwealth represented certain ideals which were dear to her—the desire for peace and friendship among races, the democratic ideals which she had inherited from Britain and which she ardently hoped to cherish. She saw in the Commonwealth link a means of revitalizing and consolidating these ideals. Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, in a note of thanks to Harold Macmillan in the House of Representatives stated that "one great thing that

Great Britain has done for Nigeria is the creation, maintenance and sustenance of parliamentary democracy in this country" and concluded : "I say for my Government and the whole Parliament that it is our desired aim and indeed our policy to hold this political institution and maintain it....." ²⁰ Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, in an address delivered under the auspices of the London branch of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, stated :

"We should reckon with our British connection and our unanimous desire to become a full-fledged member of the British Commonwealth in accordance with the Statute of Westminster. The Commonwealth is an institution which buttresses the crusade for peace and international co-operation. It is unique as a worldwide association of peoples in which extraneous factors such as race, nationality, creed and way of life give way to a common sense of fellowship." ²¹

Nigeria was also conscious that in a world that was militaristic and aggressive, in a world that was constantly at war, where man was an enemy to man, it was better to keep the friends one had than to stand in isolation. There was also an awareness that being a weak power and therefore unable 'to arm to parley' in a world that seemed to understand only the language of force, she could make her influence effectively felt only by associating with international bodies like the Commonwealth and the United Nations—organisations capable of affording her protection and investing her with prestige and respect.

There was also the fact that most of Nigeria's trade was with Britain for the obvious reason that before independence trade had been channelled solely to that country. It was difficult, even if there was any desire to this end, to break up this trading connection with the coming of independence. It would have been economically ruinous for the country. Thus Britain remained in the post-colonial period, as she had been traditionally, Nigeria's major trading partner. Most of Nigeria's exports entered Britain free of duty. In accordance with the system of Commonwealth preference, Nigeria's main agricultural products—palm oil, groundnuts, cocoa, hides and skins, benefited from a tariff preference over non-Commonwealth imports into Britain. The result was that in 1964 nearly 40 per cent of Nigeria's exports, worth about £81 million, were taken by Britain. This was more than what all the countries of the European Economic Community imported during this period. During the same period, Britain's total exports to Nigeria totalled £78.8 million. ²² Thus the balance of trade was in Nigeria's favour.

Nigeria has been receiving technical and economic aid from various Commonwealth countries. Some of her air force and army personnel have been trained in Canada, India and Pakistan, her students have been benefiting from the Commonwealth Scholarship Scheme, her men have also been receiving professional training in most of the Commonwealth countries. All this has helped the economic, educational and social growth of the country and strengthened her desire to remain in the Commonwealth. At the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Con-

ference at Ottawa in 1958, Canada announced her intention to take a lead in forming an organisation of the Colombo Plan type for the benefit of Commonwealth areas in Africa. In fulfilment of her pledge she contributed half a million dollars for technical assistance to these countries. Nigeria immediately applied for assistance.²³ Britain also announced that the Commonwealth Development Finance Company would get additional capital to provide aid for the development of the under-developed countries of the Commonwealth and that as part of the general move to improve economic conditions in this area, statutory corporations and subordinate authorities would themselves have direct access to the London Market. Britain also agreed to make Exchequer loans to Commonwealth countries. The spirit of complete mutual sympathy, understanding and friendship which permeated the conference impressed the Nigerian Finance Minister, Okotie-Eboh, so much that he stated in his report to the House of Representatives that :

“Although I have been privileged to attend several international conferences, I have never before attended one where such a feeling permeated all our deliberations. I can assure Honourable Members that if I had needed any convincing before, I now more than ever hold the firm belief that in our great Commonwealth lies the only effective answer to the problem facing the world today and with it the hopes of many hundreds of millions of people all over the world that it may long continue as a unique instrument for the continued peace, welfare and prosperity of mankind.”²⁴

Many other important factors were also responsible for Nigeria's desire for Commonwealth membership—the fact that her sterling reserves were tied up in Britain, that most of her students still went to Britain for studies, the many links, cultural, professional and sentimental, existing between Britain and Nigeria. All these contributed to influencing Nigeria to seek Commonwealth membership.

Nigeria also realized that the membership of the Commonwealth would not in any way impair or detract from her sovereignty because the organisation involved no formal ties and no obligations. This was emphasized by the Prime Minister, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, in his first statement on foreign affairs after independence :

“We have declared our intention of a plan to join the Commonwealth and the United Nations. In regard to the former, it is important to understand that all members of the Commonwealth are autonomous communities, equal in status and in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external policy.”²⁵

Finally, Nigeria also believed that the Commonwealth organization meant independence plus rather than minus. Balewa declared :

“While therefore benefiting greatly from the free interchange of ideas and consultation between the members of the Com-

monwealth and from their experience within the framework of the United Nations, we shall, nevertheless, have a free hand to select those policies which we consider to be most advantageous for Nigeria, subject always to our belief in the principle of the United Nations".²⁶

It ought to be pointed out, however, that there were a number of Nigerians who opposed Nigeria's entry into the Commonwealth. But they were very few and were unorganized and therefore inarticulate and ineffective. There were others who wanted the country to join the Commonwealth but had some reservations about it. Typical of this group are Dr. Kalu Ezeru and Vincent Ikeotuonye. Kalu Ezeru in a debate on the question of Nigeria's membership of the Commonwealth declared his support for Nigeria's membership of that body but pointed out that while accepting membership Nigerians should be careful not to let their sentiments cloud the realities of the situation. He observed that within the Commonwealth were odd fellows—South Africa and the Central African Federation (now broken up into Zambia, Malawi and Southern Rhodesia). He said in these countries fellow Africans were being oppressed, mauled and ruled by a microscopic minority of whites and concluded: "We do hope that the Commonwealth is going to satisfy our aspirations. We must make sure that all other African oppressed peoples are released forthwith and Nigeria is out and out to defend the lot of the oppressed."²⁷ Ikeotuonye, after declaring his support for Nigeria's membership of the Commonwealth which he asserted was not based merely on principles of affection but on solid self-interest as political pragmatism ought to be the decisive factor in politics, said: "As soon as we find our interest in the Commonwealth does not support the interest of our people, it will be time for us to rethink and to make an agonizing reappraisal of our relationship with Britain..... (as)..... the British people have a way of tricking their friends, and..... of destroying their enemies."²⁸

Nigeria's membership of the Commonwealth was therefore determined not only by the historical fact of her having been a colony of Britain but by her desire to share those ideals which the organization stands for, by her many and varied ties with Britain, by her own economic interests and by the consciousness of her own weakness in a world torn by conflicting ideologies, hatred and disunity and constantly on the brink of war.

The question may be asked whether the recent developments in Nigeria were in any way a reaction against the parliamentary system of government in operation before 15 January 1966, and against the country's membership of the Commonwealth. The answer is in the negative. These developments were a protest against the movement away from the system of parliamentary government and against the excesses committed by Nigerian politicians. Nigeria since her independence has been moving away gradually from the parliamentary system of government. The attempt to pass a Preventive Detention Act, and the Newspaper Bill which sought to muzzle the Press were signs of this departure from the system of parliamentary democracy. It was the people's reaction against this new trend and their disgust with the pettiness.

rancour and excesses of Nigerian politicians that led to the military takeover of January 1966. The motives which impelled the civilian administration to seek membership of the Commonwealth hold good for the army too. Reasons of self-interest had determined Nigeria's membership of the organization and until these reasons cease to be valid, Nigeria, whether under military or civilian rule, will remain in the Commonwealth.

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Origins and Development of Italian Colonialism

LEONE IRACI FEDELI

IF we consider some of the factors affecting the development prospects and problems of decolonized countries, we realize that the lower the degree of growth and the weaker the social structures of the conquered country the more important become the degree of growth, the endowment of productive factors and the economic policies of the colonizing country. In the African countries south of the Sahara, the modern sector of even primary activities was, to a greater extent than in Asia or Northern Africa, the result of European colonization; the unprocrastinable take-off of the African economies is substantially based on factors brought about by the profound and irreversible overall change which took place in the African economies as a result of the European conquest.

In those countries where weak traditional societies clashed with the more advanced ones, the causes and effects of colonization greatly influenced the rates of growth and all those institutional changes which paved the way for the development of conquered Africa. Those countries which are today awakening or re-awakening after the darkness of colonialism are confronted with different situations which came about as a result of the different degrees of growth of their respective colonizing powers.

The future difficulties emerging from an "underdeveloped colonialism", an extant heredity of backwardness, had already been taken into consideration and had even become a commonplace during the decisive period of decolonization beginning with the declaration of independence of the United States and ending with the Battle of Ayacucho which witnessed the ruin of the former European empires still tied to a mercantilist and pre-mercantilist type of colonization. Even at that time great attention was paid to the different growth capacity existing between the United States, "free-born" under an advanced colonizing country, and all those economies and communities—not so much less developed as less capable of developing—which arose out of the ruin of the Spanish Empire or which emerged from the contested independence of the African population of Haiti which freed itself from French colonialism, or those which resulted from the breaking away of Brazil from Portugal.

Today, however, the evident acceleration of the historical pace makes it possible, and at the same time imperative, to overcome even the most unfavourable conditions; if only as late as the end of the 19th century it became evident to everyone in Latin America how necessary it

was to "imitate and to equal"¹ the United States, then today there is no doubt that all those countries in Africa which had formerly undergone an underdeveloped kind of colonialism must realize how important it is to create the same conditions of development which existed in the former colonies of the more advanced countries. There is no doubt that the conditions in Africa today and in the foreseeable future show that a cultural homogeneity is more apt to take place here rather than between Anglo-Saxon America and Latin America, and consequently the problem that has to be tackled today by the former Italian colonies and the difficulties which will be encountered in the future by those countries which will soon cease to be Spanish and Portuguese colonies is a much less difficult one.

Italy which in 1889, only 19 years after the occupation of Rome, had begun to occupy the coasts of Benadir, was then, according to today's standards, an underdeveloped country. However, even if we do not take into account its stage of development, the fact that colonization was being conducted before Italy had completed its unification is itself a paradox.² The kingdom of Italy, which occupied Rome as late as 1870, had already occupied Assab in 1869. It is also well known that when on the morrow of World War II countries were classified either as developed or underdeveloped according to their per capita income, Italy came close to the \$300 per capita income which was then assumed to be the dividing line between the two groups, while Southern Italy was well below this figure.

It is a fact that 19th century Europe did not feel as strongly as we do today the absurdity of an "underdeveloped colonialism". Nowadays the mere assertion that the per capita income of Portugal is lower than that of Ghana is already a negative issue against Portuguese colonialism. This situation, however, results from an overall change in attitudes and views linked not only to the fall of colonialism (which Schumpeter, consistent with his conservative principles, regrets in vain), but even more to the fall of all the psychological pre-requisites of colonialism. Before 1914, and in fact even up to 1939, it was felt that European states had the natural right to conquer countries in other continents, especially (but not exclusively) if the latter's culture was not of European origin.

Not exclusively, however, because during the 19th century, the European imperial powers were favourable to "recolonizing" the independent states of Latin America. We all know how the "false Bonaparte" (as he was called by Marx and Engels) tried to put his hands on Mexico. In the early 19th century the countries of Europe joined their efforts in an aggression on Venezuela and in other similar undertakings; for example in 1916 the impending intervention of France, i. e. of an outside power, into Santo Domingo was the cause, or served as a pretext, for the United States military occupation of the country, from which started the Trujillo era.

In Italy the idea of recolonizing Latin America was at times considered, and we find a rather rhetoric and superficial formulation of these

ideas, as may be expected from a member of Crispi's group, in *L' Europa alla conquista dell' America Latina*, written by Ferruccio Macola.³

Although this book is nowadays forgotten, it is nevertheless very useful because it helps one to understand in a better way the policies of that period. Gramsci, who judged the book merely from a sentence quoted in it, remarked, "It must be very amusing and indicative of the state of mind of many a member of Crispi's group".⁴ No doubt it is amusing, not only for the stressing of its race prejudices against the people of the South (throughout the book the filth of the emigrant coming from Southern Italy is repeated so often as to become obsessive), but also for its intrinsic preaching of anti-democratic and anti-humanitarian clichés which were then becoming fashionable. Some of these ideas call to our minds those doctrines which became popular 20 or 30 years later and anticipate, though in a much more crass way, the theses put forth in *Pagine sulla guerra*, or in *Dottrina del fascismo*. We find, therefore, open praise for the "shooting of the black rabble"⁵ and the denunciation of "that void humanitarianism which makes Italians stupidly cry out against all those providential executions which took place in Massawa". According to Macola, however, "those killings took place in legitimate defense and in accordance with the ethnic fate which laid down that any inferior races coming into conflict with the white race—the most intelligent created being—would be doomed to destruction"⁶.

Macola was convinced, just as the nationalists and the fascists of the following generation would be, that the most important task of imperialism was to stir up passions.

"Politics has given us nothing to awaken the desire for a rigorous and impelling action which would give us new vigour, sharpen our intellects and make our hearts beat stronger" as might happen in France as a result of the myth of *revanche*.

In his book, Macola points out that Italian colonialism has also objectives of home politics, such as the restoration of government authority to its former grandeur and the justification for armaments and military regulations destined, to a large extent as he admits, to suppress internal upheavals.

"Rome was great because its citizens had ideals: today the ideals of our governments, which are rather narrow-minded, do not overstep the uninspiring balance of a budget, and democracy, with its vulgar tendency to level everything, is inclined to replace quality with quantity and the brain with the stomach.

Everything is collapsing around us: the religious feeling which was damaged by a fatal conflict, the love for those institutions which had been attained at the cost of revolutions, the country's prestige which had been achieved with so much bitter effort, the confidence in parliamentary government. Ten

years from now, when Italy shall be scattered with ruins, when discontent will reign supreme and government authority will be even weaker, what shall we then offer this poor country?"⁷.

"The concern for the political unrest in Europe during this period keeps kings, governments and parliaments fully occupied, and does not make it possible for them to cast a glance on the other side of the Atlantic. Each country must have its battle-ships, regiments and guns near at hand because even though today we solemnly pronounce the word peace, tomorrow any of us might find ourselves on the verge of war.

But once the great match has been settled either by weapons or by treaties, it is imperative for Europe to arrive at the conclusion that the colonies that have been founded in the new continent by the European proletariat must no longer be considered as a means of production for the greedy and dissipated descendants of Spanish and Portuguese adventurers, but as the outposts of its occupation.

In South America this threat of absorption, which would mark the redemption of those countries, is looked forward to by our people as a liberation, by the natives as a frightful calamity. Italy, which has the largest claims, could have already placed its hands on the small country of Uruguay, threatened by Argentina and Brazil, brought on the brink of bankruptcy by the dilapidations of its government which, during the panic of 1891, decreed five days of festivity so that its bank did not have to meet the obligation of making payments.

Argentina has by now scented the danger of an occupation on the part of Great Britain which needs to back its capital, by now committed and promised. In Brazil, instead, some writers who see beyond tomorrow have prophesied that Italy, Germany and France will in time be ruling over the rich countries of rubber, cotton and coffee"⁸.

"Let us therefore turn our eyes to America. The domestic political conditions of civilized States make it imperative that powerful armies be always ready and on the alert so as to serve as a warning to demagogues, so that order may be maintained, and so that Europe, whose duty is to defend its race and to scatter it on the other side of the seas, may be preserved.

The future of humanity, observes Nitti, depends on the proportion existing between the superior and inferior races; if the latter prevails⁹, then civilization will have a long life; if the former prevails, on the other hand, civilization will either be in danger or be destroyed. May this flourishing continent—once the theatre of war and of heart-warming braveries, torn apart by secular revolutions, exploited by

worthless populations and destined to premature exhaustion—become one day the theatre of prosperity and of work opportunities”¹⁰.

“Our century is the century of progress of science, of industries, of ideas. We must therefore bear in mind that if today we are not permitted to allow barbarities, likewise we cannot allow indolence, depravation and dissoluteness, since this way of acting would jeopardise the social future of Latin America”¹¹.

But immediately after, the author wants to prove that he is not evil, and to stress this point he comments with indignation about the brutal way in which sailors go about killing a shark, “causing it the most horrible mutilations”.....“a nauseating and yet pitiful spectacle for the fierceness which is involved”¹².

Among the commonplaces which are often heard when speaking of the tropics there is the usual episode of the monkey who was killed in a hunt: “..... the dying animal looked at us without a spark of hate, but with such an infinite feeling of pain that I felt a pang of conscience as if I had committed an evil deed. It died in my hands, uttering a soft mournful cry, the supreme expression of its agony.

“On that day I swore that I’d sooner break my rifle rather than shoot at those small Bahia monkeys who still today bring back to my mind those melancholy and sorrowful hours”¹³.

On the same page he praises the providential executions which took place in Massawa.

No measuring of national income has been done until recently and the consequences of such a situation have not been evaluated as yet. There is no doubt, however, that among these consequences may be included the rising of colonial ambitions in a country like Italy.

Even though a comparison between national income figures in different periods of time is necessarily uncertain, we may consider significant the results of recent computations estimating the *per capita* income of Italy in 1880 at a little more than \$200 in 1960,¹⁴ i.e. at a level lower than that existing nowadays in many underdeveloped countries.

There are also other indexes supporting the thesis that Italy in the 1880s, and even in the two decades which followed, lacked the conditions for a “classic” type of colonialism, i.e. for a colonialism arising from capitalist growth, as was assumed not only by Lenin, but also by Hobson.

Since a discussion on the general validity of this and other interpretations of imperialism is beyond the scope of this paper (even though

it continues to be of great importance for the solution of the problems connected with underdeveloped countries) we feel that it is sufficient at present to state that these theories do not offer a satisfactory explanation of the Italian colonial system.

Lenin, however, was not of the opinion that Italy was conducting a peculiar kind of colonialism since he mistrusted all hypothesis which seemed to him improvisations. When confronted with revisionism he displayed a kind of theoretical conservatism. Referring to the Italian conquest of Libya, Lenin called it "the typical colonial war of a 19th century 'civilized state' ". On asking himself what brought about this war, he answered that it was the greed of the Italian financiers and capitalists who needed new markets and thus craved the expansion of the Italian colonial empire.¹⁵

Conversely, Antonio Gramsci, without putting himself in explicit opposition to Lenin, accepted this thesis. In one of his works written in a fascist prison, he makes this explicit statement:

"Even Crispi's colonial policy is a direct result of his obsession for unity. This enabled him to fully comprehend the political innocence of Southern Italy; the Southern peasant wanted land, and since Crispi didn't want to (or could not) give it to him on Italian soil, and didn't want to carry on economic Jacobinism, he created the mirage of colonial lands to be exploited. Crispi's imperialism was passionate, oratorical, but with no economic or financial basis. Capitalist Europe, at that time rich in resources, and at a stage where its rate of profit was beginning to fall, found it necessary to widen the area of its productive investment. It was because of this necessity that the great colonial empires began to rise soon after 1890. But Italy was still immature. It not only lacked capital to export, but it even had to fall back upon foreign capital for its most immediate needs. Italian imperialism lacked a real incentive which was substituted by the ardent desire of the peasants to own the land; the solution of this last problem (of domestic politics) was thus indefinitely put away. For this reason Crispi's policy was opposed even by the Northern capitalists who would have preferred that all the money that was being spent in Africa be put to some better use right in Italy. In the Mezzogiorno, instead, Crispi was popular because he had created the myth of 'easy land' "¹⁶.

Owing to its absolute lack of capital exportation, its import-export structure and its prevailing technological levels, Italy of the 1880s differed profoundly from countries like Great Britain, France, the German Empire and even from the Netherlands and Belgium, but was closer to Portugal and even more to Spain. In other words, Italy had a type of colonialism which was not only underdeveloped, or nearly underdeveloped, but also different from a qualitative point of view. It was mainly an expression of pre-capitalist forces aiming to achieve goals of domestic politics. This may be said because of (a) its clear dynastic character and the illusion of power it offered to the military clique and the whole

government structure which descended directly from Piedmont's *ancien regime*, and (b) the demagogic pretexts it seemed to offer to the impoverished petty bourgeoisie and the Southern peasants. Even the fact that groups of businessmen were also inflamed by the colonial adventure is to be linked to the pre-capitalist situation: the Filonardi Company, to whom Crispi's government entrusted the administration of Benadir, is typical of a speculative kind of colonialism which is closer to the one carried out in the Mediterranean world of the 18th century and the preceding ones rather than to 19th century Europe, i. e., it is a continuation of the pre-industrial colonialism of the former Italian States¹⁷.

Thus, Italian colonization has been quite different from that carried out by more advanced countries even if a clear-cut distinction cannot be established. As a matter of fact we find in Italian colonies some elements of capitalist colonization, just as we may find in the colonization undertaken by advanced capitalist countries some aspects and considerations which are connected with the way of thinking of pre-capitalist, or at least non-capitalist, social classes

A modern kind of colonialism took place in Italy only much later, during the expansion period which occurred in the Giolitti era and which was then to be expressed in an explicit manner by the Radicals¹⁸.

As stated before, Italian colonialism was promoted by capitalist groups: "the most advanced Italian bourgeoisie patroned the new-born colonial movement"¹⁹. This statement needs to be qualified and delimited. It is an undeniable fact that the growing industrialism which took place in Italy after 1870 brought with it a search for new markets which then converged in a desire for colonial expansion. But it is not possible to demonstrate that these groups advocated a policy of colonial occupation, nor that they inspired the colonial policy which was adopted later on and which, as is well known, was almost unanimously opposed by the industrial bourgeoisie. This opinion came up at the time of the foundation of the "Association for the Commercial Exploration of Africa", which was set up in Milan in 1879. At that time, the colonization process was sweeping Europe as a result of the advanced industrial capitalism present in the more developed countries. After public opinion in the European ruling classes had accepted colonialist attitudes, colonial expansion became a permanent factor of European policy even in countries lacking objective conditions for a capitalist colonialism.

In this framework, the foundation of the above mentioned association may be objectively placed, but it is only today, after the event has taken place, that we can say that what was at that time explicitly a tool for commercial exploration was, in effect, the starting point of colonialism²⁰.

During the first few years following unification the idea of colonialism penetrated slowly, through contrasts and often in an ambiguous manner, in Italian public opinion. Italian economic and political thought was, even after 1870, opposed to colonialism. To begin with, the ideology of the Risorgimento was in complete opposition to colonization, first because it had upheld that all people—in principle at least—had a

right to have the same independence which had been fought for by Italy in the Risorgimento (this motive was of course strongly felt by the democratic current) and, secondly, because it did not seem convenient for a metropolitan country to possess colonies, especially if it were a country which, like Italy, was at a relatively low stage of economic development.

Another reason for Italian anti-colonialism was the fact that a large part of the Italian economic and political culture of the 18th and 19th centuries had a French origin.

In fact it is well known that after Louis XIV's wars, and especially after the disastrous Paris peace treaty which followed the Seven Years' War, French public opinion became very hostile to any commitments outside Europe.

The 18th century physiocratic and in general free-trade thought, which had a strong influence on Italian culture, shaped itself under these conditions. And if it is true that anti-colonialism is directly and explicitly based on argumentations of convenience on the part of the metropolitan country, it is also true that these argumentations are strictly connected with the philanthropic aspirations and the revaluation of countries outside Europe which are the leading features of the 18th century. French classical economics, which influenced Italian thought more directly, was decidedly anti-colonialistic and the rejection of colonialism was usually shared both by Italian classical economists and later by the neo-classical ones.

Conversely, there is no colonial perspective expressed as clearly and coherently. Even where an explicit colonialism exists, it is much more an artificial myth or a personal megalomania, rather than an organic expression of the attitudes of the ruling class. Even during the restless nineties when the government was engaged in the African adventure and the contrast over colonialism became part of the fight between progress and reaction, Italian conservatism (notwithstanding the fact that it supported without much enthusiasm the policy of colonial expansion) seemed more inclined to support the government rather than the government's policy, more inclined to support the State, conceived especially as a tool to "maintain law and order", i. e. to repress internal upheavals, rather than the aggressive aims of this State.

A colonial attitude begins to take shape in Italy after its unification as a result of the many evident contradictions of a revolution which had not achieved all its aims.

Even though Italy, after 1870, lacked the basis for a "classic" type of colonialism, there were nevertheless certain tendencies, frictions and traditions which converged into a colonial imperialism. This imperialism, which had developed elsewhere as a result of certain conditions present in more advanced economies, became, on the European level, an element of prestige and thus an autonomous objective of "power" politics.

The fact that the government of the *ancien regime* was continuing

in part²¹ in the Italian monarchy—and the equally important fact that, in principle, the Italian government was merely and simply continuing the monarchy of Piedmont—made the unified State inclined to adopt a policy of expansion; even though the country did not have the economic prerequisites, it satisfied the traditional aspirations of conquest of the dynasty. It should be remembered that apart from its legal formula, the State which emerged after unification was no longer the Kingdom of Sardinia: there is no doubt that between the Piedmont State and Liberal Italy there is a qualitative difference which can hardly be denied²². But the great compromise on which rested unity implied the continuation of a monarchy which would not only be symbolic but—to the extent to which unity no longer required the cooperation of revolutionary forces and made the ruling classes obsessively afraid of not having their “respectability” recognized by conservative Europe—would also be the converging centre of all those forces which had been present in the *ancien regime*. After Cavour, not only the king’s personal policy acquired a new weight, but the monarchy became once again a centre of power which was largely independent of the responsible constitutional organs²³.

It was evident both from the way in which the Liberal State of Piedmont had come into being, as well as from the formation of the kingdom of Italy, that no formal change had occurred in the king’s position. Naturally, Charles Albert had been well-aware of the powers that he would be losing—with good reason the Statute was granted *ob torto collo* after the kingdom of Naples and other Italian states had become constitutional, and as an evident tool of foreign policy—but even in this way he was in no way inclined to accept any qualitative changes in the king’s position which would have been implicit in the total acceptance of the Liberal State. The successive mental reservations of Charles Albert are of course well known.²⁴

But the point we wish to stress here is not the personal motives or the matter of conscience of this Hamletic character who was brought up in the *ancien regime* and did not support the currents of thought prevailing at that time in Europe. In the orientation of his successor—the first king of Italy, but, with reason, Victor Emmanuel the Second and not the First, in order to reassert explicitly the continuation of the dynasty—the flimsy aspirations for personal rule and absolutist reaction range from the proclamation of Moncalieri in 1849 to the planned (or at least hoped for) massacre of the volunteers who had fought to give him Rome in 1867.²⁵

What was written by Carlo Cattaneo with regard to Charles Albert may well be applied to his successor in the 1870 Europe:

“Many were called tyrants because they put to death those whom they suspected of wanting to steal away their crowns. Charles Albert killed those generous youths who had tried in every way *not* to take his crown away, but to give him one: the crown of all Italy.”²⁶

For a dynasty which was still tied to the ideas of the *ancien regime*²⁷ the building up of a unified State could only be a means or maybe an opportunity for dynastic expansion (not differing greatly, for

example, from the wars of the preceding centuries among European States and European coalitions); nevertheless, it was obvious that it was necessarily to be followed by other goals of expansion based on different motives.²⁸

It should be borne in mind that immediately after 1860, and even more explicitly after 1870, the moderate Liberal group (the right wing of that time since only much more recently was this term applied in continental Europe to political currents explicitly anti-democratic) turned back to a position which was much more conservative than the one which it had been induced to assume in the decisive years of unification under the pressure of events and the rule of Count Cavour. The conservative concern becomes dominant both in the sense of trying to avoid with all possible means a revival of popular initiative and thus any menace, although remote, which might threaten the existing social pattern, and in the sense of showing off the conservatism of this new Italy to conservative Europe so as to reassert, in an almost obsessive manner, the need to give Europe a guarantee that conservatism will continue. Although this last motive was presented to public opinion as a means to avoid foreign pressures, it is actually closely linked to the actual conservative preoccupations of the ruling class. After 1870, the close of the *Risorgimento* which took place with the occupation of Rome, the ruling classes' fear of social unrest expressed with *La Commune* of Paris, the prestige gained by the new German Empire in Europe, all contributed to making these tendencies stronger²⁹ and brought about a propensity for that policy "without principles" (later on it will be praised as "political realism") which scored its successes in the new Bonapartism of Bismark³⁰

Even though at this time there were no concrete colonial programmes or interests, the way was beginning to be paved for a possible colonialism as a means of escape from domestic tensions and the renouncement to irredentism. Meanwhile a new emphasis on power³¹, bringing back the Roman myth of strength, may also be noticed among men of the *Risorgimento*. As early as 1871 the first colonialist intervention carried out by a united Italy took place in the dispute with the Bey of Tunis over Gedeida.

Even the occupation of Rome contributed to moving the centre of gravity of Italian life from the North to the South, from Europe to the Mediterranean.³²

It will be through the Mediterranean problems that the Italian ruling class of 1870-1880 will approach a type of colonialism which, if presented in an explicit form, would still have appeared unacceptable. As a matter of fact, it was rather difficult to prepare a real colonial programme (in the modern sense of the word) before the impetuous development of European imperialism on an international scale had spread ideas and myths contrasting with those upheld by the Italian *Risorgimento*, and even before Italian colonial enterprises had begun to fire the imagination of their countrymen.

This therefore explains why all the propaganda which precedes colonialism is rather confused and abounds in euphemisms or synonyms which more or less conceal the real meaning of words: instead of using the word conquest—the myth of violence will spring forth much later when the period of conquests has already taken place—one speaks of commercial and colonial expansion, of explorations, of migration. Even the term colony is often used in an ambiguous manner to mean either the Italian communities abroad, or colonies in the contemporary sense of the word, i.e. conquered territories.

The first time Italian colonialism came finally through—or was smuggled in—was with Tunisia.³³

Indeed the Tunis problem, in view of the large immigration and thus of a colonization carried out for settlement purposes, as well as for strategic reasons, was felt to be completely different from the colonial problem³⁴; it was considered, on the other hand, similar to those to be faced by the Balkan countries which were emerging from the secular breaking up of the Turkish Empire, in the same way as North Africa.

This problem was certainly faced from the wrong standpoint, but with an evaluation which cannot be ignored. The Europeans, at that time, regarded the Balkan countries, which were then becoming independent, as "half-European," just as Italy and particularly Southern Italy had been considered as "half European" up to the second part of the last century. In other words, those countries making up what was then felt to be, to all effects, the "real" Europe, did not recognize that the Balkan countries had a right to self-government; however, they did not put them on the same level as those countries which were felt to be destined to remain only and necessarily colonies, as those of Africa and of a large part of Asia. The rejection of the main dogmas of the Risorgimento regarding the independence of countries which had been under the oppression of Austria and of the Turkish Empire will be in Italy one of the fundamental theses underlying the acceptance of "realism" and the rejection of all the principles upheld by the Risorgimento. Consequently, in contrast to all future apologetics of Italian colonialism (particularly, but not exclusively, the Fascist one) we must admit that the most representative currents of the Italian Risorgimento did not understand the objectively colonialistic nature of the conquest of territories which were already independent (as was, in fact, the case of Tunis) or about to become independent, even though these conquests were carried out for the purpose of providing a population outlet or for strategic defence purposes. We cannot however say that these currents supported in any way what was afterwards called colonialism.

There is, in other words, an interruption between the ideas upheld in the Risorgimento and the rise of Italian colonialism after 1870 on the part of the Left Wing, the party which was in power when Italy began to carry on colonial activities, and which, through Crispi's government, made Italian colonialism take on an explicit position.

The fact that a current having democratic origins was able to arrive so quickly at the most frantic colonialism could be imputed, it is true, to

only a section of that party which had been the Left of the Risorgimento³⁵. However, this change, which was then of decisive importance, showed all the weakness and disorganization of a party which was not able to become the opposition.

Although we know that this orientation is in contrast to Mazzini's ideology, in some of Mazzini's writings we already find some statements which may be interpreted as imperialistic. And this is another sign of the "theoretical indigence" of the Left of that time. It is by no means accidental that in some of Mazzini's work may be found the myth of Rome which both at that time and afterwards was a significant element of mystification and a tool for political and cultural reaction³⁶.

In 1870 Europe—characterized by the setting aside of all former values, the rise of activist myths, the new prestige of the German empire and colonial expansion—the temptation for "realism" could easily exert its influence on a movement whose position had never been too well defined. What was later said about some flimsy policies of the Italian Left, i. e. "they don't know what they want, but they want it immediately", may well be applied to the Left of that period, that is, to all the former conspirators who utilized the activism of heroic times for the aims of domestic reaction and imperialism, to the bitter hate for the French brought about by their opposition to the Second Empire and to the quasi-protectorate of Bonapartist France over Moderate Italy during the first ten years of unification which generated an uncritical respect for Bismark's Germany, and even for Austria, up to the brutal repression of irredentism.

The "realism" of a Left which no longer knew where it stood turned out to be a "realism of conservatism"³⁷, in the refusal of a definite stand, in the exaltation of strength as a quality desirable in itself, in the decision and even in the persecution of all those who appeared to be "prophets unarmed". The "obsolescence" of the Left is indeed very rapid: already in the eighties there was nothing in the governments of the Left which might mark them as "Left" in the meaning that the word has today and already had at that time as opposed to the Right government existing before 1876. In fact the repression of real or presumed revolutionary movements had become fiercer and it appeared to be, at times, the only real aim of the government³⁸.

Under the circumstances, Italy's adherence to the Triple Alliance represented much more than a diplomatic event, and in fact much more than a foreign policy decision since, for at least fifteen years, up to the African disaster and Crispi's definitive fall, it was characterized by a solidarity of regimes and an anti-democratic Holy Alliance.

In view of the conditions in Europe in the eighties, the Triple Alliance was the driving force which made it necessary for Italy to undertake colonialism.

Even the myth of war, of adventure, of violence for violence's sake, which became an integrating part of the atmosphere of imperialist Europe, rests, in Italy, on the conviction generated by the delusions of

the Risorgimento, that the only thing that could restore dignity and offer some prospects in the future to this un-nerved nation would be a great victorious enterprise. Some time later, during a debate on African events held in the Chamber of Deputies, it was stated that the need for great enterprises might be felt by the government, but would not be felt by the people who had already experienced the glorious defeats and useless victories of the Risorgimento. But even in this case, the democratic protest lacking a leadership had no following and thus ended up in becoming a tool for reactionary myths. The protest of the temporarily defeated popular initiative was defended against conformist hagiography, stimulated criticism and offered a new vision of a Risorgimento without heroes,"³⁹ a heritage of a revolt destined to live again in the Socialist movement and in the Second Risorgimento. Nevertheless this motive, like others which had a Left origin, will become, for some currents, an instrument of reactionary opposition to the policies of the Liberal State. The appeal for the "bath of blood", which calls to mind the irrationalism of the new century, had already been upheld by Crispi, and just like other motives of the Left of that time will appear again in the stream of ideas from which originated Fascism.

Even though the motives of classical colonialism are weak in Italian colonization because of the evident differences between objective conditions in Italy and those in other more industrialized countries, nevertheless we find in Italy a motive of what we might call social peace (a motive also present in the colonialisms of more industrialized countries)⁴⁰, i.e. the concern to provide an outlet outside the countries for all social tensions which, although latent, were slowly growing in Italian society. This concern underlies all programmes and myths of colonization undertaken for settlement purposes and it lasts for the entire period of colonialism. It reaches its highest peak in the Fascist conquest of Ethiopia, which is not only the last Italian colonial conquest, but also the last conquest of European colonialism.

The myth of colonization for settlement purposes is closely connected with the phenomenon of migration which took on large proportions during the first decades following unification. It is not surprising that the first theoretical elaboration of Italian colonialism—an erudite, but not particularly consistent, work by Leone Carpi⁴¹—imputes to the phenomena of migration the need for colonial expansion. Even though he favours colonization, he puts more emphasis on migration than on colonies, and when he does speak of colonies, he often considers them in the sense of communities of people living abroad. When he uses the term colony in the modern sense of the word, he only does it to discuss what its possibilities are as regards deportation which on the morrow of unification was, as is well known, a much debated question.

The fact of mass emigration, a symptom of the deep structural imbalances of the country, underlies the attempt, often repeated but with little success, to give a popular basis to colonialism.⁴²

The myth of colonialism for settlement purposes shows its instrumental yet flimsy nature by the fact that in spite of the failure of prece-

ding experiences, it turns up again. It was rather easy, in fact, to take it up again following the conquest of Libya, after 20 years of colonial occupation and very little immigration into Eritrea and Somalia. It was proposed again, in an even more clamorous manner in 1935, when it was stated that it would be possible to place all excess population (an excess which the government had tried in fact to increase by sponsoring a population policy and forbidding emigration) in Ethiopia as a result of the fact that in Libya—*notwithstanding the high public expenses*—the number of people who had settled there was not higher than the number of people who used to migrate from Italy in a single year before Fascism⁴³.

The prospect of conducting large-scale colonization in Africa for settlement purposes—a prospect supported by progressive men and intellectuals during the first decade of colonialism—was not enough to make public opinion in Italy as favourable to colonialism as in those countries where social domestic tensions were less strong and colonization offered greater prospects for economic benefits. But there is no doubt that although these prospects seeped to the popular level in a fragmentary manner, i. e. influencing a strata of public opinion which did not consciously or completely accept them, they nevertheless contributed to many colonial conquests meeting with a sort of approval which, although passive, was not to be completely disregarded.⁴⁴

Large-scale Italian emigration which, in view of its persistence, is clearly indicative of structural imbalances in the economy and society, immediately brought to mind the alternative of colonization for settlement purposes. Even the etymology of the word was partly to blame for this illusion. Actually, the colonialism which took place during the second half of the 19th century did not imply emigration: in fact even the emigration of the colonizing countries is directed to a large extent toward independent countries—the United States and the countries of Latin America—or towards countries about to become totally independent or at any rate not under colonial rule as, for example, the British Dominions.

From the fact that the migrants were mostly farmers, it was deduced, more or less consciously and with elliptical reasoning, that they were necessarily and almost naturally to be employed in agriculture; consequently, this emigration, to be rational, had to be a kind of peasant colonization. Once accepted by public opinion, this generalization became an important factor of colonialist ideology, while the awareness that the reality was quite different was limited to a small elite of people.

During the early years of the new century, when the economic take-off of Northern Italy had asserted itself and long-term emigration was taking place only in Southern Italy, people concerned with this problem became aware of the fact that most of the emigrants, even though peasants, were not inclined to carry out a peasant colonization in the newly-settled territory, but preferred non-agricultural activities, such as working in the building industry, or undertaking tertiary activities or perhaps even doing hired work for capitalist farm owners.

During the first Congress of Italians Abroad, which took place in Rome in October 1908, one of the speakers, talking about Italian emigration to the United States, said: "Three-fourths of our emigrants remain in the northern part of the United States, and even though they are mostly peasants, they do not budge from the city where they land."⁴⁵

Another speaker who reported on emigration to Latin America confirmed this tendency. He said:

"The traditions and characteristics of Italian emigration differ totally from the emigration of Scandinavian countries which was, and continues to be, substantially a type of colonizing emigration.

A deep affection for their native land and the difficulty of finding in a new country the same climatic conditions to which they are accustomed, as well as a similarity of character with the indigenous population and similar systems of farming were all factors which contributed to Italians shunning farming.

Only in Brazil, the majority of our emigrants devoted themselves to farming. This, however, was due to the fact that otherwise they would not have been able to find any other means of subsistence. But even in these conditions, agricultural work was for many of them only a temporary occupation, which engaged them either singly or in groups, without their having any intention of permanent establishment.

This is why our colonies were in an inferior position compared to the German and Anglo-Saxon colonies of North America and Brazil. The only exception to this, however, may be found in Argentina, thanks to the agricultural settlements founded there 30 years ago and to the daring and fortunate enterprises of a few courageous pioneers in the wide open spaces of the Pampa or in the hilly lowlands of the Andes.

In almost all countries of immigration some attempts at colonization were carried out, for the most part by Northern or Sicilian farmers. Although the initial phases were difficult everywhere, it is noteworthy that in general the results were quite satisfactory.

But the Southern emigrants were, and continued to be, unwilling to carry on farming in the new country: at least 70% of the peasants of Southern Italy preferred either the nomad life of the hired hand, or carrying on petty trade in the country or in the cities"⁴⁶.

The main obstacles to a colonization for settlement purposes—which were not underestimated by the more serious colonialists (who, however, did not make up the majority of colonialist public opinion)—related to

climatic conditions. The medieval conception of the "burning" tropical lands continued to persist at the popular level even in countries like Italy whose average temperature in the hottest months is much higher than that in most tropical countries. It is evident that this generalization⁴⁷ has a colonialist origin. After Columbus had unfolded the mysteries of the unknown seas and had landed in the Antilles—which was thus the first tropical territory occupied by Europeans—the first comment made was that the climate of the tropics was extraordinarily mild and pleasant.

The prerequisites for a European colonization carried out for settlement purposes were : (a) coexistence with the *Indios*, in the evangelical dream of Bartolome Las Casas, (b) replacement of the *Indios* after this race had been completely wiped out by the Conquistadores (this happened not so much in the Spanish Antilles, where African slaves were imported even before the total extermination of the *Indios*, as—for some time at least—in the French Antilles).

The conviction that Europeans were not suited to live in tropical countries became widespread in the 17th century as a result of the rationalization of the tendency to regard the European colonizers of tropical lands as a privileged minority.

In effect, the prevalence of African slaves during the first period of European colonization of tropical lands, which covers the period of colonization of tropical America conducted by Spain, Portugal and, to a somewhat smaller extent, Britain, France and some other countries, may be explained by social relations rather than by climatic factors. Colonization for settlement purposes presupposes certain relationships not only between the colonizing country and the colony but also between the former and third countries. Only by bearing this in mind shall we be able to understand concretely the feasibility or unfeasibility of colonial settlements.

It is evident, first of all, that if a country conducts colonization for settlement purposes, it must have a low standard of living, and thus this new settlement is supposed to bring about a notable increase in the income and social status of the population of the colonizing country. It must be felt, however, that these conditions will not change: usually economic difficulties (as the economic crisis of the thirties in economically advanced countries) bring about an increase in emigration, but not an agricultural type of colonization. Provided that economic difficulties do not cause the disintegration of a situation which is already structurally unstable.

In the same way, a colonization for settlement purposes cannot take place when a third country, more advanced than the one left by the migrants, offers higher or easier income opportunities than the country which is to be colonized. This is what happened in Italy: at the time when it possessed colonies, it had a low *per capita* income and the people had a low standard of living; consequently emigration from Italy took place on a large scale until Fascism put a limit to it. The emigrants, however, were attracted by European countries with a higher income level or by

the United States, or even by Latin American countries, but in these places they did not devote themselves to farming. On the other hand, emigration to the Italian colonies was on a very small scale except for the emigration to Libya following a public campaign urging people to go there.

There was, however, another possibility: a sparsely populated country could offer immigration opportunities to a densely populated country which would thus become a source of "cheap labour" supply. This method was applied by some colonial systems, e. g. Indonesian immigration into Dutch Guayana, Hindu immigration into British Guayana and Asian immigration into the Pacific Islands. Even independent states adopted this method, for example Chinese and Japanese immigration into Peru, Brazil and other countries of Latin America. This possibility was also taken into consideration for the Italian colonies, especially Somalia. In this country the natural resources were over-estimated (according to a widely prevalent view in colonialist Europe) while the possible labour supply (because of race discrimination) was under-estimated in view of the general feeling that the Somali population had a limited capacity and willingness to work.

Another reason, which made it difficult to conduct colonization for settlement purposes was that the Italian colonies—though sparsely populated—were not as depopulated as other territories in North America, Argentina and some parts of South America, Australia and New Zealand which had been populated by Europeans.

The presence of a rather large local population transformed the status of the colonizing powers since the colonization process brought about an overlapping of populations instead of a replacement of pre-existing populations. The European conquest of South Africa was carried out under similar conditions to those in North America or Australia, but as time went by it assumed different characteristics as a result of the density of the local population.

Even Italian colonialism realized, after its first illusions, that even Africa, which it had regarded as an inexhaustible source of natural resources, did not have such an enormous abundance of available land in which people had believed, and had made others believe, by making a very simple comparison of demographic densities⁴⁸.

When people were confronted with these unforeseen (and yet so much foreseeable) difficulties, there were many who undoubtedly felt that the best thing to do was to completely wipe away this conquered race. It would certainly be difficult to find an explicit, written formulation of this idea, but its general lines may be easily imagined. In direct contrast to these proposals, a responsible colonialist like Gustavo Chiesi wrote:

"Those who are pleased with the fact that there are so few Somalis in Benadir and who are of the opinion that it would be better to destroy with some *good lessons* even those who still exist, thus making even more sparse the already low

density of the present population, are not aware what a mistake this would prove from both an economic and a colonial point of view.

"Wealth and real economic development cannot take place in a country where there is a very low ratio between population density and territorial size"⁴⁹

Chiesi is therefore in favour of resorting to the alternative solution mentioned above, i. e. the immigration of other Africans living in neighbouring territories such as Aussa, Galla and Boran. Another suggestion put forward during those years was to resort to large Asiatic immigration.

After deploring the eventual immigration of European workers "which would only lessen the prestige of the white man in the eyes of the native", Emilio Leonardi, at the Congress of Italians Abroad, asserted that "after having obtained the consent of the Government, or rather of the respective governments, our colonizers should try Chinese manpower which is well known and appreciated all over the world". •

When large masses of these workers, in no way affected by environmental conditions and well-disciplined, will have attended, under the guidance of the first colonists, to the most pressing needs of the newly-awakening colony, when small farms will have been annexed to the larger ones, and when new roads will have been built, then it will be possible to move easily and safely from one part of the colony to another. Only when the territory has acquired a certain value as a result of the means of communications can we think of sending over Italian immigrants and thus enabling them to carry out their many activities.⁵⁰

This viewpoint, however, was not accepted by all the participants in the Congress. In fact another speaker was of the opposite opinion. After having called attention to the fact that at the outset—i. e. at the colonial conference organized in Naples in 1885 by Attilio Brunialti—the colonial problem was considered as a problem of migration, and even though acknowledging the fact that since a process of industrialization was at present under way, this standpoint should be considered as unilateral, Angiolo Mori asserts :

"It continues to hold true that manpower is still the prevailing factor for colonization and consequently the problem of fully utilizing it and of sending it to colonies under our direct rule is still very important".

".....If a region is to be suitable for colonial settlement it must possess certain ethnical elements which are similar to those existing in the colonizing country. It must have, therefore, the following prerequisites : (a) it must offer climatic conditions which would enable Europeans to work and to develop; (b) it must have large stretches of free and fertile land open to emigration and not densely populated so that immigrants may spread out and not be in continuous struggle with

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the natives; (c) it must offer natural resources which are similar to those which the colonists were accustomed to in their native land.

It should be rather easy to carry out a survey to see whether these factors are present in Benadir since there is a large amount of literature published on this subject, such as monographs prepared by scholars, reports and special surveys carried out by experts, official reports, etc. Furthermore, the *Rivista Coloniale* has contributed widely to this research by publishing in its review inquiries carried out by Chiesi, Rossetti, Gorroni, Carpanetti, Cerrina, Fanelli and Violati-Tescari."

He then makes some remarks on the climate, quoting the speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs delivered in the Chamber of Deputies and concludes:

- "After having observed how important the geographic element is, since it is the factor which determines whether a colony will be fit for settlement or whether it will be exploited or used for trading purposes, we may assert, with no further delay, that Benadir is certainly fit to become a colonial settlement."⁵¹

Of course even this speaker admits that large-scale colonization cannot be carried out in a very short period of time. This is due to the fact that political and economic criteria⁵² must be taken into consideration; furthermore, due account is also to be taken of the way in which the Somali would regard Italian manpower :

"The agricultural workers whom we would import would necessarily be regarded by the natives in the same way as slaves. Consequently the superiority which makes them appear in the eyes of the natives as representatives of a more advanced race would no longer exist and all relations and contacts between white men and natives would be much more difficult".

"...We must therefore come to the conclusion that at present a limited immigration of Italian labour may take place in the Gumbo-Gelib-Brava area, i.e. in the Goscia region where land concessions are beginning to be granted ; conversely, it would not be advisable to encourage immigration into other areas of Benadir as long as conditions remain unchanged"⁵³.

He is also aware, however, that the sociological nature of Italian emigration—which is made up for the most part by people with small amounts of capital and limited entrepreneurial capacities and not inclined to settling permanently in the rural areas of a new country—is a fundamental obstacle to a colonization for settlement purposes.

"This is certainly not the kind of emigration movement which can give life to a colonial settlement since this would imply a colonial attitude which would tie the worker down to his land,

since only in this way would the colony be a continuation of the mother country. Consequently if Benadir is to become a colony fit for settlement, we must find a way to assure that emigrants actually settle in the colony.

We wouldn't reach this goal if we were to send our emigrants to Benadir as wage-earners. In this way they would always be inclined to consider the colony in the same way as other countries where they might emigrate. Consequently they would choose the country which would give them the highest earnings and would thus enable them to return, as early as possible, to their native country with a good amount of savings. Furthermore, since employed labour presupposes an employer, it is clear that in the present conditions of Benadir the only employers would be the land grantees. However, under the circumstances, we must first of all see whether it would be convenient for the land grantee to hire Italian labour, and, second, whether the Italian emigrant would receive earnings high enough to make him prefer Benadir to all other places where he could go to work".

"...All we have to do is to think of all the things which a white man, as compared to a native, needs, such as an environment where he can carry out his activity, etc., to realize that all these elements would make Italian manpower so costly as to make it much more convenient to employ the native one".⁵⁴

"Consequently, if a colonial settlement is to be set up, it is necessary, as we have seen, that the colonist be tied to the land, and the only way to accomplish this is to make him owner of the land."⁵⁵

But cotton cultivation, which was at that time envisaged under the agricultural plans for Somalia and was much more rational than banana cultivation adopted later on, could not be carried out by small enterprises and furthermore "the Italian emigrant had neither the technical training nor the necessary capital"⁵⁶

It was necessary, therefore, to train future colonizers and, in particular, to help Italian farmers find work on capitalist farms which were then very few and had to be increased in number. Naturally these workers needed to be subsidized—even though in an indirect and concealed manner—since obviously the Italian entrepreneur would be more inclined to take on African or even Asian manpower since it would be more convenient for him. Furthermore, it would also be necessary to supply capital to future colonists by drawing from an emigration fund.

The speaker does not seem to ask himself what is left of the "clear colonizing vocation" of a country which finds it necessary not only to give public incentives to the colonists but also to train them. His line of reasoning, however, is quite meaningful. Even though the speaker seems to support the thesis of a colonization to be carried out for settle-

ment purposes, he brings out arguments which show it to be unrealistic. A colonization undertaken for settlement purposes becomes in Italy a myth which is held in high esteem even by those who are in fact not at all convinced that this type of colonization is feasible.⁵⁷

The inconsistency of a colonization undertaken for settlement purposes appears clearly even in what will be, for over a generation, the manifesto of populist Italian colonialism—Giovanni Pascoli's speech following the conquest of Libya.

It may be granted that the popular nationalistic virulence which may be found in *La grande proletaria si è mossa* had been in the air for many years and was a direct result of migration, but that way it had a more lasting impact and a more profound influence than in the words of mediocre journalists who even then kept repeating the same concepts. And it is not for nothing that all future apologetics of fascist wars will be based on these concepts and words.

Only a mystification of facts could create a myth which would be consistent with present-day values. This orgy of rhetorics is therefore based on a falsification of facts.

REFERENCES

1. "Los Estados Unidos, como argolla de bronce, /contro un clavo torturan de la America un pie ;/y la America debe, ya que aspira a su libre, /imilitarles primero e iguarles despues" wrote, around 1902, the Peruvian poet Jose Santos Chocano, in *La epopeya del Pacifico*.
2. Alfredo Oriani in his book, *La lotta politica in Italia* (which was to become one of the sacred scriptures of Italian nationalism) regarded this paradoxical and pathological connection of events as a sign of progress: "Nevertheless Italy was in Africa. No country, in any period of history, has ever been able to achieve in 30 years a similar degree of advancement, passing from slavery to conquest." (Alfredo Oriani, *La lotta politica in Italia*, vol. III, p. 407, in *Opera Omnia di Alfredo Oriani*, edited by B. Mussolini, Bologna, Cappelli, 1923).
3. Ongania, Venezia 1894.
4. *Note sul Machiavelli, sulla politica e sullo stato moderno*, Einaudi, Torino, 1855, p. 359.
5. p. 49.
6. p. 357.
7. *Ibid*, p. 420-421.
8. p. 421.
9. This is evidently a slip of the pen. It is clear that the author wanted to say exactly the opposite, i.e. "if the former prevails" and then "if the latter . . ."
10. These commonplaces used in the anti-Latin America controversy, even though probably of European origin—or even more probably under a mutual influence—were at that time, as well as later on, largely shared by Latin American reactionary trends as, for example, the clerical fascist party of Laureano Gomez in Colombia.
11. p. 421-422.
12. p. 114.
13. p. 357.
14. See, for example, the recent *An economic history of modern Italy*, by Shepard B. Clough.
15. *La fine della guerra fra l'Italia e la Turchia*, Pravda, Oct. 11, 1912, republished in Italian in the book, *Sul movimento operaio italiano*, Rinascita, Roma, 1947, p. 7.
16. Antonio Gramsci, *II Risorgimento*, Einaudi, Torino 1955, p. 77. Gramsci's argument was criticized by Roberto Battaglia in *La prima guerra d' Africa*, Einaudi, Torino 1958, p. 413 ff. Battaglia argues: But it should be noticed that even Gramsci himself lays an exaggerated emphasis on this motive: Crispi, whom he saw through the filter of nationalist apologetics, is represented as a man "who came before his time". This criticism does not convince us. It is clear, first of all, that it rises out of a dogmatic anti-revisionism, out of all that hypocritical, but lasting apologetics of Stalinism which was a means of defence of the leaders of the Italian Communist Party during the crisis brought about by the 20th Congress of the USSR Communist Party and by the Hungarian Revolution. Prof. Battaglia contributed with great enthusiasm to this defence, for example in the debate on the important demystifying writing of Claudio Pavone "Le idee della Resistenza" in *Passato e presente*, n. 7, January-February, 1959. See also Battaglia's reply in No. 11-12 (Sept.-Dec. 1959) where he insists on a more conformist position. This is the period which witnessed the "bringing down to size" of Gramsci, carried out by Stalinist bureaucracy, in reply to the demystifying use made of Gramsci by those who did not want to give up their critical position (even though some of them eventually did).

17. Cf. on the subject, Gennario Maria Monti, *La espansione mediterranea del Mezzogiorno d'Italia e della Sicilia*, Zanichelli, Bologna, 1942.
18. The support of some free-traders to capitalist colonialism during the first decade of the century is explicitly connected with their refusal to accept Crispi's premature and artificial colonialism. For instance, Francesco Papafava in one of his articles published in *Giornale degli economisti* and later collected in two volumes, *Dieci anni di vita politica italiana 1899-1909* (Laterza, Bari, 1913), remarked that "a sound imperialism (as opposed to the one based on ambitions of grandeur) should be the fruit of a natural exuberance, or of a spontaneous excess of energy" (Vol. II, p. 982). In June 1905 he also wrote: "It should also be remembered what a madman Crispi of Africa was! But of course it would not be reasonable to be so against Africa today as one should have been immediately after the Adowa events, when even my humble self (and I am proud of it) applauded the populace which, in protest, wanted to tear down the railways in order to avoid that new cannon fodder be sent to Eritrea. Nine years have passed since then, and crimes such as that war have not been committed; consequently even the African expansion, as long as it is not beyond our strength and it is not considered as a mere adventure, may be accepted" (Vol. II, p. 485.)
19. Roberto Battaglia, *La prima guerra d'Africa*, p. 104.
20. R. Battaglia quotes; in this regard (p. 111 footnote) what was stated by Ivanoe Bonomi in his book *La politica italiana da Porta Pia a Vittorio Veneto, 1870-1918*; Einaudi, Torino, 1946, (p. 151-60), i.e. that there was no contradiction between the interest displayed for Africa by the Lombardian bourgeoisie and its opposition to the African megalomania of the following years.
21. In the sense that the Piedmont State was transformed into the Italian State and the absolutist monarchy into the Liberal State only in an indirect and molecular way: the *de facto* Liberal State was considered a tolerated abuse. Not without reason one of the first acts of the Fascist regime was to restore the Statute.
22. Of course the actual system of rule existing during the Giolisti era was substantially different from that existing in the Piedmont State even after the Constitution. But the lack of an explicit rupture implied that the revival which had taken place was tolerated instead of being fully accepted, and that things could very well go back to their former position, as in fact happened later on, at the beginning of Fascism and when the monarchy tried to restore an almost absolute regime after July 25 and after September 8.
23. Cf. Carlo Casalegno, *La Regina Margherita*, Einaudi, Torino, 1956.
24. Cf. e.g. Cesare Spellanzon, *Il vero segreto di Re Carlo Alberto*, Parenti, Firenze 1953.
25. F. Chabod, *Storia della politica estera italiana dal 1870 al 1896*, Laterza, Bari, 1962, p. 677 "... in 1867 he regretted not having been able to carry out his plan, i.e. let the Garibaldines enter Rome, wait until there were 20-30 thousand of them and then march against them and massacre them all so as to leave no trace of them.
26. Carlo Cattaneo, "Considerazioni sulle cose d' Italia nel 1848" in *L'Insurrection de Milan e le considerazioni sul 1848*, Einaudi, Torino, 1949, p. 21.
27. Tied to this stage remained Victor Emmanuel II. Humbert I, Victor Emmanuel III—and without this "patrimonial" interpretation of the State, it would not otherwise be possible to explain the King's and his followers' behaviour in the face of Fascism (both in its long collaboration with it and in its consequent liquidation—and for a few weeks Humbert II).
28. Cf. Chabod, *op. cit.* p. 530, 660-661, 677, 686, 683. As early as the beginning of this century a democratic writer of the *Tiers Monde* observed that the manner in which the Italian Risorgimento had ended had paved the way for colonialism. In 1905 the Peruvian writer Manuel Gonzales Prado wrote:

"The monarchy of 1870 brings with it excessive centralization. The masses earn very little. The only people who benefit from the political unity of Italy are the king of Sardinia, the people of the court, statesmen and financiers. Italy is in a state of agitation: on the one hand there are Crispi's followers trying to create an aggressive and strong power having some elements of German imperialism; on the other, there are those who follow Mazzini's humanitarian principles and are trying to set up a peaceful republic with no permanent army, based on democratic principles. Political passion brings with it social unrest, and, as would happen in any civilized nation, strikes explode as a prelude to the great future revolution. The tariff war with France, the disastrous colonial adventure and the high taxes levied in order to maintain large armies, all cause poverty, sacrifices and tears. From time to time the wave of popular protest, a frightful wave caused by hunger, surges up from the nation and breaks against the walls of the Quirinale. More than once lead and steel are the answer to the plea for bread and work; more than once the blood of workers and even of women and children stains the soil of Naples, of Milan, of Sicily"—Manuel Gonzales Prado, *Italia y el Papado*, speech made in commemoration of September 20, held in Lima on September 24, 1905, in *Horas de lucha*, Fondo de cultura popular, Ediciones Futuro, Lima, 1964, p. 79-80.

29. Chabod, *op. cit.* p. 147, 456, 532-33, 536-37.
30. *Id.* p. 165, p. 489 (footnote).
31. *Id.* p. 290.
32. *Id.* p. 537.
33. *Id.* p. 541.
34. This idea of regarding North Africa not really as a colonial territory but as a frontier land (in the North American sense of the word) is evidenced in a famous anti-colonialist speech made by Andrea Costa. In his speech, Costa, who was then the only Socialist representative of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, opposed the justly deplored conquest of the shores of the Red Sea and instead favoured "national" wars to gain the irredent lands or Tripoli.

"Workers' Italy, which I feel is the real Italy, is not favourable to a colonial policy. It does not need to prove that the insult 'les italiens ne se battent pas' is not true. It has already proved how false it is, but if it were necessary to prove it again, I don't think that strong brave men would look for their field of battle on the sands of Africa, but they would be ready to fight for Tripoli or for the Julian Alps."
35. The "Left" which supported Crispi's colonial policy not only had never included until then what was called the Extreme Left, i.e. Republicans and Radicals and, a few years later, also the Socialists, but it had not even included all those Left-wing parties which supported the system.
36. F. Chabod, *op. cit.* p. 194, p. 198.
37. As is well known, this expression was introduced by Gunnar Myrdal.
38. As a result of increased class warfare, the new ruling class proved to be, on a social level, even more conservative than the former one and more bitter in repressing revolutionary movements. Their unseemly position of "self-made" men became evident during the 1893-94 insurrection when Crispi's clique burst forth in all its violence. The "devotion to the State" requested by the Moderate party to the former revolutionary ministers became in their petty bourgeois conscience an obsessive scruple and an exasperation of almost totalitarian ideals and police methods.
39. *Risorgimento senza eroi*, title of a book by Piero Gobetti which is a critical interpretation of the origins of the Risorgimento.
40. Cf. e.g. what was stated by Cecil Rhodes in 1895 according to one of his friends, quoted by Lenin in *Imperialism*: "My great idea is to solve the

social problem. If one does not want a civil war, one must become imperialist".

41. Leone Carpi, *Delle Colonie e dell 'Emigrazione*, 4 vol., Milano, Tipografia editrice Lombarda 1879.
42. In effect the most important democratic movements in Italy have always been opposed, if not to colonialism in principle, at least to the colonial policies promoted by the ruling classes. Cf. in this regard, Gaetano Arfe, "L'attitude des partis nationaux—notes et reflexions" *Les Socialistes italiens in Le Mouvement Social*, n. 45, October-December 1963, issue devoted to *Le Socialisme et la question coloniale avant 1914*. An Italian translation of this work would prove of the greatest value.
43. In an address delivered in 1939 (published in *Gli Annali dell 'Africa Italiana*, a. III, Vol. III, August 1940, p. 151-171). Prof. Paolo Fortunati, now a Communist M.P., although polemising with anti-colonialist arguments, admits that "in 1931 the Italians in Libya were less than 45,000 and in Eritrea a little more than 4,000".
44. In fact the conquest of Ethiopia in 1935-36 was the only colonial undertaking which met with a rather large, if not unanimous, approval. It is of course rather difficult to discern the different currents of public opinion under a dictatorship but it is an undoubted fact that this war had the full consent and active support of a large strata of population a consent which was not granted to the same extent to the Spanish War and to World War II. This orientation came about as a result of the country's political sterility caused by ten years of merciless totalitarian repression. Due to this fact, a large part of the population—especially the younger elements—lacked all knowledge of alternative positions; furthermore the hostility of the major imperial powers and the reactionary and feudal regime existing in the conquered country captiously presented the undertaking as a revolutionary initiative. Examples—some of them incredible—of what is stated above may be found in a book, *Scrittori e popolo* by Alberto Asor Rosa (Ed. Samona e Savelli, Rome 1965). It should be noted, however, that an undeniable influence was exerted by the strong and unconditional adherence of men of pre-fascism such as Benedetto Croce (who did not hesitate to participate in the campaign of "gold for the country") or Vittorio Emanuele Orlando (who took this opportunity to remind the people that he still existed: at that time the younger generation thought that he had long since died).
45. Report by Antonio Marazzi, in *Atti del primo congresso degli Italiani all'estero*, vol. I, *Relazioni e comunicazioni*. Istituto coloniale italiano, Roma 1910, p. 56.
46. Report by Ausonio Franzoni, *ibidem*, p. 159-160.
47. The Europeans of the colonial period considered the climate of tropical countries very uncomfortable for Europeans and for this reason they demanded special privileges and remuneration. They nevertheless felt that this was a favourable factor for the native population, since they could live on a low consumption level. The same point of view may be found in a less explicit manner in international *per capita* income comparisons: "In a hot climate, and especially in a tropical climate, the number of calories required by the human body for a physical effort is lower than in temperate or cold climates" (Vittorio Marrama, *Saggio sullo sviluppo economico dei paesi arretrati*, Boringhieri, Torino 1963, p. 39). Even though most scholars of economic development problems make appraisals which may prove favourable to the people of underdeveloped countries, some implications of this thesis may signify that the scholar, although unconsciously, is "eurocentric".
48. Even a man like Ferdinando Martini ends up by accepting these statements as a painful necessity of the age which followed the Liberal century, although he prefers to place these statements in the mouth of an interlocutor. In his book, *Nell 'Africa Italiana* (Treves, Milano 1925) it is a German botanist who tells him that "to diffuse civilization among these people and to try to educate them by setting an example is the dream of Arcadians, not

the aim of a colonizing power. We must substitute one race with another ; anyone who upholds a different view is not capable of reasoning" (p. 43). Soon afterwards, however, the liberal Tuscan seems to accept—even though with different feelings — the arguments put forth by the German *realpolitiker* and a few pages later—although he notices how unjust it is—he proclaims that it is necessary to conquer and destroy the conquered people. "I cannot resign myself to believe that there are two justices, one for the white man and one for the negroes ; that there are two rights, one for the whites and one for the colored people ; in my smallness I can only reason with my heart : after having suffered for centuries under the yoke, we are now the ones who are about to impose it on other people. But we are eclectic. We want Isonzo back and we take Mereb. When I speak about these things people shrug their shoulders and tell me that these are 18th century ideas. I am sorry for the 19th century. But we are hypocrites : Deziacc Mesfin risks his life to free his father Ros Woldenkiel from prison and his country from the invaders. If he had been born in Rome, under the republic, he would go down in history as an example of love for his country and love for his father ; since he was born in Africa, we shut him up in the prison of Santo Stefano. Those who say that we must civilize Ethiopia are either saying a lie or a foolishness. We must substitute one race with another. The natives are in our way because they do not fit in with our plans. We must, therefore, whether we like it or not, run after them and help them to disappear—as it has been done elsewhere with the American Indians — with all the means at the disposal of civilized countries : occasionally with guns and continuously with brandy. This is all very sad, but it is unfortunately true. All sentimental colonizers should not lose heart : *fata trahunt*, we have begun, future generations shall continue to drive all former inhabitants of Africa away from their country. In fact all of them shall be sent away except one. The last one shall be saved ; they shall send him to college where he will learn to praise us, in music, for having abolished—by destroying the negroes—slave trade.

49. Gustavo Chiesi, *La colonizzazione europea nell'East Africa : Italia, Inghilterra, Germania*. UTET, Torino 1909, p. 531-32. Mr. Gustavo Chiesi, a former Republican MP, either seems to regard without indignation 'the proposal for wiping out the entire conquered race, or at least shows a sufficient "realism"' so as not to make any objections which may be in contrast with the interests of the conquering nation. In recent times, we may find the same thesis in Roberto Cantalupo's *L'Italia musulmana*, Casa Editrice Italia d'Oltremare, Roma, 1932, p. 99 : "From time to time when rebellions take place, there is always someone who declares that the Arabs must be completely wiped out. A more serious heresy has never been asserted with regard to the colonial issue. The wealth of the African territories consists mainly in their population. The colonies which have no native labour are confronted with one of the most serious problems to be faced by modern Africa.
50. Report by Emilio Leonardi, in *Atti del primo Congresso degli Italiani all'Estero*, op. cit. vol. I, p. 522-523.
51. *Ibidem*, p. 529-533.
52. p. 533.
53. p. 533-535.
54. p. 537.
55. p. 538.
56. p. 538-539.
57. Cf. Ferdinando Martini, *Nell' Africa Italiana*, Milano, Treves, 1925, *passim*.

Prophetism and Development

ALBERT DOUTRELOUX

THE prophetism of the Congo¹ is known principally through *Kimbanguism*, started in the Belgian Congo in 1922 by Simon KIMBANGU. In this paper we will study this phenomenon in respect of its relation to development.

Congolese prophetism however cannot be reduced to Kimbanguism despite the importance and interest of this movement, just as we cannot attach it to a colonial situation. To do so would be to ignore the long history and the polymorphous character of these movements.

The first known manifestations of Congolese prophetism date from the end of the 17th century, beginning with the Antonians.² As for the reaction against a colonial situation, it implies only certain manifestations of this prophetism and even then only partially.³

Whatever the explanations for these phenomena may be, we can nevertheless assume that all these Kongo prophetic movements express protestation on the one hand, and induce certain socio-cultural movements on the other. Despite the fact that these movements have their origin in a protestation they are not necessarily negative.

Moreover it is difficult to classify and measure up the negative and positive aspects. The perspectives on prophetism, taken from this point of view, rely too often on the ideological climate in which the observer operates or operated.⁴

Development here signifies all socio-cultural dynamisms regardless of the *negative* or *positive* meaning of this process. Nor does it assimilate the notion with the notion of *acculturation*, or more honestly *occidentalization* or else *technicization*.

A too exclusive study of this *manifestation* of prophetism does not result in a satisfactory typology of these phenomena. Moreover it may distract one from the essential meaning of prophetic reality. In such a case it becomes hazardous to establish a correlation between prophetism and development.

If the first question is to locate the prophetic phenomenon itself, one can resort to previous observation. Protest seems to be the common basic element of all Kongo prophetism. But this statement after all underlines a piece of evidence. The prophet or the Messiah, the Inspired One, by definition, stands up against an established order. He receives a specific message and mission which confront him with something or

someone. This remark however is too general to be useful for the scholar. If the protest may be understood as a type of relation, we must examine the two related points to be able to perceive exactly this relation. Who protests and/or against what or whom does he protest ?

We can summarize the claims of Kongo prophetic protests as follows :

—At the end of the XVII century, the *Antonians* rose up against the king of San Salvador and his religious policy.

—At the beginning of this century, the *Kiyoka* fought against fetishes and witches. This remains one of the purposes of all prophetism.

—*Kimbanguism*, *Matswanism*, *Mpadism* protested against the religious exclusivity of Christian missionaries and, after this first realization, against colonization.

—In 1960, the *Prophetic Church of Mayumbe* rose up against the official *Kimbanguism*.

The facts are to be noted but do not yet seem to permit to define a more essential protest unifying all other protests. Nevertheless the protest of the *Prophetic Church* leads us to this basic explanation.

In fact the reaction of this latter movement discloses another series of significant facts.

In 1960 the *Prophetic Church of Mayumbe* was born by secession from *Kimbanguism*. Forty years earlier, Simon Kimbangu had quit the *British Missionary Society*. And we must remember that Reformed Churches are created by a split from the Roman Church and Christianity itself seceding from the official Jewish religion. In 1966 separatist movements were still appearing in the *Prophetic Church of Mayumbe*.

Of course these facts are too briefly noted. Many concurrent explanations would be used for such facts, according to the socio-cultural backgrounds in determined areas and times. But nevertheless a common element appears in all these secessions. Prophets first, their followers later, are conscious that *they* practice the true religion facing others.

The *Antonians* denounce the betrayal of the ancestral cults by the kings of San Salvador converted to Christianity. The *Kimbanguists* accuse B.M.S. missionaries of preventing their best followers from practising *Kimbanguism*. Prophets of the *Prophetic Church* charge the *Kimbanguists* with giving way to the temptation of worldly action. And now their own seceders are reproaching them in the same way. At the same time, but without such a success, many other prophets in Kongo area have seceded or are seceding for similar reasons.

This basic purpose in fact can be and often is combined with other considerations, political, sociological and material. Here exist the *pures* and the others, opportunists, swindlers or maybe criminals. But nevertheless this purpose remains noticeable. The prophetic opposes *pure*

believers against *compromised believers*, compromised with human power, human structures, human needs. In other words, with prophets and their followers, the religious man faces the simple social man. The iconoclasm of certain movements is, from this point of view, a way to refuse the *world* and society.

Many prophets have asserted that they do not need financial aid or approval of the State, schools, dispensaries, structures. They want only to pray and teach how to pray, to encounter God directly for them and for others.

As a consequence, prophets do not formulate a complete doctrine, at least not in the beginning. They do not feel the need to *explain* their religion. Their actions and their words are mystical acts in which their followers participate similarly according to their degree of union with the Divinity. The spiritual leader of the *Prophetic Church* has told us calmly: "Religion cannot be *explained*; it is *experienced* as God tells us, and He himself bestows understanding when and how He wills it". It is worth noting that this spiritual leader consented to meeting and speaking to us only after we had first convinced him that we had not come to discuss matters outside the sphere of religious experience in its strictest sense. As soon as this understanding was reached with him and others, all the obstacles which otherwise would have impaired or formalized all meaningful communication between us were eliminated. The subjects thus approached were thereafter more in the order of mysticism than of sociology or ethnology. These conversations were rich and prolonged, but rarely animated for, as another prophet noted: "By speaking too much, one eventually finds oneself speaking all alone..." Simon Kimbangu had similarly appeared as a sincere man, preoccupied solely with spirituality, when he met a Catholic missionary who was otherwise little inclined to heap flattery on the Kimbanguists⁵. This attitude on the part of the prophets leads them to a very flexible and sincere tolerance toward other religious groups, inasmuch as they seem sincere, and do not feel they are suspected or accused of fraud or heresy. Sooner or later, of course, these inspired men become witnesses to the slow but irresistible transformation of their movements when they are not forced themselves even to give in to it.

The *Legal Representative* of the *Prophetic Church*, for example, is a man of means: with other devotees, he has already established a system of elementary schools. He dreams of organizing a secondary level of schooling and building medical welfare centres by appealing for funds to the State and even those outside the country. He recently organized a celebration as part of a planned programme aimed at having his Church officially recognized by the Civil authorities.

This feast was disapproved of by the *purists*, the more orthodox group of prophets who had led the movement for separation. They have a dim view of the secular extensions of their movement. Nevertheless, the reactions of the unchallenged Leader of this prophetic movement are non-existent, or at least so it appears. Along with many others, he is content to dissociate himself from the overtly human endeavours of certain followers while feeling sure in other respects of always preserving

his prestige in the eyes of the true believers. This attitude is an echo of that of a Kimbanguist pastor who attributed it to Joseph Dyangyenda, Leader of Kimbanguism: No need to take measures against the wicked and those gone astray for God Himself will punish them and re-establish order as He sees fit. The principle reveals the non-involvement of the *pure* core group with other groups and the world, even though in practice it may provide room for a few humanly understandable exceptions from time to time, as in the case of Joseph Dyangyenda. At this point we may remember the strange behaviour of Simon Kimbangu when he let himself be captured without resistance by the colonial authorities after having eluded them for two full years, simply because "his time had come". He had not taken any measures even to organize his followers. It was not until 1959, first with Emmanuel Mbamba and then with the sons of Simon Kimbangu, that Kimbanguism became really established and began to launch a programme of wide scope, largely taken from the Christian missions. The old companions of Simon Kimbangu have not yet forgiven them for this departure from *otherworldliness*.

Again, it was almost inevitable that other protests and collective actions should branch out from the stem of this fundamental protest in accordance with the different social, economic, cultural and political situations prevailing at that time. These activities do not appear to have been originated by the inspired ones themselves, at least not in the beginning. Two exceptions must be noted however: Andre Matswa, who became a prophet in spite of himself when his followers could not imagine him playing any other role, and Simon Mpadi, who has always had an almost maniacal obsession with organization and entertained dreams of revolution and of a Golden Age, but who initially took the protection of the spiritual authority of Simon Kimbangu.

This fundamental protest of the inspired ones is the very essence of the prophetic movements and served to define them as *religious* phenomena in the strictest sense. Without referring to any specific faith or ideology, religion may be defined as a systematic intention to attain the transcendent. It is precisely the intention of the prophets to experience, and make others experience, this transcendental relation with the Numinous, without compromising with the immanent, or at least to subordinate the latter to the former.

From the above description it follows that there is no correlation, as such, between prophetism as defined and socio-economic development. The former operates at one level; marginal to social structure as such, while the latter operates at the specific socio-cultural level.

Nevertheless, the facts of the case seem to accuse the prophets and their most faithful followers of angelism and utopianism. The *Antonian* movement is known to have supported the conspiracies organized against the king of San Salvador. The Abako, the Kongo political party, in its appeals for independence, quite evidently profited to some extent from the conscious orientations and emotional mobilization of a large section of the population brought about by *Kimbanguist* and other affiliated movements. Since Independence, the *Kimbanguist Church* has become a real intermediate power between the State and the people and the

Prophetic Church has imitated it with similar results though to a somewhat lesser degree. The role of these movements in provincial and communal elections is a very important one. Furthermore, these churches have been responsible for the development of the school system and have even taken on responsibilities of *civil leadership* in certain areas where no such leadership was present, as many Christian missions have had to do, and still must do, in some cases. Finally, all the Kongo prophetic movements, from the *Antonians* to the *Prophetic Church* through the *Kiyoka*, *Kimbanguism* and a series of lesser movements, have participated in the fight against sorcery, a social malady of Kongo society, and in the effort to promote traditional values in a society undergoing the experience of acculturation.

It may be asked whether the energies liberated by the prophetic movement have been *captured* from without and directed from there to the ends of the whole society, or whether the movement has of its own accord put these energies at the service of society.

In the opinion of the prophets themselves, the first statement is the correct one. Certain historical facts seem to confirm this belief: *Matswanism*, for example, was opposed to the colonial power before Independence, and later opposed the power of the new independent State just as consistently. This must not be interpreted as an obstinate opposition to an object that no longer existed, as R. BASTIDE did, but precisely as a faithful consistency with the fundamental protest of prophetism itself.⁶ In the Congolese Democratic Republic, this same tendency appears even now, although less strongly, as it may be observed in the worried and suspicious attitudes of many prophets toward the new powers. This is consistent with the fact, already noted by H. Desroches about messianism in general, that the prophetic movements, such as official *Kimbanguism* and part of the *Prophetic Church*, can succeed in secular endeavours only at the cost of ceasing to be *prophetic*⁷. They become *churches* and groups whose *ideology* still refers to religion, but is integrated with the socio-cultural context of the whole society. It is at this point that the *capture* hypothesis suggested above may be discussed.⁸

This *capture* of derived energies has been denounced and rejected, in good faith and even heroically, by the *pure*. Simon Kimbangu rejected the political use of his religious movement on the ground that blacks and whites are bound together as are husband and wife.

However, it is too simple to throw the whole responsibility for this use of prophetism solely on the *society outside*. Prophetism—as any other form of religion—suffers from one basic ambiguity. The intention of achieving transcendence, in the final analysis, can only actualize itself through immanent realities. The Inspired One, and then his followers, are all faced with certain problems. Communication, for instance, is at once a linguistic and an organizational reality. The leaders must teach and guide, and eliminate *false prophets* as well as preserve the faithful. Rites are created; a language and a hierarchy, however vague, are instituted, and the beginnings of a dogma become elaborated, more or less confusedly. The social reality which it was the prophet's intention to

transcend reforms itself around him in spite of his wishes. There is no doubt that the main intention, at this point, remains fundamentally religious: the organization, liturgy and thought of the movement are still polarized by the *One Necessity*. However, a group has thus been formed, which will sooner or later develop some purely *human* needs: its own places of worship and teaching, adapted to its function and properly equipped, the necessary material means, and the need for social acceptance. This last mentioned need is of capital importance. While the *pure* continue to protest, and may succeed in withdrawing themselves in a series of secessions, others in the meantime have become a self-conscious group and naturally tend to show it. Above and beyond its own problems and language, this latter group immediately rediscovers the problems and language of the society in which it has formed itself.

The periods in which prophetic movements accomplish this cycle vary considerably in length. The *Prophetic Church*, for one, has achieved it within four or five years. *Kimbanguism* took 40 years to become a church, while in the same period *Matswanism* and *Mpadism* went through the cycle much more spontaneously. The first of the two latter movements began as a *friendship society*, without any religious reference in the mind of its founder, and later became a prophetic movement through its contact with *Kimbanguism* and certain local movements and as a result of the pressure exercised by its adherents. *Mpadism* began in 1939 by taking up the heritage of *Kimbanguism*, which had been temporarily dismantled by the colonial authorities. Its leader, without posing himself as a *messiah*, immediately gave the movement a strong organization, at least in theory, and the messianic vision of the coming of a Golden Age.

Moreover, there is the question of reintegration of the prophetic movement within the total society. Such a reintegration is possible, and even easy, because the members of these movements belong to a particular society in the first place. Whether or not they accept this fact, it is true that the prophet as well as his immediate assistants and followers are destined to live with the language, ways of thinking, and the basic system of reference of their society⁹. Their symbols are passed down to them from the group's cultural past, as well as through the process of acculturation. It is thus natural that their system of symbols refers, on the one hand, to the Cult of the Spirits or Ancestors, the old anti-sorcery rituals and the mythical ethnic history of the group and, on the other, to the new forces brought by the whites—such as the locomotive, the city and its riches—and the missionaries—the Trinitary doctrine, Biblical history, the Sacraments. It incorporates old instruments as well as new ones: the knife and stick of the old chiefs as well as Christian holy water and liturgical vestments.

No doubt, the Inspired and the True Initiates invest this language with new, mystical meanings. But it is a fact that the mass of followers and the even greater number of those who gravitate around them without adhering directly to the movement shift easily from these reformed meanings to the overt meanings found in popular tradition and in the socio-cultural context of the moment.

Evocations of the old *Kongo Kingdom*, as well as renewed piety toward the Ancestors, are remarkably consistent with the aspirations for Independence, and strongly reinforce the anti-colonial claims made on the political front¹⁰. However confused they may seem, these prophetic evocations have been nourished by those very dreams and aspirations for Independence.

Henceforth the fight against sorcery is carried on in the name of the *Holy Ghost* and of his superior power in rituals combining ancient and new elements. But the prophets and their followers, as well as everyone else in their society, believe in sorcery. As a consequence, their sincere intention of eliminating such practices finally tends to reinforce the popular belief in sorcery, and only succeeds in intensifying the practice of witchcraft.

These are but a few small examples. Such deviations occur against the will of the orthodox prophets who are incapable of preventing them. It must be noted that while prophetism willingly or unwillingly depends on the society it has emerged from, the society itself calls for the secular interpretations of the faithful. It persuades them to take militant action and even attempts when necessary to coerce them into such action, which sometimes may imply abandoning of the strictly religious dimension of the movement. From this point onwards society imposes, or seeks to impose, a choice of secular action, even to the degree of selecting in the doctrine itself those aspects which suit its particular needs. It also happens, however, that these pretensions turn against society, and turns convinced followers into opponents.

The *Abako*, the Kongo political party, has in the past taken up the theme of the old *Kingdom*, and captured for its own ends the enthusiasm of many *Kimbanguist* followers, but without taking into account the incompatible teachings and spiritual goals of Simon Kimbangu. The courts are currently being swamped with cases of witchcraft. The judges and administrative officers call for the services of marginal prophets in order to unmask the sorcerers and confound them. The people ignore the repeated teachings of the *Pure* who insist that they pray to God and have their sick treated at the medical centre instead of seeking out spell-throwers, since all evil does not come from sorcery. The efforts of the prophets to eliminate magic beliefs and replace them with religious conceptions are thus neutralized by the pressure of a still highly traditionalistic opinion, all to the advantage of those responsible for it. Certain politicians make similar use of the *esprit de corps* of certain movements and those of their leaders who accept to be politically involved in order to advance their own political campaigns in spite of the repeated withdrawal of the *pure* prophets and their followers. Finally, it sometimes happens that this *capture* of prophetic dynamism, given certain changes in situation, turns itself against the manipulators so that the prophets and their followers become bitter enemies of society. This is what has happened in ex-French Equatorial Africa since Independence.

Therefore, if prophetism correlates itself in any significant manner with social development, it can do so only indirectly and against its own manifest intentions. Like religion in general, it reaches deep into the

collective personality and brings forth emotional dynamisms of particular effectiveness. All development must in fact call upon this type of dynamic source. Suffused with the language of society from which it emerges, prophetism no doubt reactivates it in its own particular way and according to its own goals. However, there is a fundamental ambiguity in religious reality. On the one hand, it allows a kind of induction process whereby society can "capture" the energies thus developed. On the other, this forced contribution is in turn ambiguous and may just as well turn against the goals of society. Here again, much more will depend upon the truly religious depth and structure of the prophetic movement than on the means used by society to solicit or demand its support.

Marxist theory is correct in asserting that, in a given socio-cultural context, prophetism may be a positive factor of conscious orientation, but that at a later stage its role becomes negative as it channels the energies thus liberated into *utopian* directions. That is exactly the view taken by society of prophetism, as of all religious reality.¹¹ In the *Kongo* context, as in other similar contexts, prophetism as such is opposed to the traditional religions whose role lies in the service of the group, its structure, its homogeneity and its functioning as a going concern. Prophetism represents an attempt, constantly renewed for more than three centuries, to institute an autonomous religious reality, which would be non-social if not anti-social. As such, it ignores the facts of development. Once "captured" however, in spite of itself but with very deep internal complexities, it is capable of playing, positively or negatively, a decisive role in an eventual development effort.

Outside of any conviction or ideological persuasion to the contrary it must be recognized that there exists a non-social *something* within social reality itself, even in a religiously impregnated type of society such as archaic societies. This non-social level of reality is consciously intended to be so, and effectively succeeds in maintaining a relative degree of autonomy even if its very effectiveness is constantly put to test. The correlations which may be established between prophetism and development by a sociologist or an ethnologist are really correlations between a development effort and certain accidental aspects of prophetism. By ignoring these limits of the sociological investigation or the specific nature of prophetism, one might be led here, as in other fields perhaps, to the archaic reasoning that *post hoc ergo propter hoc* !

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6. R. Bastide, *loc. cit.*
7. H. Desroches, "Les messianismes et la catégorie de l'échec", *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie*, XXXV, 1963, pp. 61-84.
8. A comparison could no doubt be made with the *great religions*, those which have developed beyond the tribal or ethnic frame of reality. Despite their intention of unity, and even of real unity *at one level*, it has been observed that they can, at *another level*, become the frames of reference for different (an even divergent) forms of action and behaviour, according to different societies or different classes, for example, within the same society. The importance that Power has always recognised in this *instrument* is well known.
9. Cfr. A. Doutreloux, "Prophetisme et Culture", in *African Systems of Thought*, M. Fortes and G. Dieterlen (Eds.), Oxford, I.A.I., 1965.
10. A comparison may be drawn here with the confusion made by many Jews in the time of Christ between the coming of the Kingdom of God and the temporal restoration of their sovereignty, all in good faith.
11. It may be easily demonstrated, on historical grounds, that this perception is typically that of all power groups, of all societies as powers and as societies.

University Education in Malawi

BRIDGLAL PACHAI

WHEN 92 students started their university careers in the newly opened University of Malawi in September 1965 it marked the end of a decade of uncertainty about university education in Central Africa for students from Malawi.

The earlier uncertainties had been real and disturbing in spite of the fact that the number of students likely to be affected was small. When plans for the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland were beyond the blueprint stages there was no university in Central Africa. The architects of the Federation looked upon the role that education was likely to play in the coming "partnership" as a very important one. Speaking in the House of Commons on 27 July 1953, six months before the Federation became a reality, Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, said :

"I state with deep sincerity, as I have stated before, that the first task after the Federation comes into being is, by education, to create first of all leaders for African opinion in sufficient numbers for the Africans to be worthily represented; that is, leaders upon whom Africans will rely and who will be competent to state African views. There is one instrument by which it can be done, by education, by primary and secondary education and by higher education in a university.

"Even if that university were exclusively African, it would go a long way towards achieving our first objective, but I see no reason why we should not do two things at once; first to create a larger class of Africans with the equivalent of home university degrees, and also secure that while they are gaining these degrees they will have a multi-racial university, and that the two main races concerned should work closely together during the formative years of their lives....."¹.

Two weeks earlier, on 13 July 1953, the Queen Mother, Queen Elizabeth, had laid the foundation-stone of the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in Salisbury, thus giving practical expression to a project which had first been launched in 1945 with an individual donation of £20,000 for such a purpose.²

The Inaugural Board of the projected university met for the first time in January 1953. But before this a body known as the Central African Council had been instrumental in the setting up of a commission under the chairmanship of Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders to report on the

needs for higher education for Africans in Central Africa. The commission visited the three territories in November 1952. It presented its report in February 1953 in which it recommended the establishment of a university college on an inter-racial basis in either Salisbury or Lusaka.³

A gift of 250 acres of land, later increased to 474 acres, by the Salisbury City Council and an amendment to the Land Apportionment Act in 1954 (which made it possible for a student of non-European origin to occupy the university premises in the European part of Salisbury) were the next important developments.⁴

While these preliminaries were under way, the territory of Nyasaland was itself making slow progress in its educational programmes for African students. In a country in which the missions had borne the main brunt of providing education, the Government gave no grants until 1908. In later years it paid to the missions small grants ranging from £1,000 in the first year to £10,000 in the last year of the school programme. It was only in 1941 that 37 candidates passed the primary school leaving examination. That year the first secondary school in Nyasaland, viz., the Blantyre Secondary School, was opened.

By 1952 the number had increased to three: an increase of two secondary schools over a period of 11 years. By 1952 only 18 candidates had obtained the Cambridge School Certificate from schools in Nyasaland. To this number must be added a few who obtained qualifications of a similar standard in South Africa or Southern Rhodesia.⁵

The following figures for the first secondary school in the country will help to illustrate the gradual progress over the years.⁶

Year	No. of pupils in all classes	No. of candidates	No. passed
		C.S.C.	C.S.C.
1954/5	82	13	12
1955/6	97	15	14
1956/7	103	20	18
1957/8	100	24	23

There were other problems besides the paucity of students for Nyasaland in the matter of starting the new university. The government protested over the name that was envisaged: the "University College of Rhodesia". The Director of Education in Nyasaland suggested that it be named the "Central African University", arguing, in 1954, that it was "quite possible that branch colleges of the University might well have been opened in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland" in 20 years' time.⁷ Events have proved this prediction to be off the mark by almost ten years, and whilst the forecast referred to branch colleges, autonomous institutions have taken the place of branches (University of Malawi, 1965, and the University of Zambia, 1966).

The name suggested was not accepted by the Inaugural Board of the University. Reporting on this (and another important matter which will be dealt with shortly) to his Government, the Nyasaland Director of Education said:

"As an instance of the usual attitude of the Board towards Nyasaland, I quote the following from the minutes of the November meeting (which I was unable to attend):

"With some reluctance the Board agreed to the change of the name from Rhodesia University College to University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland".⁸

The other important matter referred to above concerned the entry level at the university. The Nyasaland Government had hoped that the Cambridge School Certificate level of entry would be accepted. This was not the case. The following excerpt from the Newsletter of the Rhodesia University Association dated 3 November 1954 explains the points in dispute :

3. "The university is to be multi-racial but to be successful it must have a preponderance of European students not only in the early stages but even later on.
4. "The output from sixth forms in the schools in the Federation and the high standard of entrance to the Rhodesia University College will indeed ensure that there will be a European majority. This is confirmed by the present number of those who enter universities from the Federation."⁹

It is not difficult to see how this statement was unacceptable to Nyasaland. In this country there was no secondary school at that time preparing candidates for the higher level of entry prescribed by the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. What the Government here had thought was more in keeping with the realities of the day was that the lower entry at Cambridge School Certificate or the General Certificate of Education at the "O" level followed by a four-year degree course would serve to confer the advantages of a university education on a greater number of students. The Rev. Andrew B. Doig, who was the Nyasaland member on the Inaugural Board, made strong criticism of the proposals. In a letter to the Acting Chief Secretary a week after the appearance of the Newsletter he said:

"I have never been satisfied with the proposed standard of entrance. Our needs could have been met with a lower standard. But after talks with Professor Rollo (the Interim Principal) I have tried honestly to explain it to Africans as being a sincere desire to have the highest and best we can for our University from the beginning. I have tried to discourage the Africans' criticism that it was all being arranged to suit the European and keep the number of African students low.

"Now out comes a statement from the Inaugural Board designed to set the European fears at rest but as reported in the *Rhodesia Herald* it clearly suggests that the high standard is designed to limit the number of African students. I shudder to think what the African reaction will now be".¹⁰

The reaction was certainly one of grave concern. But it must be pointed out that the lower entry level was not asked for because of any incapacity on the part of the student in Nyasaland to attain the higher levels but because of the absence of facilities for him in the country. As the then Director of Education pointed out: "...while I consider that when his educational system marches with his innate mental capacity the Nyasaland African is capable of competing with the European to pass a high standard of entry followed by a three-year university course, I remain convinced that, for the present, thanks rather to the low quality of the present schools than to any innate mental weakness, a School Certificate level of entry followed by a four-year course is more fitting for the Nyasaland Africa".¹¹

In 1955 the University College was incorporated by Royal Charter as an autonomous institution and plans were made for it to open its doors to its first intake of students in 1956. The Government of Nyasaland also took steps to meet the situation by arranging in 1955 for the admission of up to ten sixth-form students at the Munali Secondary School in Northern Rhodesia and the Goromanzi Secondary School in Southern Rhodesia. This arrangement continued till 1958 when the first Higher School Certificate course in both arts and science subjects was introduced in Nyasaland at the Dedza Secondary School.¹²

As the first students at Dedza did the Higher School Certificate examination only in 1959 and the Munali and Goromanzi institutions between them catered for a maximum of ten students annually from 1955, it was still a very long way for students with the requisite qualifications for entry to the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to join this institution in large numbers. The following Table indicates how very low the numbers were:

Nyasaland Higher School Certificate Results : 1956-1960¹³

<i>Year</i>	<i>Candidates</i>	<i>Passes</i>
1956	4	1
1957	9	4
1958	8	5
1959	18	9
1960	9	2

In 1959, of the 24 Nyasaland students who were pursuing higher education with the aid of scholarships and bursaries, only 4 were at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.¹⁴ This position was the subject of a question asked in the Federal Parliament by the Hon. Mr. W. Chafulumira who wished to know whether the numbers were kept low because of any quota allowed to the country or whether more students did not qualify for admission according to the prescribed standards. He was told that it was because of the latter position.¹⁵

Clearly, the situation called for drastic measures. The urgency of the matter was beyond question. The newly elected African members of the Nyasaland Legislative Council put forward a motion in 1958 calling for an enquiry into African education in the country. The result

was the so-called Philips Report of 20 January 1962. The Report touched upon a crucial point when it observed that the "generally poor quality of education lies in a vicious circle—the schools are poor because the teachers are poor and the teachers are poor because the schools in which they are educated are poor. We believe that the circle must be broken in the secondary schools..."¹⁶.

Since the publication of the Philips Report in 1962 many significant changes have taken place and much progress recorded. In the annual report of the Ministry of Education of Malawi in 1964 the Cambridge School Certificate results show a great improvement: of 663 candidates 159 obtained passes and 46 obtained the G. C. E., giving an overall result of 205 successes. At the higher levels, 63 candidates out of 65 obtained the G. C. E. advanced level.¹⁷

These were clear signs that the new architects of the country were determined that their bequest to the coming generations would be different from that which they had inherited. The Philips Report had mentioned that the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland could well serve the needs of Nyasaland for the next ten years, but it had also gone on to say: "On the other hand, experience elsewhere in Africa shows that it is easy to under-estimate the speed of the demand for university education in emergent countries, where it is understandably encouraged by the rising tide of national prestige. The establishment of a university college in Nyasaland might well be much nearer than many people expect."¹⁸

Three years after the appearance of this Report the University of Malawi became a reality. The stages towards this realisation were indeed taken in rapid succession. In February 1960 a vigorous nationalist monthly called *Tsopano* carried the following terse but meaningful caption:

"In a small prison cell a great dream is revived....."

A UNIVERSITY FOR NYASALAND"

The body of the article carried the following excerpt: "Many years ago, Dr. Laws, Nyasaland's pioneer missionary, had the 'dream of developing the mission of the Church of Scotland at Livingstonia to University College status. Today, at Livingstonia we find Primary and Secondary Schools, a Teacher Training College, Domestic Science classes, a Trade School, Commercial Centre and Theological training.... but no University.

"Somewhere in the past decades Dr. Laws' dream has been dropped and has lain dormant, awaiting revival by someone of the same vision and energy.

"The first sign of this revival is now apparent, for in Gwelo Prison another doctor has been thinking and planning.....In fact, Dr. Banda's determination to fulfil the dream is such that the young Form 1 pupils of today can take hope that Nyasaland will have at least a Faculty of Arts

and Science by the time they are of age in five or six years time. Nyasaland may have loitered between the passing of Dr. Laws and the coming of Dr. Banda but now the national renaissance is fast approaching and once again we can look *forward*.

"The University of Malawi—that is the ideal. But the ideal must be translated into reality, so let us examine what is required to begin a University. First, dynamic determination: this we have. At present it is confined in Gwelo prison, but determination cannot be constrained....."¹⁹

Determination from many quarters has achieved much since the appearance of this article. It is true that in five years the job was done. Speed, vigorous and imaginative planning, and goodwill and assistance from near and far have all played their roles. The time for a fair and full appraisal is yet to come, for the roles are by no means over.

The rapid phases recorded after 1960 represent a story of phenomenal progress: in 1961, the Malawi Congress Party Election Manifesto referred to an accelerated programme for education at all levels, including university; the U. S. Agency for International Development offered its assistance that year for the proposed polytechnic.

In 1962, the Soche Training College and the Institute of Public Administration were opened. In that year the Conference on the Development of Higher Education in Africa, held at Tananarive, accepted the idea of the University of Nyasaland as a project and listed it in its Report.²⁰ In 1962 students from Nyasaland studying at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland were recalled.

The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into African Education (the Philips Report) appeared in January 1962. Reference has been made to it earlier in this article but one further point needs to be mentioned here: the challenge thrown out in the Report to both the inhabitants of this country and its Government and the British Government. In the words of the Report: "This year a decisive step has been taken in constitutional advance; in the same year only two pupils from the African schools of the Protectorate have qualified for admission to a university. The seriousness of the position cannot be exaggerated. We have thrown out a challenge to the people of Nyasaland. We now throw a second to the British Government and people. Self-government will be meaningless without these to make it work"²¹

It is clear that what the Report was referring to was the manpower, the educated manpower, of the country and the pressing need to have this resource available as expeditiously as possible.

The challenge has been accepted and much has been achieved. At the higher levels the Livingstonia Junior College was established in 1963 and developed as an arts college with the objective of preparing students for the Advanced Level standard for university entrance. Similarly, the Secondary School at Dedza has developed since 1963 as a science college with the same objective. Both these institutions closed their

Advanced Level programmes in 1964 and 13 of their students were transferred to the University of Malawi. Since 1964 the only school in the country left with Sixth Form classes is the Blantyre Secondary School.

What the Sixth Form schools in Malawi are now not doing will be done by the University during the extra year provided for the purpose. Like most developments in the country since 1961 in the field of education, the stages in which the University came into being were so rapid as to be almost incredible. The Philips Report of 1962 did not cover higher education because all higher education at that time was the responsibility of the Federal Government. For this reason, the Malawi Government requested that a further survey be made in 1963 which would look into the question of the educational needs of the country for social and economic progress. The upshot was that the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America, together with personnel chosen by the Inter-University Council for Higher Education Overseas and the American Council on Education, arranged for a team of three to visit Malawi in May 1963. A report entitled *Education in Nyasaland : Report of Preliminary Study Team* emerged in June 1963. On the basis of this report a fuller survey was decided upon under the joint auspices of the Governments of Malawi, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The members of the survey team were : Eldon J. Johnson, President, Great Lakes Colleges Association (Chairman) ; John W. Blake, Professor of History, University of Keele and Vice-Chancellor Designate, University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland; Arthur T. Porter, Vice-Principal and Professor of History, Fourah Bay College, the University College of Sierra Leone, Principal Designate, the University College, Nairobi; K. Iwum-Barima, Dean, Faculty of Agriculture, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology.

The services of the following consultants were also enlisted : Bernard E. Lawrence, Chief Education Officer, Essex (financial matters); Bruce J. Hahn, Chief of Party, US/AID, University of Southern California, (technical and vocational matters); Wendell P. Jones, Associate Professor of Education, University of California at Los Angeles (secondary education and teacher training) ; Wiley V. Harris, Superintendent, Westwood View School, Kansas (primary education).

On higher education, the report of the survey team begins its remarks with the following words: "In the modern world, Malawi urgently needs university education. No nation can meet its minimal obligations and perform its essential services without university-trained talent. This applies to governmental, professional, and private sectors of society. Therefore, though the country could and will benefit from outside universities, Malawi must have the incalculable and progressive influence of a self-regenerative, indigenous community of scholars, research workers and consultants. True intellectual independence requires this development. The Government and the people of Malawi are alike convinced that only a national university can achieve these purposes."²³

The report appeared in early 1964. The then Minister of Education

and the Permanent Secretary for Education discussed it with the Prime Minister, Dr. Banda, who not only accepted its recommendations but said that he wanted the university to start in 1965. In April 1964 Sir Christopher Cox, Education Adviser to the Secretary of State, was on a visit to Malawi. It was then that the Prime Minister discussed some details concerning the university with Sir Christopher, particularly the urgent matter of finding a Vice-Chancellor for it. In July 1964 Dr. Banda was in London to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. It was during this time that candidates for the post were interviewed. In August 1964 the Vice-Chancellor-designate, Dr. Ian Michael, Professor of Education at the University of Khartoum, came to Malawi for the first time. Two months' later, in November 1964, Dr. Michael came to Malawi to take up his new post.

During these formative days the Vice-Chancellor was helped by the Ministry of Education which voted a sum of £12,500 in 1964 to meet the university's provisional needs. It is interesting to note that the first full-time appointments to the university after that of the Vice-Chancellor were those of a messenger, Mr. Manuel Chirambo, and a typist, Mr. Abisai Nyalubwe, both of whom are still with the university. The Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Education, Mr. I. C. H. Freeman, who had been the link between the university and the Ministry of Education since December 1964, was seconded to the university as its first Registrar from January 1965. In April 1965, Professor John Utting, formerly Professor of Economics at the University of Khartoum, joined the pioneers as Dean.

When the first students of the University of Malawi were formally admitted on 28 September 1965 an important milestone was reached in the history of Malawi. The speed and resolution with which things have happened since 1961 are an indication of the nation's determination not only to succeed but to make up the lee-way which divides Malawi from its more fortunate neighbours. Malawi has had a long tradition of education in one form or another. With the establishment of its own university the pinnacle has been reached. It is one of the important landmarks in the country and the expression of the nation's quest for higher learning which, in its turn, will contribute much towards the country's future progress and prosperity.

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Debt Servicing Capacity and Developing Countries

PAVEL PRAZAK

MOST developing countries today are trying to mobilize all possible resources for development. Recent experience and theoretical analyses show that both internal and external resources must be used. It is commonly accepted that without the mobilization and exploitation of internal resources effective utilization of external resources cannot be assured. However, this does not imply the rejection of external resources. They can be of considerable importance especially during the initial period of growth.

The flow of long-term capital from the developed to the developing countries is subject to two mechanisms. The first, which may be called the *objective* mechanism, regulates the international flow of capital according to its relative marginal returns and includes methods and terms of repayment. The second may be called the *subjective* aspect of the flow of capital, i.e. government directional interference and adjustments. Economic realities show that more attention should be paid to the *objective* economic aspects. Because unless taken into account they could have much negative impact. In fact misuse of external resources could do more harm than their absence.

When analysing external resources, we must consider separately their two important forms — direct investments and long-term loans¹.

Direct investment can to a certain extent and under certain circumstances contribute to economic progress. Obviously foreign investors can be prevented by a sovereign state from hindering economic development and the state can take *any* steps to direct the economic activity of foreigners. The most important negative feature which as a rule accompanies direct investment is that on the whole it results in an excess of the outflow of capital (mainly in the form of profits) over and above the total inflow and reinvestments. For example in Latin America in the period 1950-1963 the inflow of direct investments from the U.S. amounted to \$3.5 billion. During the same period the amount of reinvested profits was almost \$3 billion and the repatriated incomes of the American firms totalled \$8.5 billion of accumulated funds and the loss of foreign exchange was \$5 billion.

The second source of foreign capital is loans. Usually it is easier to find a country which would be able and ready to extend loans than to utilize these loans most effectively. This is of course an objective limi-

tation and at the same time the only criterion by which the exploitation of foreign loans can be measured.

During the years 1960-1962 the average annual inflow of foreign capital (in all forms) into the developing countries was \$6 billion. During the same period, however, the foreign indebtedness of these countries rose from \$11.8 billion in 1960 to \$16.3 billion in 1962. The rate of growth of foreign indebtedness was (and still is) very high. From 1955 to 1962 it rose in South Asia and West Asia by 26 per cent, in Far Asia by 15 per cent and in Africa by 10 per cent². These rates did in fact exceed the rates of growth of national incomes, production and foreign trade. As a rule long-term loans should and could play a positive role in increasing the rates of investment. But they should be used in such a way that their exploitation does not become an obstacle to development. For example, the insolvency and incapability of a country to honour its commitments in time limit its future ability to obtain further loans, i.e. it leads to less than full utilization of the advantages of the international division of labour.

The inflow of foreign capital in the form of loans increases the volume of funds available for financing development. At the same time, the debtor country is bound to refund the loan in accordance with the conditions laid down in the agreement. This means that the borrowing country is obliged to send part of its national income abroad at some future date. As repayments are mostly made in foreign currencies, the foreign debt influences the balance of payments of the borrowing country.

Therefore, it is useful to look upon the relationship between the repayment of foreign loans and the balance of payments position. An examination of the possibilities of using foreign loans requires an analysis of the ability to repay them and, hence, an analysis of the variables influencing the balance of payments.

These variables can be classified as follows³ :

1. *Fluctuating Variables*
 - (a) exports
 - (b) flow of foreign capital
 - (c) inflation induced and emergency imports
2. *Offsetting Variables*
 - (a) reserves of gold and of foreign exchange
 - (b) compensatory financing
 - (c) compressible imports
3. *Rigid Variables*
 - (a) non-compressible imports
 - (b) payment of interest on loans
 - (c) repayment of loans

The relative importance of each of these variables in the balance

of payments and their influence upon the servicing of loans depend on the economic policy, economic structure and level of economic development of the country under consideration.

1. *Fluctuating Variables*

(a) *Exports*

The earnings from exports are the most important variable influencing the balance of payments. Exports, however, are far from stable. This is mainly caused by the limited flexibility of supply of primary products in the short run—the impact of business cycles in the developing economies—the seasonal fluctuations, bad crops, etc. Even if all of these factors are short-termed or limited in volume their effect upon the sensitive economies of the underdeveloped countries becomes greatly magnified. Together with instability, there is also a long-term tendency towards a worsening of the terms of trade, or a fall in the purchasing power of exports of the underdeveloped areas. It is also a reflection of the differences in the productivity of work in the developing and the developed countries, of the relative decline in exports of certain raw materials and a number of other causes. From the point of view of balance of payments, instability is the most important factor. Especially, countries dependent on only one or two export commodities are usually more sensitive than others.

(b) *Flow of Foreign Capital*

Despite the constantly growing inflow of foreign capital into the developing countries in general it is impossible to forecast the future net inflow to each individual country. We must also take into consideration the structure of the inflow (loans, donations, direct investments, etc.) because of the outflow and therefore the net accretion. Moreover, in many countries we can see large amounts of domestic capital flowing out. This and future inflow depend upon economic and political factors which cannot be regulated by the developing countries alone.

(c) *Inflation Induced and Emergency Imports*

Natural catastrophes, crop failures, etc., could sometimes lead to a higher than average volume of imports and put a strain on the balance of payments. If there is a "domestic" inflation and the rate of foreign exchange remains temporarily unchanged, the tendency usually is to increase imports. All factors inducing such an increase can hardly be constant.

2. *Offsetting Variables*

(a) *Reserves of Gold and of Foreign Exchange*

These reserves offer one of the possibilities of compensating to a certain extent the sudden decrease of export earnings or the expenditures induced by the sudden increase of imports. During the last 20 years the developing countries' reserves of gold and foreign currencies decreased considerably. This was caused, among other things, by the necessity of using all the disposable funds for national development programmes. At

the same time, the need to keep a reserve was reduced through their membership of the International Monetary Fund. Despite their membership of the IMF their existing reserves are still too limited to enable them to offset the impact of the fluctuating variables on the balance of payments.

(b) Compensatory Financing

The function of compensatory financing is clear but often over-emphasized. The main source of compensatory financing is official loans from the developed countries (mainly from the US), earmarked for settling the balances of payments. There are also short-term loans raised in the private capital market. The third source is the possibility of drawing on the IMF's financial resources to tide over a temporary deficit in the balance of payments. Since each member contributes gold to the extent of 25 per cent of its quota, the IMF permits each member to draw freely up to the amount of its gold contribution. And if the member appears to make a reasonable effort to solve its problems, IMF often permits a drawing up to the next 25 per cent of the quota. The main feature of compensatory financing is that it is a short-term device which cannot alleviate the real causes of the balance of payments difficulties.

(c) Compressible Imports

Generally, it can be said that compressible imports consist of that part of imports without which the process of economic development in the importing country can go on. But in the case of each individual country it can be defined more precisely. Often compressible imports consist of consumer goods excluding foodstuffs. For a more precise definition it is of course necessary to make an analysis of the commodity structure of imports for each country separately. The possibilities of reducing its volume depend on the economic policy and ability of a country to influence foreign trade as well as its socio-economic structure.

3. Rigid Variables

(a) Non-compressible Imports

The definition of non-compressible imports depends upon the definition of compressible imports. They include practically all necessary capital goods and foodstuffs as well as fuels, medicines, etc. The structure of this part of imports depends on the economic structure of the country and on the type of economic growth desired. Despite the realization of projects destined for the substitution of imports, the volume of non-compressible imports tends to grow steadily.

(b) Payments of Interest on Loans

The sum of interest payments is the most rigid element in the balances of payments of the developing countries. When a loan is granted the rate of interest and the mode of its payment are determined independently of the future economic position of the country. The new feature of economic policy of the developed countries in the field of long-term loans is a tendency to lower the rate of interest. For example,

in 1962 the US granted 58 per cent of its loans to the developing countries at an interest of less than 1 per cent, 39 per cent of loans given by France, the German Federal Republic, Italy, Japan, Britain and the U.S. were given at an interest of less than 1 per cent⁴. Despite this tendency it cannot be expected that the interest rate on credits from the developed countries will disappear. For short-term and medium-term loans the interest rate remains unchanged and as it is considerably higher than that on long-term loans its adverse effect on the balance of payment is more important.

(c) *Repayment of Loans*

The amount of repayments of loans is also a very rigid element in the balance of payments. The instalments are fixed in advance without regard to the future economic situation and the balance of payment position. The problem here is that the structure of a foreign debt in many cases consists of several loans payable in a short period and the debtor country is forced to contract several short-term loans at very high interest rates to meet the payments when they are due. The resulting worsening of the balance of payments is obvious. During the period 1963-1967 Venezuela is to repay 68 per cent of the debt accumulated by the end of 1962; Mexico 64 per cent, Guatemala 61 per cent, Iran 56 per cent, Indonesia 55 per cent, etc. And difficulties in the repayment of these loans are reflected in the difficulties of contracting new loans, and in the sharp decline of the inflow of money when it is most needed. These difficulties are only partially compensated by the fact that the creditor countries usually agree to prolong the period of repayment. For example in 1962, 51 per cent of the long-term official loans granted by the US were payable in more than 30 years, and 39 per cent of those granted by France, the German Federal Republic, Italy, Japan, Britain and the US were made payable over a period of more than 30 years. This could help to soften the balance of payments difficulties to a certain extent.

The debt servicing ratio⁵ is a commonly used index for expressing the burden of foreign debt in the economy of a country. It is defined as a share of the volume of interest and payments and repayments in the volume of foreign exchange receipts on the current account (i.e. receipts from the exports of goods and services) in a limited period, usually one year. It is possible to use it only in a broad concept of the detailed analysis of foreign indebtedness. It can be used as an auxiliary criterion expressing the relative weight of the burden of indebtedness and the dangers resulting from the instability and fluctuations of foreign trade. It is impossible to give the limitations under which a foreign debt has no direct negative pressure on the balance of payments because the index comprises only 2 out of the 9 variables mentioned earlier. Its calculation could be useful for making rough estimates and as a warning signal for economists. Some economists and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development are of the opinion that the maximum acceptable limit for the developing countries is 25 per cent. Numerous exceptions however confirm its auxiliary character.

Any use of loans from abroad leads to an outflow of capital in the form of servicing payments. This is a factor which continuously and

negatively affects the volume of national product and accumulation. It has already been mentioned that loans can be repaid in three ways:

- (1) by an increase in export earnings,
- (2) by a decrease in import expenditure; and,
- (3) by an inflow of new loans.

The developing countries in their efforts to advance economic development sometimes contract loans without due consideration to their repayment. The effective use of foreign loans means that they are used in accordance with the potentiality of the economy to make repayments. In this respect four basic conditions should be fulfilled.⁶

1. New projects financed by foreign loans should carry a higher rate of interest on all loans drawn by a country. If the rate of profits is lower, there could appear a negative pressure on its internal resources and balance of payments. In some cases, however, national effectiveness must be taken into consideration. This means that some projects of special importance to the country could be subsidized but as a rule projects financed from abroad should conform to the condition mentioned earlier.

2. Funds accumulated from the increase of national income created by projects financed from abroad should be increasingly used for domestic investment.

3. Investments financed from abroad should lead to an increase in the national income which, if possible, should overtake the rate of population growth.

4. The state sector of the economy should be developed in such a way that foreign investments open up opportunities for an acceleration of domestic economic activity.

We must take into consideration that in many countries, especially in Africa, the effective utilization of external resources is greatly influenced not only by unsuitable social and economic structures but also by low incomes. This results in a tendency in these countries to attract and use *any* external resources at *any* price. However, the satisfaction of immediate needs will in the future be outbalanced by its negative results. If foreign indebtedness is growing more rapidly than national income and capacity of exports, it is obvious (with the exception of situations in which external funds do not require repayment abroad) that such a developing country will be sooner or later in considerable difficulties. Such a situation will bring about a crisis in the balance of payments position and other difficulties.

A. Determination of the future need of foreign loans from the point of view of the formation of national income.

1. An assessment of the future formation and growth of national income of GNP requires first an analysis of the past and present trends. Although it is possible to make use of the figures of a long-term plan for economic development, if there is one, for practical purposes it is always

between 5 and 1. It means that if the net investment is 20 per cent of the national income and if the rate at which investment is turned into net income is 5 to 1, we could assume that the rate of growth of the national income will be 4 per cent per year⁷. The incremental capital-output ratio can be precisely expressed only *post-facto*, because the changes are not caused by its components alone. The capacity of enterprises, the labour force potential, climatic conditions and other factors must be accounted for. The factors not accounted for raise the possibility that economic growth brings about an automatic increase of the incremental capital-output ratio (from "5 to 1" to "3 to 1" for example); in practice (especially in the developing countries) it undergoes numerous fluctuations. But for our purpose, the coefficient of investment can be found. We can conclude that the bigger the capital-output ratio, the less investment is required and *vice versa*. If we are able to know this ratio for several past years, we could use it without too much risk for the calculation of future needs of capital.

2. The next step should be the determination of future trends in the national income.

- (a) First we have to examine future development on the basis of internal resources. In other words, we assume in advance a given social and economic structure, the rate of growth of population, the increasing (or decreasing) share of the active population and we put down the real possibilities of the maximum utilization of internal resources and their impact upon the future growth of the national income and the national income per head.
- (b) As for foreign capital we are only concerned with the share and weight of direct (private) investments already operating in the country and its probable development: growth of production, profits, reinvestments, etc. These investments constitute the negative pressure on the balance of payments through the outflow of profits. There is however no direct relationship between the movement of private capital and the insolvency of a country. It is difficult to estimate the future inflow of *new* direct investments (and donations). They depend on many economic and non-economic factors which could hardly be influenced by the developing country alone.
- (c) The result of this phase of analysis should give us an estimate of the future national income without taking into consideration the future inflow of loans.

3. The determination of the investment gap (which is theoretically equal to the balance of the current account) is much more difficult than it seems at first sight. First we need to know the values of the following variables for the period we are examining :

- (a) the rate of investment from internal resources (plus the foreign capital already operating).

- (b) the estimated national income and its rate of growth ;
- (c) the incremental capital-output ratio and as many factors as possible which influence it.

There are some difficulties in determining the national income because its estimates are usually not very precise, but the biggest problem is the construction of the incremental capital-output ratio. As was mentioned earlier we could use the past one and we should try to adjust it as far as possible. After this we can proceed to the calculation of future needs of loans from abroad. There are many quantitative models which could be used, but for the purpose of simplification we use the Harrod model.

$$G_w = \frac{s}{C} = \frac{\Delta I}{Y} \cdot \frac{1}{C}$$

G_w —Warranted rate of growth.

s —Rate of accumulation.

C —Incremental capital-output ratio.

Y —Income.

ΔI —Investment.

Investment is composed of two components: investment from internal resources and investment from external resources (hire loans), which is the variable we should calculate from this model. The validity of this formula is of course very limited, especially because of the incremental capital-output ratio. It is influenced by a number of other variables, namely,

- (1) capacity of enterprises;
- (2) utilization of labour force;
- (3) depreciation of capital;
- (4) climatic conditions;
- (5) seasonal character of production;
- (6) availability of factors of production;
- (7) population growth;
- (8) dependence on the international market;
- (9) effectiveness of production ; and others.

An analysis of these variables practically means an evaluation of the investment programmes for the period in question and also means a correction of the incremental capital-output ratio. We can then calculate the amount of investment required in the future which in our case is equal to the inflow of loans. We assume that:

1. This investment will not induce other foreign investments or a further inflow of loans;
2. This investment will not induce other investments from internal resources (it will not mobilize additional internal resources). In practice the situation requires the correction of the previously calculated figures of the national income. Furthermore we assume that it is easy to obtain loans in normal conditions.

3. Now we should add the estimated sum of the loans needed in the future to the previously contracted sum of loans which will flow during the period under consideration. The result will be the future gross inflow of foreign loans.
4. Assuming constancy in the situation and in the conditions of the world market for capital (the rate of interest, the grace period, the structure of repayments, the period of total repayment) we can calculate the amount of servicing payments for each year of the period analysed. Naturally we must add the servicing payments of the previously contracted loans. We obtain a figure which represents the constant burden on the debit side of the balance of payments.
5. At this stage we ought to return to foreign trade. Foreign trade is the most important source of foreign exchange for the majority of the developing countries. This means that it is also the most important service for the repayment of foreign debts. Here we have in mind not only receipts from exports of goods, but services too (for example earnings from the Suez Canal make a decisive part of the foreign exchange earnings of the UAR). For the purposes of our analysis we examine imports and exports separately. Taking exports first—exports and export earnings are a weak spot in the economies of the developing countries. Their instability and fluctuations result from business cycles in the developed world. There is also a tendency towards lowering the purchasing power of exports. The unfavourable position of the developing countries in the world market imposes certain limits to the expansion of their foreign trade, especially in the short run. We should however try to estimate as accurately as possible future earnings from exports. The import side is more complicated. We should look separately upon three main groups of imports: compressible imports, non-compressible imports and induced imports. Our aim is to calculate expenditures on imports of goods and services. This could be done by another (and easier) way too. An analysis of the past trends in foreign trade has proved that in the developing countries there is a relationship between the growth of national income and the growth of the value of imports. On this basis we can establish the linear regression reflecting the quantitative connections between the growth of national income and imports during the preceding 10-15 years. On the basis of this calculation we can fix the probable value of imports for the period analysed. The results can be controlled by the coefficient of correlation for the variables used (the nearer to 1, the more precise the result). We should take into consideration the possible changes of proportion between compressible and non-compressible imports which reflect changes in the whole social and economic structure of the country.
6. We thus gain two partial results:

- (a) *the total amount of the future servicing payments for the period under consideration.*
- (b) *the total net future amount of the earnings of foreign exchange.* As auxiliary we can introduce the orientative coefficient—the *debt servicing ratio*. We should use it only in the way described earlier in this article.

B. The construction of the hypothetical balance of payments for the period under consideration.

1. The first step should include an analysis of the past and present balances of payments (current account and capital account separately) in accordance with the factors influencing them.
2. On the basis of Part A we can put down the hypothetical balance of payments (estimated amount of servicing payments, balance of current account and debt servicing ratio included).
3. We then evaluate the deficit of the balance of payment which is
 - influenced by the following variables:
 - (1) The balance of current account;
 - (2) The outflow of capital; and
 - (3) The inflow of capital.

Then 2 and 3 require only an estimate as it is difficult to calculate accurate figures. The balance of the current account can be easily made with the results of Part A. The compensation (liquidation) of the deficit of the balance of payments can be done in three ways:

- (1) With the help of the gold and foreign exchange reserves;
- (2) By compensatory financing; and,
- (3) By the new inflow of capital.

We assume that the deficit was not caused by the inflow or outflow of capital but by the balance (deficit) of the current account. We are in fact interested in the balance of payments.

C. Conclusions

As we cannot know the exact amount of the future compensating funds we are obliged to proceed more or less empirically. We therefore analyse the past development of the deficit of the balance of payments together with ways of its compensations. On the basis of the estimates of future development of compensating (offsetting) variables we can fix the maximum "balanceable" deficit and compare it with the calculated deficit (which in this context means the deficit in the current account).

We are then likely to obtain two results:

- (1) The calculated deficit of the current account is smaller or equal to the "balanceable" deficit. In this case the utilization of

foreign loans and their repayment do not cause any harm to the balance of payments. The rate of growth of national income is sound and theoretically there should be no difficulties.

- (2) The calculated deficit is bigger than the "balanceable" one and in this case the utilization of such a quantity of borrowed funds from abroad will cause difficulties in the balance of payments. There are two solutions:

- (a) We must reduce the amount of the debt servicing payments by postponing the dates of repayment and by reducing the rate of interest. If we can reduce the deficit on the "balanceable" level, we shall be able to keep the targets of the income growth unchanged.
- (b) We must reduce the amount of the debt servicing payments by reducing the amount of inflowing loans. This will be reflected in the investment gap which will not be covered and consequently we shall be forced to cut down the unreal rate of growth of the economy.

There is however another possibility of maintaining the original rate of growth by contracting additional long-term loans or other forms of foreign funds. In this case we should repeat the whole analysis. In many cases this does not bring about great improvements as the liquidity crisis is only postponed.

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1. We omit portfolio investment, soft loans and loans in the form of agricultural surpluses for their relative unimportance in the bulk of capital flowing into the developing countries. Donations, the volume of which is constantly rising, are not included because they have no direct bearing on the balance of payments. The interesting problem, however, is their effective use for development.
2. See *Financing for an Expansion of International Trade*. UNCTAD, E/Conf. 46/9, Geneva, 1964.
3. See *Improvement of Invisible Trade of Developing Countries, Economic Growth and External Debt—An Analytical Framework*, UNCTAD, E/Conf. 46/84, Geneva, 1964.
4. See *Financing for an Expansion of International Trade*, UNCTAD, E/Conf. 46/9, Geneva, 1964.
5. See D. Avromavic, R. Gulhah : *Debt Servicing Capacity and Postwar Growth in International Indebtedness*, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1959.
6. See *Improvement of Invisible Trade of Developing Countries*, loc. cit. and D. Avramovic, R. Gulhah : *Debt Servicing Problems of Low-Income Countries 1956-58*, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1960.
7. This is of course a very simple approach the usefulness of which should not be exaggerated. The incremental capital-output ratio is dependent on the behaviour of other factors of the economic system and therefore there are several possible relations between it and the rate of growth. See H. Leibenstein: *Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth*, and W. A. Lewis: *Theory of Economic Growth*.

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Quarterly Chronicle

India and Africa

IN the heyday of Indo-African cordiality some years ago Jawaharlal Nehru described the Indian settlers in East Africa as a source of embarrassment to India. Taking a cue from Nehru, African leaders in Kenya and Tanzania have been at pains to demonstrate that these immigrants are a greater embarrassment to their adopted homelands. During the quarter under review these African governments made determined efforts to weed out a substantial number of Indians from Kenya and Tanzania. This problem, as expected all along, eventually landed in India's lap and the External Affairs Ministry became closely involved in a consideration of the future of these unfortunate people whom nobody seemed to want, not even Britain whose legal and moral responsibility most of these Indians happened to be.

It all started with the deportation from Tanzania of four non-Africans, including two "Asians", on Jan. 15. The Home Minister, Mr. Lawi Sijaona, said the Indians, T. Lakhani and J. Thaker, had lived in the country till independence but left thereafter with all their money. This was construed as evidence of their disloyalty to the country, hence their presence in it was regarded as "undesirable". Significantly, only the week before Mr. Joseph Nyerere, brother of the Tanzanian President, had told a rally at Mwanza, the home town of the Indian deportees, that businessmen who had sent money out would have their businesses confiscated. He went to the extent of labelling such people as murderers who deserved to be hanged, thus causing widespread panic among the minority communities. Mr. Nyerere's words carried weight because he also holds the important position of a Regional Commissioner. That Mr. Nyerere really meant business this time was demonstrated by his own revelation that he had personally confiscated the business of an Indian who had sold his property to return to India. The African leader lost no time again when he handed the rice and oilseed mill of Lakhani to a youth wing member of the ruling Tanzania African National Union.

Before the Indian Government could review the situation, Tanzanian authorities served expulsion orders on another 300-odd Indians, most of whom, though holding British passports, had lived all their lives in the country. The official reason given for their summary deportation was that they were not citizens and did not possess valid work permits. But the Tanzanian High Commissioner in New Delhi, Mr. S. A. Salim, explained that his government's action was in conformity with its policy of ensuring prosperity first for its own citizens. The type of business which the deported persons did—examples given officially in Dar-es-Salaam were those of shoemakers, barbers and tailors—could be handled easily by the Tanzanians themselves, Mr. Salim said. The reaction in

India was sharp and one newspaper pointed to the Tanzanian action as evidence of racial discrimination in the country. The Indian External Affairs Ministry summoned Mr. Salim and after expressing its serious concern hoped that the deportation of Indians would be reviewed in the interests of continued Indo-Tanzanian friendly relations.

On Feb. 10 India's High Commissioner in Dar-es-Salaam, Mr. N. V. Rao, announced that the Tanzanian government was going to reconsider the expulsion orders served on some 500 traders, including Arabs. He stated that only a handful of these traders held Indian passports, the rest being British citizens. The following day information was received in New Delhi that the African government had revoked the deportation orders. Still another version of the unfortunate episode was made available on Feb. 28 when the Tanzanian government issued a statement that a national committee had been appointed to review all the expulsion cases. It said the quit orders had been issued in the first place because the Asians were not in possession of any documents legalising their stay in the country or they held documents which were not in order. The statement admitted that "in the process hardship has been caused or that some people have been treated unfairly". The new move came rather late because several of the deportees had already sold their businesses or made alternative arrangements and confirmed bookings to India or Britain.

Britain would not however admit the bulk of them in spite of their legal status. This was not because of the non-existence of diplomatic relations between Britain and Tanzania, broken last year over the Rhodesian issue. A spokesman of the Canadian High Commission in Dar-es-Salaam, which looks after British affairs, explained the position thus: "A situation may arise in which a person holds a passport describing him as a citizen of the United Kingdom and its colonies but has in fact lost that status as a result of the independence of the colonial territory from which he derived that citizenship."

In East Africa the virus spreads easily. Fearing entry of Indians from Tanzania, the Kenyan authorities tightened their border security and checks. The Vice-President, Mr. Daniel Moi, announced that many "Asians" had moved in following the Tanzanian action and if any of these people did not carry papers enabling them to reside in Kenya they would be told to quit. The Minister for Economic Planning and Development, Mr. Tom Mboya, warned Asian traders of racial agitations starting against them if they did not open their firms and businesses to Africans. He disfavoured what he called mere window-dressing with Africans enjoying titles without any work. He wanted Africans to be promoted to positions where they could acquire a say in the policy of the firms, even influencing decisions on whether the firms should expand their activities in Kenya and whether they should plough back profits and make new investments. Mr. Mboya however assured the Indians and other immigrant communities that they were welcome to live in Kenya as equal citizens.

While he was uttering these sentiments the ruling Kenya African National Union Party was busy organising a mass boycott of Indian shops

in Mombasa, Kenya's second largest city, because the community was not adequately represented at a mass rally addressed by President Kenyatta. A party official said the community's pretensions of loyalty to Kenya could not be taken at face value when it refused to join in meetings, especially those addressed by the head of the State to explain important policies. About this time, incidentally, the Indian envoy in Nairobi, Mr Prem Bhatia, was busy settling scores with his new Pakistani counterpart, Mr R. Noor. Mr Bhatia protested to the Kenyan External Affairs department against Mr Noor's remark over a television programme that India's over-spending on the army had resulted in widespread starvation deaths in the country. Mr Bhatia described the Pakistani diplomat's remarks as "crude, offensive and provocative". There was no public response to this protest from the Kenyan government.

Another move which would have caused widespread dislocation for the Indian business community in Kenya was vetoed in Parliament by Mr Ronald Ngala, Minister for Cooperatives and Social Services. The Opposition party, the Kenya People's Union, led by former Vice-President Oginga Odinga, tabled a motion urging immediate nationalisation of key financial houses, firms and industries. Though a nationwide feeling exists on this issue, particularly in view of what is happening in neighbouring Tanzania, the move was defeated by the overwhelming official majority. Mr Ngala successfully moved an amendment that the government should act to secure effective Africanisation of the country's economy. He said immediate nationalisation meant that there should be no negotiations, which was contrary to the government's policies.

The Kenyan plan was inspired by Tanzania where, a few days earlier, President Nyerere had announced the nationalisation of all banks. This was followed by restrictions on the free flow of currency to its common market partners, Kenya and Uganda. Four days later President Nyerere announced at a rally in the capital that he planned to take over land and big industries also. At this meeting his supporters carried placards reading "British institutions in our country should go" and "Socialism and self-reliance our salvation". This declaration was followed by the nationalisation of all insurance firms and eight major import-export firms. Mr Nyerere announced he was taking a controlling share in the sisal industry and a majority share in seven other big ventures, including all three breweries in the country. These firms included Bata Shoe Co., Metal Box Company, British American Tobacco, Tanzania Breweries and Tanganyika Portland Cement. Some Indian-owned concerns, mainly banks, were also affected. These included the Bank of Baroda and the Bank of India, the former having three branches and the latter one in the country. Managers of these banks have been taking part in compensation talks with the government. But Mr Nyerere has indicated that compensation to banks and other concerns taken over by the State has to be "long-term". He said there was no question of not paying compensation, as feared in some circles, because the government had to pay the price of its policies. He admitted frankly that he had been inspired by China in these drastic moves, warning that anyone standing in his way would be crushed.

This preoccupation with nationalisation overshadowed another Tanzanian move which caused deep disquiet among the minority communities. On Feb. 5 the government ordered the closure of the Goan Club which had a membership of 800. This step was taken on the complaint of a solitary African who was allegedly refused a drink at the club. He wrote an angry letter to a local newspaper accusing the club of pursuing "colonialist" activities. The government move was regrettable because the club had previously lost no time in following official instructions to amend its constitution to make it completely non-racial. The club had even changed its name from Goan Institute to Dar-es-Salaam Institute.

Economic Assistance

Though these and other moves adversely affecting "Indian interests" followed one after another, on its part India continued to lend a helping hand to African countries. 116 Indian railway personnel, including 53 locomotive drivers, were recruited for immediate service on the Zambian railways which, jointly administered by Zambia and Rhodesia, have been seriously disrupted by the illegal seizure of power by the whites in Rhodesia. These men included signal technicians, plate-layers and fitters. • Zambia had appealed through the United Nations to friendly countries for assistance and India had offered to recruit all the personnel required for the Zambian railways. Zambia, with whom India's relations have been excellent, sent a 12-member team to study municipal administration in India. Led by Mr Kumbi, Local Government Officer of Lusaka, the delegation visited various offices of the Delhi Municipal Corporation, watched the proceedings of the Standing Committee and called on Mayor Nur-ud-Din Ahmed. They also visited Ghaziabad, where they conferred with officials of the Improvement Trust and saw the new developing colonies of Kavinagar and Rajnagar and other cities in India.

India offered to set up joint industrial ventures in Ghana. This followed the participation in the Ghana International Fair in January of ten representatives of prominent industrial establishments in India who explored the possibilities of launching such projects. India Day was observed at the fair where both Mr J.W.K. Harley, Vice-Chairman of the ruling National Liberation Council, and the Indian envoy, Mr S.V. Patel, stressed the desirability of increasing the volume of trade between the two countries. A little earlier an Indian agricultural expert, Dr N. Dwadhwa, had announced that India and Ghana were to cooperate in the manufacture of basic agricultural implements for farmers in Ghana. Dr Dwadhwa's firm, Agricultural Engineers Limited, with a capital of £100,000, will make hand and wheel hoes, animal ploughs, animal carts, groundnut planters and poultry and irrigation pumps. Two Indian experts on farm implements will soon reach Ghana to train the staff of the company locally. The Commerce Minister of Mauritius, Mr Krishnaswamy Thiruvengadam, announced that it was proposed to set up a textile mill in the island in collaboration with Birla Brothers. The Mauritian Minister was in India to negotiate with the Birlas who, he said, had already submitted the feasibility report. The mill, he said, was expected to be set up in the island before the general elections due later

this year. Another Mauritian Minister, Mr V. Ringadoo, who holds the portfolio of Education and Cultural Affairs, came here on a goodwill tour and went back highly satisfied after eliciting promises of increased Indian aid to his country in the fields of science and technology. Mr Ringadoo also met several of the 200 Mauritian students at Indian educational institutions and publicly expressed his satisfaction that they were being treated very well.

East African Book Week

India took part for the first time in the East African National Book Week which opened in Dar-es-Salaam on Jan. 28. About 120 books on India covering a wide range of subjects were on display. India contributed \$3,325 to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa. The fund is meant for victims of the apartheid policy of the South African regime. Considerable interest was aroused in India by a Kenyan student, B.A. Omyse, winning the Nehru Shield in a declamation competition organised in Moscow by the Indian Students' Association at Lumumba Friendship University. The shield, a map of India in relief mounted in silver on wood, has been presented by the Government of India to the Indian Students Association to serve as a running shield for the declamation contest in memory of the late Prime Minister. The subject of the debate this year was "My understanding of socialism". All proceedings of the contest, including the speeches made by the competitors, were in Russian.

Diplomatic Appointments

On the diplomatic front, India opened an embassy in Brazzaville. India's envoy in Kinshasa, Mr. V. Siddharthachary, was concurrently accredited to Brazzaville on the other side of the river. A diplomat with African experience, Mr. Khemchand Khilnani, who was in Nairobi some years ago, was appointed to Senegal. He will be concurrently accredited to Gambia, with residence at Dakar. Mr. Khilnani is now India's ambassador in Rumania. Mr. S. G. Ramchandran, Joint Secretary in the Finance Ministry, was appointed High Commissioner to Nigeria in succession to Mr. P. L. Bhandari, who is to move to Khartoum. India's Commissioner in Mauritius, Mr. P. R. S. Mani, is being called to New Delhi and his place is being taken by the envoy in Denmark, Mr. Avtar Singh.

What next in Rhodesia?

India continued to take a keen interest in the developments in Rhodesia. In a note to the UN Secretary General on February 1, India assured its fullest support to efforts to bring down the illegal minority regime in that country. India's representative told U Thant that India backed the Security Council in ordering mandatory economic sanctions against the Salisbury regime which declared unilateral independence on November 11, 1965. On February 21 a procession was taken to the office of the British Deputy High Commissioner in Calcutta in protest against Britain's Rhodesia policy. The demonstration was organised by the Samyukta Socialist Party.

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Though there was no immediate prospect of the Rhodesian regime being toppled, opposition to it both inside and outside the country continued to mount. The leader of Rhodesia's all-African Parliamentary Opposition, Mr. Josiah Gondo, called for massive political action against the policies of Premier Ian Smith. He cautioned his followers that majority rule was not going to come like a Christmas gift but had to be fought for by all constitutional means available to them. A Rhodesian paper reported that secret moves to form a new party to oppose Ian Smith were taking place in the country. The men behind the new body, provisionally called the Reconstruction Party, were leading businessmen and professional men. The party's nine aims included implementation of the "Tiger" constitutional proposals, as accepted by the Rhodesian Cabinet and reopening of negotiations with Britain on the means for a return to legality. A group of the former Rhodesian politicians demanded that Ian Smith consult the people of Rhodesia before taking any action to make the country a republic. This statement from the Constitutional Association, a group of one-time members of the now-defunct United Rhodesia Party, was the first organised reaction to Smith's remark a few days earlier that in his view Rhodesia was already a republic. Mr. Smith's contention was that Rhodesia had been a republic since the UN Security Council adopted Britain's resolution for mandatory economic sanctions in December last year. Smith's legal experts have been engaged in a study of whether Rhodesia had been made a republic by Britain's action in taking the issue to the UN. British Commonwealth Secretary Herbert Bowden lost no time in stating that any declaration proclaiming a republic in Rhodesia would be unconstitutional, illegal and ineffective. He said Rhodesia remained a part of Her Majesty's dominions and continued to be a British responsibility. With his tongue in his cheek, Ian Smith asked Rhodesians to think of Queen Elizabeth as Queen of Rhodesia and not of Britain. He said the "antics" of British politicians had put the Queen in an invidious position. He continued his tirade against Harold Wilson personally and even forecast that the British Prime Minister would be thrown out of office if he used force against Rhodesia. A war in Rhodesia or Zambia, he believed, would become an all-African war, then a world war. Wilson too kept up his torrent of abuse and said Smith was becoming "desperate" though it was impossible to forecast a time-limit for a solution of the Rhodesian issue—this in sharp contrast to his oft-repeated pledge to bring the regime down in a matter of months. Mr. Wilson charged Mr. Smith with not having the courage to stand up to the extremists in his government who were pushing him. The British leader again asked the rebel Premier to end his rebellion so that mandatory sanctions against the colony could be lifted through the UN, without fear of a Soviet veto. Rhodesia however continued to be under a severe strain as a result of the sanctions war, though it took some extreme steps to keep up a facade of defiance. It abolished all Commonwealth preferences and adopted a single customs tariff. The country was gloomy about the prospects of getting round the mandatory sanctions where its main item of export, tobacco, was concerned. Crippled by sanctions, Rhodesia's Ford car assembly plant stopped production. With this reverse, the Rhodesian government announced that it had earmarked £1 million for a fighting fund to combat sanctions. Finance Minister Wrathall did

not say how the money would be spent or where it would come from. There were reports that the giant West German industrial group of Krupp was negotiating for a future takeover of Rhodesia's two car assembly plants in a deal of at least £5 million.

Pleas for the use of force to topple Smith continued to be made by African leaders outside Rhodesia. The 13-nation Central African Summit meeting in Kinshasa adopted a declaration condemning Britain for its handling of the Rhodesian problem and, although supporting selective UN sanctions, reiterated that the use of force was the only effective method of ending the rebellion. The summit was attended by Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Kinshasa was also chosen the venue for the 1967 Organisation of African Unity summit conference in September. This was announced in Addis Ababa by OAU Secretary-General Diallo Telli. He did not comment on reports that moves were afoot to shift the OAU headquarters from Addis Ababa to Kinshasa. Although there have been suggestions that the majority of the OAU heads of State have found it impossible to adapt themselves to the high-altitude climate of the Ethiopian capital, OAU sources close to Mr. Telli have let it be known that their objections are more to Ethiopia's political climate.

Zambia's Troubles

The country most affected by the Rhodesian crisis, Zambia, raised the possibility of total war unless the Smith regime was brought down by economic sanctions. Zambia again offered the use of its territory to Britain to launch an offensive against Salisbury. President Kaunda, who sought a meeting with Harold Wilson, admitted publicly that his own difficulties were mounting following the UN mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. It was reported that Zambia was considering applying for invoking Article 50 of the UN Charter under which countries affected by implementation of sanctions can seek official assistance from the world body. Thanks to the Rhodesian crisis, Zambia was knocked down to the third position in the free world copper production chart, behind the United States and Chile. In 1966, Zambia's copper production fell short of its 725,000 long ton target by more than 18 per cent. This production loss is estimated to have cost the country £54 million. A silver lining in the dark enveloping clouds appeared with the World Bank promising to finance Zambia's new \$84 million hydroelectric plant. This would end Zambia's dependence on its present source of electric power which it owns jointly with Rhodesia.

Zambia was conscious of the new line-up that was clearly emerging from the continued state of the Rhodesian rebellion. Ian Smith gave several hints that he was moving more in the direction of South Africa. On Feb. 18 he said he had evidence that Africans preferred to live according to their own customs and that tribal chiefs were more suited to represent the views of Africans than members of Parliament. Four days later he denied his government was moving towards a South African type of apartheid policy. But he confirmed that

the new commission on Rhodesia's future that he was going to appoint would also try to work out a constitution which would allow different communities to live together acknowledging one another's rights. British sources have testified to mounting evidence that Rhodesia is now firmly set on the path taken by South Africa. Though these countries seemed to move closer, there was little evidence of South African involvement in Rhodesia's fortunes. No South African leader of any consequence made any significant pronouncement of support for the illegal regime to the north. The outgoing President, Mr. Charles Swart, merely stated that outside intervention in the Rhodesian constitutional deadlock could have serious consequences for countries not only in Africa but elsewhere. In a speech opening a new session of Parliament in Cape Town, Mr Swart said his government adhered to its conviction that the Rhodesian dispute remained the exclusive responsibility of the two parties concerned, Britain and Rhodesia, and that intervention by outside parties could endanger a settlement. Mr Swart is due to resign on May 31. His successor will be Dr T. E. Donges who resigned recently after eight years as Finance Minister. He was chosen by an electoral college consisting of members of the House of Assembly and the Senate. He received 163 votes against 52 polled by the candidate nominated by the Opposition United Party, 77-year-old Maj. Pieter Van Der Byl, a leading member of Gen. Smuts's war-time Cabinet. Dr Donges made a few unsuccessful bids to become Prime Minister. Only six months ago he was bypassed in the choice for premiership after the death of Verwoerd. After Mr Strijdom's death, he contested against Verwoerd but was defeated by 75 to 98 votes in the second ballot.

Future of South-West Africa

As in 1966, South Africa's chief concern this year will be the mandated territory of South-west Africa. The year began rather auspiciously with a Supreme Court Judge in Johannesburg ruling that as South Africa was not legally a member of the UN, the world body had no jurisdiction over the mandated territory. Mr George Wynne, Western Cape Province judge, stirred a fresh nationwide controversy by stating that South Africa's ratification of the UN Charter in 1945, signed by Field-Marshal Smuts, was invalid. The judge said Premier Smuts had no legal authority to sign it because it should have been done by the country's head of State at the time and S. Africa's official seal affixed. Instead, the seal of the South African External Affairs Department, also headed by Smuts, was used. The judge concluded that the South African instrument of verification was invalid on the ground that it did not comply with the obligatory requirements of the UN Charter. If this is the legal position, it may not be necessary for South Africa to quit the world body formally, as Premier Vorster has threatened to do this year because of the tendency in the UN "towards complete disregard of existing rules". He must obviously have thought it against rules for the UN General Assembly to vote on Dec. 17 a resolution condemning South Africa's apartheid policy as a crime against humanity. The vote was 84 to two, South Africa and Portugal voting against it. The resolution also declared that the situation in the Republic constituted a threat to peace and world security.

The UN General Assembly's special 14-nation committee on South-west Africa met for the first time on Jan. 15. The committee was set up on Oct. 27 last year when the General Assembly declared the termination of South Africa's mandate over South-west Africa and said the territory henceforth would be a direct UN responsibility. The committee is to recommend means of administering the territory pending independence in a report to the fifth special session of the Assembly late in April. Four African countries—Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal and the UAR—which are members of the committee proposed on Feb. 10 that the UN appoint a council, a commissioner and establish a police force for South-west Africa. The United States proposed that the African plan be examined in detail with a view to a complete analysis of its advantages and disadvantages. It suggested that this analysis, together with other alternatives, should form the basis for the committee's final recommendations to the April session of the Assembly. The US also sent to the committee a proposal that the OAU provide the administration for South-west Africa. Canada also supported a detailed analysis of the alternatives provided so that the committee did not become frozen in its advocacy of any one solution. Pakistan said it was of the utmost importance that a UN presence be introduced in the territory as early as possible so as to ensure a quick fulfilment of the world body's obligations. Japan felt that a UN involvement was "inescapable". Russia has already said it will support any economic or military measures which the 14-nation committee may suggest to advance the territory to independence.

The committee will gain strength in its determination by the view categorically expressed by a leading research organisation that one of the major obstacles in the fight against apartheid is the inability of the UN to force South Africa to surrender its control over the mandated territory. The International Review Service, a private research organisation which counts the UN and numerous governments and non-governmental bodies among its subscribers, caused no surprise when it "disclosed" that South Africa is actively engaged in an atomic programme aided by the Western powers. As a consequence, it found that South Africa is now stronger militarily than ever before. In the quarter under review the Pretoria regime continued to augment its military resources. It tried, among other things, to place a 250 million florin order in Europe for four submarines and a long-distance radar network. It was reported that Dutch industry had been officially forbidden to accept the order but French industry was trying hard to secure it. South Africa also announced plans to increase conscription and make all medically-fit male citizens liable for military service. The government made it clear that it was taking this action in case the country got embroiled in a major international crisis through its defiance of UN sanctions against Rhodesia and refusal to hand over South-west Africa to the UN. South Africa also sought a raise in the gold price of \$35 an ounce, threatening to stop mining the metal if this was not done. Urging a doubling of the gold price, which had remained static for one-third of the century, it said 20 of the country's gold mines made little or no profit and had to be subsidised indirectly by the government.

Open Clash in Lesotho

In Lesotho, which became independent last year and is surrounded on all sides by the Republic, King Moshoeshoe II's campaign for greater powers led to an open clash with the government led by Prime Minister Jonathan. Fighting between the two factions, in which nine people died, led to the arrest of the 28-year-old Oxford-educated King in late December. Several others were arrested, including the King's advisers and two Opposition leaders, Ntsu Mokhele, leader of the powerful pan-Africanist Congress Party, and Seth Makotoko, leader of the minority Opposition party, the Maramatlou Freedom Party, on the charge that they were supporters of the King. He was released ten days later after he agreed to discontinue his campaign for powers enabling him to control police, army and external affairs. He signed a document providing for his automatic abdication if he failed to accept his purely constitutional role. His reverse was facilitated by the fact that Lesotho's 22 principal chiefs, who together as the college of chiefs wield disciplinary power over the King, sided with the Prime Minister in the dispute.

Attempted Coups

Another attempted coup, perhaps more important, passed off less noticed. This was the coup in Togo which was bloodless, almost painless since President Nicolas Grunitzky broadcast over the radio that after talks with the military leaders he had handed over power to them. The first word of the second coup in four years came in a broadcast from Lome, the capital, from 29-year-old Lt.-Col. Eyadema, the army chief, saying he had seized all civil power. The only reason he gave was the "grave situation which has reigned in the country". He said the constitution had been suspended, the National Assembly dissolved and all political activity forbidden. He promised that the army would hand back power to the civilians after free elections had been held. Col. Eyadema is credited with having been one of the leaders of the coup which overthrew President Sylvanus Olympio's rule in 1963. His brother-in-law, Grunitzky, took over. But it was only the support of the army which kept him in the saddle.

Sudan too escaped a coup in late December. Junior army officers, with the help of about 300 soldiers, tried to overthrow the government of Premier Mahdy. But Mr Mahdy said the authorities had prior knowledge of the plot and were able to foil it without any armed clash or casualties. He said the uprising was the result of the current political turmoil in the country which was reflected in the armed forces. He identified Lt. Khaled Husein as the leader of the rebels who tried to capture the radio station and other key installations in Khartoum. The trouble arose out of a High Court decision lifting a year-old ban on the Communist Party. This led to violent demonstrations. All members of the judiciary threatened to resign *en masse* if the government rejected a note from them demanding an apology for alleged remarks about their decision.

Sir Albert Margai, Prime Minister of Sierra Leone, claimed in early February that he had discovered an army plot to overthrow the

government. The plotters, he said in a broadcast, would have murdered him, the armed forces commander, David Lanshana, and several top officials. They would have set up a committee of advisers, including opposition leaders Siaka Stevens and R.S. Easmon, he said. An African country which he did not name provided help for the plotters. Sir Albert complimented Guinea President Sekou Toure for taking military action to help him deal with the plot. President Toure had alerted the Guinean army and air force along the country's frontiers with Sierra Leone following an agreement with Sierra Leone to prevent any subversive movement against the legitimate government of that country. Sierra Leone will go to the polls in the middle of March to usher in a new republican type of constitution. Parliament was dissolved on Feb. 16 on the advice of Sir Albert. At present the country has a monarchy type constitution with the Governor-General representing Queen Elizabeth.

Another West African country, Ghana, announced that it had uncovered a plot to stage a coup, inspired by two Ghanaians and a Nigerian. Two of the men allegedly belonged to the now disbanded Nkrumah Ideological Institute. The plotters had planned to assassinate all eight members of the ruling National Liberation Council. The government said two lieutenants of the Ghana army and two plotters had been detained. The Ghanaian authorities, continuously obsessed with the shadow of Nkrumah in neighbouring Guinea, announced a reward of \$28,000 for the capture of the former President and three of his security officers. The four are to face charges of conspiracy and murder, the police said. Last May an international warrant was issued for the arrest of Nkrumah. Following reports that Nkrumah had intensified his plans to send infiltrators into Ghana to pave the way for his return to power, the Ghana government published a decree making it an offence for Ghanaians to communicate with the deposed leader or any of the 86 people living with him in Guinea. The decree also made it an offence for individuals or proprietors of hotels or motels to harbour Nkrumah and his men, should they return to Ghana, unless authorities were informed within 24 hours of their arrival. The National Liberation Council warned all countries with diplomatic missions in Accra that relations with them would be severed if they encouraged Nkrumah's subversion against Ghana. The government showed newsmen explosives which it said were smuggled into Ghana by Nkrumah's agents. Efforts by the new regime to destroy Nkrumah's image were crowned by the issuance of a new currency, known as New Cedis and New Pesewas, on the eve of the first anniversary of the dictator's overthrow.

Nigerian unity in danger

In neighbouring Nigeria efforts to integrate the country were continued by its new leadership. The Supreme Commander and Head of the Nigerian Federal Military Government, Col. Yakubu Gowon, said the creation of more States in the country would have to be given early consideration. Nigerian military leaders met in early January in Aburi, Ghana, to consider how the country could be kept together. Col. Gowon denied reports that the leaders attempted to write a new constitution for the country. The meeting, held in Ghana because Eastern Zone Governor Lt.-Col. Ojukwu would not go to Lagos for fear of his life, was

regarded by observers as an ominous sign threatening a breakup of the federal set-up. Fears have been expressed that the Eastern Zone government might break away from Lagos and seek Commonwealth recognition. A confederal structure has been mooted as the most acceptable goal but Col. Yakubu has openly expressed himself against it on the ground that it would further disintegrate the country. In the middle of March, the Nigerian government confirmed officially that Maj. Gen. Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, who had headed the country's military government after the first coup in January last year, was killed in the second coup last July.

Crisis in Congo

A grave crisis arose in the Congo from the refusal of Union Miniere company to transfer its headquarters from Brussels to Kinshasa. The Congolese stand was that all firms having their principal dealings in the Congo had complied with the country's law and transferred their headquarters except the Union Miniere. President Mobutu reacted by forming a new firm, the Congolese General Mineral Company, which took over the activities of the foreign-owned Union Miniere. This move against the giant mining company came close to the deadline for payment of 7.5 billion Belgian francs (\$150 million) the Mobutu government claims from Union Miniere. The amount represented the Congolese estimate of the value of ore taken from the mines but not yet sold. In order to keep the mines running the Congolese government announced that none of the 2,000 foreign technicians would be allowed to leave the country for the present. But this restriction on their movements was later withdrawn. Exports of copper via Matadi were resumed after it was discovered that the dispute had cost the Congo 3 billion Belgian francs in two months.

Kenya Cabinet Reshuffle

Nearer Congo, Kenya continued its own political "revolution" by reshuffling the Kenyatta cabinet. This had started with the resignation last year of Oginga Odinga from the Vice-presidency. President Kenyatta appointed Home Minister Daniel Moi as Vice-president. The latter succeeded Joseph Murumbi who was a temporary incumbent having always wanted to quit politics to take to business. What was significant was that the post of Home Minister was more or less abolished, Moi having been invested with his previous powers. Other changes included the promotion of Minister of State James Nwamweya virtually as Foreign Minister and the entrusting of general administration to Kenyatta's old friend, Peter Koinange, who was the second Minister of State. Kenya also postponed the general elections, due in 1968, till 1970. This followed the abolition of the Senate, the Upper House, and the total absorption of its members in the House of Representatives. In neighbouring Uganda, President Obote also announced that there would be no general elections for another five years. The country is still in a disturbed state, a legacy from early last year when half a dozen Ministers were arrested in a swoop on their houses soon after a Cabinet meeting and the Kabaka of Buganda was forced to flee the country after an attack on his palace in Kampala by Central government troops.

Although Kenya's relations with Somalia continued to be strained, Somalia and Ethiopia, nurturing an old border dispute, reached an agreement to halt the propaganda war they had been waging against each other. The Somali government said this was done in response to appeals by the OAU. A Somali Minister, Mr Ahmed Abid, attacked Kenya for its bad-neighbourly policy at a meeting of the Economic Commission for Africa at Lagos. There were riots in French Somaliland on the eve of the March 19 referendum to decide the future of the territory. The French authorities deported to Somalia Mr Abdil Yusuf of the Popular Movement Party who accused them of trying to obtain a false verdict in the referendum. Somalia claims this 9,000 square miles area on ethnic grounds and in pursuance of its Greater Somalia policy.

Rioting Toll

Rioting and disturbances took a heavy toll all over Africa. It was reported that Sudanese troops massacred 400 people during the last week of January in reprisal raids on six villages in the southern province of Equatoria. This claim was made by the Azania Liberation Front which is fighting for the independence of southern Sudan. The Front also claimed that the Sudanese air force had resumed bombing of Southern Sudan in order to "intimidate" the people before the March elections. Kenyan security forces claimed that they had killed 187 Shifta bandits from Somalia in three months of operations. Kenyan police rounded up more than 100 Somalis living in Nairobi after searching their homes for weapons and explosives. The raids followed threats by the nationalist "high command" in Mogadishu, the Somali capital, to send raiding gangs into the heart of Kenya to strike at Nairobi and other key places. Fifty-six people, including a member of Parliament, were killed in a clash between Government forces and a group of bandits in the eastern part of Chad. A dozen people, two of them gendarmes, were killed in a fight in a village in Dahomey after Government tax collectors had made their rounds. The President of the Senegalese ruling party and an MP, Demba Diop, was murdered 50 miles from Dakar. A political rival of Diop belonging to the same party was among nine persons arrested in this connection.

Fighting between Portuguese and African nationalists in Mozambique and other colonies was in a class apart. Portuguese troops killed nearly 100 Africans in Mozambique in the first two weeks of February. Nearly 35,000 Portuguese soldiers are deployed in this colony alone. In the same period the whites captured 176 "terrorists" who, they claimed, carried Chinese and Russian weapons. The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola said Portuguese air force planes and helicopters bombed two villages with napalm and killed 60 people. The African nationalist organisation, on the other hand, claimed to have killed 213 Portuguese soldiers between Jan. 12 and 23 and destroyed 13 military vehicles. The Portuguese authorities admitted that the African war against them was spreading on almost all fronts wherever they were entrenched. The Portuguese were also reappraising seriously their costly war against uniformed guerillas in the tiny West African colony of Portuguese Guinea. This swampy enclave has been keeping more than 22,000 Portuguese troops busy. Premier Salazar, worried about this

drain, despatched his Defence Minister, Gen. Gomes De Arujo, to this colony on a ten-day inspection tour. Rebels have claimed that their 5,000-man force, equipped with arms from communist sources, has already liberated large areas of the colony. About 200 white soldiers died in skirmishes with Africans. This is the biggest toll in any of the three Portuguese African territories.

Sino-Soviet Clashes

Though they continued to nourish freedom movements in parts of Africa with arms and other materials, communist countries suffered several political reverses on the continent. The Chinese got the greatest snub when the Council of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) decided to hold its fifth congress in Algiers later this year rather than in Peking as originally planned. The decision to change the venue was spearheaded by delegations from India, Russia and Egypt. It deepened the split between the pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions in AAPSO. Russia seemed to be having the upper hand in these disputes which led in the beginning to the expulsion from the Nicosia meeting of the pro-Peking delegation of South-west Africa. Three other pro-Chinese delegations—from Bechuanaland People's Party, Basutoland People's Party and Swaziland Progressive Party—withdrew in protest and charged "Soviet revisionists" with trying to wreck Afro-Asian solidarity. The Chinese stayed away from the deliberations. The prospect now is of two rival AAPSO conferences being held, one in Algeria and the other in Peking.

China protested in vain to the Kenya government against the breaking of a display window in the Chinese embassy in Nairobi. The Kenya government warned China against provoking retaliation against Kenya's embassy in Peking and against interfering in its internal affairs. The Chinese embassy note had described the incident as a "gross insult to Chairman Mao and the Red Guards and a grave provocation to the 700 million Chinese people". Kenya described the note as a propagandist manoeuvre. The Chinese embassy in Tunis also appeared on a war path with the Tunisian government which has been studying ways of preventing distribution of Chinese information bulletins on which a ban has been imposed. Diplomatic relations between the two countries are only three years old. The Chinese envoy in Tunis, Yao Nien, openly rejected the Tunisian ban saying it would continue publishing and distributing the bulletins "because it is our inviolable right". All the 70 Chinese communist students in Algeria left for home to participate in the cultural revolution. Before doing so, some of them waylaid a senior Soviet diplomat's car, pounded it with their fists and spat on him through the windows. Another Sino-Soviet clash on African soil took place rather dramatically on Feb. 7 in Bombako, Mali, where, at an official ceremony, the Chinese Charge d' Affaires rushed up to the Russian ambassador and denounced him as a "fascist". The Soviet diplomat was sitting with members of his staff at the opening ceremony of a North Korea-built factory when the Chinese chose to deliver his attack in this fashion. Prime Minister Jonathan of Lesotho sent a formal note to UN Secretary-General Thant protesting against the training of African youth in sabotage and subversion by communist countries whose aim was to

overthrow "peaceful" governments in Africa. Most of them were trained in Peking, the Lesotho leader said. But the African politician who was most helpful to the Chinese was President Nyerere of Tanzania who publicly admitted that Peking had inspired him to pursue his socialistic policies. He complimented the Red Guards on the work they were doing and said it was "relevant to the development of Africa". As he was talking the Chinese ambassador in Dar-es-Salaam was busy packing his bags to return to Peking, apparently to take part in the cultural revolution. A left-leaning Indian newspaper wondered why, instead of building up an African personality and true socialism at home, Nyerere and Sekou Toure had turned into consistent imitators of the Chinese.

Japanese Journalist's Visit

The Council presented literature about its activities to a Japanese journalist, Mr. Yoshiki Hoshino, who was recently on a visit to India. The Executive Secretary of the Council had an exchange of views with Mr. Hoshino, who works in Africa for a Japanese newspaper.

Government Appointments

The Council's acting President, Mr. Asoka Mehta, has been appointed Minister for Planning, Social Welfare and Petroleum and Chemicals in the new Indian Government formed after the elections. Mr. Dinesh Singh, Vice-President of the Council, has been appointed Minister of Commerce ; Mr. K. C. Pant, General Secretary of the Council, Minister of State for Finance; Mr. I. K. Gujral, a member of the Council, Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs, and Mr. V. C. Shukla, another member of the Council, Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Visitors from Somalia

Two Somali nationals, Miss Hawa Aden and Miss Hawa Ali, spent a few days in Delhi as guests of the Council.

Book Reviews

The Importance of Being Black : An Asian Looks at Africa

Frank Moraes. Macmillan Company, New York, pp. 436, \$8.95, 1965.

MR. Moraes had intended his book on Africa to be published in 1962 but it was delayed by more than three years. As a result a large portion of this voluminous study has become outdated. He says in the foreword that Africa changes from week to week: after 1961 the changes took place with hurricane speed. Under the circumstances there was no alternative to taking recourse to extensive footnotes which have however acted as a distraction and spoiled reader interest. In fact, it would not be far wrong to say that the most up-to-date Africa is found in the footnotes.

The greatest value of the book lies in its being among the very few on the subject by Indian authors. One has only to glance through the bibliography at the end to be shocked by the paucity of Indian writing on African subjects. This in itself is a matter requiring some probe. Even Indians settled in Africa have written very little on the countries of their adoption compared to their British and other European settler counterparts who have filled archives with their impressions of the new continent. Mr. Moraes could have at least touched this problem but he does not even tell us the barest story of the Indian people who opted for Africa decades ago and who now number nearly one million. For instance, Asians in East Africa are discussed in two pages. An Indian author could have done better justice to them, particularly when one knows that even Europeans have acknowledged the impact of Indians on Africa.

Nor does India's role in the Congo crisis get the treatment it deserves. This is a subject on which some western authors have written but the Indian case has seldom been presented fairly. India emerged from the Congo crisis with a darkened image, thanks to the hostility which the western press showed towards it, largely because of its pre-conceived partiality for secessionist Moïse Tshombe. As an Indian author of international renown, Mr. Moraes could have delved deeper into the subject and restored the perspective in this badly painted picture. But let it be said at the same time that his two chapters on the Congo and Katanga are among the best in the book for their analysis.

Some leading African personalities have been treated rather unfairly by the author who, one feels, allowed himself to be carried away by the emotionalism of his informants, talking as they must have been in the context of a highly surcharged racist atmosphere. Mr. Moraes has been particularly unkind to Mr. Joshua Nkomo, the Rhodesian national-

list leader now in detention. "Nkomo, an indolent, easygoing, indecisive individual, is not built in the mold of leadership", says the author who admits that he never met this African nationalist. It is again strange reading that "Kenyatta, Nyerere, Kaunda, and Banda are believed to have approved of his removal though Nkomo, who has substantial support from his own people, is attempting a comeback". Who are these outsiders any way to seek the removal of a leader whom his own people want?

Again, some of the author's conclusions are not quite so sound and appear to be based on guess only. It is too much of a generalisation on his part to say that in Africa "the transfer of power has been effected peacefully". Perhaps the author is not to blame, for it is the post-1961 events which have showed more than anything else that Africa is suffering to this day from the after-effects of this transfer— bloodshed, instability, dictatorship and tyranny. No commentator has been able to keep a count of the coups that have rocked successive African governments in the north, east, south and west. What about the massive killings in Rwanda and Burundi, even if the bloodshed in Algeria and the Congo is put in a class apart?

Some factual errors which are bound to be noticed by discerning Indian readers should be pointed out. Mr. Moraes has suggested that Pakistanis, rather than Indians, have developed closer relations with Africans in East Africa. But he has wrongly based this conclusion on a description of Ismailis (followers of the Aga Khan) as Pakistanis. Whatever their private preferences might be, the Ismailis neither call themselves Pakistanis nor Indians. Again, it is not quite correct to label Indians in East Africa as being "self-centred and aloof", taking no account of the fact that a very large number of them have always lived in the villages and smaller townships in the company of the indigenous majority.

It is unconvincing to read that "some French Africans still find it hard to understand how Nigeria and Ghana can remain in the Commonwealth without having their independence affected by Britain". Neo-colonialism was a term specifically invented for the former French colonies which have, in matters economic or political, shown far greater subservience to their ex-masters than countries like Ghana or Nigeria. Nor, on the other hand, is this description of the British quite justified by facts. "The British in Africa refrained from drawing their colonies into a well-knit, centralised system controlled by London, but preferred to hold them on a loose economic rein, allowing them to trade with other parts of the world, to be self-supporting..." In fact, the British *did not* allow their colonies to trade with the outside world which was why one of the early acts of the former British colonies on attaining independence was to throw open their doors even to the communist world. A staunchly pro-British government as Kenya's was in the forefront of such newly-freed nations.

It is easy enough to review events in retrospect but it does seem odd that the author, in dealing with the Tanganyikan mutiny of early 1964, made no reference to the role of Sheikh Babu, one of East Africa's most

controversial politicians, and laid all stress on the part played by Oscar Kambona. In the chapter on Uganda, little reference is made to the discontent within the ranks of the Uganda People's Congress, Obote's party, which was at the root of the subsequent crisis which impelled the Prime Minister to arrest six of his Cabinet colleagues and put them into jail.

Though he drew a most accurate pen-portrait of Kwame Nkrumah, Mr. Moraes proved wrong in forecasting that the "deflated dictator" could not be written off easily. The author is at his best in drawing pen-portraits of African personalities and it is unfortunate that he has done less of it in preference to lifting history wholesale from other sources, something which the reader could have done for himself.

AJIT GOPAL

Politics in West Africa

W. Arthur Lewis. London. Allen & Unwin, 1965, pp. 90, 15s.

The title of this remarkable book could be misleading, for the situations Prof. Lewis discusses are relevant to the whole of developing Africa. In these 90 most readable pages, one gets something like the quintessence of present-day political Africa which may not be possible to get from volumes of printed matter one comes across everywhere. This is because Prof. Lewis has known African leaders personally for 30 years and shared their anti-imperialism. Added to this is his masterly capacity to embrace several disciplines in a single sweep.

The book is a terrible denunciation of African politicians, West African in particular. Their basic fault may be that "politics is their career, and they cannot afford to let themselves be driven out of it". Most West African Ministers, he says, consider themselves to be above the law, and are so treated by the police. For them, decision-making is arbitrary. Claiming to be democrats, they behave like emperors.

Himself of African origin, though hailing from West Indies, Prof. Lewis writes that "personifying the state, they dress themselves up in uniforms, build themselves palaces, bring all other traffic to a standstill when they drive, hold fancy parades and generally demand to be treated like Egyptian Pharaohs". And yet, he wonders, everyone is hearing about the popularity of these great men who, when they fall, do not even see anybody crossing the street. Here he finds it relevant to remind us that most of these politicians have no commitment to democracy, have never actually experienced democracy, and know neither its philosophy nor its history.

Prof. Lewis admits that the system cannot be explained entirely in terms of the character and behaviour of the politicians because the attitudes of the general public are relevant. These, however, he finds it difficult to assess because the politicians who are voted into power use the police and the army to suppress their opponents, control the press and the radio, and indoctrinate the public.

The author pulls no punches in trying to dismantle many prevailing notions about present-day Africa. Politicians put the qualifying word 'African' before the word 'socialist' precisely because they do not wish to be tied down to what 'socialist' may mean in Europe. Everywhere, he says, one can meet young men who feel bitterly about the few rising African capitalists. One stereotype that Prof. Lewis is anxious to destroy is the notion that it is natural that a people struggling for independence will rally behind a single charismatic leader, so that it is natural for a single political party in power to usher in independence. "This idea has slight historical foundation. Independence movements are normally led by a number of men with different personalities, quarrelling with each other. This is what happened in West Africa....." This is also what happened in Kenya and many other developing African countries.

But Prof. Lewis is not at his best when he states that polarisation into Government and Opposition is not an essential part of democracy. He even argues that this is unsuitable to West African conditions, the most fundamental reason being that the West African elector votes for a representative, and not for an issue. Surely it is the issues which become crystallised when we travel along the path of democracy—individuals come and go, but principles remain for ever. It is possible that the author would have felt differently had he written after the series of coups which took place all over Africa beginning early 1966, toppling such unshakable men as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana.

AJIT GOPAL

Africa Remembered

Philip D. Curtin (Ed.), University of Wisconsin Press (Madison), 1967, 363pp.

This book consists of accounts of the personal experiences of a number of West African people of the 18th and 19th centuries who were intimately connected with slave trade—most of them having been its victims. The main objective of the book, as the editor tells us, is to "make historical sources more widely available". They are two factors which give special significance to the book. First, the documents included in it "mirror the West African slave trade from the non-European viewpoint". They give us a glimpse of the feelings and reactions of victims of the slave trade. Secondly, the documents are introduced by specialists. This helps the reader in understanding them in their proper perspective. And that is the *tour de force* of the book.

The book is divided into three parts. Part I consists of narratives of three African travellers of the 18th century, namely, Ayuba Sulemein, Oloudah Eguiano and Philip Ouague. Ayuba Sulemein was the son of the high priest of Bondu. He was captured in Gambia in 1731 and sold as a slave to Maryland. He was rescued by Bluett, a British missionary who took him to England and later on helped him to return to Africa. Sulemein describes the circumstances leading to his capture in Gambia. From his narrative we get a picture of the culture and civilisation of that part of Africa in Sulemein's time. The second narrative is by Oloudah

Eguiano who as a boy was kidnapped from his house in Nigeria. Later he regained his freedom and took part in the anti-slavery movement of England. He gives us a vivid picture of the people and places he saw as a slave. The third narrative is by Philip Ouague of Cape Coast. He was indirectly connected with slave trade. He went to England for his education and returned to his country as a missionary. He wrote a series of letters to the headquarters of Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (SPG) in London. His letters provide us with a "realistic and informative picture of life on the West African coast in the 18th century".

Part II includes three travelogues on the Gold Coast Hinterland. They are by Salih Bilali, Abu Bakral-Siddig and Wargee of Astrakhan. Salih Bilali was captured, enslaved and shipped from the Gold Coast around 1790. Wargee of Astrakhan, though not personally connected with the slave trade, gives us extremely valuable information about the routes of commerce in the Gold Coast. These memoirs taken together make a substantial contribution to otherwise "scattered and partial" sources for the history of the region. They also give some idea of social conditions on the eve of the great religious revolution that took place in Western Sudan in the early decades of the country.

Part III covers the memoirs of four 19th century Nigerians—Ali Esomi Gazirmbe of Bornu, Osifekunde of Ijebu, Samuel Ajayi Crowther of Oyo and Joseph Wright of the Egba. Each one of them closely observed the war and revolution that swept through Yoruba during the early decades of the 19th century.

The book is a 'must' for students of African history.

R. C. PRADHAN

K.P.U. Manifesto

Nairobi, 1966, 45pp.

This pamphlet contains the policy statement of the Kenya People's Union—a splinter group of KANU which under the leadership of Oginga Odinga established itself as a party in April 1966. As a radical group in KANU it was dissatisfied with the policies followed by the Kenya Government, particularly the concessions it gave to foreign capital. Matters came to a head when in early 1966 the post of Deputy President of KANU was abolished to exclude Oginga Odinga from the party. Oginga Odinga's group left the party and formed Kenya People's Union. The circumstances leading to the establishment of KPU are vividly described in this manifesto. While on the one hand it is a statement of policy and programme of KPU, on the other it is a severe indictment of the policy pursued by the present Government of Kenya. Indicting KANU it says: "KANU had been formed to lead the country to independence and thereafter to promote African socialism in the reconstruction and de-colonisation of the country. But KANU became a party of the right-wing, dedicated to enrich further and entrench a small privileged

class. It completely distorted the noble ideals which inspired the struggle for independence" (p.8) Hence there was no alternative for "dedicated nationalists" but to form a new party to carry on the struggle for a better life for the Wananchi—a Swahili word for people. It exhorts all nationalists to join its ranks in the struggle to defeat neo-colonialism and establish a truly democratic socialist society dedicated to the uplift and welfare of the people and determined to abolish their exploitation in the interest of a privileged few.

KPU promises to work for the establishment of a democratic and socialist society. Some of the major planks of its internal policy are: promotion of individual freedom and right of political association contained in the Constitution, establishment of a truly socialist society by sharing national wealth more equitably among the people, national control over the means of production, promotion of African tradition and culture, radical land reforms, promotion of agriculture, rapid expansion of industry, Africanisation of services. In foreign policy it stands for non-alignment, formation of an East African federation, support to the United Nations and support to the Commonwealth on the basis of equality. There is hardly anything new here. Promises to this effect have been made in the manifestoes of various political parties of Afro-Asian countries. But after capturing power, many of these political parties have not been able to fulfil them. Whether this failure could be attributed to economic compulsions or to the insincerity of political leadership or both is difficult to say. The reasons vary from country to country. We do not question the bona fides of KPU but merely wish to point out that there is nothing extraordinary about the manifesto. What will make a difference is how efficiently and honestly it is implemented. But the will to implement policies can be tested only when a party comes to power.

There is much misunderstanding about KPU. Very often its leader, Odinga, is charged with pro-communist leanings. But the manifesto declares KPU's faith in democratic institutions. It says: "KPU will employ constitutional means to achieve these objectives" (p.8)

R. C. PRADHAN

Poems from Kenya

Ahmad Nassir bin Juma Bhalo. The University of Wisconsin Press. \$ 5.00/37s 6d. pp. 244.

This is an English translation of the *gnomic verse in Swahili* (Poems from Kenya). A gnome, as defined by a scholar or rather African specialist, is "in general a sententious saying; in particular, it may be proverbial, figurative or moral." The introduction which must have been from the editor-translator is very much didactic and I think it should have been reproduced instead of a review of this book. But this is never done. The poet, Ahmad, has drawn inspiration from *Islam*. In particular when the poet refers to God, this touch is quite clear. A paragraph from the introduction reads: "It is important to emphasize that the language of Swahili poetry is not a specialist language. Neither the vocabulary nor the grammar is of a special kind, except

insofar as abbreviations and omissions of grammatical elements are permissible for the sake of preserving the syllabic measure. The shape of words may also be modified in final position in a hemistich in order to maintain the rhyme."

As a matter of fact Swahili poetry is an expression of conventional values and these values in poetry matter to the people of Africa. Though the present anthology is not very much impressive still it is welcome. Some of the poems are good and make interesting reading. Most of the themes deal with the poet's personal problems. In the first part entitled "The Poet and his Rivals" he enumerates the problems he faces as a poet, in the field of writing in particular. He has many rivals (as indicated in the introduction) and most of the poems in a sense are addressed to his fellow poets.

The translations are not good enough and at some places words tend to be redundant. The poet has used a common man's vocabulary. He should have been rather careful about it. As he says in the poem, "A Bone is Not Cookable"—'Poetry is not just a story nor does it call for over-eagerness'. In this poem the poet advises his fellow poet (any one) not to consider himself equal to him because in poetry he is far behind him (Ahmad). Everyone knows the reality that with the blessings of God he (Ahmad) has the skill of writing good verse. "The Bone is not Cookable"—since his fellow poet is not so sensible he cannot reach the stage where Ahmad is and, moreover, he will not be able to convince people that he is a better poet. Just as a bone cannot be cooked so the poet should not try to do a thing which is impossible for him.

In the poem "A Male Lion, I Roar" the poet addressing his fellow poets challenges them to compete with him and let the people know who is a better poet. Just as people are afraid of a lion so other poets are afraid of him. They are hiding in their houses as they are afraid of the lion. "You who are hiding, come out let us know the ripe from the raw," is his slogan. Furthermore :

The end is in the twelfth verse O orator, come then, orate
It is the roaring lion I who roar in the bush
Whom these matters have annoyed let him put his foot
on the path
You who are hiding, come out let us know the ripe from the
raw.

There is an introduction to every part. The second part is entitled "The World and Humanity". The poet uses his own experiences as a man to convey the truth about religion and that is why his readers would not know from the poem itself about the occasion when it was written. "To err is human, to forgive, divine" is the common theme of the poems. So in this section he functions as a teacher of religion or performs the work of a missionary, but in his own way, i.e. through his poetry. The most outstanding poems in this context are: "Who Climbs a Ladder Comes Down", "The World," "Be on Your Guard", "Beware of the World", etc. These and many

other poems are directed against the evil use of the tongue. In some of the poems he emphasizes the seriousness of his message as a missionary. In the poem "Be on Your Guard" he uses the simile of a storm which suddenly thrashes with thunder and lightning and here he advises the people of his village to be careful and be united with one another as "when darkness has given way to morning there is no more night". Most of the poems are gnomic and some of them give the reader peace of mind. This is probably the best part of the book. In another poem, "Do Not Shut Your Eyes", he says :

God has given us intelligence to weigh up matters
And pairs of eyes for us to see the past and the future
For us to understand proverbs concerning this and that
So do not miss the right way as you so, take care.

The third part of the book is devoted to "Love and Marriage." Here he has avoided the use of gnome though he has used it at a few places. These poems tend to come out of physical experience. Many of them are concerned with a wife's devotion or duty towards her husband. Another reason for this sort of poetry (wife's devotion to husband) is that most of Swahili poetry has been written by men. That is why we read more about wife's devotion to husband than husband's devotion to wife. A part of this section is about a young man's love, the passions and response he gets from his counterpart. Probably the best poem in this part is "That Patience is Difficult". It seems to me that the poet is trying to convey through his poem something to a particular girl who has been a bit careless in responding to his love. This is a beautiful and self-contained poem. It is plain and light and is addressed directly to another person.

It is the end, I shall not say much common sense is needed
Do not cheat your youth or your lovely appearance
To act without meaning is to look for trouble
Don't look for the impossible for me Consider, O you who
are waited for.

The fourth and the last part is about "Personal Relations". It is devoted to poetry written for and about relations and other members of the family. "Swahili poetry has always been a family possession." In some of the poems the poet gives special importance to the need for charity in speaking to other people. But the theme remains unchanged. Many of the poems are simple and can be easily understood. In short this part does not move the readers as much as the first three, particularly the second and the third.

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
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
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5, Balvantray Mehta Lane,
New Delhi-1 |
| 2. Periodicity of its publication | Quarterly |
| 3. Printer's Name
Nationality
Address | S. A. Mehdi
Indian
5, Balvantray Mehta Lane,
New Delhi. |
| 4. Publisher's Name
Nationality
Address | S. A. Mehdi
Indian
5, Balvantray Mehta Lane,
New Delhi. |
| 5. Associate Editor's Name
Nationality
Address | S. A. Mehdi
Indian
5, Balvantray Mehta Lane,
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| 6. Name and addresses of individuals
who own the journal and partners
or shareholders holding more than
one per cent of total capital. | Indian Council for Africa |


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
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